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This dissertation uncovers the processes of negotiation between private citizens, 
President Woodrow Wilson’s administration, the War Department, and the Commission 
of Fine Arts that led to the establishment and final visual presentation of the United 
States permanent World War I cemeteries in Europe (sites that are still frequented by tens 
of thousands of international visitors each year). It employs archival research and the 
analysis of newspapers and photographs to recover the voices of the many stakeholders 
involved in the cemeteries’ foundation. Whereas previous studies have attempted to 
understand American World War I commemoration practices by focusing on postwar 
rituals of remembrance alone, my study contextualizes and explains postwar 
commemoration by analyzing the political ideologies, public rhetoric, and material 
realities of the war years (1914-1918)—ideologies, rhetoric, and material realities that 
shaped official and vernacular projects of memory after the Armistice. Providing what I 
believe is the first complete history of American World War I cemeteries in Europe, my 
dissertation situates these rhetorically charged sites within contemporary political debates 
about what it meant for U.S. soldiers to die on foreign soil; what would constitute the 
“proper” treatment and commemoration of the nation’s war dead; how much control the 
U.S. government should have over the lives and bodies of American citizens; and, how 
best to communicate the nation’s image to international populations. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 ORIGINS OF MY STUDY 
My dissertation uncovers the processes of negotiation between private citizens, President 
Woodrow Wilson’s administration, the War Department, and the Commission of Fine 
Arts that led to the establishment and final visual presentation of the United States 
permanent World War I cemeteries in Europe (sites that are still frequented by tens of 
thousands of international visitors each year). It employs archival research, oral history, 
site observation, the analysis of newspapers and photographs, and interpretive 
ethnography to recover the voices of the many stakeholders involved in the cemeteries’ 
foundation. Whereas previous studies have attempted to understand American World 
War I commemoration practices by focusing on postwar rituals of remembrance alone, 
my study contextualizes and explains postwar commemoration by analyzing the political 
ideologies, public rhetoric, and material realities of the war years (1914-1918)—
ideologies, rhetoric, and material realities that shaped official and vernacular projects of 
memory after the Armistice. Providing what I believe is the first complete history of 
American World War I cemeteries in Europe, my dissertation situates these rhetorically 
charged sites within contemporary political debates about what it meant for U.S. soldiers 
to die on foreign soil; what would constitute the “proper” treatment and commemoration 
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of the nation’s war dead; how much control the U.S. government should have over the 
lives and bodies of American citizens; and, how best to communicate the nation’s image 
to international populations. 
The seeds of this study were planted in 2005, when the burial grounds 
unexpectedly came into my life (or, perhaps more accurately, I came into theirs). That 
summer, while working for New Voyage Communications (a film production company 
based in Washington, D.C.), I served as an associate producer for the PBS documentary 
film, Hallowed Grounds (nationally televised in 2009). Traveling for six weeks through 
England, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland, my colleagues and I shot 
extensive footage of America’s World War I and World War II cemeteries. Awestruck by 
the beauty, scale, and tranquility of these permanent, overseas burial grounds—and 
moved by the endless rows of white marble headstones (shaped in the Latin Cross or Star 
of David) that marked soldiers’ graves—I returned to the United States with a newfound 
interest in American war rhetoric and memorials (generally) and the circumstances that 
had caused so many U.S. citizen-soldiers to die on foreign territory (more specifically). In 
the fall of 2005 I began pursuing my Ph.D. in the Department of Communication at the 
University of Pittsburgh. Almost immediately, I realized that America’s overseas military 
cemeteries might serve as an excellent subject for my dissertation; soon thereafter, I 
discovered that these sites had received scant attention from scholars (thus, there would 
be much to learn and, eventually, say). Thanks to the University of Pittsburgh’s Stanley 
Postrednik Nationality Room Award, I was able to return to Europe in 2006 to conduct 
original on-site research at several of the World War I and World War II cemeteries in 
France. Ultimately, this research became the foundation of the work I have done since. 
3 
When I embarked on this dissertation study, I planned to research and write about 
the establishment of America’s WWI and WWII cemeteries in Europe; the visual 
rhetoric1 found at the sites; and, the ways international audiences have responded to the 
burial grounds since their founding. In time, however, I learned to narrow my scope. The 
nation’s eight WWI cemeteries and fourteen WWII cemeteries span the globe—from 
England to Italy, from Tunisia to the Philippines; given my limited time and resources as 
a graduate student, the notion of thoroughly investigating all of the cemeteries seemed 
impossible. Moreover, I quickly realized how difficult it might be to study 
comprehensively all of the domestic and international historical and cultural events that 
had shaped the establishment and audience reception of the sites throughout the twentieth 
and early twenty-first centuries. Having come to these conclusions, I contemplated 
                                                 
1 Although visual rhetoric has become a popular subfield of communication 
studies—and despite the fact that countless rhetoric scholars have used the term “visual 
rhetoric” in their scholarship—visual rhetoric remains a rather ambiguous, broadly 
defined concept that be casually invoked in discussions of anything having to do with 
both the visual and the rhetorical. Attempting to bring some measure of clarity to the 
term, rhetoric scholars Lester C. Olson, Cara A. Finnegan, and Diane S. Hope have 
recently offered what stands as the most authoritative definition of visual rhetoric: 
“[V]isual rhetoric name[s] those symbolic actions enacted primarily through visual 
means, made meaningful through culturally derived ways of looking and seeing and 
endeavoring to influence diverse publics.” Building on this definition, we might think of 
visual rhetoric as the art, practice, and study of persuasive communication through visual 
means. With regard to the inventional process, we might add one word to Aristotle’s 
famous definition of rhetoric and think of visual rhetoric as “the faculty of observing in 
any given case the available visual means of persuasion.” Ultimately, I believe the visual 
rhetorical perspective allows us to understand any given visual object as something more 
than a manifestation or expression of a particular culture or historical moment. Rather, 
the visual rhetorical perspective encourages us to examine the motives, decisions, and 
constraints that led to a given object’s final visual presentation; the original or intended 
audiences that the object’s maker had in mind; and the ways that the object’s meanings 
have lasted or changed over time. See Lester C. Olson, Cara A. Finnegan, and Diane S. 
Hope, eds., Visual Rhetoric: A Reader in Communication and American Culture 
(Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 2008), 3. 
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focusing on the World War II sites only, as I knew more about the Second World War 
than I did the First World War. But I soon made another discovery: it is impossible to 
understand the WWII sites (built during the 1940s and 50s) without first understanding 
the WWI cemeteries (built during the 1920s and 30s). Thus, I decided to direct my 
attention to the World War I sites exclusively. 
I am glad I did. Aside from the fact that I have been able to complete my 
dissertation in a relatively timely manner, I have been fortunate enough to study and 
write about a historically, culturally, and politically important topic that, for various 
reasons (which I discuss in Chapter 4), has been overlooked by scholars (in 
communication and at large). Moreover, I have been able to develop my research 
interests in war rhetoric, visual/material rhetoric, and public memory through my study of 
the WWI burial grounds; many of the ideas that appear in my various published essays 
were first sparked while thinking about the establishment, visual rhetoric, and audience 
reception of America’s military cemeteries in Europe. In short, I have thoroughly enjoyed 
both this research and my time at Pitt, and I am excited to start transforming this 
dissertation into my first book (which, with the approach of the Great War’s 100th 
anniversary, should be timely and of popular interest). 
1.2 PREVIOUS SCHOLARSHIP AND PROJECTED CONTRIBUTION TO 
COMMUNICATION STUDIES 
Over the past three decades, scholars within communication and across the humanities 
have shown a marked and growing interest in the intersections of public memory, 
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nationhood, war commemoration, and visual/material rhetoric. A fusion of these areas of 
study contributes to the overarching theme of my own dissertation, which positions 
American overseas military cemeteries as promising ground for an exploration of how 
war memorials facilitate the social and political processes of the maintenance of public 
memory and the construction of national identity. Historically, to be sure, the 
memorialization of war is not simply under the rubric of communication studies. 
However, the ongoing call-and-response of enunciation and reception that leads to and 
occurs at sites such as these monumental burial grounds gives communication scholars a 
unique position from which to examine various forms and aspects of the memorialization 
of war. It is my intention that this cultural history of America’s overseas military 
cemeteries will elucidate the communicative interplay between enunciation and reception 
that can occur in public spaces of memory. 
“By common consent, the postmodern age is obsessed with memory,” writes 
historian Daniel Sherman in The Construction of Memory in Interwar France.2 Over the 
last three decades, memory, and its relationship to how publics construct shared 
understandings of self and nation, has received immense attention. This phenomenon can 
be explained, at least in part, by the almost universal need—shared by populations across 
the world—to reconstitute communities that have been shattered by the atrocities of war, 
the reconfiguration of borders, and the massive diasporas of the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries. Another explanation for this phenomenon is the postmodern challenge to 
linear and empirical modern historiography, which has opened up the field of memory to 
                                                 
2 Daniel J. Sherman, The Construction of Memory in Interwar France (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999), 1. 
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include events and experiences previously left out of master narratives. A third 
explanation is modern psychology, as posited by Sigmund Freud, which ushered in a 
deep mistrust of memory as an instance of the mind’s ability to disguise, fabricate, and 
transform the past. The intricate complexity and constitutive nature of memory to both 
knowledge and feeling is what has made memory studies practically inexhaustible. 
In large measure, the “memory boom” of the late twentieth century may be 
viewed as a response to seminal late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century literary, 
philosophical, and psychological works on the nature of recollection. Such contributions 
include William Wordsworth’s autobiographical poem, The Prelude (published 1850), 
Marcel Proust’s magisterial Remembrance of Things Past (1913-27), the philosophical 
works of Henri Bergson, and Freud’s psychoanalysis, which examine memory from 
different angles, exhibiting both its slippery nature and central role in each individual’s 
ongoing construction of self. For example, in his 1925 essay, “A Note upon the ‘Mystic 
Writing-Pad,’” Freud uses the metaphor of the wax writing-pad to offer an account of 
memory’s processes of writing, rewriting, and erasure. Freud tells us that like the 
celluloid cover of the writing pad, from which writing vanishes once lifted, the conscious 
mind retains no permanent traces of the past; the unconscious mind, like the wax slab 
which retains the permanent trace of what was written, stores a more permanent record of 
the past, an indelible inscription which is legible in certain lights; thus, like inscriptions 
written on a pad, memories of the past are temporary and fleeting, their traces accessible 
7 
only under certain conditions.3 Such works contributed to the developing notion of 
memory as unstable, selective, and driven by the complex dynamics of consciousness. 
Although Wordsworth, Proust, Bergson, and Freud’s expositions of memory were 
mindful of the behaviors and influences of groups, these works have often been regarded 
in ways that encourage a view of recollection as a solitary act. By contrast, the vast 
majority of memory studies of the twentieth century—conducted by scholars such as 
Maurice Halbwachs, Pierre Nora, and Michael Kammen—have been concerned with how 
individual memory is shaped by family, religion, class, the media, and other sources of 
the creation of group identities. While recognizing the significant contributions made by 
Freud, Proust, and the like, twentieth century scholars have examined how societal forces 
that intervene in the creation of group identities influence an individual’s processes of 
memory and sense of what is worth recollecting. “In these accounts,” writes literary 
scholar Michael Rossington, “‘individual’ turns out to be inseparable from ‘collective’ 
remembrance. Moreover, collective memory occupies an important function, distinct 
from history, in conceiving of a society’s past.”4 This interplay between the individual 
and the collective becomes a major theme throughout my dissertation, particularly when I 
consider the government’s wartime suppression of the individual’s ability to express 
her/himself freely; the vast range of feelings, beliefs, memories, and arguments expressed 
by grieving families and individuals during the immediate postwar years; and, the 
                                                 
3 Sigmund Freud, “A Note upon the ‘Mystic Writing-Pad,’” in On 
Metapsychology: The Theory of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 11 of “The Penguin Freud 
Library,” trans. James Strachey, ed. Angela Richards (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), 
429-34. 
4 Michael Rossington, “Introduction to Section 4,” in Theories of Memory: A 
Reader, ed. Michael Rossington and Anne Whitehead (The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2007), 134. 
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rhetorical effects of the cemeteries’ final visual presentation, which find ways to display 
both the unique sacrifice of each dead soldier and the collective sacrifice of all the men 
buried at the sites. 
The ever-expanding field of collective remembrance studies can trace its 
fundamental arguments to the work of nineteenth century French philosopher and 
historian Ernest Renan, who famously brought attention to the deep connection between 
the modern nation-state and collective memory. In his seminal essay, “What is a Nation?” 
(1882), Renan states: “A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth 
are but one, constitute this soul or spiritual principle. One lies in the past, one in the 
present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is 
present-day consent, the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the 
heritage that one has received in an undivided form” (emphasis added).5 In a few short 
lines, Renan points to the constant and dialogical relationship between the past and 
present, that indispensable space where the modern nation-state exists; that space where 
the nation makes sense of its present through its recollection of the past. As I show in the 
fourth chapter, public commemoration of the U.S. Civil War during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries taught the government that establishing and controlling 
publicly memory of the WWI experience would go a long way to rewriting history, 
shaping national consciousness, and ameliorating crucial social rifts and wounds. 
This recollection, however, Renan argues, does not stay faithful to the fullness of 
historical events as they may have occurred, for a collective understanding of the past 
                                                 
5 Ernest Renan, “What Is a Nation?” trans. Martin Thom, in Nation and 
Narration, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (London: Routledge, 1990), 8-22: 19. 
9 
often requires strategic forgetting. In fact, Renan states that “the essence of a nation is 
that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten many 
things.” Renan argues that a nation’s collective memory depends, ironically, on the act of 
forgetting. The nation of France, a state composed of individuals who hold various and 
uncommon ethnic and cultural backgrounds, memories, and violent histories, can stay 
whole only when the individuals disregard the atrocities of the past and develop a 
common understanding of a cleansed “French” history, a shared understanding of the 
purpose of “France.” 6 Thus, Renan introduces the dialectic of remembering and 
forgetting, which has become highly influential on recent memory studies. This dialectic 
becomes central to my exploration of how American overseas military cemeteries, while 
serving as sites of collective recollection, are simultaneously predicated on forgetting 
actual bloody, ironic, and traumatic attributes of the World War; by structuring the past, 
the sites make remembrance of the past manageable and meaningful. 
Renan’s groundbreaking insight on the relationship between collective memory 
and the construction of national identity were picked up and developed by early twentieth 
century French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, who further untangled history (the past) 
from collective memory (an act of the present). In Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire 
(1925), Halbwachs argues, “The individual calls recollections to mind by relying on the 
                                                 
6 Ibid, 11. Renan explains the importance of forgetting in national recollection by 
claiming, for example, that “every French citizen has to have forgotten the massacre of 
St. Bartholomew”—a bloody event during which Catholics massacred thousands of 
Huguenots—otherwise history might be a series of vengeances that would make the 
construction and maintenance of “France” impossible. Renan argues that through what 
can sometimes be a turbulent process, groups within a nation must forgive and forget to 
create stable conditions for life and nation. 
10 
frameworks of social memory.”7 In his later work La Mémoire collective (1950), 
Halbwachs claims that while history attempts to provide objective truth unaffected by the 
psychology of social groups, “every collective memory requires the support of a group 
delimited in space and time.”8 Thus, says art and architecture historian Kirk Savage in an 
overview of scholarship on commemoration, Halbwachs’ work teaches that “our view of 
the past does not come primarily from professional historical scholarship but from a 
much more complicated and interwoven set of relationships to mass media, tourist sites, 
family tradition, and the spaces of our upbringing with all their regional, ethnic, and class 
diversity—to name just a few factors. Hence the now-commonplace notion that collective 
memory is ‘constructed,’ amidst a perpetual political battleground.”9 It is this perpetual 
political battleground that will be addressed in my study of the history of the 
establishment of American WWI cemeteries. 
I should note here that the term “collective memory” has often been used 
interchangeably with “public memory” (as even casual readers of memory literature can 
attest). Communication scholar Edward S. Casey argues that these two terms in fact 
indicate different types of recollection, and should be considered as such. In his essay, 
“Public Memory in Place and Time,” Casey effectively delineates individual memory, 
social memory, collective memory, and public memory from one another in order to 
provide working terms for the investigation of memory, and prevent the trivialization of 
                                                 
7 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, ed. and trans. Lewis A. Coser 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 182. 
8 Halbwachs, The Collective Memory, trans. Francis J. Ditter Jr. and Vida Yazdi 
Ditter (New York: Harper and Row, 1980):84. 
9 Kirk Savage, “History, Memory, and Monuments: An Overview of the Scholarly 
Literature on Commemoration,” National Park Service,  
http://www.nps.gov/history/history/resedu/savage.htm (accessed May 30, 2007). 
11 
public memory through the inclusion of all and every collective or public encounter with 
the past. Casey argues that individual memory “refers to the person who is engaged in 
memory on any given occasion.” Social memory “is the memory held in common by 
those who are affiliated either by kinship ties, by geographical proximity in 
neighborhoods, cities, and other regions, or by the engagement in a common project.” 
Collective memory implies “the circumstance in which different persons, not necessarily 
known to each other at all, nevertheless recall the same event,” each in her or his own 
way. Public memory signifies memory that takes place “out in the open, in the koinos 
cosmos where discussion with others is possible—whether on the basis of chance 
encounters or planned meetings—but also where one is exposed and vulnerable, where 
one’s limitations and fallibilities are all too apparent.” Encompassing individual memory, 
social memory, and collective memory, this type of memory “serves as an encircling 
horizon,” an ever present it that is both presupposed and “an active resource on which 
current discussion and action draw.” Resisting the vicissitudes of current events by 
maintaining some constant ideas about the past, public memory “serves to stabilize any 
given direction of public events.” Nevertheless, public memory is forever malleable, as 
members of the public “can revise it on the spot” for the purposes of the given moment.10 
Casey’s definition of public memory is crucial to my own ongoing investigation of how 
audiences have responded and interpreted America’s overseas military cemeteries, for it 
allows me to move from the individual to ‘the nation as a whole,’ as well as all the 
different kinds of communities in between. Furthermore, while providing a range of foci 
                                                 
10 Edward S. Casey, “Public Memory in Place and Time,” in Framing Public 
Memory, ed. Kendall R. Phillips (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004), 17-44, 
20-5. 
12 
for the study of memory, Casey’s conceptions of these four types of memory are 
functional terms that bring clarity to the growing body of memory scholarship.11 
The challenges to the presumed stability and trustworthiness of memory that have 
emerged within memory studies coincide with the questions posed to the stability of 
language and meaning, first brought forth in the work of Ferdinand de Saussure and then 
later, in a more comprehensive way, in philosopher Jacques Derrida’s theory of 
deconstruction. The so-called “linguistic turn” has had lasting effects in the humanities 
and social sciences, for it strikes at the heart of our philosophical pretensions that we can 
empirically order the world through systems of language. If, as Derrida famously argues 
in his 1968 essay “Différance,” language is always subject to reinterpretation, 
undecideability, and “slippage,” and the disciplines of the humanities and social sciences 
depend upon language to find and express meanings, then these meanings are subject to 
reinterpretation, undecidability, and “slippage” as well.12 In the field of history, this has 
                                                 
11 Memory scholarship has been complicated by recent challenges to the 
(sometimes slapdash) usage of terms such as “collective memory,” and even “memory” 
itself. In Regarding the Pain of Others (New York: Picador, 2003), cultural theorist 
Susan Sontag claims that, “there is no such thing as collective memory—part of the same 
family of spurious notions as collective guilt. But there is collective instruction.” Sontag 
argues, “All memory is individual, unreproducible—it dies with each person” (85-6). In 
Remembering War, historian Jay Winter advocates the term remembrance over the term 
memory, for to privilege remembrance is “to insist on specifying agency, on answering 
the question who remembers, when, where, and how? And on being aware of the 
transience of remembrance, so dependent on the frailties and commitments of the men 
and women who take the time and effort to engage in it” (3). The points made by Sontag 
and Winter have merit, and push those who enter into the dominate scholarly discussions 
of remembrance to take a stand on some of the key concepts and linguistic terms of the 
field. For more on these issues, see especially Bradford Vivian, Public Forgetting: The 
Rhetoric and Politics of Beginning Again (University Park, Penn.: Penn State University 
Press, 2010). 
12 Jacques Derrida, “Différance," in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 1-28. 
13 
raised profound questions about the roles historians play in constructing history, for 
throughout the nineteenth century and much of the twentieth century, historians 
endeavored to make history a series of empirical and stable facts that could be understood 
through uncovering archival, primary, and “official” sources of information. With the 
linguistic turn there has been the realization that archival and primary sources are not 
necessarily infallible or objective reflections of the truth, but are linguistic compositions 
written under the play of “différance.” Furthermore, scholars such as Hayden White 
argue that historians are really interpreters who cannot avoid bringing in their own 
prejudices, skills, political affiliations, resources, and choices of language that separate 
“fact” from “fiction.” Therefore, the construction of history cannot be an entirely 
empirical endeavor. This does not mean that historians should abandon their job of 
analyzing historical and cultural artifacts to discern what is possible, impossible, likely, 
invention, or lie. Instead, it means, as White suggests in Metahistory: The Historical 
Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe, that historians act as “linguistic skeptics,” 
who question their own choices of language and the language choices of others.13 It is 
this kind of skepticism that I bring into my archival work as it infuses texts with greater 
possibilities of meaning. 
While the linguistic turn has injected some instability into the commonly accepted 
practices of empirical historiography, it has moved scholars, especially those 
investigating public memory, to focus on cultural objects beyond the strictly political 
historical as artifacts worthy of close study. As White’s Metahistory shows, since the 
                                                 
13 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century 
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Enlightenment, scholars interested in the ideology of the modern nation tended to focus 
on “high” political statements such as national constitutions, official political speeches, 
and patriotic op-ed articles in leading newspapers—foundational objects clearly intended 
to spell out specific ideas of the modern nation. On its own, an artifact like a national 
constitution contains a univocal, elite perspective that projects a conception of the nation 
intended to be taken a specific way. Over the past forty years, scholars have consciously 
broadened the scope of historical inquiry to examine cultural objects in which the 
complementary projects of nation-building and public memory are not as obvious, but in 
which one finds the traces of both. For, as Michel de Certeau shows in The Practice of 
Everyday Life (1980), it is within public monuments, museums, street names, paintings, 
and everyday social practices that these everyday projects occur, often in understated 
ways.14 
This revision has had the effect of bringing about, in historian E.J. Hobsbawm’s 
words, “attention to the view from below,” i.e. the view of the nation “as seen not by 
governments and the spokesmen and activists of nationalist (or non-nationalist) 
movements, but by the ordinary persons who are the objects of their action and 
propaganda.” While this view is forever difficult to discover, “social historians have 
learned how to investigate the history of ideas, opinions and feelings at the sub-literary 
level, so that we are today less likely to confuse, as historians once habitually did, elite 
perspectives with public opinion.” Ethnographic studies of social practices, memory 
practices, and material culture have revealed how publics have used, interpreted, 
                                                 
14 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 
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remembered and forgotten pieces of the past to construct, maintain, and develop 
rhetorically conceptions of the citizen and the nation.15 
One of the most influential social historians to take the “view from below” 
approach in understanding the projects of nation-building and public memory has been 
historian Pierre Nora. Taking off from the contributions made by Renan and Halbwachs, 
Nora’s edited volume Lieux de Mémoire (Realms of Memory) sets out to understand the 
conjunction of collective memory and national identity through the traces of this 
conjunction in everyday “memory sites”: national archives, libraries, festivals, 
dictionaries, mythic stories, competitions, agricultural practices, town squares, leisure 
activities and cuisine (to name but a few). More than a linear chronicle of critical 
moments in France’s history, Nora’s volume demonstrates how meanings derived from 
such memory sites, forever slipping and changing with time, are collectively more 
important than the events themselves. Commemoration, Nora argues, is all that we have, 
and is indeed how France’s history is both recovered and monumentalized. Nora is less 
interested in causes than in effects; less interested in “what actually happened” than in its 
perpetual re-use and misuse, its influence on successive presents; less interested in 
traditions than in the way in which traditions are constituted and passed on. In this spirit, 
contributors to Nora’s volume pick apart an eclectic set of cultural artifacts to explain the 
construction of “the French past.”16 
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Reality (Cambridge: University Press, 1990), 11. 
16 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire,” 
Representations 26 (Spring 1989): 7-24, 7. 
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Nora’s approach to studying the project of nation-building has been influential on 
American scholars, as evidenced by professor of American history and culture Michael 
Kammen’s famous opus, Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in 
American Culture. In this book, Kammen is concerned with public memory, the ways in 
which Americans have remembered the past—a story in which myths and legends have 
as much place as history and high culture. Kammen argues that since the close of the 
American Revolution, popular myths have persisted and historical awareness has existed 
with varying degrees of intensity, manifesting themselves in cultural traditions, practices, 
and artifacts. In the United States, Kammen argues, the effort to define, preserve, and 
instill public memory has characteristically been decentralized, diffuse, ad hoc, relatively 
non-coercive and—for most of our history—in private hands. An exhaustive study 
ranging from the commemoration practices of Civil War veterans groups to the anti-war 
demonstrations of the Vietnam era, from poignant regional public war memorials to the 
depoliticized capitalist realm of Disneyland, from the film Gone with the Wind to the 
television series Roots, Kammen’s book reveals that many rituals within American 
society in fact reconstruct the past rather than faithfully record it, often omitting and 
forgetting what actually occurred. Such rituals do so “with the needs of the contemporary 
cultural moment clearly in mind, manipulating the past in order to mold the present.” 
Given the diversity of the United States, the construction of national identity often 
demands the lessening of ethnic and religious rivalries and resentments, and hence the 
abandonment of much of our ancient heritages. Kammen argues that conflicting accounts 
of the past, competing in a marketplace of memories, are most conducive to true 
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recollection. But in the name of reconciliation, Americans rituals of remembrance often 
reduce national history to one-dimensional commonalities.17 
However, a number of revisionist historians have been more interested in the 
interplay of cultural and economic forces upon modern conceptions of the nation than on 
problems of memory and memory’s impact on historiography. Benedict Anderson argues 
that nations are “imagined communities” that are to be distinguished, not by their 
falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined. For Anderson, nations 
are imagined because the members of even the smallest nation “will never know most of 
their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the 
image of their shared community.” For Anderson, this phenomenon was made possible 
not by self-consciously held political ideologies, but by the rise of “print-capitalism” in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. During this period, capitalist entrepreneurs 
printed books, newspapers, and pamphlets in vernacular languages in order to reach 
wider audiences. As a result, readers speaking different local dialects were able to 
understand each other, and common discourses emerged. The advent of mass print media 
caused psychological effects upon readers, who were now capable of imagining shared 
bonds with other distant readers. Thus, an event such as the French Revolution would 
enter the accumulating memory of print as an accessible concept upon which readers of 
the French language could imagine and construct a shared, national comradeship. The 
underpinning assumptions of Anderson’s theory are that people’s identities are rigid to 
begin with; people’s identities are prone to inadvertent reshaping by unforeseen 
                                                 
17 Michael Kammen, Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition 
in American Culture (New York: Vintage Books, 1991). 
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socioeconomic forces; nationalism and nations are products of modernity and have been 
created as means to political and economical ends; and that a nation, ultimately, is a 
stable, identifiable entity.18 
Other scholars privilege nineteenth century socio-economic changes and the 
dissemination of print media above political ideologies as the basis for the constructions 
of nationhood and personal identities, but come to different conclusions than Anderson. 
For instance, communication scholar Ronald J. Zboray, in A Fictive People: Antebellum 
Economic Development and the American Reading Public, argues that rapid economic 
change during the first half of the 19th century in the United States disrupted traditional 
forms of identity-building among individuals. Specifically, the rise of the modern railroad 
system restructured space and time for both producers and consumers of print media. But 
rather than eliminating regional differences in reading habits across America, the 
railroads may have exacerbated differences by bypassing non-modernizing rural areas 
and isolating them still further. At the same time, the curriculum of governmentally-
mandated schoolhouses throughout the country, which stressed a “nationalistic-moralistic 
emphasis in reading instruction” and propagandized the superiority of the United States 
above other nations, actually stunted the potential for a national literary culture by 
smothering the natural creativity and imagination of schoolchildren (some of whom were 
descendents of immigrants or immigrants themselves). These phenomena fostered diverse 
and haphazard patterns of reading throughout the American public, pushing individuals to 
escape from the numbing regime of the classroom and the emotional and career needs 
                                                 
18 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1991). 
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created by rapid economic change. American readers turned to whatever was available 
for consumption—often fiction—to forge personal and eclectic imaginations of 
themselves and the nation. As a result, antebellum America was not made of a 
homogenous “nation of readers,” but rather by an assorted mix of individual readers 
whose personal perceptions of the nation were less rigid and more fluid.19 
As Zboray’s book suggests, “national ideas” are usually variable in the 
multitudinous minds of publics—a point that emerges again and again throughout my 
dissertation. This stance is strongly supported by Hobsbawm. In Nations and Nationalism 
Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, Hobsbawm argues that official ideologies of 
states and movements are not guides to what is in the minds of even the most loyal 
citizens or supporters. Nor can historians assume that for most people national 
identification—when it exists—excludes or is always or ever superior to the remainder of 
the set of identifications which constitute the social being; in fact, it is always combined 
with identifications of another kind, even when it is felt to be superior to them. 
Furthermore, national identification and what it is believed to imply, can change and shift 
in time, even in the course of quite short periods. Hobsbawm argues that what we 
understand to be “national consciousness” develops unevenly among the social groupings 
and regions of a country over periods of time. Sometimes these developments are highly 
influenced by cultural phenomena.20 Other times they are shaped primarily by historical 
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culture and its literature. Swept by romantic representations of the pure, simple and 
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phenomena.21 As my dissertation will show, national consciousness and public 
understandings of the Great War developed unevenly and were highly influenced by 
historical, cultural, and material phenomena. 
Not surprisingly, studies of public memory and the construction of national 
identity have often focused on the remembrance of war. For it is around the remembrance 
of war that public memory and the construction of national identity converge most 
powerfully. “It is not just the injuries of war, but its drama, its earthquake-like character, 
which has fueled the memory boom,” writes Jay Winter. “The story of war has been 
narrated by a host of institutions and media whose audiences have never been larger nor 
more varied.” As interest in memories of war has spread, the narratives of these 
memories have changed, accounting for the voices of witnesses who previously had been 
marginalized from the history books. “It is no longer the generals and admirals, or even 
soldiers and sailors, who dominate the story of war. It is the victims, more and more of 
whom have been civilians. If initially the memory boom focused on serving or fallen 
men, it no longer does.”22 In congruence with the bottom-up approach set forth by 
intellectuals such as Nora, scholars have paid increased attention to how civilian 
populations have remembered and reconciled with state-sponsored wars, and to the ways 
                                                                                                                                                 
uncorrupted lives of the peasantry, this elite class of educated Germans transformed the 
folkloric rediscovery of “the people” into a “national tradition” (103-4). 
21 Hobsbawm shows that domestic nationalism increased sharply in late 19th 
century Ireland after the United Kingdom granted modest rights of sovereignty to 
Scotland and Wales. The number of newspapers in Ireland describing themselves as 
“national” or “nationalist” exponentially grew over a few short years as local leaders 
demanded the same levels of autonomy granted to their Commonwealth counterparts 
(105). 
22 Winter, 7. 
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in which memories of past wars have been fashioned, maintained, and altered by present-
day groups in order to satisfy the collective need of self-identification.  
As a result of this increased interest in the memory of war, many scholars have 
turned to war memorials—those physical public spaces where publics can gather and 
define themselves at ceremonies, rallies, and pilgrimages—as fruitful objects of study. In 
“Commemoration, Public Art, and the Changing Meaning of the Bunker Hill 
Monument,” Sarah J. Purcell reveals how the meanings and audience receptions of a 
Revolutionary War monument in Charlestown, Massachusetts, have been subject to 
constant renegotiation; recently, the memorial has been appropriated as a symbolic 
gathering space where local activist groups rally against violent crime occurring in the 
community.23 Kirk Savage, in Standing Soldiers, Kneeling Slaves, explores how the 
history of America’s slavery and its violent end (the Civil War) were transmitted through 
the sculptural monuments that increasingly came to dominate public space in nineteenth-
century America; these sculptures, often depicting a male slave groveling before his 
benefactor President Lincoln, worked to reinforce the collective (and convenient) 
memory of the North’s righteous role in the war.24 Recently, a number of American 
scholars have critically examined how war memorials on the Mall in Washington, D.C., 
function as memory texts where publics gather to define themselves vis-à-vis material 
representations of soldierly sacrifice.25 And in France, attention has been paid to the 
                                                 
23 Sarah J. Purcell, “Commemoration, Public Art, and the Changing Meaning of 
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24 Kirk Savage, Standing Soldiers, Kneeling Slaves: Race, War, and Monument in 
Nineteenth-Century America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 4. 
25 The Vietnam Veterans Memorial has received more attention than other war 
memorials situated on the Mall. See, for example, Marita Sturken, “The Wall, the Screen, 
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typology, semiology, and political meaning of civic monuments raised in memory to 
French soldiers killed in the First World War.26  
Despite the ever-expanding interest in the interplay of public memory, 
nationhood, war rhetoric, and visual/material rhetoric, America’s overseas World War I 
cemeteries have received scant attention from scholars. Whereas the military cemeteries 
of Britain, France, Germany, and Russia have been the foci of many scholarly works,27 
the American sites have been virtually ignored. The limited work that has been done 
rarely goes beyond mere descriptions of American cemeteries’ visual presentation28 or 
highly subjective accounts of scholars’ contemporary, on-site, phenomenological 
interactions with the sites.29 Cultural historian Ron Robin has offered the most thorough 
history and analytical critique of the American cemeteries abroad, but his interpretations 
                                                                                                                                                 
and the Image: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial,” Representations 35 (Summer 1991): 
118-42, and Kim Servart Theriault, “Re-membering Vietnam: War, Trauma, and 
‘Scarring Over’ After ‘The Wall,’” Journal of American Culture 26.4 (Dec. 2003): 421-
31. However, the World War II Memorial, inaugurated in 2004, has drawn some recent 
study; see Barbara A. Biesecker, “Remembering World War II: The Rhetoric and Politics 
of National Commemoration at the Turn of the 21st Century,” Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 88.4 (Nov. 2002): 393-409. 
26 See Antoine Prost, “Monuments to the Dead,” in Realms of Memory: 
Construction of the French Past, ed. Pierre Nora (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1997), 306-330. 
27 See, for example, Suzanne Evans, Mothers of Heroes, Mothers of Martyrs: 
World War I and the Politics of Grief (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2007); Nina Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World 
War II in Russia (New York: Basic Books, 1994); and Jay Winter, Remembering War: 
The Great War Between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: 
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28 See, for example, Richard E. Meyer, “Stylistic Variation in the Western Front 
Battlefield Cemeteries of World War I Combatant Nations,” Markers: Annual Journal of 
the Association for Gravestone Studies 18 (2001): 189-253 
29 See, for example, Carole Blair, V. William Balthrop, and Neil Michel, 
“Arlington-sur-Seine: War Commemoration and the Perpetual Argument from Sacrifice,” 
Sixth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation, 
Amsterdam, Holland June 27-30, 2006. 
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and judgments of the sites’ political meanings and overall effectiveness fall victim to a 
lack of contextual understanding (a point I address later). Recently, Lisa M. Budreau, a 
research historian at the Office of The Surgeon General of the United States, engaged the 
sites in her book, Bodies of War: World War I and the Politics of Commemoration in 
America, 1919-1933. Although she devotes an entire chapter to America’s overseas 
burial grounds, Budreau does little more than repeat Ron Robin’s previous assertions. 
And like Robin, and other scholars Budreau ignores the rhetorical foundations that 
emerged during the war (as her book’s title explicitly reveals) and fails to appreciate the 
Commission of Fine Art’s dominant role in the postwar project (again, a point I address 
below). In short, America’s overseas World War I cemeteries have not received the 
careful scholarly consideration they deserve. 
What explains this dearth of scholarship? Surely it is not a lack of interest in the 
intersections of American war rhetoric, public memory, and visual/material culture, for 
these intersections have become popular subjects of study in recent years. Perhaps the 
biggest factor is the Atlantic Ocean; while American scholars have relatively easy access 
to pertinent historical documents held at the U.S. National Archives and other 
repositories, conducting on-site research at the eight cemeteries abroad (in order to bring 
the documents to life) is a costly and time-consuming proposition; at the same time, 
while European scholars enjoy immediate physical access to the U.S. burial grounds, 
crucial information (written in English) concerning the sites’ genealogy and meanings 
can only be found thousands of miles away in American archives and libraries; in other 
words, a truly thorough analysis of the sites requires much hard work, dedication, and 
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investment of resources.30 The lack of scholarship may also be explained by the fact that 
the historical, ideological, rhetorical, and physical complexities of these idiosyncratic 
burial grounds (which are, themselves, dispersed across Western Europe) are 
overwhelming to the individual scholar; thus, it is far easier to pay lip service to the 
cemeteries’ appearance and supposed political meanings. Whatever the case, the standing 
research has been relatively simplistic and deficient. This is something that I hope to 
redress with my own scholarship. 
Employing an interpretive ethnography to investigate the complex processes of 
negotiation that have led to the production of the overseas burial grounds, my dissertation 
focuses on both the public and the behind-the-scenes factors that led to the final visual 
presentation of America’s WWI burial grounds. It is my hope that my dissertation (and 
subsequent book) will make several contributions to the disciplines of communication 
and American history/studies. With regard to the latter, I will provide the first 
comprehensive study of these burial grounds—sites that have influenced American war 
rhetoric and commemoration practices ever since. But beyond filling this gap in 
American history/studies scholarship, I intend to advance several ideas that will enrich 
scholarship in my own discipline—specifically scholarship on public memory and 
visual/material rhetoric. Briefly, I hope to continue developing and advancing my belief 
that public memory is, more than anything, a powerful rhetorical strategy that, at least at 
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first, allows those who instigate projects of public memory to rearticulate the past for 
contemporary political and rhetorical purposes. As my dissertation shows, America’s 
overseas military cemeteries—which look the same as they did eighty years ago and are 
visited by tens of thousands of people from around the world annually—were the result 
of a series of carefully considered rhetorical decisions regarding the construction of 
public memory (and, necessarily, public forgetting). As for scholarship on visual/material 
rhetoric, my dissertation shows that, in order to fully comprehend the visual rhetoric of 
space or object, it is necessary to have a complete understanding of the negotiations and 
decisions that led to the physical presentation of the space or object; that the rhetorical 
power of things like headstones found in military cemeteries is found in their ability to 
stand in place of the dead (buried below) who cannot be visually displayed (in this case, 
because the dead are little more than disturbing rotten skin and bones); and, that 
(generally speaking) communication scholars need to recognize the polysemic nature of 
physical spaces and objects—too often, scholars ascribe one meaning or one set of 
meanings to spaces and objects in order to simplify the picture and make the process of 
judging their effectiveness easier. 
1.3 SOURCES, METHODS, AND APPROACH 
Due to its scope and method, I believe my work on America’s overseas military 
cemeteries is complementary yet differs from what has been already established in war 
memorial studies. Some of this difference arises from the methodology employed. Unlike 
many historical studies of war memorials, the foundation of my dissertation is based on 
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historical/archival research of primary and secondary sources that either elucidate the 
dynamic and fluid rhetorical processes that led to the establishment and final design of 
the cemeteries, or provide evidence of audience responses to the sites. This project 
combines the analysis of historical primary sources (contemporary newspaper reports, 
films, books, and public posters), archival materials (family correspondence between 
grieving families and the War Department and government, soldierly diaries, unpublished 
military reports) with visual analysis of the ABMC sites and participant observation 
completed in Belgium and France. Theories of memorial studies past and present, 
emanating from communication studies, cultural studies, and history, anchors this 
research within a theoretical framework. 
The bulk of my archival research was conducted at the U.S. National Archives 
and Records Administration II (NARA) in College Park, Maryland. Over the past four 
years, I have dug into various NARA records groups that others have only barely touched 
with a shovel. For instance, to get a better sense of some of the internal history of the 
American Battle Monuments Commission (the governmental agency that was ultimately 
given control over the design and establishment of the cemeteries), I explored Record 
Group 11 (“Record Group of the American Battle Monuments Commission”). This 
record group was an abundant source of information on the internal discussion, decision, 
and actions taken by the ABMC throughout the postwar years. RG 117, which has been 
underutilized by other scholars interested in the U.S. cemeteries abroad, includes internal 
reports and memos; agendas and minutes of relevant meetings; monthly reports from 
regional offices and cemeteries; original sketches and panoramic views of the World War 
I cemeteries; cemetery dedication scrapbooks; transcripts of political speeches delivered 
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at the overseas burial grounds; copies of agreements with foreign governments regarding 
rights and responsibilities of the United States with respect to its military cemeteries 
abroad; correspondence (1926-42) of ABMC Secretary Major Xenophon H. Price; and 
motion pictures, still photographs, and sound recordings of the construction of various 
ABMC cemeteries and rhetorical activity at the sites. 
The third chapter brings forth the voices of ‘ordinary’ U.S. citizens who, 
following the First World War, responded to government inquiries regarding the final 
disposition of their loved ones’ bodies. This section is based upon tens of thousands of 
letters I unearthed in the Records of the Office of the Quartermaster General, Record 
Group 92. Within Record Group 92 there are 5,400 boxes, organized alphabetically, 
containing burial case files of every U.S. soldier who died during World War I. Each box 
holds roughly twenty individual files. To collect correspondence related to the final 
disposition of 400 soldiers, I requested every fourteenth box from the 5,400 available. 
From each of these boxes I collected data from the first file that contained what I call 
‘extra communication’—letters, notes, telegrams that went beyond the filling out of 
forms. Although many relatives simply filled out and returned forms issued by the War 
Department, others crafted messages of varied, and often poetic, rhetorical appeals to 
express their opinions regarding the plan to bury American war dead in distant lands. 
These letters serve as what historian Robert S. McElvaine terms “immediate testimony” – 
personal statements that reveal the contemporary views of people who lived through a 
particular historical moment.31 While historical letters have limitations as primary 
                                                 
31 Robert S. McElvaine, Down and Out in the Great Depression: Letters from the 
Forgotten Man (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 5. 
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sources of evidence,32 I have done my best to interpret each individual letter within all of 
its available contextual information.33 The following pages recover the immediate 
testimonies of a range of American citizens: from those who relinquished the care of 
corpses to the government, to those who demanded, sometimes bitterly, the return of 
loved ones’ remains to the U.S., to members of the African-American community whose 
men had fought and died for a nation that treated blacks as inferior citizens. The 
correspondence discussed here offers views into the complexities of the feelings, 
ideologies, traditions, and rights of U.S. citizens who were prompted by the death of their 
kin to consider both their own relation to the nation and the human costs that U.S. 
intervention in global affairs entailed. I argue that, beyond capturing the sentiments of a 
past generation of Americans, this textual corpus also served as an inventional resource 
for officials developing an administrative rhetoric that at once could satisfy the needs of 
U.S. citizens and advocate for the establishment of symbolic and monumental cemeteries 
in Europe. I contend that through the process of communication it initiated with grieving 
families, the War Department learned to temper its highly bureaucratic speech with a 
personal and sentimental vernacular appropriated from the letters of citizens. This 
vernacular became not only part of the government’s official discourse regarding the final 
disposition of the dead, but was also instantiated in the visual presentation of America’s 
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they can tempt one to take the letter writer’s words at face value. See Mary Jo Maynes, 
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eight World War I cemeteries in Europe, still seen by thousands of international visitors 
each year.34  
My examination of archival materials held at NARA (as well as the U.S. Army 
War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and the Soldiers and Sailors Memorial and 
Museum in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania) is largely based on the perspective of what 
Kathleen J. Turner terms “the rhetorical historian.” Asking questions that are different, 
yet similar, to those posed by colleagues in the social sciences and humanities, the 
rhetorical historian “is interested in the ways in which rhetorical processes have 
constructed social reality at specific moments in time and in specific contexts.”35 
Elaborating upon Turner’s point, David Zarefsky argues that what separates rhetorical 
historians from other types of historians is not subject matter, but rather perspective. “The 
economic historian might view human conduct from the standpoint of the market, the 
political historian from the mobilization of power and interests, the intellectual historian 
from the historical evolution of ideas, and the rhetorical historian from the perspective of 
how particular points in time people invented and used rhetorical devices to identify with 
and influence others.” Thus, the rhetorical historian regards history as “a series of 
situations that call for different persuasive and rhetorical actions.”36 The expressions of 
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meaning found in the design, style, and symbolism of the ABMC cemeteries today are 
the result of eighty years of decisions, actions, and maintenance.  
In order to understand the ideologies, rhetoric, and material realities that shaped 
the establishment and final visual presentation of American World War I cemeteries in 
Europe, I turn primarily to contemporary national and local newspaper accounts of the 
war and the national war effort. While I am conscious of the fact that texts such as these 
are representations and must be considered within very specific contexts—and that much 
of the news Americans were exposed to was little more than propaganda and lies—they 
provide textual and visual evidence of how publics considered relevant events, 
phenomena, and ideas at specific moments in time. 
Unlike most studies, which establish a safe distance between the historian and the 
period studied, my dissertation occasionally brings in oral history in order to have as rich 
and complete a record as possible. In order to be as inclusive as possible of itinerant 
visitors’ and ABMC officials’ views and interpretations of the cemeteries, oral history 
has become a key component of my methodology. According to Valerie Raleigh Yow, 
oral history is “the recording of personal testimony delivered in oral form.”37 As a 
method of historical inquiry, oral history seeks to create “oral evidence” of the past; this 
evidence is “an account of first hand experience recalled retrospectively, communicated 
to an interviewer for historical purposes and preserved on a system of reproducible 
sound.”38 Addressing some recurring questions, but not keeping to the standard format of 
a written group survey, oral history amplifies the voices of those not necessarily included 
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in what George Lipsitz calls the “dominant narratives” of history.39 Rooted in feminist 
theory, oral history embodies the democratic, “bottom-up” approach of the new 
historicism movement and expands our understanding of who can serve as legitimate 
informants of the past.40 In conjunction with my archival research on audience reception 
and rhetorical activity at the ABMC cemeteries, oral history interviews have enriched my 
study with personal, “unofficial” evidence of how these sites have been received. Thanks 
to the University of Pittsburgh Nationality Rooms Stanley Prostrednik Award, in the 
summer of 2006 I conducted a number of on-site oral history interviews (in English and 
French) with itinerant visitors and ABMC superintendents at cemeteries in Belgium, 
France, Holland, and Luxembourg. These interviews have offered parallel, yet less heard 
insights into audience reception and rhetorical activity at these sites. It is my intention to 
complete many more oral history interviews, preferably at sites I have not yet visited. 
Overall, the historicist approach to this subfield of communication studies will allow a 
closer reading of how these sites have served as nodal points in the circulation of ritual 
practices and constructed meanings of public memory and national identity at different 
phases of their existence. In addition to oral history interviews, I want to continue 
                                                 
39 George Lipsitz, Time Passages: Collective Memory and American Popular 
Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), xiii. 
40 Expanding upon and reshaping the accomplishments of the slave narratives of 
1934-35, the Federal Writers Project of the late 1930s, and the organizational activities of 
Allan Nevins’ “The Oral History Project” at Columbia University, feminist scholars such 
as Sherna Berger Gluck, Margaret Strobel, and Susan H. Armitage (to name just three) 
revolutionized the practice of oral history by developing methods that account for the 
feelings, priorities, and values of women, African-Amerians, and other non-dominant 
groups. See Sherna Berger Gluck, “Women’s Oral History Resource Section,” Margaret 
Strobel, “Doing Oral History as an Outsider;” Susan H. Armitage, “The Next Step,” and 
Armitage and Gluck, “Reflections on Women’s Oral History: An Exchange,” in Women’s 
Oral History, eds. Susan H. Armitage, Patricia Hart, and Karen Weathermon (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 75-86. 
32 
observing the actions of such visitors at specific sites in order to have of a record of not 
only what they say, but also of what their behaviors, in relation to the sites, indicate. For 
instance, I hope to continue to observe the emotions that visitors express; the rhetorical 
activities conducted by decedents of the dead, admirers of those who died, and tourists 
who just happen to come across these sites.  
Finally, a major component of my methodology is the analysis of images—
photographs, blueprints, and films—that capture the aesthetic realities of the sites. These 
images come from contemporary media texts, files held at various archives, and my own 
photographic work at various overseas cemeteries. I have already developed a personal 
archive of visual materials from these sites for future rhetorical analysis. It is my 
intention to return to Europe to increase my personal archive, especially now that I have a 
better sense of my arguments and future scholarship. 
1.4 THESIS AND CHAPTER DESIGN 
I argue in these pages that the U.S. World War I cemeteries in Europe should be best 
understood as rhetorical productions whose meanings are not immanent and unitary (and 
thus not immediately available by phenomenological visual analysis of present day sites), 
but are, instead, tension-filled and polysemic due to complex histories out of which they 
emerged, particularly, as negotiations among various players with conflicting interests in 
what the cemeteries should be, or if there should be cemeteries at all. Those players and 
their arguments emerged out of a discursive environment stretching to the early days of 
the war in Europe in 1914, which by the point of eventual American formal participation 
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in 1917 provoked what Paul Starr calls a generative crisis,41 a crucial moment of 
exigence regarding the burial of American war dead, ripe for rhetorical invention. Yet, as 
the war ended in 1918, new constraints converged upon the rhetorical situation, as did the 
constitutive challenge of using the cemeteries as rhetorical productions of addressing 
successfully various audiences with shifting and contradictory needs. In time, the 
government, the military, the Commission of Fine Arts, and the American Battle 
Monuments Commission had to negotiate and adequately acknowledge and account for 
the symbolic expressions and feelings of U.S. citizens and grieving families as they 
pursue their goal of establishing monumental cemeteries in Europe that might dictate 
public memory of American participation in the Great War and communicate political 
messages regarding U.S. democracy to international audiences. 
My dissertation is divided into four chapters. Each chapter has a central claim that 
feeds into the subsequent chapters. The first chapter is titled, “The Uncensored View of 
War and Death from Afar: Pre-War American Media Depictions.” Here, I bring forth, 
analyze, and interpret American public discourse regarding the Great War and the 
relevant issues of death, killing, sacrifice, burial, and commemoration during the period 
of American neutrality (1914-1917) in order to contextualize the subsequent U.S. 
wartime policies (such as media censorship and compulsory military service) and postwar 
policies (such as repatriation of the dead and the establishment of permanent overseas 
military cemeteries) that were to follow. I argue that during the period of neutrality, 
Americans understood the Great War to be something akin to a “human slaughter-
                                                 
41 Paul Starr, The Creation of the Media: Political Origins of Modern 
Communications (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 274. 
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house”—an apocalyptic manifestation of mechanized death that threatened to destroy 
civilization. In 1916, President Woodrow Wilson won his reelection campaign on the 
slogan, “He Kept Us Out of the War!” Wilson’s victory was considered to be a 
referendum against U.S. intervention in the World War. 
The second chapter is titled, “ Pursuing the ‘Body and Soul and Spirit’ of Every 
American: The Government’s Wartime Project of Motion.” In April of 1917, Woodrow 
Wilson committed one the swiftest about-faces in U.S. presidential history. Abandoning 
the staunch antiwar platform of his 1916 presidential campaign, he went before Congress 
and asked for a declaration of war against Germany. Members of the House and Senate 
overwhelmingly supported the President’s idealistic call to make the world “safe for 
democracy” and plunged the U.S. into the Great War. Recognizing the antiwar streak that 
coursed through public discourse and consciousness, and comprehending the obvious 
incongruity between his pre- and post-election stances, President Wilson helped develop 
a series of wartime laws, policies, and agencies that made citizen (and non-citizen) 
support for the war effort a matter of compulsion, not choice. Establishing an 
unprecedented national draft, a powerful propaganda and media censorship bureau, and a 
Justice Department bent on prosecuting dissenters, the Wilson Administration attempted 
to control the hearts, minds, and bodies of every American. Within months, the people of 
the United States were legally and rhetorically transformed (through language, law, and 
force) into subservient, expendable cogs of the national war machine. And by November 
of 1918, roughly 117,000 American men would die “over there,” on the other side of the 
Atlantic. Utilizing rhetorical theorist Kenneth Burke’s heuristic dichotomy of motion and 
action to analyze Wilson’s address and the nation’s subsequent war effort, this chapter 
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offers a rhetorical analysis of (what I term) the U.S. government and military’s wartime 
“project of motion”—a program that sought suppress dissent and symbolic action, and 
cast American intervention in the Great War as a matter of compulsion (motion), not 
choice (action). 
The third chapter is titled, “A Sentimental Vernacular: Family Letters and the 
Burying of Dead World War I Soldiers.” Here I bring forth the voices of citizens (and 
non-citizens) who, after the Armistice, responded to federal government inquiries 
regarding the final disposition of their loved ones’ bodies. This chapter analyzes 
correspondence (1918-1922) from a wide range of Americans: from those who 
relinquished the care of corpses to the government, to those who demanded, sometimes 
bitterly, the return of loved ones’ remains, to members of the African-American 
community whose men had fought and died for a nation that treated African Americans 
as inferior citizens. I argue that through the process of communication it initiated with 
grieving families, the U.S. War Department learned to temper its highly bureaucratic and 
nationalistic speech with a personal and sentimental vernacular appropriated from the 
letters of citizens. In doing so, the War Department was able to make a stronger public 
case for its controversial plan to bury soldiers in symbolic overseas cemeteries. 
The fourth and final chapter is titled, “Life, Death, God, and Nation: The 
Cemeteries’ Final Visual Presentation.” The task of designing America’s overseas 
military cemeteries was initially assigned to the purview of the Commission of Fine Arts, 
the nation’s preeminent voice on cultural and artistic matters during the early twentieth 
century. While the CFA certainly wanted to extend its preferred aesthetic style (a 
neoclassical, Beaux-Arts style that mimicked and venerated Greco-Roman traditions) and 
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its ideologies regarding public space to the European sites without interference from 
outside parties, the commission had to approach its plans for the visual presentation of 
the overseas military cemeteries with great care and tact. To begin, the nascent sites were 
cemeteries—inherently sacred and emotionally charged spaces of profound social 
significance that would have to incorporate and display the remains of dead human 
beings appropriately. Thus, the CFA would have to take contemporary sensibilities 
regarding the function and appearance of the American gravescape into account. The 
sites would not just be cemeteries, however—they would be military cemeteries. 
Therefore, the CFA would have to meet the expectations of leaders in the armed forces, 
who would want the cemeteries to serve as decidedly pro-war celebrations of American 
military prowess, and governmental officials, who would want the burial grounds to do 
the same rhetorical work that federally controlled Civil War cemeteries (like Gettysburg 
National Cemetery and Arlington National Cemetery) had done over the preceding 
decades (namely, suture critical social divides and display the dead soldier as an ideal 
model of the American citizen). Of course, the planned sites were not only military 
cemeteries—they were overseas military cemeteries. The CFA was compelled, therefore, 
to design sites that would simultaneously match the monumentality of other nations’ 
World War cemeteries, convey discernable and effective messages to heterogeneous 
international audiences, and symbolically re-link the interred soldiers to their homeland 
thousands of miles away—no small order. On top of this, the CFA would have to weigh 
every aesthetic decision against economic considerations (the cost of obtaining suitable 
construction workers and masons in Europe, for example) and material realities (such as 
the relatively small number of dead bodies that had been left overseas). Finally, and most 
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importantly, the CFA—an organization that held the emotional sensibilities of nineteenth 
century Victorian culture in contempt—would have to account for both the sentimental 
vernacular that the government had appropriated into its own postwar public rhetoric and 
the feelings of grieving (and often dejected or disenchanted) Americans whose sons, 
brothers, and fathers—destroyed in the prime of their lives (supposedly) for the good of 
the nation—required a proper and meaningful burial. In short, the CFA found itself in a 
highly constrained rhetorical position—but one that ultimately led it to design a new form 
of American war commemoration. 
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2.0  THE UNCENSORED VIEW OF WAR AND DEATH FROM AFAR: PRE-
WAR AMERICAN MEDIA DEPICTIONS 
It is ghastly beyond imagination. Words cannot portray to the mind that picture by day 
and night—white eyes staring out of faces burned coal black by the sun. There are places 
where there are veritable piles of bodies […] These silent heaps are more weird by 
moonlight than by day.42 
2.1 THE UNCENSORED VIEW FROM AFAR 
This chapter brings forth, analyzes, and interprets American public discourse regarding 
the Great War and the relevant issues of death, killing, sacrifice, burial, and 
commemoration during the period of American neutrality (1914-1917) in order to 
contextualize the subsequent U.S. wartime policies (such as media censorship and 
compulsory military service) and postwar policies (such as repatriation of the dead and 
the establishment of permanent overseas military cemeteries) that were to follow. To get 
at this public discourse, I focus primarily on American mainstream newspaper coverage 
of the war—coverage that sometimes blurred the line between truth and the propaganda 
of Great Britain and Germany. 
                                                 
42 “German Walls of Iron Hold ‘Hell of Death’ Battlelines Between Arras and 
Ypres,” Washington Post, June 28, 1915, 1. 
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By the outbreak of the War in Europe, daily newspapers had become the 
dominant source of current information on local, national, and international affairs for 
Americans.43 As historian David Paul Nord has shown, as early as the 1890s, the popular 
daily newspaper had become a fixture of everyday life for readers of every social class 
and geographical region in the United States.44 In a world without radio and television 
broadcasts, newspapers were the first (and only) place to turn to for the latest news. 
Sociologist Michael Schudson tells us that, despite a healthy skepticism fostered by the 
“muckraking” and “yellow journalism” of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries, during the Great War period, American readers and journalists were by and 
large “naïve empiricists” who believed that facts could speak for themselves—that what 
appeared on the pages of newspapers were “not human statements about the world but 
aspects of the world itself.”45 This sentiment was surely enhanced by the fact that 
telegraphy allowed correspondents to relay information from the battlefields of Europe 
almost instantly, thus giving editors and publishers only a small window to interpret or 
filter the war’s narratives; in the race to provide the freshest information, American 
                                                 
43 In a letter to the editor of the State, Columbia, South Carolina, resident Frithzof 
Knudsen spoke to the (easily abused) power newspapers had on the shaping of public 
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44 Communities of Journalism: A History of American Newspapers and Their 
Readers (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2001), 225-45. 
45Schudson writes: “From the 1920s on, the idea that human beings individually 
and collectively construct the reality they deal with has held a central position in social 
thought.” See Discovering the News: A Social History of American Newspapers (Basic: 
New York, 1978), 5-6. 
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newspapers had precious little time to fiddle with reports.46 In short, during this era, 
American newspapers enjoyed an exclusive authority over the mass circulation of news. 
By virtue of more or less controlling information that was based on firsthand reporting 
and quotes from official and expert sources, newspapers exercised an agenda-setting 
influence that told Americans not only what to think about, but also how to think—a 
process Nord describes as “event orientation.”47 Eliciting and publishing letters of 
response from readers,48 newspapers of this era truly were, in the words of 
communications theorist James W. Carey, sites of “information” and “conversation” that 
“preside[d] over and within the conversation of our culture.”49 Thus, I believe that U.S. 
newspaper coverage of the war provides an excellent (if not entirely complete) glimpse of 
the American public’s understanding and imagination of the conflict. 
This chapter is divided into five parts. Each addresses a major recurring theme 
within media coverage of the Great War during the period of American neutrality. The 
first section examines how the media portrayed war-torn Europe as a vast cemetery 
                                                 
46 This is not to say that the information sent from Europe was ever completely 
“pure,” “true,” unbiased, or accurate, as some newspaper editors never pretended to 
pursue such standards; in 1912, James Keeley, the chief editor of the Chicago Tribune 
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See James Keeley, Newspaper Work: An Address Delivered Before the Students in the 
Course of Journalism at Notre Dame University, Nov. 26, 1912 (n.p., n.d.), pamphlet in 
library of the Chicago Historical Society, 2, quoted in Nord 249. What I want to suggest 
is that the almost real-time speed in which information came from Europe probably 
strengthened the general assumption that readers were getting an unadulterated, “play-by-
play,” and (therefore) authentic view of the war. (Something akin to recent attitudes 
concerning American “embedded” reporting of the War in Iraq.) 
47 Communities, 280. 
48 Nord, 246-77. 
49 “The Press and the Public Discourse” Center Magazine 20 (Mar.-Apr. 1987): 4, 
quoted in Nord, 6. 
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where few fallen soldiers received proper burials, and many went unburied altogether 
(and thus, were exposed to further posthumous degradation). The second section reveals 
how the media depicted the war as a “human slaughter-house”—a deadly affair that was 
destroying soldiers’ bodies and minds in previously unimaginable ways; negating the 
possibility of heroic soldierly death upon the battlefield; and infecting European nations 
with a crazed desire for murder and destruction. The third section explores media 
coverage of various atrocities committed by belligerent nations during the early years of 
the war in Europe. Here, I show that such coverage tended to cast Germany and its allies 
as immoral, barbarous, and anti-Christian, but also raised troubling questions about the 
thin line between combat journalism and propaganda. The fourth section surveys the 
ways in which the media handled issues related to European mourning practices and the 
personal grief of civilians whose loved ones perished in the war. Here, I show that the 
media paid little attention to the many United States citizens who died fighting for 
European armies, a fact that indicates that, at this time, it was socially acceptable for 
Americans to pledge their allegiance to other nations. In this section I also examine 
media accounts of and public discourse surrounding the sinking of the ocean liner 
Lusitania, a scandalous event that nearly thrust the nation into battle. The fifth and final 
section analyzes public debates concerning the prospect of American belligerence and the 
sacrifice of U.S. citizen-soldiers that intervention in Europe would entail.  
The first part of this final section examines the star-spangled, jingoistic rhetoric of 
Theodore Roosevelt, presidential candidate Charles Evans Hughes, and other members of 
the military “preparedness” and pro-war lobbies who attempted to raise martial spirits 
across the country and cast the inevitable deaths of U.S. soldiers as a sacrifice that 
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patriotic Americans would willingly make in a time of war. The second part interprets the 
rhetoric of feminists, socialists, anarchists, labor unions, and other anti-war groups that 
cited the potential deaths of thousands upon thousands of U.S. citizen-soldiers as a prime 
reason not to fight. The third part of this section discusses how President Woodrow 
Wilson won the 1916 presidential election by occupying a political and rhetorical 
position somewhere between the ideologies of the pro-war and anti-war movements. To 
conclude the chapter, I argue that the uncensored media depictions of the Great War 
between 1914 and early 1917 made it patently clear to Americans that the war in Europe 
was an extremely deadly, horrific, and immoral affair that had little to do with the 
material interests of the average U.S. citizen. This uncensored view of the war helps 
explain many of the official policies and public debates concerning patriotic death, just 
killing, collective sacrifice, proper burial, and public commemoration that would emerge 
during American belligerence and the postwar years. 
2.2 “ACRES OF DEAD AND DYING” 
From its inception, the War in Europe was portrayed and understood in the United States 
as a conflict of unprecedented levels of mass death and human destruction. On August 
31, 1914, the New York Times published a front-page article by British journalist Philip 
Gibbs, who recounted an “immense slaughter of Germans” he had witnessed during an 
Allied retreat near Amiens, France. One of the earliest firsthand in-depth accounts of the 
Great War to appear in the United States, Gibbs’ report indicated that this conflict would 
entail death on such a grand scale as to make the loss of life almost indescribable. “I find 
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it difficult to piece together the various incidents and impressions and to make one 
picture,” Gibbs wrote. “It all seems to me now like a jigsaw puzzle of suffering and fear 
and courage and death.” Notwithstanding this problem of representation, Gibbs continued 
with his tale of what he had seen. He reported that despite the French “death carts trailing 
back from unknown places” past teary-eyed women and children, the retreating French 
forces had exacted a heavy toll on the advancing Germans: 
I will tell at once the story of the French retirement when the Germans 
advanced from Namur down the Valley of the Meuse, winning the way at a cost 
of human life as great as that of defeat, yet winning their way […] 
French artillery was up on the wooded heights above the river and swept 
the German regiments with a storm of fire as they advanced. On the right bank the 
French infantry was intrenched [sic], supported by field guns and militareuses, 
and did deadly work before leaping from trenches […] 
In justice to the Germans it must be said they were heroic in courage and 
reckless of their lives, and the valley of the Meuse was choked with their corpses. 
The river itself was strewn with the dead bodies of men and horses and literally 
ran red with blood.50 
 
According to Gibbs, in this modern war of attrition, the rivers, forests, and fields of 
Europe would be “strewn with the dead bodies” of victors and vanquished alike. Few 
fallen soldiers, it seemed, would receive proper burial or a peaceful resting place. 
Following the First Battle of the Marne and the German invasion of Belgium, 
shocking descriptions of corpse-riddled battlegrounds made their way onto the pages of 
American newspapers. On September 17, 1914, the Washington Post reported: “Terrible 
stories are reaching the French capital of the piles of dead and wounded which incumber 
[sic] the battlefields along the Marne. At one place the Germans built a barrier 6 feet high 
of dead, behind which to resist the French charges. This barrier finally was carried, after a 
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bloody struggle […] and a horrible litter of 7,000 bodies now marks this spot.”51 Another 
Washington Post article claimed: “At the Wavre and St. Catherine forts alone (outside of 
Antwerp) the German dead may be counted by thousands. At several points the corpses 
lie in heaps. Entire companies have been exterminated.”52 The New York Times reported 
that Flanders, Belgium, had become “a vast cemetery.” Quoting a British official 
“eyewitness,” the Times wrote: 
All the ground near the front line is plowed up with shells and furrowed 
with the remains of old trenches and graves […] 
In a sheltered spot […] there is a little graveyard where some of our own 
dead have been buried. Their graves have been carefully marked, and a rough 
square of bricks has been placed around them. In front of the trenches German 
bodies still lie thick […]  
At one point of the brickfields recently some thirty men tried to rush our 
line. At the head was a young German officer who came on gallantly, waving his 
sword. He almost reached the barbed wire and then fell dead, and lies there yet 
with his sword in his hand and all his thirty men about him. 
It is the same all along the front in this quarter. Everywhere still gray 
figures can be seen lying, sometimes several rows together and sometimes singly 
or in twos or threes.53 
 
Such reports intimated, that due to the conditions of the fighting, few corpses were 
receiving proper burial, and that the majority of soldierly remains were being left to rot in 
muddy battlefields, where they became exposed to even further degradation. On 
September 23, 1914, the Los Angeles Examiner published the following gruesome 
testimony taken from a French soldier near Amiens:  
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 We have fought over and over the same old ground until now there are 
 about ten miles of dead bodies. We go on fighting over corpses of friends and 
 enemies until the road becomes impassible […] The dead bodies. The artillery is 
 driven right over them, time and again, until a hundred have been crushed right 
 into the ground. We never need to bury them.54 
 
Eviscerated by modern munitions, then mashed into the earth by mobile artillery 
equipment, infantrymen fighting in Europe were being rendered into little more than 
actual, not metaphorical, cannon fodder and human fertilizer. The integrity of their bodies 
was wrecked until all that remained was fleshy pulp. 
As decaying dead bodies became an integral and seemingly unavoidable 
dimension of the Great War battlefield, soldiers began using the festering corpses as 
defensive fortifications, much like trench walls. The evocative image of piles of dead 
soldiers serving as ramparts for desperate compatriots became a common meme in early 
coverage of the war. Describing a scene from the Battle of Verdun, the Macon Daily 
Telegraph (Georgia) reported in a front-page article: “French machine guns and rifles for 
two days have been pouring death into the ranks of the Germans attacking in mass the 
village of Douaumont […] Each time that the fortune of battle has changed more dead 
from the thick masses of German assailants have been added in the piles behind which 
their surviving comrades have sought brief protection.”55 In a lengthy exposé titled, 
“Acres of Dead and Dying,” the Washington Post offered this firsthand account of the 
Battle of Gallipoli from British infantryman Clutha Mackenzie: 
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While acres of ground were covered up with dead and dying, the dried-up 
water courses were piled high with mounds of corpses […] 
The fighting was of the most awful character. The Turkish rifles and 
machine guns were spitting millions of bullets at us, and let me tell you, the Turk 
knows how to shoot when he is under fire. He doesn’t lose his head […]  
Our advance was marked by a trail of dead and dying. Those in the rear 
had to clamber over the piles of corpses as they moved forward. In the midst of 
this frightful tangle of maimed humanity the shells from the Turks’ big guns were 
dropping with frightful accuracy […]  
There was an explosion right in front of me that knocked me senseless and 
covered me with blood and dirt. When I came to everything was dark, and then I 
was told that both my eyes had been blown out by an exploding shell and was 
blinded for life. 
My trip to the rear was an experience of such frightfulness that I yet 
shudder to recall. Suffering the most intense pain and in absolute darkness I had 
to crawl on my hands and knees over the corpses of brave fellows who had been 
killed the day and night before. I wondered at the time whether I could consider 
myself any luckier than they. 
 
Mackenzie’s chilling statement implied that the dead outnumbered the living at Gallipoli. 
Carpeting the battlefield, the “frightful tangle of maimed humanity” had become one with 
the topography. Blinded by a Turkish shell, Mackenzie survived only by clawing through 
the ghastly “trail of dead and dying” that marked the way back to the rear and safety.56 
Antithetical to the order and tranquility of typical cemeteries and burial grounds, the 
battlefields of the Great War were hellish human sewage dumps. 
Often the heaps of human flesh were viewed not as useful defensive walls but 
rather as obstacles that had to be cleared for advancing forces. The Aberdeen Daily News 
reported that French military operations near St. Mihiel had been driven to a halt because 
the trenches and surrounding woods had become “so choked with […] huge stacks of 
dead soldiers […] The battles are of so furious a character that neither army is able to aid 
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its wounded, much less bury the dead.”57 In such cases, high explosives were used to part 
the sea of mangled flesh so that fresh troops could mount new attacks. An English 
observer stationed at Verdun reported the following scene to the Wall Street Journal: 
I could clearly see through my field glasses the Germans moving forward in mass 
 formation. Suddenly, the French guns opened and mangled  humanity was piled in 
 windrows. 
I thought the battle ended, but in a short time another line in solid 
formation was sent steadily forward and as they started to pass over the piled-up 
heaps of their dead and dying comrades, the French cannon again blazed and the 
pile of dead and wounded looked a solid wall. 
I have never dreamed of such slaughter: but the sight that followed  I think 
no man ever before saw. High explosive shells began blowing into pieces the 
masses of dead and dying. 
It seemed fiendish: I wondered that the French were so insatiated: when, 
horror of horrors: I discovered that the high explosive shells were from the 
German guns, blasting the walls of dead and dying that another line of German 
troops might pass through and execute the German order ‘Forward.’58 
 
By all measures, according to this overtly anti-German report, the armies of the World 
War had jettisoned proprieties concerning the treatment and veneration of war dead (the 
fallen, it seemed, were simply physical matter void of symbolic value). In this atrocious 
affair, belligerent forces were capable of viewing the remains of even their own soldiers 
as obstructive detritus that needed to be removed from the gears of war.59 
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This is not to say that the universal desire to identify and bury the dead properly 
had been entirely snuffed out within the theater of war. Occasionally, American 
newspapers reported on the (predominantly futile) efforts that armies took to treat the war 
dead with some semblance of respect. In April of 1915, the Washington Post announced 
that a “special sanitary commission has been appointed to disinfect and purify the 
battlefields of Western Poland on which many thousands of the dead lie either unburied, 
or else buried in dangerously shallow graves and trenches.” Equipped “for their 
unpleasant work with rubber garments and masks which sterilize the air they breathe,” 
the sanitary commission was charged with the task of opening “all the so-called 
‘brotherly graves’ in which friend and foe were buried together, and separating them 
from one another.”60 Such measures to inter the fallen, let alone those to separate the 
dead according to national affiliation, were rare and depended on a lull in the fighting, for 
in the war zone, burying the dead entailed exposing oneself to snipers, machine guns, 
stray bomb shrapnel, and the distinct possibility of joining the ranks of the departed. As 
the Columbus Enquirer-Sun (Georgia) explained in a 1914 report from Belgium, 
infantrymen were often forced to abandon impromptu battlefield burials of their 
comrades: “The French dead, in all sorts of conveyances, were a common sight and 
squares and cemeteries with unfinished graves, mute evidence of a hurried French 
retreat.”61 Usually, those who risked their lives to bury the dead during battle were deeply 
religious people for whom the sacred duty overrode considerations for personal safety. 
Such was the case with the Irish priest Father Lane-Fox, who ignored bullets passing by, 
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“hissing of death and terror,” as he dutifully buried the dead in no-man’s-land; or the 
“heroic” Christian Zouave (a North African soldier fighting for France), who, to the 
astonishment of the Germans, crawled his way to fallen comrades left between the lines 
and from his belly, dug shallow graves for them with his bayonet and fingers.62 
To offset the danger associated with battlefield burials, belligerent forces 
occasionally requested brief truces so that both sides could bury the dead.63 Such 
proposals for momentary suspensions of hostilities could be refused64 or, even more 
disturbingly, intentionally violated. In one alleged episode, British forces at Gallipoli 
acquiesced to a Turkish request for a burial truce; as British soldiers descended upon the 
battlefield to tend to their fallen, the Turks “[abused] the white flag” and “opened fire, 
killing a number of men.”65 In any event, burial truces were short, often just a few hours 
long,66 a fact that made identifying the dead correctly before interment an all but 
impossible task. And as American newspapers revealed, even when soldiers were able to 
carry out battlefield burials, their efforts were just as likely to be upturned and destroyed 
by enemy artillery as not.67 
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This chronic inability to bury the dead properly had a number of detestable and 
marked effects that were widely reported in American papers. First, and perhaps most 
obviously, it left large swaths of Europe completely covered with an unholy mix of sun 
bleached human bones and rotten human flesh; Europe’s picturesque landscapes, it 
seemed, had been polluted by mass human death. The Los Angeles Times reported that in 
Neuve Chapelle, France, “German skulls lie about like cobblestones.”68 In Louvain, 
Belgium, corpses “filled the roadways,” where “[r]iderless horses, some of them wild 
from the pain of wounds, dashed across the ground, trampling the dead.”69 On a 
battlefield near Ypres, the grisly remains of 10,000 soldiers laid exposed to the elements. 
“The stench is pestilential,” wrote the Washington Post: 
 It is ghastly beyond imagination. Words cannot portray to the mind that 
 picture by day and night—white eyes staring out of faces burned coal black by the 
 sun. There are places where there are veritable piles of bodies. As the days and 
 weeks go by they shrivel and shrink together until they look like little heaps of old 
 clothes. These silent heaps are more weird by moonlight than by day.70 
 
Unable to keep pace with the war’s production of death, soldiers watched in horror as 
wild animals gorged on the seemingly endless supply of unburied human remains. Along 
both the Eastern and Western Fronts, rats feasted upon the eviscerated and bloated 
corpses that polluted the trench mazes.71 The New York Times described the “rats, rats, 
tens of thousands of rats” that populated the battlefield at Ypres, “slinking from new 
meals on corpses […] crunching between battle lines while the rapid-firing guns mow the 
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trench edge—crunching their hellish feasts.”72 In Galicia (a contested region between 
Poland and Ukraine), crows, ravens, and dogs “running wild with hunger” ate the flesh of 
fallen Russian and German soldiers.73 In the forests of Petrograd, wolves descended upon 
a veritable banquet of unburied human carcasses.74 The living could do little but turn 
away as the dead became animal food (and excrement). 
Second, the omnipresence of unburied corpses fostered deep psychological 
distress for soldiers and other witnesses who were forced to fight and live among the vast 
human wreckage. In June of 1915, the Washington Post published a letter from a French 
infantryman who, in a voice betraying both terror and distress, described going into 
“German trenches, walking and running over dead bodies. Some were old men, some 
looked not more than 16 years, some in such curious positions they looked alive.”75 It 
was reported that many British soldiers along the Western Front had adopted the 
paranormal belief that the “bewildered” souls of unburied corpses could not escape to the 
afterlife, but rather were condemned to “hang over the battlefield where they met their 
fate” and torment the living who cowered in the trenches.76 If not actually haunted by the 
souls of unburied dead, living soldiers were surely tortured by the constant sight and 
ungodly smell of exposed corpses. Writing from a battlefield in Champagne, France, 
American correspondent E. Alexander Powell described decimated German trenches as 
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“the most horrible sight that I had ever seen or ever expect to see. This is not rhetoric, this 
is fact.” Powell recounted: 
 Going through an abandoned trench I stumbled over a mass of rags and 
 they dropped apart to disclose the headless, armless, legless torso of a man. I 
 kicked a hobnailed German boot out of my path, and from it fell a rotting foot. A 
 hand with awful, outspread fingers, thrust itself from the earth as though 
 appealing for help for its dead owner. I peered inquisitively into a dugout, only to 
 be driven back by an overpowering stench. 
 
“No wonder,” Powell concluded, “that hundreds of the German prisoners were found to 
be insane.”77 Who could blame them for their fits of madness? 
Third, it was clear that the incapacity to identify and bury war dead in a timely, 
accurate, and appropriate fashion meant that the bodily remains of many dead soldiers 
would be forever lost to the muddy battlefields and burnt forests of Europe, or, at best, 
deposited into anonymous graves. “Europe is daily becoming a vast cemetery of 
unmarked graves,” remarked the Macon Daily Telegraph, where fallen soldiers “are 
buried in trenches like dumb brutes merely to get rid of the odors arising from the 
decaying bodies. Their relatives and friends could not identify their burial places if they 
wanted to.”78 According to the Washington Post, along the Western Front, both the 
Germans and the French were struggling to identify the dead by anything more than 
nationality: “The only distinction [between German and French battlefield graves] is in 
the color of the crosses. The French are white, and the Germans are black. And on each is 
printed a number, the number of the regiment to which the dead belonged. There is 
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seldom anything else.”79 It was clear that the nature of the war was making it increasingly 
difficult to maintain the sacred coincidence between soldiers’ identities and their bodily 
remains. American readers learned that in Courdemange, France, the graves of hundreds 
of French and German soldiers were marked only by “small crosses formed of two 
broken branches of trees […] without name or number to indicate the occupants.”80 A 
reporter for the Oregonian pronounced the figurative “silence”—the lack of 
commemoration and care—that surrounded most soldiers’ burials as “unspeakably 
pathetic.” Describing the burial of two unknown French soldiers, the journalist 
empathized with the relatives of the dead, who surely craved information about the 
location of their loved ones’ remains: “Somewhere there will be French mothers and 
wives and sisters who will wonder what become of those two men. Weeks will go by 
with no word from them. They will be reported missing, but whether dead or as prisoners 
will not be stated. They will lie in their shallow grave in the field near a little Belgian 
town, with grave unmarked.” Still, the author reminded readers, identifying war dead 
properly could entail great, unexpected pain for grieving families: 
 The son-in-law of the president of the upper Rhine provinces was killed at 
 Liege. A notice of his death was sent to his relatives, and they went at once in an 
 effort to recover the body, which had been buried in a trench. I saw the widow 
 when she returned from this sad errand. Her eyes were red and swollen from 
 weeping and her father and mother were trying to console her. 
 They had found the body in a grave, lying at the bottom of a pile of six 
 other soldiers, officers and privates, and the father had identified the face of his 
 son-in-law.81 
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Though they had been lucky enough to find their loved one’s body, the family members 
were staggered by the ignoble manner in which he (and his comrades) had been interred. 
Fourth, the inability to bury the dead facilitated the spread of infectious diseases 
throughout Europe. In March of 1915, American newspapers began issuing reports that 
connected the human cesspools of the war zones to various epidemics that were 
devastating civilian populations across the continent. In a front-page article titled, “Red 
Death in Europe,” the Los Angeles Times claimed that the conditions of the Great War 
had set the stage for a type of plague not witnessed since medieval times: 
With much of continental Europe in a highly unsettled state, with fields 
and trenches drenched with blood; with shallow graves of thousands of dead 
scattered throughout the war area; with vermin and filth on every hand; with 
hundreds of thousands of wounded men being cared for in a pitifully inadequate 
way, a vast number of them having infected wounds, and with the approach of 
warm weather, and attending flies and mosquitoes, Europe may well be gravely 
apprehensive—fearful that an unprecedented plague will sweep the Old World.82 
 
In places like Serbia, where medical and mortuary supplies and staff were scarce, typhus, 
dysentery, and smallpox had created nothing short of an apocalyptic scene. “Uskub is a 
veritable valley of the shadow of death,” claimed the New York Times. 
If the tired nurses leave the crowded hospitals for a little exercise and 
fresh air they are met by a long procession of bullock wagons carrying rude 
coffins to the cemetery. Sometimes three coffins with unfastened lids rest on the 
same cart and the bodies of the dead are exposed as the wheels jolt over the rough 
pavements […] Take a large Serbian Hospital […] Details of the interior cannot 
well be printed, but may be conjectured when one mentions that fouls rags and 
dressings and even portions of amputated limbs are thrown over a wall and left to 
the attention of crows and magpies and pariah dogs. Similar refuse has been 
thrown in the river.83 
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The frightening reality was that, in less than a year, the Great War had left Serbia 
overwhelmed with rotting human remains. As the New York Times wrote in follow-up 
article: “Scarcely enough people remain unstricken to dig graves for the dead, whose 
bodies lie exposed in the cemeteries.”84 Upon returning from a tour of war torn Belgium, 
former Major Surgeon in the U.S. Army Dr. Louis Livingston Seaman told the New York 
Peace Society that soldiers were fighting and dying on soil that, for farming purposes, 
had been highly fertilized. In Seaman’s expert opinion, the rotting, unburied dead and the 
fertilized earth were combining into an unnatural concoction that would surely produce 
lethal epidemics the likes of which had not been seen in modern history.85 In seemingly 
every corner of Europe, the war had incapacitated nations’ abilities to bury their dead 
(civilian and military alike) properly. In turn, the exposed corpses facilitated the spread of 
disease, thus ensuring that more bodies would be added to the piles. In this tortuous 
arena, death begot death. In contrast to the apparent hellish decay of the “Old World,” the 
“New World” (the United States) must have seemed downright sanitized, orderly, and, 
perhaps, even heavenly. 
As reports of the Great War’s immense tax on human life became increasingly 
common, strange ideas about death, the human body, and gender politics in Europe began 
to circulate in American public discourse. For instance, in May of 1915, newspapers 
reported that Albert Oppenheim of Marietta, Ohio, a leading member of the Western 
Nitroglycerin Manufacturers’ Association, was advocating the use of the bodies of men 
killed on European battlefields for the mass production of glycerin. Oppenheim believed 
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that the War in Europe was depleting the world’s supply of glycerin, an essential element 
of explosives, and leaving various American industries in peril: 
If the glycerin is entirely used up, [Oppenheim] said, it will have not only 
an important effect on the war, but much work, such as the development of oil 
wells, will be stopped […] 
“No explosive aside from nitroglycerin has the shattering effect necessary 
for shooting oil wells,” said Mr. Oppenheim. 
“Glycerin is produced from but one source—animal sinews—and there is 
no way of increasing the production unless we can make use of the bodies of the 
horses and men killed on the field of battle.”86 
 
At once profane, cynical, unemotional, and morbidly practical, Oppenheim’s vision to 
turn dead soldiers into explosives that could be used on the oil fields of Texas and the 
killing fields of Europe reflected the perverse reality that the War in Europe was creating 
an excess (and untapped resource) of dead human flesh. 
While people like Oppenheim were concerned with the impact that mass death 
was having on certain global industries, others speculated about its potential effects on 
gender roles and norms in Europe. Less than a year into the war, some belligerent nations 
had begun replenishing their depleted infantry forces with women, placing, as one 
newspaper put it, “Amazons in the field” of battle.87 Others had begun “prostituting” 
their social institutions of marriage and motherhood in the “interest of repopulation”: the 
Miami Herald reported that to “replace the men rotting in unmarked graves on European 
battle fields, Germany, France and England [are urging] women to marry. Marry; never 
mind inclination or affection; marry, and breed.”88 As the extreme loss of male citizen-
soldiers became increasingly apparent, some speculated that women would come to 
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dominate European politics and civic life after the war. Citing the “staggering cost” of 
human life in the Great War—a war in which casualty lists made the carnage at 
Gettysburg seem “paltry”—editors at the San Jose Evening News bluntly claimed that in 
post-war Europe “there will be left only the men inferior in physique, and the women.” 
As a result, the newspaper argued, women would inevitably use “their superior numbers 
and superior powers [to] take over the management of the nations.” Thus, the editors 
promised, “The spectacle awaits us of all Europe being in the hand of the women.”89 For 
Americans who opposed women’s enfranchisement, this notion must have been 
troubling. “The noted psychologist” Dr. Hans Huldricksen publicly argued that this return 
to the “matriarchate” might be a positive development for the Western World: “In the 
most primitive literature there is no suggestion that woman was an inferior, treated with 
contempt and cruelty as she has been during a large part of our civilized history […] 
There is, therefore, good philosophical ground for arguing that a return to the primitive 
matriarchal condition would within reasonable limits be a victory for justice and 
morality.”90 Whatever lay ahead, such media reports indicated a general consensus of 
opinion that the war’s tax on human life would plunge European nations into a bizarre 
and unfamiliar future. 
In time, the World War degenerated into a network of bloody stalemates along 
continuous fronts in France, Russia, northern Italy, northern Greece, northeastern Turkey, 
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and even Mesopotamia and Palestine.91 As millions of men from around the world 
perished in this total war of attrition, U.S. newspapers kept track of each nation’s casualty 
reports and like morbid scoreboards, presented the incredible figures to the American 
public. On March 12, 1917, just weeks before American entry into the war, the Los 
Angeles Times reported the “appalling” number of casualties suffered by the belligerent 
armies: “More than 10,000,000 are recorded as killed, wounded, captured or missing in 
the European war.” In less than three years, at least five million soldiers had died in the 
conflict, while another five million had been permanently wounded, captured by the 
enemy, or lost in the havoc of war. “These figures are admittedly only approximate and 
in some instances necessarily several weeks old,” the Times stated. “They are not called 
exact in any sense, but are known to be so nearly so as to give a fairly reliable picture of 
the war’s results.”92 The picture painted was dismal indeed. As we will see, when the 
United States eventually entered in the war in 1917, the picture would to be erased and 
redrawn to suit the needs of the government and military and ameliorate the anxieties of 
soldiers’ families. 
2.3 “THE HUMAN SLAUGHTER-HOUSE” 
In 1913, a German schoolmaster named Wilhelm Lamszus published a prophetic book 
that foretold the horror, madness, and savagery of the impending European war. Titled, 
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The Human Slaughter-House: Scenes from the War That Is Sure to Come, the book 
chronicles the experiences of a young German soldier who, after witnessing the grisly 
effects of modern warfare upon the human body and mind, quickly goes insane. In one 
particularly haunting passage, the main character and his comrades come upon an enemy 
soldier who has emerged from a mine explosion: 
He stumbles upright into the trenches and tumbles, sobbing and howling, 
among our rifles. He strikes out at us with hands and feet. He is crying and 
struggling like a child, and yet no man dares go up to him, for now he is rising on 
his knee, and then we see! Half his face has been torn away, one eye gone, the 
twitching muscle of the cheek is hanging down […] he is kneeling and opening 
and closing his hands, and is howling to us for mercy […] We gaze at him horror-
stricken, and are paralyzed […] then at length the yokel—and our eyes thank him 
for it—raises the butt of his rifle and places the muzzle against the sound temple. 
Bang! And the maimed wreckage falls over backward and lies still in his blood. 
 
In an act of “mercy,” the fictive Germans execute the disfigured enemy soldier like a 
rabid dog. Following this encounter and a series of similarly disturbing vignettes, the 
German unit meets its brutal end on an impassable minefield. Showered with the bodily 
remains of his friends, the book’s protagonist finally crosses the threshold into madness: 
I raise my hand to my eyes. It is red and moist. Blood is flowing over my 
white hand. Then I realize it, the white thing under me, is not a heap of sand. I 
have been sitting on a corpse. Horror-stricken, I rush about, and one is lying over 
there too, and there, and there! Merciful God! I see it plainly now; there are only 
dead tonight. The human race died out this very night. I am the last survivor. The 
fields are dead—the woods dead—the villages dead—the cities dead—the earth is 
dead—the earth was butchered tonight, and I, only I, have escaped the slaughter 
house. 
 
With this final damning realization, the young German raises a pistol to his head and 
pulls the trigger. 
Shortly after its publication, The Human Slaughter-House was banned by German 
authorities, who claimed that the book “would tend to arouse a horror of war in the 
laboring classes and make them refuse to perform their military service.” As the drums of 
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war beat louder throughout Europe, the conservative press in Germany denounced the 
author as “a peril to the public safety,” and Lamszus was removed from his position as a 
state schoolmaster. Despite these acts of suppression, The Human Slaughter-House was 
celebrated by pacifist groups, was translated into English, and became an international 
bestseller. By the outbreak of the European War in July 1914, at least 300,000 copies of 
the book had been sold. On August 30, 1914, the Washington Post reviewed Lamszus’ 
book and praised it as an accurate picture of the “dreadful” war in Europe.93 Indeed, the 
brutal realities of the Great War would prove to mirror—and in many ways, exceed—
Lamszus’ apocalyptic visions. 
From the beginning, the European War was portrayed to Americans as something 
akin to a “human slaughter-house” that mutated once noble and civilized soldiers into 
something like crazed savages who cared little for either the living or the dead. On 
October 8, 1914, the Washington Post published its conversation with Col. Webb C. 
Hayes of the U.S. Army (and son of former President Rutherford B. Hayes), who had 
recently returned from an expedition to the front lines in Belgium and northern France. 
“When I left Havre,” Hayes said, “the allies were fearful that they would not be able to 
penetrate the German line through the mass of dead men and horses on the battlefields, 
which, unfortunately, the combatants seem not to heed about burying.” Describing the 
war zone as one big “sausage grinder,” Hayes reported that “the stench is horrible, and 
the idea of climbing over the bodies must be revolting, even to brave soldiers.” Hayes 
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was a grizzled veteran of the Spanish-American War who was familiar with the 
tribulations and terror of combat, yet he was profoundly disturbed by the incoherent 
spectacles of death he saw on the European battlefields: “The battle front these days is far 
different from what it used to be. There are few men to be seen and practically no guns. 
All are concealed. Shrapnel flies through the air and bursts. That is the scene most of the 
time.” When asked if he would return to the Front to continue observing military 
operations, Hayes responded: “Does any one wish to visit a slaughter house a second 
time?”94 His question required no answer. 
As the conflict unfolded into a ceaseless war of attrition, the combatant nations 
stepped up their production and implementation of unconventional armaments and 
modern war machines in hope of breaking the enemy’s will. In the United States, the 
press reported on the development, use, and physical and psychological effects of gas 
shells, “liquid fire,” “monstrous sharks of steel” (submarines), and “man-made vultures 
of air” (fighter planes) with a morbid fascination.95 On January 25, 1915, the New York 
Times described a French medical report on “soldiers killed by the wind of shells, shock 
of explosion, gaseous fumes, [and] nervous disturbance.” Quoting a French military 
doctor, the Times wrote: 
Dr. Sencert states that a soldier, brought to the hospital affected by a big 
shell bursting within a yard, though unwounded presented signs of graves 
disturbance, face pale and anxious, nose pinched, eyes hollow, respiration rapid 
and superficial, pulse faint and frequent […] Despite treatment he died a few 
hours later. An autopsy showed the lungs and stomach full of blood, which came 
from a large rupture in each lung. These were due to air pressure, resultant from 
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the explosion, which forced into the lungs a greater volume of air than was 
endurable.96 
 
The Washington Post reported that the constant barrages of high explosive shells along 
the Eastern and Western Fronts were having a “demoralizing effect” on troops from both 
sides, whose nerves were “turning to water.”97 In March of 1915, the New York Times 
announced that the Germans had begun using “liquid fire” against French forces in the 
Argonne territory of France. Quoting a traumatized survivor of one of the first attacks, 
the Times stated that “the Germans squirted liquid flame into the French trenches,” then 
set the Frenchmen on fire with “a rain of incendiary bombs, grenades and torches.” At 
least one hundred and fifty French soldiers were incinerated in the unholy pyre.98 German 
flesh was just as combustible: at Verdun, French flamethrowers rendered unlucky 
German victims into “formless heap[s] of blackened ashes, from which all vestige of 
humanity […] departed.”99 An American who had served with a Canadian regiment in 
France described the experience of being gassed to the New York Times: “A crawling 
yellow cloud […] pours in upon you […] gets you by the throat and shakes you as a huge 
mastiff might shake a kitten […] your eyes starting from their sockets […] your face 
turned yellow-green.”100 The Washington Post remarked: “On both sides men are being 
shot into pieces of palpitating meat […] blown into separate parts of what was once a 
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human body; being stifled by poisonous gases; incinerated by liquid fire.”101 In this 
conflict, the act of killing the enemy—the immemorial purpose of war—involved not 
only taking the life out of warriors’ bodies, but also subjecting their bodies to theretofore-
unimagined levels of torture and dismemberment.  
Such textual depictions of the war were reinforced and substantiated by countless 
fictional and documentary films shown in “motion picture theatres” across the country. In 
Columbus, Georgia, the Bonita Theatre screened “the special four-part war drama” War 
is Hell, which revealed to audiences “the horrors of modern warfare in Europe today.”102 
The Duluth News-Tribune (Minnesota) reviewed a popular seven-part documentary that 
offered American moviegoers “real pictures of real fighting” from “every phase and 
feature of the war on land and sea and in the air.” Released by the British government in 
an effort to drum up war relief funds, the uncensored film’s harrowing images were “vital 
and vivid with a grim desperate realism which cannot be simulated”: 
 As everyone who has seen them must know, they are amazingly frank. 
 They show a charge out of the trenches, where a man falls as he reaches the 
 parapet, tries to claw his way up and sprawls on his face. They show a rush 
 through the barbed wire, at least three soldiers dropping as they run. There is, too, 
 a picture of a wounded soldier—title admits that he died half an hour afterward—
 being carried out, all limp, with the passing of his soul. 
 
According to the News-Tribune, the film was so viscerally disturbing that audience 
members at one screening had left the theater “midway of the second reel, unable longer 
to control their emotions.”103 Mass-produced and distributed to big cities and small 
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hamlets alike, such films disseminated the idea that this disastrous war was rendering 
death in ways and at levels unparalleled by previous conflicts. 
As the War in Europe progressed, American newspapers reported that both sides 
had begun firing “dum-dum” bullets at each other. Developed by the British in India to 
suppress “fanatical savages,” but banned by The Hague in 1899, this soft-nosed, 
expanding slug was notorious for its ravaging effects upon the human body. The 
Washington Post revealed that the “dum-dum” bullet “refuses to go straight but slashes 
and tears its way through the flesh and vitals of whatever object it happens to hit.” 
Instead of leaving a small clean hole that could be more easily addressed by field 
surgeons, the “dum-dum” bullet “plunges sideways,” “ruptures blood vessels for a 
considerable distance around its wound,” “[tears] up tissue and [breaks] bones,” and 
“delivers a tremendous shock […] men go down when hit as if struck by lighting.” Often, 
soldiers who witnessed the ghastly effects of the “dum-dum” bullet upon the bodies of 
the dead and dying were traumatized at the sight. Thus, weapons used in the World War 
could inflict both physical and long-lasting psychological damage upon enemy 
combatants.104 
The psychological terror associated with the dum-dum bullet, flamethrower, and 
grenade, however, paled in comparison to the general fear surrounding the new, long-
range “big guns,” which both sides used to rain death upon the enemy at unprecedented 
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rates.105 An American doctor volunteering for the French Red Cross described the 
“awful” effects of heavy artillery to the Washington Post: “I saw hundreds of men torn to 
pieces in a few seconds […] It was like the work of an unseen hand. I could see the ranks 
filled one moment and the next a gaping hole had been torn out and 50 men had 
disappeared.”106 For infantrymen pinned beneath the scant protection of trench walls, the 
knowledge that one could be wiped from the earth without an instant’s notice was 
maddening. A French Canadian veteran told the New York Times: “The soldier in the 
trench never knows when he may be blown into small pieces—and that is why we always 
preferred to risk uncertain dangers between the lines at night, instead of lying down in the 
wet trench, helplessly waiting for death.”107 The futility of such risks, the inability to 
confront or hide from enemy guns, and the random luck of surviving the enemy’s 
ceaseless bomb attacks indicated that there was little possibility within this war for the 
average soldier (who was more or less rendered impotent by the long-range guns) to die 
heroically upon the battlefield. 
The atrocious weapons, tactics, and circumstances of the Great War produced not 
only dead bodies, but also countless injured soldiers who required immediate emergency 
medical care (and who, if fortunate enough to survive, would permanently display their 
injuries as evidence of the violence that had taken the lives of so many comrades). 
Throughout the first few years of the conflict, American newspapers offered readers 
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explicit descriptions of the war’s effects upon soldiers’ bodies and dramatic accounts of 
the risky procedures that doctors performed to save the wounded. On December 13, 1914, 
the Idaho Daily Statesman ran a story about American surgeons volunteering in German 
hospitals along the Russian border. The front-page article described the general condition 
of disfigured German soldiers the Americans encountered: 
Here are gathered men who were worn, haggard and suffering long before 
they were wounded. Many of them had not removed their clothing for four or five 
weeks, and had slept in mud and filth. Water was scarce and food scarcer. A large 
number lay on the fields for a day or two after being injured before receiving 
medical attention. Following then by journeys of a day or more in jolting 
peasants’ carts and three or four days nerve-racking riding on railway trains until 
the base hospitals finally were reached… These delays caused at least 90 percent 
of the wounds to become infected, making the problems of the surgeons more 
difficult. 
 
The article stated that although the American doctors preferred to use bone and skin 
grafting methods to save damaged limbs, the conditions of the Eastern Front had forced 
them to become butchers that spent their days lopping off gangrenous hands, arms, feet, 
and legs (a terrifying phenomenon that had been common during the American Civil 
War).108 Of course, the act of amputating an injured limb was often perilous for soldiers, 
who could easily die from shock. On January 8, 1916, the Washington Post published an 
article on the death of “Gen. Serret, who was in command of one of the divisions of the 
French army in the Vosges.” Having suffered a leg wound in battle, the general was taken 
to a French hospital. “It was necessary to amputate a leg,” the Post reported, but “the 
general did not recover from the shock” of the operation.109 Thus, it was clear that even 
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officers, who presumably received the best medical care, could perish from the “shock” 
associated with battlefield surgery. 
Doctors in the battle zones were also routinely confronted with a peculiar type of 
injury that had no known medical cure: “shell shock.” In a November 7, 1915, article 
titled, “What Shell Shock Is,” the Washington Post described the baffling epidemic that 
was incapacitating legions of soldiers along the fronts: “When a big shell explodes it 
creates a sudden a very great pressure in the surrounding air. This pressure causes ‘shell 
shock.’” The Post stated that victims of shell shock “become temporarily deaf, dumb and 
blind. In nearly ever case, indeed, the eyesight is affected, and does not become normal 
until months after […] There have been a number of cases, too, where soldiers have lost 
their memory owing to shell shock, and are unable to recognize any of their friends.” The 
Post reported that although doctors were unable to explain the physiological effects of 
shell shock, “the cure is chiefly a matter of time, the body slowly coming back, as it 
were, to its normal state.”110 The technologies of killing employed in the European War 
led not only to ruptured flesh, muscle, and bone, but also to unprecedented, frightening, 
and invisible interior injuries that had no known clinical explanations or treatments. In 
this strange war, a soldier could go deaf, dumb, or blind even if his ears, tongue, or eyes 
had not been shot or lopped off.  
Although makeshift hospitals throughout Europe provided some measures of 
healing, refuge, and hope for wounded and dying soldiers, even these temporary clinics 
were susceptible to accidental bombings or targeted attacks in what had become a total 
war without limits. Though lucky to receive any medical attention at all, injured soldiers 
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became sitting ducks when their respective hospitals came under fire. In a particularly 
visceral account of the perils of wartime medicine, the New York Times published the 
words of a young German stretcher-bearer, who had tended to German and French 
soldiers alike in an improvised hospital: 
A soldier asks for a drink; as he rises with hand stretched out for a glass of 
water, a bullet comes through the window and strikes him full in the heart. The 
poor fellow sinks without a sigh. Most of the wounded are taken away in a lull of 
the combat […] An adjutant, terribly wounded, begs to be put into the cart […] 
Scarcely is he laid there when shrapnel bursts over him, killing him […] A 
wounded man in the kitchen calls me. Struck by a ball in the chest, the poor 
fellow pants for breath. He is supporting himself by one arm, which slips on the 
bloody straw […] Raising my eyes to the ceiling, I see the plaster break into a 
huge star, and through the gaping hole the end of a great shell appears. The 
ceiling sinks funnel-wise; at the same moment the roof cracks and the shell 
explodes. Then all is dark. Presently, I come to myself, half suffocated with dust 
and the fumes of dynamite. The house is riven from top to bottom, and we can see 
the calm blue sky through the broken roof. Nearly all of us are bleeding. The poor 
[soldier] is dead, disfigured.111 
 
What madness, that even the dying were not left to suffer in peace, to die in dignity. No, 
in this war, a dying soldier was just as much a target as a healthy one. In this war, not 
even the process of dying would be respected. 
The safest hospitals were those in major cities far from the war zones. However, 
for a soldier to be treated at an institution in Berlin, London, or Paris, it meant that he had 
suffered injuries of the most serious and (in all likelihood) gruesome of kind. Throughout 
the war’s early years, American newspapers routinely offered detailed clinical 
descriptions of what occurred in such medical centers, often conveying both a sense of 
wonderment at the miracles of twentieth century medicine and a sense of unease over 
these Frankensteinian-like workshops. For example, on September 24, 1916, the 
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Washington Post published a long article on English hospitals that specialized in “face 
mending” and treating “the mutilating effects of modern war.” At Hammersmith 
Hospital, doctors tended to “‘claw hand’ ‘trench foot’ and the innumerable limb 
deformities which are caused by gunshot wounds” by grafting bones, applying special 
steel splints, and administering “electrical treatment.” The Post described how at 
Wandsworth Common, “Lietenant Derwent Wood exercises his ingenuity as a sculptor in 
patching up damaged faces with copper masks painted flesh-color, and when necessary, 
with imitation eyelashes and mustaches.” Another London hospital specialized in 
experimental treatments of nerve damage: 
A little while ago, there was a patient who had had part of his arm shot 
away, so that the nerve was missing over four inches. In these circumstances to 
pick up the ends of the nerves and unite them was impossible. The surgeon who 
had the case in hand made inquiries at other hospitals in London, and he found 
that at one of them a man was to have a leg amputated at 3:30 o’clock the same 
afternoon. Orders were issued so that the moment the limb was severed it was put 
in a saline bath and taken to the military hospital in a taxicab. The patient at the 
military hospital being under anesthesia, his damaged arm was opened and piece 
of healthy nerve from the other patient’s amputated leg was substituted for the 
injured portion. The operation was completely successful, the patient recovering 
the use of his hand which had been paralyzed. 
 
Acknowledging the disturbing undertones associated with these vignettes of “copper 
masks painted flesh-color” and taxicab deliveries of freshly amputated body parts, the 
Post reassured the public that due to developments in anesthesia and pain relief, “modern 
science has robbed [these procedures] of most of their terror” and given the average 
patient a new lease on life.112 
Still, such stories of human mutilation must have been at least slightly distressing 
for American readers who lived in regions where the rights and public presence of 
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disabled people were actively suppressed by the so-called “ugly law.” Established in 
1867 by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors to prohibit injured soldiers of the Civil 
War from begging on city streets, the “ugly law” eventually spread to every corner of the 
nation: from Portland Oregon, to New Orleans; from Denver to the entire state of 
Pennsylvania; from Cleveland to Lincoln, Nebraska. The “ugly law” is perhaps best 
represented by Chicago’s version (passed in 1881), which decreed: “Any person who is 
diseased, maimed, mutilated, or in any way deformed, so as to be an unsightly or 
disgusting object, or an improper person to be allowed in or on the streets, highways, 
thoroughfares, or public places in this city, shall not therein or thereon expose himself to 
public view, under the penalty of a fine of $1 for each offense.” Such ordinances 
classified disabled people as unsightly “objects” that were to be removed from “public 
view.” Seemingly designed to decongest city sidewalks, the “ugly law” enabled the 
government and big business (in the words of scholar Susan M. Schweik) “to position 
disability and begging as individual problems rather than relating them to broader social 
inequalities.” In an era devoid of social safety nets and compensation for injuries 
sustained on the job, such laws had helped condition the American public to judge 
maimed veterans, injured workers, and disabled beggars with condescension, repulsion, 
and fear.113 
The reality that the European War was transforming countless young soldiers into 
disfigured “objects” surely presented a problem for American elites who envisioned the 
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United States’ eventual participation in the war. The American public was well aware of 
the war’s destructive impacts upon soldiers’ bodies. But the same polis had been 
conditioned to harbor a deep prejudice against the disabled. How, then, would the 
American public react if the government called their sons, fathers, brothers, and husbands 
to fight in Europe? How could the public be convinced to participate in a war that would 
surely leave so many American men maimed, broken, and “ugly?” 
Perhaps in a concerted effort to cope with this dilemma, American newspapers 
began reclassifying the horrendous damage inflicted upon soldiers’ bodies as (what I call) 
“patriotic injuries.” On April 2, 1916, the Philadelphia Inquirer described an emotional 
reunion between wounded French soldiers and their families at a Paris train station in 
such terms: 
At the door through which they pass stands a galaxy of officers and 
civilians of note, who salute and lift their hats to the homecomers. One fellow, 
wheeled along in a chair, with a leg and an arm missing, manages to hold onto a 
large French flag. It is frayed at the edges and much faded. It partly covers his 
body and the missing leg. He draws a solemn salute and a tear as he passes […]  
A soldier holds his sweetheart, but sees her not, for he is blind forever, so 
he feels her faces and smiles. A woman rushes into a soldier’s arms and suddenly 
recoils to make doubly sure of his identity. Part of his face has been shot away. 
But he can see, and he stands up and throws his arms about her. He can only 
mumble indistinctly from a semblance of a mouth. But he does his best […]  
The speaker is a notable from the War Office and a well known patriot 
among the people. He arises at the end of a table in a far corner of the room and 
bows low before his compatriots. He comes to thank his friends, his brothers, he 
says, for their service to the country. Their sacrifices have been for France, for 
those they love, for others, and the thought is a just compensation […] Here and 
there are soldiers who smile as they wave the little flags […] They have sacrificed 
their all, but it has been for France, their country, and there is cause for pride in 
that! Such is the spirit of the French people.114 
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The French, it seemed, had learned to accept the war’s toll upon the soldier’s body—to 
embrace maimed soldiers as living representations of patriotic sacrifice.115 In a similar 
vein, the Washington Post published an article on September 17, 1916, that discussed 
Germany’s efforts to rehabilitate its “war-maimed heroes.” Reporting from the Oscar-
Helene Home in Berlin, the Post detailed the hospital’s efforts to train disfigured soldiers 
and reintroduce them into German society as useful workers. The Post wrote of one 
Sergeant Neumann: “The bone of his forearm had been completely shattered, but the 
surgeons had saved his hand and a leather case held arm and hand together and with his 
crippled hand he was weaving a beautiful sofa cushion.” The Post chronicled how 
“young war heroes” were trained to use their newly affixed “ball-bearing working arms” 
to build tables and even their own bowling alley. “1916 will produce no more war 
crippled beggars,” the Post opined. “The days are past when cripples have to beg for 
food, when they must dance for alms.”116 Such portrayals of the living wounded worked 
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to reorient the American public’s perception of permanently injured soldiers, not as 
frightful embodiments of destitution, but rather as symbolic representations of patriotic 
sacrifice. This transvaluation of the crippled soldier’s body, arguably crucial to 
motivating American participation in the war, would eventually be advanced and codified 
by the establishment of the Purple Heart following the close of the war (in essence, the 
Purple Heart would be an official coping mechanism for the wartime reality of bodily 
destruction). 
As the “sausage grinder” devolved into a bloody, attritional deadlock along the 
Western and Eastern Fronts, it came to light that soldiers in the trenches were suffering 
deep psychological wounds. Reporting from the Battle of the Somme, the Washington 
Post described a “man, mother naked” who “raced round in a circle” upon the battlefield, 
“laughing boisterously” until an “impartial bullet went through his forehead” and “he fell 
headlong to the earth.”117 Sometimes drawing upon the terminology of Freudian 
psychology,118 American newspapers reported with great fervor the war’s “marked 
neurotic effect” upon once sane men. In an article published in the Idaho Daily 
Statesman, French military surgeon Henri Bourget claimed that “nerve racking insanity 
[is] breeding nightmares that banish sleep” from soldiers living and fighting in the 
trenches. Bourget described one French soldier who had to be awoken from a violent 
night terror: 
 I asked him what the dream was […]  
“I could see the country in front of me exactly as you see it now,” he said. 
“About fifty yards from there is a dead German lying on his back with his right 
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arm stretched stiffly up toward the sky, and around him are twenty or thirty 
bodies.” 
“You mean you saw them in your dream?” I asked. 
“I saw them in my dream, yes,” he said, “but they are there. They are part 
of a charge from the German trenches this morning. If you will look through the 
observing glass you will see them.” 
I looked through the glass and sure enough there they were, a number of 
bodies with one corpse near their centre. This dead man’s right arm was rigidly 
stretched upward in one of those uncanny, terrible attitudes in which the violent 
death of the battlefield fixes some of its victims […] 
“As I stood there, in my dream, I saw the dead German with the 
outstretched arm begin slowly to rise. He stood, dead, with his arm still stretched 
upward as you see it. And slowly all the dead men around him began to get up. 
Then they began to advance upon me, led by this man with the rigid arm. Some of 
them had their faces shot off. Some of them had no arms; their bodies were 
mangled. Still I could not move […] I awoke to find you beside me. I will not 
sleep again.” 
 
Bourget claimed that this dream was common among troops from both sides. So too was 
the sight of “sleeping men wandering behind the lines with arms outstretched and terror 
depicted on their faces.”119 It seemed that by day soldiers butchered each other; by night 
they piteously struggled with the traumatic memories of what they had done and seen. 
Participants in a ceaseless program of death, decay, and mutilation, soldiers of the 
World War were turning into monsters capable of inflicting the worst cruelties upon foes 
and allies alike. U.S. newspapers published lectures from prestigious American scientists, 
who, monitoring the conflict from afar, analyzed the “profound alterations in soldiers’ 
characters and thoughts after they have faced the terrors of battle” and explained the 
European War’s “‘throw-back’ to primitive emotions and ideas.”120 On October 26, 1916, 
the Idaho Daily Statesman published a vivid letter sent home by a “Boise boy” 
volunteering in the British Expeditionary Force. In one of the few letters from American 
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volunteers that slipped past British censors, the young soldier described the Western 
Front as “several kinds of hell.” He wrote: “I have faced death in every form […] Been 
talking to a man, and the next instant his head was blown off.” The young man knew that 
such events had drastically altered his very nature: “I shall never be the same; my nerves 
are in a rotten state now—I don’t mean I am frightened, but when I come through a 
charge I look like some hunted beast, and I look much older than when I first came out 
here.” The traumatic circumstances of the war had also shattered the collective 
conscience of his unit: “We lived for days in a German trench we captured, with dead 
bodies all around us, and the smell was terrible. You can’t trust [a German] one inch, 
even when he surrenders; and so I leave it to your imagination—we don’t take many 
risks.”121 It seemed that the conditions of the European War could even transform apple-
cheeked American boys into grizzled executioners.  
Similar stories of merciless killing and feverish bloodlust appeared in newspapers 
across the nation. In March of 1915, the Kansas City Star wrote of a French victory along 
the Western Front. French soldiers came upon a “few remaining Prussians [who] threw 
themselves on their knees. ‘Comrades! Comrades!’ they cried, but the carnage was on, 
and the bayonets and rifles did their terrible work, butchering the last with awful 
cries.”122 In May of 1916, the Los Angeles Times published a report about a French 
reprisal attack against German forces near Verdun. Covered with the “horrible fragments 
of [their comrades’] torn flesh,” a decimated French unit managed to overtake a German 
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trench, where they bayoneted their helpless foes to death as they would “rats.”123 In this 
hateful war, no quarter would be given to the enemy. Kill or be killed was the way. 
Americans also learned that the war had driven soldiers to enact what seemed to 
be insane and barbaric practices against their own compatriots. For instance, on 
December 31, 1916, the Duluth News-Tribune reported that the British army had begun 
punishing derelict soldiers with “crucifixion.” Applied to infantrymen for even the 
slightest offenses (such as losing one’s gas mask), “crucifixion” entailed “tying a man to 
the wheel of a wagon or to a tree and leaving him there for some time, usually two 
hours.” The article quoted British General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, who attempted to 
rationalize this abuse: “The civilian experiences possibly a sense of shock at learning that 
punishment of this kind has to be inflicted at the front, but were he in the army he would 
realize that the most essential thing of all in the face of the enemy is the absolute 
maintenance of discipline.”124 In other instances, soldiers from both sides had been 
known to kill fellow countrymen who had gone “crazy” in the trenches so as to “become 
a menace to their own comrades and officers.”125 Infantrymen, it seemed, were to be cogs 
in the grand instrument of killing. Those who proved to be imperfect would be 
barbarically refined through torture or, in some cases, simply put down like rabid dogs. 
It was evident that the madness that had infected soldiers of the war had overtaken 
civilian populations throughout Europe as well. Just three months into the conflict, Irish 
playwright George Bernard Shaw felt compelled to publish an essay in the New York 
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Times that railed against a growing public sentiment in England that the Allied Forces 
should try to kill every German woman so that the “Teutons” might be completely 
destroyed, once and for all. “[I]t would be too horrible,” Shaw asserted. “[L]ife would be 
unbearable if people did such things.”126 In September of 1914, the Columbus Enquirer-
Sun told the story of a mob of citizens in Rheims, France, who attacked a small group of 
wounded German prisoners. Having raised their rifles to shoot, they would have mowed 
the Germans down were it not for the intervention of “a little priest, the Abbe Andreiux.” 
Standing between the French mob and the helpless prisoners, the cleric pleaded: “Don’t 
fire. You will make yourselves as guilty as they are.”127 That same day, the New York 
Times reported that the German army had been “willed” to destroy most of the Belgian 
city of Louvain because local citizens would not cease shooting German soldiers from the 
windows of their homes.128 In April of 1915, the Times described how “Serbian civilians 
cut off the forearms and legs below the knees of a Hungarian hussar and placed him on a 
horse, which was chased round amid the applause of the people.” Perhaps worse than 
that, the same group “bored a hole in a soldier’s chest, then [drew] a rope through it, and 
hanged him in this way on a tree, afterward lighting a fire under him.”129 In every corner 
of Europe, it seemed, basic social moralities had been replaced by the frenzied, state-
sponsored pursuit of almost-orgiastic mob violence. Reflecting on such events, Father 
James McGolrick of the Cathedral of the Sacred Heart in Duluth, Minnesota, told his 
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congregation: “Europe’s present war would indicate that many of the so-called Christian 
nations had lost their spirit of Christianity.”130 This was putting it mildly. 
By 1916, an uncontrollable desire to kill the enemy had permeated European 
civilian life to such a point that a peaceful resolution of the war seemed impossible. “It is 
said that if any man in London seriously proposed peace he would be hung to the nearest 
lamppost,” the Wall Street Journal announced in a front-page article. “The French are 
crazy with war passion and demand not only success for their side, but revenge across the 
line.”131 On February 10, 1916, the Philadelphia Inquirer reported that editors at the 
Manchester Guardian were so disgusted by the violent attitudes of their fellow citizens 
that they had begun to publish entreaties against the “competitive butchery of women and 
children” and urged that “England and her allies refrain from barbarism and fight out the 
war along civilized lines.” Sadly, the Inquirer stated, the Guardian’s message represented 
only a “minority sentiment.”132 Fearing that such attitudes were leading to the “suicide of 
Europe,” Pope Benedict exhorted Catholics of every European nation to “redeem the 
sins” of war and “appease divine justice” by rededicating themselves to “works of 
Christian piety.”133 Sadly, Pope Benedict’s appeals for peace had little effect, as civilians 
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throughout Europe had become integral and willing participants of the World War now 
capable of the cruelest of acts.134 
The horror, savagery, and insanity of the war’s early years were perhaps best 
displayed in the writings of the few non-government-affiliated, international journalists 
who managed to gain access to the trenches. On December 10, 1916, the Washington 
Post published a long dispatch from reporter Granville Fortescue, who recounted an 
apocalyptic vision of the Battle of the Somme: 
Out on the battlefield the waste of war is framed in a still more desolate 
setting. Half the scene is shut in by a naked forest of rotting ghostlike trees. They 
rise as withered braken from the sodden soil. As far as the eye can see this soil is 
ulcerated with shell holes filled with reeking, viscid slime. Mixed in that slime is 
all the debris of war, broken rifles, casques, shells, clothing, bayonets, hand 
grenades, cartridge pouches, winged bombs, buried and rotting in the mud. 
Other hideous things are buried here. I see a gray-green repulsive form 
sprawling at the bottom of a shell hole. Passing through the trenches, heavy boots 
stick out from the trench wall, half blocking the path. Skeleton hands snatch at 
me. In the end, here is the real business of war.135 
 
Fortescue’s distressing portrait of the “business” of the Great War was something akin to 
Dante’s and Hieronymus Bosch’s respective, well-known depictions of Hell. However, in 
Dante’s Inferno and Bosch’s Garden of Earthly Delights, violence is strictly ordered and 
regulated—punishments are designed to match the sins. In the battlefields of Europe, 
however, the ghastly, man-made carnage and immolation of human flesh appeared to 
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exceed all previous images of a world abandoned by God. In time, American citizen-
soldiers would find themselves in the trenches of this forsaken terrain. 
2.4 “AN UNQUENCHABLE THIRST FOR BLOOD” 
As the American public monitored the war from the other side of the Atlantic, it became 
clear that the great “human slaughter-house” was quickly rupturing previously held 
notions of the moral boundaries of state-sponsored warfare. It seemed that as the Allied 
Nations and Central Powers became ever more entrenched in the conflict, the values of 
honor, decency, and compassion increasingly vanished from European consciousness. 
Throughout the first year of the war, authorities from both sides accused each other of 
facilitating the wanton torture and murder of wounded and captured soldiers. Germany 
provided evidence to the international press that French soldiers had mutilated prisoners 
by cutting off their noses and ears and filling the holes with sawdust. The Germans also 
claimed that “meat axe”-wielding Senegalese and Hindu conscripts fighting for France 
and Great Britain (respectively) had “brought with them savage practices of warfare of 
their native countries […] severing the heads from bodies as war trophies.”136 
Meanwhile, the French accused the Germans of slitting prisoners’ throats, burning 
prisoners alive on makeshift pyres, and throwing wounded enemies into the Meuse River 
to drown. A French soldier described the following scene from the small village of 
Hannescamp: “Two of our wounded had been shot by the Germans […] They were 
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strapped to ladders and the ladders placed upright against a wall and their brains blown 
out […] I saw the bodies. They were still strapped to the ladders.” Similarly, the English 
claimed that German soldiers had crucified a Canadian soldier by thrusting bayonets 
“through the palms of his hands and feet […] pinning him to [a] fence.”137 Along the 
Eastern Front, a marauding Russian guerrilla nicknamed “Earless Peter”—credited with 
killing a countless number of German soldiers—was equally celebrated by the Russians 
and feared by the Germans for his insatiable thirst for blood. “Both of Peter’s ears exist 
and are painfully sound,” wrote the Washington Post. “He is ‘earless’ merely because he 
is deaf to appeals for mercy […] He slaughters no prisoners, but he refuses to take 
them.”138 Reporting from a Russian camp at Petrograd in March of 1915, a British 
correspondent described a wounded German prisoner’s disillusionment with the base 
nature of the War in Europe. Published in the San Jose Mercury Herald, the account read 
in part: 
 He persisted that it is not a real war when a man can be shot down before he has 
 at least a fair chance of shooting his enemy. Within seven days of arriving at some 
 large unnamed town he marched along a road near [Lublin, Poland] “in fours, 
 singing.” Rifle bullets and shells came from an invisible enemy. “It was like an 
 apple-tree being shaken down on you.” The soldier did not know whether his 
 hand was smashed by a bullet or by a shell fragment.139 
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For this bewildered German prisoner, the World War was “not a real war,” for he had 
never had a “fair chance” to fight back against the enemy. His vivid personal testimony 
signified a disjunction between previously held assumptions about chivalrous wartime 
killing and the seemingly uncivilized practices of this modern war. By all appearances, 
the armies of Europe were operating without their moral compasses. 
As the real and imagined rules of war disintegrated, civilian populations—which 
provided the human, economic, and material resources necessary to sustain domestic war 
efforts—became prime targets for attack, much to the disgust of American newspaper 
editors. On October 6, 1914, in an article simply entitled, “Unbelievable,” the Idaho 
Daily Times reported that German zeppelins had bombed London with great destructive 
effect. “[T]he officially-directed killing of non-combatants, of women and children, 
indiscriminately—that is not warfare excepting from a cannibal viewpoint,” the Daily 
Times opined. “The whole bomb-dropping business is bad, but it is damnable and 
inexcusable on the part of civilized nations when the targets are citizens […] who are not 
active participants in the war […] It can only be justified in the minds of the brutal and 
the degenerate.”140 Similarly outrageous accounts of German zeppelin raids upon Paris 
and Antwerp emerged throughout 1914.141 On October 16, 1914, the New York Times 
published a German accusation against a Russian officer who had supposedly “forced 
[Belgian] inhabitants of the villages under his control to join the Russian troops in the 
trenches.” According to the report, the Russians then “used women as shields for [their] 
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machine guns” during a firefight with German forces.142 In May of 1915, English 
historian George Macaulay Trevelyan, having returned from a harrowing tour of war-torn 
Serbia, told the New York Times of atrocities committed by Austro-Hungarian soldiers 
against local civilians. “[T]here was an Austro-Hungarian proclamation to the soldiers 
saying the Serbs were a race of murderers, and great severity was to be shown them,” 
Trevelyan testified. “The Magyars made an invasion and killed 3,000 or 4,000 Serbian 
civilians. Some of them they burned alive, others had their eyes gouged out, their ears 
clipped off, or suffered similar injury.” As stated by Trevelyan, the attacks had forced 
half a million Serbians to flee to a refugee camp in southern Serbia, where many 
succumbed to typhus.143 A month later the Times reported that German and Russian 
forces, battling for control of the territory between Lodz and Warsaw, had equally 
terrorized Polish civilians throughout the region.144 In September of 1916, the 
Washington Post announced that Romanian soldiers had been sweeping through Bulgaria 
and executing every male civilian they found.145 Whether harnessing the indiscriminate 
power of new technologies like the zeppelin, or falling back on timeless means of 
terrifying populations (such as ethnic extermination or the spectacle of torture), the 
belligerent armies of the Great War had cast aside all protocols and rules of war that had 
been previously devised to mask the state-sponsored destruction of human beings as a 
civilized phenomenon. 
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According to several newspaper accounts that read somewhat like anti-German 
propaganda, civilians were just as vulnerable to attack, perhaps even more so, when 
traveling on ships in what were supposedly neutral waters. As the subsequent German U-
boat attacks upon the passenger ships the Falaba, the Ancona, and the Sussex proved, 
virtually no corner of the theater of war was safe for non-combatants. “There can be no 
military justification for opening fire with shells and torpedoes upon a merchant ship 
carrying hundreds of passengers,” the New York Times angrily declared following the 
sinking of the Italian ship the Ancona. “They were absolutely defenseless […] The act 
can be explained only as one perpetrated in savage cruelty for the joy of slaughter, for the 
lust of killing, because of an unquenchable thirst for blood.”146 Thus, it seemed that like 
crazed, mechanized sharks on perpetual hunt, German U-boats sent hundreds of innocent 
civilians to their cold, dark, watery graves. 
In the spring of 1915, tales of the deliberate and systematic extermination of 
ethnic Armenians started to emerge from Turkey (an ally of Germany and Austro-
Hungary). On April 26, 1915, the Washington Post issued its first report on the efforts of 
the Ottoman Empire (which was predominantly Muslim) to purge its lands of Armenians 
(who were Christians), stating that 30,000 Armenians had been attacked and driven from 
their homes. According to the Post, the refugees had begun a deadly exodus toward 
Russia, dying from disease and hunger, or at the hands of marauding Turkish horsemen, 
along the way. Desperate Armenian mothers drowned their babies in rivers to end the 
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infants’ suffering, while the elderly died “unheeded and unmourned” by their families. 
“In fact,” wrote the Post, “those who died seemed to be envied by the living.” The Post 
related the story of a young Armenian named Hackatur, who had escaped “from a well in 
which the bodies of the dead had been crammed [by Turkish soldiers]. He fell with 
others, and was tossed into the well, but he managed to wriggle through the bodies lying 
on top of him and escaped at nightfall.”147 Throughout 1915, reports of the ongoing 
“Armenian Atrocities” dominated the covers of American newspapers. A Lexington 
Herald headline dubbed the event “The Murder of a Nation.”148 The State of Columbia, 
South Carolina, called it an exercise in “demoniac cruelty.” According to the State, 
Turkish Major Djevdet Bey had dispatched his “Butcher Battalions” to massacre the 
Christians of the city of Sairt and torture others in the Armenian village of Mush: “Two 
head men of the village had their finger nails and then their toe nails forcibly extracted; 
teeth were knocked out and in some cases noses were whittled down, the victims thus 
being done to death under shocking lingering agony […] The female relatives of victims 
who came to the rescue were assaulted in public before the very eyes of their mutilated 
men.”149 An American missionary named Rev. Father Dakras, who claimed to have 
witnessed the Turkish “holy war” against Armenian Christians, corroborated these 
“scenes of wholesale murder” in an essay for the Washington Post: 
[T]he savage Moslem Kurds and Bedouins on horseback had already entered the 
 city. Like wolves charging into a sheep herd, they dashed into the frantic, terror-
 stricken, helpless multitudes. Like the harvester with his keen-edged scythe, so 
 the Moslem hordes on horseback waved their crescent-shaped swords and mowed 
 down innocent men, women, and even infants, many of whom were only a few 
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 months old […] The godless invaders gathered around units of panic-stricken 
 Christians […] and drove them into wells. These wells filled with humanity, were 
 guarded while other Kurds dashed to the already deserted houses, produced 
 kerosene oil, and poured it into the wells […] [S]imultaneously they were set on 
 fire. Merciful Father! I can still hear the shrieks of the victims. But their 
 tormentors watched the work of their demon acts with serene satisfaction[...] At 
 Diza […] the Kurds buried more than 3,000 Christians to their chins. The 
 following day many of them had already died, but still quite a number of them 
 were half alive […] when the main Bedouin troops arrived [and] rode over the 
 skulls of the thus buried Christians. 
 
Offering a graphic testimony of rape, torture, terror, and murder, “Father Dakras” 
claimed “between 600,000 and 800,000 Christians of Turkey—Armenian Gregorians, 
Roman Catholics and Protestants—had been killed.” He described the whole Armenian 
territory between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean as “a vast graveyard” strewn with 
the “mutilated bodies” and “decayed flesh” of Christians, lamenting: “If the Christians of 
the western world would only realize how many thousand times unholy is this Moslem 
‘holy war!’”150 Here, the American public was encouraged to think about the war in 
religious terms, as a battle between moral Christian forces and in this case at least, 
barbaric Muslims. 
Tales of the German “Rape of Belgium” (facilitated by clandestine British and 
French propaganda agencies151) did little to quell the notion that the wartime actions of 
the Central Powers—Germany, Austro-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire—were neither 
guided nor restrained by “civilized” Christian principles of mercy, compassion, and piety. 
In August of 1914, German forces executed the infamous Schlieffen Plan, which called 
for a swift and devastating attack against France via the neutral nation of Belgium. 
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Unfortunately, Germany’s invasion of Belgium violated, among other things, the 1839 
Treaty of London, which bound Britain to guard Belgium’s neutrality in case of invasion. 
The German occupation of Belgium not only gave Britain an “official” reason to enter the 
war,152 but also provided the Allied Nations a seemingly endless source of anti-“Teuton” 
propaganda. The countless reports that emerged from war torn Belgium between 1914 
and 1915 seemed to prove beyond a doubt that a godless German army and its allies were 
willing (even eager!) to commit the worst atrocities against citizens of enemy and neutral 
nations alike in order to achieve their “barbaric” military and geopolitical goals.  
Citing eyewitness accounts from Belgium, the Washington Post wrote of violated 
and mutilated “bodies of young girls lying by the roadside,” “bodies of boys impaled on 
hedge stakes,” and a “drunken orgy” in which German soldiers raped the women of a 
small Belgian village while their husbands “were forced to look on at the frightful 
spectacle.”153 In Mont-sur-Marchiennes, a German soldier had taken a child by the legs 
and crushed his head on the sidewalk; another had hacked a young boy’s right hand 
off.154 In Liege, 
400 people lost their lives […] some on the banks of the Meuse, where they 
 were shot according to orders given and some in the cellars of the houses where 
 they had taken refuge. Eight men belonging to one family were murdered. 
 Another man was placed close to a machine gun which was fired through him. 
 His wife brought his body home in a wheelbarrow […] A hair dresser was 
 murdered in his kitchen where he was sitting with a child on each knee. A 
 paralytic was murdered in his garden […] Many of the inhabitants who escaped 
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 the massacre were kept as prisoners and compelled to clear the houses of corpses 
 and bury them in trenches.155 
 
An unidentified merchant from Roulers claimed that German soldiers there had murdered 
women and children en masse: “One woman was shot as she was burying her baby in a 
garden […] The kaiser said that the Germans do not make war on women and children. 
By --- they do not […] Their bodies are the kaiser’s breastplate!”156 Other alleged victims 
included Catholic priests, who “were shot by German soldiers under the pretext that the 
clergy were French spies in disguise.”157 In a town near Ransbach, soldiers of the 
predominantly Lutheran German army raided a priest’s house, “dragged him from his 
study, placed him against his own garden wall and shot him summarily as a traitor and 
spy […] The priest was buried without a coffin at the end of his little garden plot.”158 In 
Spontin, a local priest “was first hung up by the feet and then by the hands and pierced 
with bayonets.”159 Viscount James Bryce, a former British ambassador to the United 
States, attempted to put these purported atrocities into historical terms, telling American 
newspapers that “[r]iot, lust and pillage” were prevailing over Belgium “on a scale 
unparalleled in any war between civilized nations during the last three centuries.”160 
Characterized as untamed barbarians capable of the worst obscenities, the Germans 
appeared to be securing their place in the annals of infamy. 
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In time, the “Rape of Belgium” became symbolized by one notorious and 
memorable event: the execution of British nurse Edith Cavell. Serving at a clinic in 
Brussels, Cavell had helped smuggle hundreds of Allied soldiers and Belgian men out of 
the country and to safety during the first year of the war. Placed under arrest by German 
authorities in August of 1915, Cavell confessed to her actions. In accord with German 
military code, a tribunal condemned her to death. On October 12, 1915, Cavell was 
mowed down by a German firing squad. In the following weeks and months, American 
newspapers buzzed with accounts of the woman’s death, which was presented as the 
ultimate example of German “butchery.”161 British authorities relayed the testimony of 
the Reverend Stirling Gahan, an Anglican chaplain who had been permitted to see Cavell 
and give her Holy Communion before her execution. According to British reports, in her 
final moments, Cavell uttered these moving words to Gahan: “[T]his I would say, 
standing as I do in view of God and eternity: I realize that patriotism is not enough. I 
must have no hatred or bitterness toward any one.” Gahan further claimed that Cavell 
“was brave and bright to the last. She professed her Christian faith and said she was glad 
to die for her country. She died like a heroine.” American newspapers reported that, in 
order to add insult to injury, callous German authorities had refused to hand Cavell’s 
body over to Gahan or anyone else.162 The stark contrast between Cavell, portrayed to 
United States readerships as an angelic saint, and her merciless German executors 
provided excellent fodder for public figures who advocated American entry into the war 
on behalf of the Allied nations. Shortly after her death, James M. Beck, former Assistant 
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Attorney General of the United States, published a lengthy treatise in the New York Times 
in which he compared the “murder of Miss Cavell” to the Romans’ execution of Jesus 
Christ. For Beck and many others, Edith Cavell represented all the “other victims of the 
rape of Belgium”—all the “innocent” people who had suffered the wrath of German 
belligerence.163 In a letter to the Oregonian, Chehalis, Washington, resident E. W. Herald 
echoed Beck’s assertions, claiming that “when [Cavell] fell as the seething, hissing 
bullets tore through her tender flesh, she fell a martyr […] a victim of that Frankenstein 
monster of militarism of which the whole world now stands in dread and fear.”164 For 
Herald, as for many others, the execution of this innocent, peaceful, Christian woman 
symbolized the relentless inversions of morality that the Great War entailed.  
The obvious fact that most reports concerning the “Rape of Belgium” were 
emerging from British and French sources led some people to doubt the veracity of the 
tales. In September of 1914, the New York Times published a lecture by Jerome K. 
Jerome, the famous English humorist and author of Three Men in a Boat, who believed 
that such reports were gross exaggerations designed to “build barriers of hatred” on both 
sides of the Atlantic. “Half these stories of atrocities I do not believe,” Jerome wrote. “In 
every war each side, according to the other, is supposed to take a fiendish pleasure in 
firing upon hospitals” and other vile acts. Jerome urged the peoples of the world not to let 
the stories make them “[m]ad with fear, mad with hate, blinded by excitement.”165 
Objecting to media portrayals of the Cavell case, Boise resident Gustave Kroeger wrote 
to the Idaho Daily Statesman: “Your editorial relating to the execution of Miss Edith 
                                                 
163 “The Case of Edith Cavell,” New York Times, October 31, 1915, SM1. 
164 “Woman Spy’s Death Epochal,” Oregonian, November 28, 1915, 11. 
165 “Warns the English of Atrocity Tales,” September 27, 1914, 3. 
91 
Cavell, seems to me so extremely unfair and biased, that I would ask permission to 
shortly reply to it.” Kroeger advised editors at the Statesman to avoid becoming 
mouthpieces for the war’s belligerent nations. “It is an easy matter for the press to arouse 
the passion and indignation of unthinking people, and for that reason, it seems that a 
newspaper should be careful how it uses its power and in commenting upon a case, of 
which partial and imperfect reports have reached.”166 To offset such sentiments, many 
newspapers attempted to provide irrefutable evidence of the alleged German atrocities. 
The Washington Post, for example, provided as “proof of the contention that German 
soldiers have been guilty of barbarity” the testimony of Dr. Frederick S. Mason, an 
American doctor who had treated Belgian victims in Paris. “With my own eyes I have 
seen enough examples to show barbarity among the invaders was not confined to 
scattered cases,” said Mason, who described in detail the mutilation of young Belgian 
girls. In January of 1915, the New York Times quoted from diaries found on dead German 
soldiers in Belgium: “The Belgians, at Dinant on the Meuse, fired on our regiment from 
inside the houses,” one soldier’s diary supposedly read. “We shot everyone we could see, 
or we threw them out of the windows, women as well as men. The bodies lay three feet 
high in the streets.”167 The State of Columbia, South Carolina, cited an official British 
commission that had interviewed 1,200 people who had witnessed Germany’s sack of 
Belgium. “[The witnesses] were cross-examined by trained lawyers. So soon as their 
stories showed signs of the natural hysteria incident to a severe strain, they were thrown 
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out of the record.” From this set of supposedly ironclad testimonies, the commission had 
determined beyond all doubt  
that civilians were shot down in numberless towns by squads, that villages were 
 put to the torch, that people were tortured and mutilated by order, that children 
 were not spared, that when a house was fired the amusement of the soldiers was to 
 fire at its fleeing inhabitants as though they had been rabbits.168 
 
Such suspect evidence proved to be strong enough for Americans like L. H. Slaw of 
Baltimore, who, in a letter to the Philadelphia Inquirer, argued that Germany’s actions in 
Belgium constituted “the worst vandalism perpetrated in all history, manifesting to what 
means Germany will descend in her hatred of her enemies.”169 In Slaw’s mind, 
Germany’s attacks against non-combatants was not only a direct violation of the 
traditional conditions set forth by just war theory, but also a war crime that exceeded all 
others that came before in its depravity. 
2.5 PROPER GRIEVING AND THE LOSS OF AMERICAN LIFE 
As the war degenerated into a “human slaughter-house”—an endless series of atrocities 
that produced “acres of dead and dying” and “vast cemeteries of unmarked graves” in 
seemingly every corner of Europe—American newspapers occasionally examined the 
attitudes, psyches, and mourning practices of those who grieved for soldiers lost in the 
infernal conflict. Two opposing viewpoints regarding this matter emerged. The first 
suggested that civilians in belligerent countries had learned to accept citizen-soldiers’ 
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deaths as a necessary, if unfortunate, aspect of wartime sacrifice, and to grieve for loved 
ones in ways that would not hamper national war efforts. It was reported that in France, 
where government officials made highly publicized visits to unmarked battlefield graves 
to honor “the immortal victors of the Marne,” mothers and wives “cheerfully see [their] 
sons and husbands go to be maimed or killed [so] that France may live.” The New York 
Times published a note allegedly sent by a grieving Parisian mother to her dead son’s 
commanding officer: “In this unspeakable sorrow a great consolation remains to me. 
During seventeen years I have fought over my son with all kinds of sickness. I have been 
able, by constant care, to keep him out of the clutches of death. It makes me very proud 
to have succeeded in saving him from sickness to give him a chance to die for ‘La 
Patrie!’” This mother’s attitude supposedly reflected the “brave spirit” that had spread 
across the nation; as one Washington Post correspondent put it: “No woman weeps in 
France.”170 According to similar reports, this was the case in England as well. For 
example, a New York Times journalist described the measured, “reverential spirit” 
exhibited by Londoners on Easter Day of 1915:  
No one seeing the spectacle of London’s Easter day could say that the 
 Londoner takes the war too lightly nor yet that London put on a gloomy face. 
 That’s not London’s way […] It was noticeable that though in thousands of 
 families sons have been killed no mourning was seen in [Westminster Abbey], 
 nor for that matter, on the streets. London’s afflicted families all bravely refrain 
 from wearing it.171 
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Another Times correspondent described the “wonderful spirit” of English citizens, many 
of whom had lost men in the war: “I went to a family dinner party at the home of a 
widow all of whose three sons had been killed. Several of the relations who were guests 
had put in black, but the widow said: ‘There is no mourning in this house; my boys only 
did their duty.’”172 Other reports from the Times made it seem as though news of 
soldiers’ deaths did little more than strengthen English resolve to win the war: “The 
English people […] had been quite calm until the publication of the first casualty list, 
after which the men poured forward with wonderful enthusiasm and offered themselves 
for enlistment.”173 Whereas media accounts of the “Rape of Belgium” implicitly 
encouraged Americans to imagine themselves as helpless Belgians and perhaps, 
experience emotions of rage and indignation, these reports provoked a different 
sensibility—one of tranquil stoicism. It is possible that such articles prompted American 
readers to contemplate what their own reactions to the loss of loved ones in battle would 
be—to wonder if they, in a time of war, could replicate the unflinching, soldierly-like 
courage and “stiff upper lipped”-attitude exhibited by French and British families. Would 
Americans accept such enormous sacrifices with the same kind of grace, dignity, and 
grit? 
At the same time, various newspaper accounts offered the antithetical view that 
European citizens were, in fact, crippled by grief for loved ones lost to the war’s carnage. 
According to Rosika Schwimmer, secretary of the International Council of Equal 
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Suffrage and a peace advocate, the war’s death toll had touched so many families that 
government officials in Austria, Germany, and France had effectively forbidden public 
acts of mourning so that martial spirits would not be dampened. Following an extensive 
tour of war torn Europe, Schwimmer told the Washington Post: “Women on the continent 
are not permitted by the authorities to dress in mourning even after the bodies of their 
dead are brought home,” as the “sight of black might depress the public mind […] Such a 
policy is mockery and sends more and more women to suicide graves.”174 By repressing 
the human need to mourn for the dead, officials in Europe were pushing citizens over the 
brink of madness. In certain regions of Germany, the girlfriends of slain soldiers had (in 
what may have been an act of defiance) begun adopting their sweethearts’ last names in 
order to symbolize their grief and fidelity to the dead.175 Various media reports suggested 
that a veritable cloud of despair hung over all of England. According to the Fort Worth 
Star-Telegram, the Great War had “leveled all classes” in England by shedding the blood 
of “duke and commoner alike”; thus, grief had become democratized, extending from 
factories, shipyards, and urban tenements to all the “noble houses of England.”176 The 
Washington Post claimed that the war’s death toll had “bereaved every royal house” in 
England and “turned the House of Lords into the House of Mourning.”177 According to 
various reports, throughout Great Britain and Continental Europe, countless families 
“suffering from poignant grief” over the loss of loved ones had turned to a booming, 
pseudo-scientific “spiritualism” movement in hope of somehow communing with fallen 
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soldiers. American newspapers reported that leading proponents of spiritualism included 
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle (creator of the famous literary character and symbol of logical-
positivism, Sherlock Holmes) and the physicist Sir Oliver Joseph Lodge, both of whom 
had lost close relatives in the fighting. It seemed that even the most rational thinkers in 
the world, once directly touched by the war’s hand of death, were willing to abandon 
scientific reason and turn to clairvoyants and crystal-gazers in order to ease their 
emotional pain.178 It was clear that neither class, nor wealth, nor levelheaded rationality, 
nor patriotic courage could protect families from the unbearable pain of losing their 
beloved young men to this mad war. 
While nearly all reports regarding death and mourning practices focused on 
European victims of the Great War, newspapers occasionally addressed instances in 
which Americans were killed in the theater of war. Between 1914 and 1917, hundreds of 
Americans died as a direct result of the Great War. Many of these victims had voluntarily 
enlisted in the armies of their ancestral homelands and perished on the battlefields of 
Europe. During the war’s early years, newspapers frequently reported the deaths of 
Americans fighting for the Allied or Central Powers. Typically, these reports were brief, 
unemotional, non-judgmental, and matter-of-fact—indicating that, during the period of 
American neutrality, it was socially acceptable for a U.S. citizen to pledge allegiance to 
another nation (France, Germany, or otherwise). For the most part, editors and journalists 
across the country took a cautious, neutral position on the meanings of such deaths, and 
resisted commemorating the dead in any grand fashion (perhaps because the meanings of 
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the deaths were so uncertain).179 Some articles addressed the personal characteristics and 
talents that the departed had exhibited while living in the States; for instance, in 
December of 1916, the New York Times discussed the “remarkable achievement in verse” 
by Alan Seeger, a young American poet who was killed in Northern France while 
fighting with the Foreign Legion.180 Others described “impressive ceremonies” that 
grateful European nations conducted in commemoration of American volunteers killed in 
battle.181 But rarely did U.S. newspapers show any pointed interest in exploring the 
emotions and attitudes of Americans whose loved ones died in the fighting, a provocative 
topic that surely could have been alluring to many readers.182 Newspapers took a 
similarly dispassionate approach to reporting the untimely deaths of non-combatant 
Americans who, while traveling to Europe to visit family, volunteering in hospitals, or 
pursuing business opportunities, had been ensnared in the war’s web of violence. It seems 
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the media had adopted the attitude that American victims of the conflict should have 
known the risks entailed by entering the expansive war zone.183 
The glaring exception to this tempered attitude can be found in media coverage of 
the infamous sinking of Lusitania. On April 22, 1915, the “Imperial German Embassy” 
placed a notice in the New York Times that warned Americans, in no uncertain terms, of 
the perils of traveling to Great Britain: 
 TRAVELERS intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded 
 that a state of war exists between Germany and her allies and Great Britain and 
 her allies; that the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; 
 that, in accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial German Government, 
 vessels flying the flag of Great Britain, or any of her allies, are liable to 
 destruction in those waters and that travelers sailing in the war zone on ships of 
 Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk. 
 
Despite the Germans’ foreboding advertisement, on May 1, 1915, the British ocean liner 
Lusitania departed from New York City for Liverpool, England carrying 1,959 civilians, 
many of them American. Six days later, a German U-boat torpedoed and sunk the mighty 
passenger ship off the Irish Coast, sending 1,198 passengers to their premature, frigid 
deaths. Of these casualties, 124 were U.S. citizens.184 
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In light of the relatively high number of civilian deaths, the sensational nature of 
the U-boat assault,185 and the fact that American celebrities had perished in the attack,186 
the sinking of the Lusitania quickly became a major story as the media grappled with the 
political meaning of the deaths. For weeks, the question on everyone’s minds was: 
“Could the deaths of so many Americans draw the United States into the war?” On May 8 
(the day after the attack), the New York Times reported that, although the nation’s capital 
was “full of rumors” that Congress would declare war against Germany, “the 
Government […] has shown no inclination toward excitement or taking hasty action.” 
President Woodrow Wilson, for his part, was staying mum. “The news that many lives 
had been sacrificed […] was given to him at the White House about 1 o’clock this 
evening, but no word came from him as to what effect this intelligence had on him.” But 
despite Wilson’s silence, the Times cautioned, “[t]he situation is full of dangerous 
possibilities.”187 It seemed plausible that the country might go to war over the death of a 
hundred citizens—an act that, ironically, would entail sending thousands upon thousands 
of U.S. soldiers to their own premature deaths.  
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While the federal government took a measured approach to handling the crisis, 
many citizens, newspaper editors, civic groups, and notable figures across the United 
States vocally weighed in on the matter. Billy Sunday, the charismatic and popular 
Evangelist preacher who commanded audiences in the tens of thousands, denounced the 
sinking of the Lusitania as a “damnable” violation of Christian morality:  
It’s damnable, damnable, absolutely hellish. Such work deserves the 
 righteous condemnation of every God-fearing person in Christendom. I’d say the 
 same thing if England did it instead of Germany. To think—only to think—that in 
 these supposed civilized days any nation would endanger the lives of thousands of 
 Christians simply because they were under the enemy’s flag. Hellish.188 
 
Judging the scandalous affair from a position of religious authority, Sunday explicitly 
called into question German civility and fidelity to Christian morality. Former President 
Theodore Roosevelt spoke from a more secular perspective, arguing that it is the nation-
state’s obligation to protect the safety of its citizens, wherever they happen to be. 
Roosevelt told the press that the attack constituted “warfare against innocent men, 
women and children traveling on the ocean and on our fellow country women who are 
among the sufferers.” As such, Roosevelt implied, the event warranted a military 
response from the United States: “It seems inconceivable that we can refrain from taking 
action in this matter, for we owe it not only to humanity, but to our own national self 
respect.”189 Roosevelt’s veiled argument for war was stated more bluntly by one Mrs. 
John Philip Schaefer, who, in a letter to the New York Times, urged her fellow citizens to 
demand American entry into the European War: “Where has the spirit of ’76, of 1812, of 
1860 gone?” Schaefer asked. “Time was when our forefathers did not hesitate to give up 
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their lives unquestioningly for the honor of our country […] Let us do more than protest 
by words.”190 Dr. Alexander Smellie, chairman of the British Association of Atlanta, 
Georgia, described the Lusitania affair as a “horrible offense against humanity” and 
demanded American belligerence: “It is a terrible thing to plunge a country into war, but 
in view of the atrocious nature of this latest crime, it is the only logical thing that can be 
done.”191 The New York Times published an editorial from the Toronto Globe that asked 
whether President Wilson “propose[d] to let German submarines [continue to] destroy the 
lives of American citizens” throughout the future. “Does he still think the mad dog of 
Europe can be trusted at large? Is it not almost time to join in hunting down the brute?”192 
This cascade of provocative metaphors surely appealed to the imaginations of Roosevelt 
and likeminded Americans, who considered themselves defenders of civilization and 
hunters of beasts. Former U.S. Attorney General George W. Wickersham employed 
different language—the language of sex—when he publicly argued that Germany’s 
“wanton killing of American men, women and children” had effectively neutered the 
country: “It is now for the American people to decide whether this nation has any virility 
left.” Wickersham criticized President Wilson for maintaining a “sexless policy” of 
neutrality, and implied that a display of military might—an act of violent revenge—could 
reinvigorate the nation’s sagging masculinity.193 To instill casualties, it seemed, was to be 
masculine. To suffer casualties was to be “sexless.” 
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Many citizens and leaders, however, argued against an impetuous rush to war. For 
them, the arguments to go to war were synecdochical by nature, constructed on just 
partial (and in some cases, intentionally falsified) information. In a rather eloquent letter 
to the Oregonian, a reader named William Donniges challenged the position taken by 
Roosevelt and other pro-war advocates: “The comments of Theodore Roosevelt 
following the sinking of the Lusitania are somewhat vague. Does the gentleman mean 
that the United States shall go to war with Germany? If that is his idea, he would appear 
to be suffering with a surplus of Shakespearean east wind and to be taking his usual 
conversation method of relieving himself.” Clearly familiar with Roosevelt’s rhetoric, 
Donniges reminded his fellow countrymen and women that “ample warning was given by 
Germany as to the dangers of entering the war zone around Great Britain.” Besides, 
Donniges argued, if the nation went to war, “thousands of United States citizens would 
lose their lives […] What would be gained by all this sacrifice?”194 The Herald of 
Lexington, Kentucky, published a letter from local resident J. J. Dickey, who suggested 
that, under the rules of war, the German assault on the Lusitania had been justified. “It 
seems to me,” Dickey wrote, “American citizens should [be] apprised of the fact that the 
Lusitania had in her hold munitions of war, such as brass, copper, cartridges, powder of 
various kinds, and probably the tin to make poison gas for bombs. Such is stated by Dr. 
Fisher, an American, who was on board.”195 In churches throughout Cleveland Ohio, a 
city that boasted one of the largest German-American populations in the country, German 
pastors deplored the loss of American civilians, but defended their homeland’s actions. 
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The Reverand J. F. Frederick Keller of Evangelical Luther Christ Church, for example, 
told his congregation: “I hold Germany is absolutely justified in sending to the bottom a 
boat which carried nearly a half million dollars’ worth of munitions of war […] War is 
war, and the passengers must take their chances just as do those men who go to the front 
to fight in Flanders.”196 It seemed that for Keller, at least, patriotic devotion outweighed 
fidelity to universal Christian tenets of non-violence. The noted Socialist Eugene V. Debs 
opposed American belligerence, but was thoroughly troubled by the implications of the 
Lusitania affair. Debs argued that Germany’s murder of so many innocent Americans 
indicated “that Prussian militarism has gone stark mad,” and that if the Germans were 
able, they would gladly “overrun this country and set off their asphyxiating bombs, 
poison the wells, rape the women, mutilate the infirm and murder the children.” But 
despite the Lusitania sinking, Debs urged the U.S. government to resist entering the War 
in Europe. “Moral self-restraint at this crucial hour requires greater courage and is more 
potent for righteousness and peace than a declaration of war.”197 Sensing that mounting 
public anger over the sinking of the Lusitania might actually bring the United States into 
the war on behalf of the Allied Nations, the German Foreign Office issued a somewhat 
halfhearted public apology, which stated: 
 If England after repeated official and unofficial warnings, considered 
 herself able to declare that that boat ran no risk and thus light-heartedly assumed 
 responsibility for the human life on board a steamer which, owing to its armament 
 and cargo was liable to destruction, the German Government, in spite of its 
 heartfelt sympathy for the loss of American lives, cannot but regret that 
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 Americans felt more inclined to trust to English promises rather than to pay 
 attention to the warnings from the German side.198 
 
The German apology deflected responsibility for the lives lost onto the British. 
Three days after the sinking of the Lusitania, President Wilson emerged in 
Philadelphia to articulate publicly what course of action, if any, his administration would 
pursue. Speaking before an audience of 4,000 recently naturalized citizens, Wilson 
reaffirmed his commitment to maintaining American neutrality199—the country, he 
stated, would not be coaxed into battle: 
America must have the consciousness that on all sides it touches elbows and 
 touches heart with all the nations of mankind. The example of America must be a 
 special example, and must be an example not merely of peace, because it will not 
 fight, but because peace is a healing and elevating influence on the world, and 
 strife is not […] There is such a thing as a man being to proud to fight. 
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The New York Times reported that Wilson’s speech was met with “a tremendous 
ovation,” a sign that, despite the loss of American life, few citizens (naturalized or 
otherwise) wanted war.200 The following day, Wilson released a public note addressed to 
Germany that declared the assault on the Lusitania “to be indefensible under international 
law.” Employing a more acerbic tone than that of his Philadelphia speech, Wilson 
reiterated the United States’ neutral position, but outlined a series of demands, including 
the cessation of U-boat “attacks on merchantmen carrying non-combatants.” Wilson 
stated that the “usual financial reparation will be sought, although Germany is reminded 
in effect that no reparation can restore the lives of those sacrificed in the sinking of the 
Lusitania.” In closing, the President extended a vague threat of violence: “It is made plain 
that the United States will leave nothing undone, either by diplomatic representation or 
other action, to obtain compliance by Germany with the requests that are made.”201 
Wilson’s principled and determined, if somewhat toothless, stance seemed to fit the bill. 
Praising Wilson’s “even temperament and quiet nerves,” the Lexington Herald urged its 
readers to  
follow the example set before us by the President of the United States and 
 members of Congress; “do not rock the boat,” but sit still and patiently, with 
 Christian fortitude […] reverently bow our heads amid the shadow of sorrow that 
 enfolds us […] and breathe a prayer for the departed souls of the innocent victims 
 of this cruel war, including those whom an unrelenting fate decreed should find a 
 watery grave just as the Emerald Isle beckoned them.”202 
 
Readers in Kentucky were encouraged to practice Christian restraint and, like their 
President, suppress the urge for revenge. Editors at the Charlotte Observer echoed this 
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tone and contributed to what appeared to be a growing cult of personality, writing: “The 
Observer is not given to irreverence, but […] it is now strengthened in the conviction that 
has possessed it for some time that Wilson was a divinely appointed leader of the 
people.”203 Investors appeared to feel equally blessed to have such a “divinely appointed 
leader”: stocks soared on Wall Street as skittish traders responded favorably to Wilson’s 
prudent approach.204 The gears of capitalism would not be wrenched by war. 
The loss of 124 Americans in the sinking of the Lusitania failed to draw the 
United States into the Great War. The world would not witness American belligerence 
until two years later. This infamous event, however, had several immediate and 
significant effects on American attitudes toward the war. First, the imagined scene of 
American and British civilians dying at the hands of German aggressors surely nudged 
American sentiment one bit closer to the side of the Allied Nations and one bit further 
away from the Central Powers.205 Second, the sinking of the Lusitania was, as much as 
anything, a spectacle of German dominance over European seaboards—a spectacle that 
revealed the real and disturbing dangers that would be entailed in shipping American 
soldiers overseas, and their corpses back, should the United States enter the war. 
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2.6 THE PROSPECT OF WAR AND DEATH 
The American presidential election of 1916 hinged primarily on the question of U.S. 
participation in the Great War. On one side was Democratic nominee Woodrow Wilson, 
who promised to keep the nation out of the war for as long as possible. Reaching out to 
Midwest and West Coast voters (the majority of whom opposed the idea of American 
belligerence) and independent progressives (social workers, sociologists, and 
intellectuals), Wilson built his re-election campaign around the slogan, “He Kept Us Out 
of War.” On the other side was Republican nominee Charles Evans Hughes, who 
fervently preached the gospels of military preparedness and U.S. intervention on behalf 
of England and its allies. Supported by the always-hawkish former President Theodore 
Roosevelt and various pro-war groups (including munitions makers that jockeyed to cash 
in on American participation in the conflict), Hughes sought to raise enthusiasm for war 
to a fever pitch, and then capitalize on voters’ emotions at the polls. The dynamics of the 
1916 election reflected the conflicting attitudes—one anti-war, the other pro-war—that, 
for two years, had dominated American public discourse regarding the possibility of U.S. 
belligerence. This section briefly examines the rhetorics of the anti-war and pro-war 
movements of 1914-1916, and reveals how both sides addressed the very real prospect of 
American soldiers fighting and dying on the apocalyptic battlefields of Europe.206 
The pro-war movement originated with the actions of several so-called 
“preparedness” lobbies, which saw the distant war in Europe as an opportunity to 
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advance conservative and corporate interests at home. The strongest of the preparedness 
groups was the National Security League (NSL), an affiliation of prominent corporation 
lawyers, Christian preachers, military brass, bankers, and mega-rich capitalists like 
Cornelius Vanderbilt, Henry C. Frick, Simon Guggenheim, and J. P. Morgan. Although 
the NSL privately supported the cause of the Allied nations, the group did not publicly 
argue for American intervention at first. Instead, it pushed for measures to “prepare” (i.e., 
militarize) American society, such as shoring up national defenses by expanding the army 
and Navy, instilling a system of universal military training, and promoting patriotic 
education and a spirit of national service—measures that translated into coordinated and 
successful campaigns opposing the election of various Congressmen who favored labor 
unions and government ownership of the railroads. Progressive reformists like Amos 
Pinchot were not fooled by the efforts of the NSL and its ilk, and publicly declared that 
American elites were “using the preparedness campaign as an excuse for preaching the 
sanctity of American industrial absolutism.” Despite Pinchot’s warnings, conservative 
and jingoistic civic groups like the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) responded favorably 
to the patriotic flavor of the NSL’s message; in August of 1915, the VFW issued a public 
demand that President Wilson steel the nation for the potential “catastrophe of war.”207 
The National Security League’s call for national “preparedness” was gaining traction. 
“Preparedness” quickly became a productive term for Republicans, conservatives, 
and pro-war advocates of all kinds, who, like the NSL, used it as a vehicle to accumulate 
and mobilize political, social, and financial capital. While the motives of these groups 
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may have varied, their arguments for “preparedness” tended to revolve around two 
emotionally charged ideas. The first was that the United States was ill equipped to defend 
itself against foreign invasion. Hudson Maxim, for example, the inventor of smokeless 
gunpowder and other war technologies, claimed that an enemy invasion of Boston or 
New York would decimate American forces within a day. “Nothing under heaven we 
could do would prevent the invaders from capturing the entire country between the 
Alleghenies and the sea within two weeks,” Maxim counseled.208 Editors at the 
sensationalist daily rag New York American argued that the government should create a 
military big enough to protect American civilization, “ruled by white men and white 
thought,” from what they described as the “Asiatic hordes being led by Germany” into 
Europe through Constantinople. “It is our business to prepare this country for attack from 
every source, from the nations of Europe, from the brown men of Japan, and if necessary 
from the whole of Europe overrun by Asia.”209 Film studios released profitable, 
melodramatic, and suggestively titled “photoplays” that made overt arguments for 
national “preparedness.” Movies like The Battle Cry of Peace and The Fall of a Nation 
depicted in graphic detail the horrors that a German invasion of the United States would 
entail.210 Meanwhile, Major General Leonard Wood, the former Chief of Staff of the U.S. 
Army and an unofficial spokesperson for munitions makers everywhere, testified before 
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the Senate Committee on Military Affairs that the homeland would not be secure from 
enemy attack until a system of universal service was adopted to strengthen the size and 
readiness of the U.S. armed forces.211 Wood challenged Congress and the President: 
would they leave the nation in such risk? 
The second commonly proffered idea was that military “preparedness” would 
somehow foster “Americanism,” an amorphous, patriotic quality that the nation’s 
ethnically heterogeneous population supposedly lacked. In October of 1915, the National 
Defense League, the Navy League of the United States, and the National Rifle 
Association linked “preparedness” with “Americanism” in a publicly issued resolution: 
“[T]he American people, in order to provide for their needs at home and abroad, for their 
security from foreign aggression and for the maintenance of the ideals which have 
inspired the republic from its foundation, must create an efficient [military] sufficient in 
size to keep the national honor unstained.” These associations—which stood to gain 
mightily from American entry into the Great War—argued that, by increasing the might 
of the U.S. armed forces and providing military training in public schools, “Americanism 
[would be] raised above the mere level of politics, [become] a part of our governmental 
system,” and reveal the immigrant “parasites” and “so-called Americans” whose 
sympathies still rested with their ancestral homelands in Europe.212 Around the same 
time, the New York Times published a long letter from military expert Frederick A. 
Kuenzli, who claimed that increased military training in public schools would help forge 
young American boys into respectable men and citizens: 
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 Military training is nothing else but a branch of physical training, that 
 gives the boy gait and posture, straightens his spine, throws his shoulders back, 
 and makes him walk erect. In other words, it gives him the manly appearance that 
 you and I appreciate in the common expression, “Isn’t he a fine young man?” 
 
Downplaying the potential violence and mass death to which a military build-up could 
lead, advocates like Kuenzli instead amplified the benefits that “preparedness” might 
have for ethnic communities, American youth, and the nation as a whole.213 
As was probably originally intended, the “preparedness” movement morphed into 
an outright “pro-American intervention” movement. As it did, pro-war agitators set their 
sights on ideological opponents who stood in their way, publicly lambasting pacifists, 
Socialists, Democrats and other groups that sought to avoid U.S. belligerence. The 
loudest of these pro-war advocates was former President Theodore Roosevelt, who 
claimed that the United States should fight to protect “our self-respect” and the rights of 
“France, England and the rest of the civilized world.” The championed model of 
American virility, masculinity, and militarism (the New York Times routinely called him 
“Colonel” instead of “President”), the former “Rough Rider” toured the country to 
denounce the “mollycoddles,” “sissies,” and “cowards” (i.e., pacifists and Socialists) who 
wanted to meet Germany’s “policy of blood and iron” with “a policy of milk or water.” 
Roosevelt roared that “if the pacifists are not all poltroons, they teach ‘poltroonism,’ and 
if they had their own way would breed a nation of poltroons.” Likewise, he urged 
Americans to “realize that the words of the weakling and the coward, of the pacifist and 
                                                 
213 “Military Training in Our Schools,” New York Times, September 18, 1915, 8. 
112 
the poltroon, are worthless to stop wrongdoing.”214 Editors at the New York Times 
advanced Roosevelt’s denunciations, decrying the “spineless pacifism” and “opposition 
to preparedness” that had spread to Midwest states like Kansas.215 In a similar vein, a 
Times editorial pilloried the “Socialist-Pacifist” students of the City College of New York 
who had held an anti-war rally at the campus flagpole. “The flag is the symbol of the 
nation, of what American youths, fit to be Americans are ready to fight for and to die 
for,” the Times opined. “These misled boys should run away from a flagpole. The 
American flag is nothing to them. It was born, as the nation was born, of war.”216 By 
contrast, the Times was impressed with students at the University of Illinois who hanged 
an effigy of U.S. Senator Robert M. La Follette, one of the leading figures in the anti-war 
movement.217 
As the presidential election of 1916 drew nearer, representatives of the recently 
allied Progressive and Republican Parties stumped for their candidate, Charles Evans 
Hughes, mostly by attacking President Wilson’s commitment to American neutrality and 
charging him with softness in defending the nation against German aggression.218 
President Wilson, they claimed, was a man who possessed lofty language but few 
convictions. Dubbing Wilson’s White House as an “Administration of words,” Senator 
Henry Cabot Lodge told an audience Republican voters in Nantucket: “Behind a great 
                                                 
214 “Roosevelt Firm Against Germany,” New York Times, July 12, 1915, 1; 
“Roosevelt Hints at Hughes for 1916,” New York Times, July 20, 1915, 20; “Roosevelt’s 
New Word,” New York Times, July 25, 1915, 11; and “Roosevelt Heaps Blame on 
America,” New York Times, December 1, 1915, 4. 
215 “The Kansas Spirit,” New York Times, January 20, 1916, 8. 
216 “Fists and Pacifists,” New York Times, March 31, 1916, 10. 
217 “La Follette in Effigy,” New York Times, March 6, 1917, 1. 
218 Kennedy, 12. 
113 
barrier of words, the President has sheltered himself, surrounded by a cloud of phrases; 
big words with no meaning.” In a time of international crisis, Lodge claimed, the nation 
needed intrepid action, not empty language.219 The Progressive National Committee 
released a declaration of principles, which served as a thinly veiled diatribe against 
Wilson’s alleged inaction and lack of courage. “The Wilson Administration has suffered 
American men, women, and children to be slaughtered […] on the high seas […] It has 
stood by while the law of nations disappeared from the earth without adequate protest or 
effective resistance.” By resisting the “preparedness” movement and adopting the “futile, 
cowardly, and unrighteous” principle of “peace at any price,” Wilson had “repudiated the 
faith of our forefathers” and brought the “contempt of the world” upon American 
citizens. “Our people are becoming impatient of leaders who hold that comfort, 
prosperity, and material welfare are above honor, self-sacrifice, and patriotism,” the 
Progressives asserted. “They are demanding that principles and policies shall be 
proclaimed and carried out by a man who has the wisdom to formulate them and the 
manhood to fight for them.”220 Predictably, the bitterest polemics directed at Wilson 
came from Roosevelt, who told one receptive audience that the President’s refusal to 
avenge Germany’s attack upon the Lusitania had amounted to “kissing the bloodstained 
hand that slapped his face!” At an appearance in Manhattan, Roosevelt spewed that 
“there should be shadows now” haunting the White House lawn, 
the shadows of the men, women and children who have risen from the ooze of the 
 ocean bottom and from graves in foreign lands—the shadows of the helpless 
 whom Mr. Wilson did not dare protect lest he might have to face the danger! The 
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 shadows of babies gasping pitifully as they sank under the waves! The shadows of 
 women outraged and slain by bandits […] the shadows of deeds that were never 
 done, the shadows of lofty words that were followed by no action, the shadows of 
 the tortured dead!221 
 
Roosevelt had revenge on his mind, and hoped that more Americans might too. And just 
days before the election, Roosevelt told a packed audience at the Brooklyn Academy of 
Music that Wilson’s cowardice and anti-militaristic attitudes had left the country 
“shamefully unprepared” and “helpless in [the] event of war.” Introduced as “a man who 
is not too proud to fight for his country,” Roosevelt once again tied militarism with 
Americanism, claiming that Wilson’s reluctance to fight had fostered treacherous 
sentiments among the nation’s various ethnic groups (particularly German-Americans 
and Irish-Americans): 
 Thanks to Mr. Wilson, our unpreparedness in naval and military matters is 
 appalling and our dereliction in duty to humanity at large shocking beyond 
 description. But our spiritual unpreparedness, thanks to Mr. Wilson, is even 
 greater than our physical unpreparedness. Mr. Wilson, through his ceaseless flow 
 of graceful elocution, has bewildered the minds and crippled the sense of honor of 
 our people. The too-proud-to-fight doctrine is a cloak behind which the coward 
 hides […] It has been the chief cause responsible for the spread of the spirit of 
 disloyalty in the United States among those who openly or secretly believe in a 
 divided citizenship […] No man will be permanently loyal to a country that is too 
 proud to fight. 
 
Roosevelt implied that Hughes, if elected, would offer more than words, lead the country 
to victory one the battlefields of Europe, and correct the damage that Wilson had inflicted 
upon the American people’s honor and unity.222 
Of course, Americans who had paid attention to media coverage of the Great 
War’s tax on human life knew that intervention would inevitably result in the deaths of a 
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large, if unknowable, number of U.S. citizen-soldiers. This unpleasant fact hung over the 
“preparedness” and pro-war lobbies’ exhortations like a dark cloud, but was rarely 
addressed head on, in concrete terms. At best, those in favor of intervention shrouded the 
certainty of soldierly deaths in a blanket of star-spangled abstractions and myths. For 
instance, while campaigning in Bridgehampton, New York, Hughes preached to an 
audience of potential voters: “It is because we had men who were willing to suffer, to die, 
to venture and to sacrifice that we have the country, and it is only by that spirit that we 
will ever be able to keep a country.” Hughes claimed that by nature, Americans “are not 
filled with a spirit of militarism.” Nor are they “anxious to get into trouble.” But, Hughes 
declared, “if anybody thinks that the spirit of service and sacrifice is lost and that we have 
not got the old sentiment of self-respect, he doesn’t understand the United States.”223 
Hawkish editors at the Washington Post made similar allusions to national mythography, 
insinuating that true Americans would be willing to fight and die for their country, just as 
George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, and “the American revolutionists” had been 
“ready to make war rather than endure an unjust peace.” The Post opined: 
 We have no fear that the impracticable, illusory, un-American theory of 
 peace at any price has become an obsession with any great number of Americans. 
 The liberties and rights that were bought with blood will be defended by blood, if 
 necessary. They will not be handed over in a dream to the spoiler and the invader. 
 With eternal vigilance, Americans who have received these liberties will guard 
 them and hand them down to their children. They will fight and die rather than 
 surrender them.224 
 
Dying, it was argued, was something American men would gladly do in the names of 
their forefathers and children. But what of the mothers, wives, and girlfriends of soldiers 
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lost in Europe? How would they react to the deaths of their beloved? The “preparedness,” 
pro-war answer to that question was perhaps best enunciated by Lucy Abbot Throop of 
New York City, who, in a letter to the New York Times, proclaimed her supreme faith that 
American women would exhibit a patriotic stoicism in wartime: 
You will find that there are many women—in fact, I fancy the great 
 majority of them—who believe men go to war with love of country, self-sacrifice, 
 and true heroism in their hearts, knowing that suffering and death may be their 
 share, but still going gladly. Many women realize that while war is horrible, more 
 horrible than words can say, and that it brings ruin and devastation in its train, it is 
 sometimes necessary, and when the time does come it must be met bravely, 
 promptly, efficiently, and fought to the bitter end. Many—in fact, most—women 
 realize that human life and suffering are the price which has to be paid for the  
 onward sweep of civilization, and that the brave men who have the sorrow and the 
 great honor to be making such tremendous history will not flinch until the task if 
 done—until, at not matter what cost to themselves, they have beaten down the 
 principle of cruelty and hate which is trying to submerge the world.225 
 
The notion that American mothers and wives would gladly hand over their children and 
husbands to defend both a country in which they could not vote and a civilization that had 
done little to advance the welfare of women was dubious at best, propagandistic at worst. 
Opponents of the “preparedness” and pro-war movements offered stiff resistance 
to the nation’s march toward militarism. Some countered Roosevelt and his cohort’s 
vague reasons for belligerence (such as defending the nation’s honor and rights abroad, 
developing “Americanism” at home, and protecting the liberties symbolized by Ol’ 
Glory) with similarly vague reasons as to why the United States should not fight. For 
instance, some alluded to the Christian doctrine of “turning the other cheek,” arguing that 
it takes “courage not […] to be bullied into a fight,”226 while others (particularly those 
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whose hearts were with the Central Powers) evoked the supposedly democratic ideal of 
“fair play” to oppose an international ganging-up on the already beleaguered German 
nation. “A few days ago the press of this country yelled for war against Germany,” a 
Columbia, South Carolina, resident wrote to the State. “Oh, you gallant, brave boys, after 
five big nations are already on top of Germany, the chances for America to jump on 
Germany also, without getting thrashed herself, looked pretty good, eh? But where is the 
boasted American love of fair play?”227 Many anti-war advocates, however, cited more 
tangible reasons for avoiding belligerence. For example, the Woman’s Peace Party, a 
feminist coalition led by Fanny Garrison Villard, Carrie Chapman Catt, and Jane 
Addams, warned American women of the detrimental effects that mobilization would 
have on their quest for suffrage. As historian David M. Kennedy puts it: “They felt that 
war, which would glorify the material and virile virtues, posed a particular threat to the 
feminist movement, struggling as it was to minimize sexual differences and to discredit 
the spurious claim that male primacy in the sexual order derived from the primeval 
prowess of men as warriors.”228 Economics, not gender equality, was the crucial issue for 
automaker Henry Ford, who publicly insisted that American neutrality and the pursuit of 
peace in Europe was “not a sentimental proposition, but a business proposition.” Ford 
advised his fellow magnates (many of whom were salivating at the thought of U.S. 
military contracts) that the Great War was suppressing innovation and international trade, 
and that “there is ten times as much prosperity in peace work as in war manufactures.”229 
Meanwhile, less capitalistic voices in the anti-war movement argued for neutrality from a 
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polar opposite perspective, denouncing the corporate profiteering and (in the words of 
Yale professor Irving Fisher) “prostitution of public interest to private interests” that 
militarism and belligerence would inevitably entail.230 To unveil and confront these 
threats, Democratic Congressman James H. Davis of Texas, a self-proclaimed 
“Preparedness Foe,” introduced a bill that mandated “that each corporation shall be 
forced to pay the cost of maintaining one soldier or sailor for each $50,000 of capital and 
surplus in excess of $250,000 and in time of war for each $25,000 in excess of $75,000.” 
Likewise, immense wartime taxes would be placed on the personal incomes, inheritances, 
dowries, and incomes by foreign investment of the wealthiest American citizens. 
“Violators of the law, if it becomes one, Mr. Davis would punish by treating them as 
deserters,” wrote the Washington Post. “In war time they would be shot.” If Davis had his 
way, he would pop the upper class’s bubble before it even expanded. 
The anti-capitalistic strain of Davis’s proposed legislation reflected both the 
media coverage of the Great War’s carnage and the worldview of anarchists, the 
American Socialist Party, and the Industrial Workers of the World—radical, yet 
influential, leftist groups that vigorously opposed entering a war in which (as they saw it) 
the proletariat of each side had nothing to win and much to lose. Drawing upon popular 
understandings of the Great War’s tax on human life, socialist and union leader Eugene 
V. Debs publicly argued that the ongoing World War had resulted from economic 
competition among European nations for international markets and was a conflict 
between two groups of capitalists that had little concern for the welfare of those who 
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were called to fight and die. “Let the capitalists do the fighting,” Debs wrote in an 
editorial for the Nation Rip-Saw: 
 Do that and there will never be another war. Not even a skirmish. They are 
 not fools enough to go out and kill one another and the fools they hire for that 
 purpose they hold in contempt. 
 The capitalists tell us it is patriotic to fight for your country and shed your 
 blood for the flag. Very well! Let them set the example. 
 It is their country; they own it and therefore according to their logic it is 
 their patriotic duty to fight and die for it and be brought home riddled with bullets 
 and covered with flowers as shining examples of patriotic duty to the youth of the 
 nation […] 
 You never had a country to fight for and never will have as much as an  
 inch of one as long as you are fool enough to make a target of your bodies for the 
 profit and glory of your masters. 
 Let the capitalist do their own fighting and furnish their own corpses and 
 there will never be another war on the face of the earth. 
 
Debs’ critiques of capitalism and nationalism were seconded by Morris Hillquit, founder 
and leader of the American Socialist Party, who cited “commercial rivalry, imperialism, 
and militarism” as the main causes of “the heavy tragedy of blood-stained Europe.” 
Hillquit attacked Roosevelt and other proponents of “preparedness” for “cultivating the 
deadly germs of strife and bloodshed” through the abuse of Americans’ sense of 
patriotism. Anarchist Emma Goldman (dubbed “a professional lawbreaker” by the New 
York Times231) attacked “the big interests […] who are growing phenomenally rich by the 
manufacture of military supplies,” and asserted that the Great War would have lasted 
only a few months “had the American munition clique and food speculators not been 
given the opportunity to supply warring Europe with the means to keep up the slaughter.” 
Max Eastman and other writers for The Masses, a monthly periodical devoted to Socialist 
politics, composed scathing essays that denounced “bloodthirsty ministers,” “war-
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mongering Christians,” “unscrupulous patriots,” and members of the “owning class” who 
would happily push the nation into war. In 1916, a popular sticker issued by the 
International Workers of the World advised members of the underclass: 
Don’t Be a Soldier. Be a Man. 
Join the I. W. W. and fight on the job for yourself and your class. 
 
Journalist and communist activist John Reed was perhaps the most effective at putting the 
relationship between class and war into stark relief. In March of 1917, Reed published an 
essay in The Masses that appealed to sentiments against the war’s savagery and asked: 
Whose war is this? Not mine. I know that hundreds of thousands of American 
 workingmen employed by our great financial “patriots” are not paid a living  
 wage. I have seen poor men sent to jail for long terms without a trial, and even 
 without any charge. Peaceful strikers, and their wives and children, have been 
 shot to death, burned to death, by private detectives and militia men. The rich 
 have steadily become richer, and the cost of living higher, and the workers 
 proportionally poorer. These toilers don’t want war—not even civil war. But the 
 speculators, the employers, the plutocracy—they want it, just as they did in 
 Germany and in England; and with lies and sophistries they will whip up our 
 blood until we are savage—and then we’ll fight and die for them.232 
 
It appeared that, if given the choice, many likeminded American workers would never 
willingly risk their lives in a war that had little or nothing to do with their own material 
interests. 
Whereas those in favor of American “preparedness” and intervention in Europe 
addressed the prospect of mass casualties tangentially by casting U.S. soldiers’ deaths as 
an unavoidable, but noble, sacrifice that patriotic citizens would be willing to make in 
time of war, those who opposed “preparedness” and intervention cited the prospect of 
soldierly death as a prime reason not to militarize and fight. Appeals for a greater 
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consideration of the human cost of American belligerence came in different shades, from 
various corners of the anti-war movement. Some were delivered by socialists, union 
leaders, and radical leftists, who cogently argued that the majority of future U.S. 
casualties would be members of the large American working classes, not members of the 
so-called plutocracy. Anarchist Ricardo Flores Magón, for example, urged workers to 
think of the plight of their counterparts in Europe, “imbeciles” who “die fighting for the 
glory of their own exploiters.” In a November, 1914, essay for his Los Angeles-based 
magazine Regeneración, Magón advised his readers to contemplate the daily reports of 
mass death, and to reject what would inevitably be their own “march to the 
slaughterhouse”: 
 How many have died in the present conflict? If one said that a million 
 workers have died, that would be a low estimate of the number of lives lost. But 
 let’s suppose that the number lost in this evil war is a million; this would signify 
 that a million families find themselves without protection because their men were 
 so stupid that they preferred to march to the slaughterhouse to defend the interests 
 of their exploiters rather than to go to war in defense of the interests of their 
 class.233 
 
For Magón and his cohort, the Great War was a rich man’s war that should be fueled by 
the blood of the wealthy and “stupid,” not the poor and wise. As James H. Maurer, 
President of the Pennsylvania Federation of Labor, told a joint Senate-House military 
committee in 1916, “The workingmen will refuse to be cannon fodder for [capitalists’] 
wars.”234 Concerns over the inevitable loss of life that American belligerence would 
entail were also voiced by interested ethnic groups; a coalition of German Americans 
from Toledo, Ohio, for instance, publicly urged government officials to reflect upon the 
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devastating impact that mass death would have on American families: “The present crisis 
may plunge our nation into this world war, thus adding the lives of untold thousands of 
our men to the already long list of fathers, sons, and husbands who up to now have been 
sacrificed on the blood-stained battlefields of Europe.”235 Dr. Abraham Jacobi, the former 
president of the American Medical Association, was worried about the negative effects 
that “the tax of blood and brain” would have on American society writ large. “We see 
much talk in the newspapers of the number of men killed in present combat, but with the 
mere statement of their number the accounts stop,” Jacobi told the New York Times in 
1916. “When we see reports of property destroyed we are likely to see, also, estimates of 
its value. Such estimates never follow the accounts of human life destruction. That is 
puzzling.” Borrowing from (what seems to the modern eye like) Social Darwinian 
thought, Jacobi warned that the destruction of American soldiers (“the best male part of 
[the] nation”) upon the battlefields of Europe would result in “an even greater social 
loss”: an increase in “physical and moral degeneracy and poverty,” “spiritual 
deterioration,” and “psychological and mental loss” here at home.236  
While anti-war advocates like Jacobi discussed the inevitable effects of mass 
death in broad societal terms, others addressed the matter at the more personal and 
emotional level of motherhood. In a 1914 anti-war poem entitled, “Who Pays?” Edna 
Valentine Trapnell argued that only women “know by each birththroe the value of human 
life”: 
Cheers and shouts greet the headlines that tell of the battles won. 
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Who remembers the death-wrecked bodies motionless under the sun? 
“Victor stood to our banners, only a handful lost—” 
Only! We bore those bodies, and we know what bodies cost! 
(Mothers and wives of the soldiers dead—who better can gauge the cost?) 
[…] Counselors, kings, and rulers, ye take what ye cannot give. 
Can ye say to the things in the trenches, “Be whole, rise up and live?” 
Do ye know—who have killed your thousands by a word from a death-tipped  
  pen— 
One little pang of the cost to those who breed your fighting men? 
(Who pays, dear Lord, for their bodies and souls but the mothers and wives of  
 men?)237 
 
Trapnell’s poem was meant to remind Americans that rapturous eulogies and military 
ribbons could never bring the departed back to life; that government officials who signed 
young men’s death warrants could never understand nor experience the unique suffering 
of “mothers and wives of the soldiers dead”; that women, the bearers of human life, 
occupied an almost unrebuttable position from which to protest policies of death. Similar 
ideas appeared in other anti-war pieces of popular art, perhaps most notably in the 1915 
song, “I Didn’t Raise My Boy to Be a Soldier.” Written and composed by Alfred Bryan 
and Al Piantadosi, this pacifist song purported to be the lament of a lonesome mother 
whose son has been killed in the Great War, and argued that if mothers around the world 
stood together in solidarity, they could bring an end to the fighting in Europe: 
Ten million soldiers to the war have gone, 
Who may never return again. 
Ten million mothers’ hearts must break, 
For the ones who died in vain. 
Head bowed down in sorrowin her lonely years, 
I heard a mother murmur thro' her tears: 
I didn’t raise my boy to be a soldier, 
I brought him up to be my pride and joy, 
Who dares to put a musket on his shoulder, 
To shoot some other mother’s darling boy? 
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The song was a smash hit; over 700,000 copies of the music sheet were sold in the first 
eight weeks of its release, and recordings flew off the shelves.238 The anti-war anthem 
became so popular that Theodore Roosevelt, in true fashion, felt compelled to curb its 
momentum. “As for the woman who approves the song, ‘I Did Not Raise My Boy to Be a 
Soldier,’ her place is in China,” Roosevelt publicly snorted, “by preference, in a harem in 
China—and not in the United States […] Every woman who has not raised her boy to be 
a soldier at need has, in unwomanly fashion, striven to put a double burden on some other 
boy whose mother has a patriotic soul.”239 Thus, for this famous saber-rattler, pacifism 
was something akin to prostitution—an act that was diametrically opposed to traditional 
American values. 
Seeking the votes of a populace that seemed evenly divided over the war issue, 
President Wilson strategically pursued a political middle ground where he could relax his 
neutral stance while simultaneously expressing his desire for peace. David M. Kennedy 
tells us: “By the late summer of 1915, moving to protect his vulnerable right political 
flank, he had begun to indicate his support for what he called ‘reasonable preparedness.’” 
As the campaign season progressed, Wilson submitted to Congress a proposal for the 
expansion of the military and Navy,240 and told an audience in Cincinnati, Ohio:  “This is 
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the last war that involves the world that the United States can keep out of.”241 At the 
same time, his election committee made widespread use of the anti-war phrase, “He Kept 
Us Out of the War,” printing it in handbills and plastering it on billboards throughout the 
country. Wilson further muddied the political waters by co-opting the major arguments of 
the “preparedness” movement: he publicly agreed with his foes that the nation’s armed 
forces were dangerously small and weak, and that there was a disturbing lack of 
“Americanism” among disloyal “hyphenates” (a disparaging term for Irish-Americans, 
German-Americans, and other ethnic groups).242 Naturally, Wilson managed to outrage 
both progressive leaders, who fervently opposed militarism, belligerence, and 
xenophobia,243 and conservative leaders, who considered him a hypocrite. “President 
Wilson appeals for support on the ground that he has kept us out of war,” Roosevelt 
correctly argued, “and now […] he says that never again is the United States to keep out 
of such a war […] What does he mean by promising in the future the exact reverse of 
what he has done in the past and is now doing in the present?”244 It seemed that Wilson 
was not required to provide answers to such pointed questions, as his middle-of-the road, 
pro-“preparedness,” anti-war position successfully appealed to enough centrist voters on 
both sides of the political spectrum. By promising to strengthen the nation’s military 
might while simultaneously casting his opponent, Charles Evans Hughes, as a trigger-
happy warmonger who was eager to send American boys to their muddy graves in 
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Europe,245 Wilson was able to win the 1916 election by a narrow margin.246 While the 
race had been close, many considered his victory a referendum against war. As one 
British dignitary commented at the time: “[T]he elections have clearly shown that the 
great mass of the Americans desire nothing so much as to keep out of the war.”247 Still, 
Americans should not have been completely surprised when, five months after the 
election, on April 2, 1917, President Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany. 
For on January 31, 1916, while speaking before 15,000 people at a campaign rally in 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Wilson had indicated his willingness to sacrifice American 
soldiers upon the battlefields of Europe:  
 God forbid that we should have to use the blood of America to freshen the 
 color of that flag. But if it should ever be necessary again to assert the majesty 
 and integrity of those ancient and honorable principles, that flag will be colored 
 once more and in being colored will be glorified and purified.248 
 
Indeed, the color of Old Glory would be freshened with the blood of young American 
men. 
After consuming uncensored media coverage of the Great War for two and a half 
years, the majority of American citizens were dead set against the idea of entering this 
sordid, evil, and destructive affair. Who, in her or his right mind, would want to see the 
United States enter a war that had diminished the possibilities of patriotic death, just 
                                                 
245 Hughes was so wedded to the “preparedness” and pro-war lobbies that most 
Americans assumed that a vote for Hughes was essentially a vote for war. As a result, 
many women publicly supported Wilson by default, for he, unlike Hughes, would not 
necessarily send their sons and husbands to fight and die. In Portland Oregon, a train of 
Hughes campaigners was met by a riotous mob of women, who chased the visitors out of 
town with cries of “We want Wilson!” “Where’s the casket?” and “Fetch a coffin!” See 
“Jail Woman Heckler,” Washington Post, October 15, 1916, A3. 
246 Kennedy, 12. 
247 Ellis, 307. 
248 “Calls Hyphen a Failure,” New York Times, February 1, 1916, 1. 
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killing, collective sacrifice, proper burial, and satisfactory public commemoration? Who 
would gladly send American men overseas to be utterly destroyed or disgustingly 
maimed by terrible new war technologies? Who would idly stand by as American men 
were sent off to butcher the men of other nations? Who could support entering a war that 
had already claimed the lives of millions, and left countless families without any hope of 
reclaiming fallen soldiers’ remains? The graphic reporting of the Great War’s many 
brutal and negative aspects between 1914 and 1917 undoubtedly fostered deep and 
widespread anti-war sentiments, and shaped public imaginations about the calamities that 
belligerence would entail. As we will see in subsequent chapters, media coverage of the 
Great War and the public discourse it cultivated during the period of American neutrality 
would, in time, directly inform and shape official wartime policies (such as media 
censorship and compulsory military service), official postwar policies (such as 
repatriation of the dead and the establishment of overseas cemeteries), and American 
vernacular concerning the treatment and commemoration of U.S. soldiers killed in 
Europe. 
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3.0  PURSUING THE “BODY AND SOUL AND SPIRIT” OF EVERY 
AMERICAN THE GOVERNMENT’S WARTIME PROJECT OF MOTION  
There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful 
thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of 
all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance.249 
3.1 A “PROJECT OF MOTION” 
In April of 1917, Woodrow Wilson committed one the swiftest about-faces in U.S. 
presidential history. Abandoning the staunch antiwar platform of his 1916 presidential 
campaign, he went before Congress and asked for a declaration of war against 
Germany.250 Members of the House and Senate overwhelmingly supported the 
                                                 
249 This is a passage from President Woodrow Wilson’s War Address to U.S. 
Congress, April 2, 1917. See “Full Text of the Address by the President to Congress,” 
Los Angeles Times, April 3, 1917, I1. 
250 Scholars have debated the reasons Wilson abandoned his anti-war position 
after the 1916 presidential election. As David M. Kennedy shows, Wilson publicly 
justified his request for war as a defense of the nation’s neutral rights (seemingly violated 
by German submarine assaults) and an opportunity for the U.S. to vanquish autocracy in 
Europe and mold a lasting peace based on democratic principles and collective, global 
security. Left-leaning scholars, however, have taken Wilson’s public claims to task. 
Richard Hofstadter, for example, argues: “This was rationalization of the flimsiest sort 
[… Wilson] was forced to find legal reasons for policies that were based not upon law but 
upon the balance of power and economic necessities.” Expanding upon Hofstadter’s 
thoughts, Howard Zinn believes that Wilson, and the pro-war statesmen, bankers, and 
capitalists who supported Wilson’s call for war, were motivated by purely financial 
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President’s idealistic call to make the world “safe for democracy” and plunged the U.S. 
into the Great War. The battle cries on Capitol Hill, however, did not necessarily express 
the sentiments of the American people. For three years Americans had received a 
relatively uncensored (if distant) view of the Great War in all its terror and mass murder, 
and many had come to see the conflict as a senseless, apocalyptic, and strictly European 
affair that the United States could (and should) stay out of. Recognizing the antiwar 
streak that coursed through public discourse and consciousness, and comprehending the 
obvious incongruity between his pre- and post-election stances, President Wilson helped 
develop a series of wartime laws, policies, and agencies that made citizen (and non-
citizen) support for the war effort a matter of compulsion, not choice. Establishing an 
unprecedented national draft,251 a powerful propaganda and media censorship bureau, 
and a Justice Department bent on prosecuting dissenters, the Wilson Administration 
attempted to control the hearts, minds, and bodies of every American. Within months, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
considerations: “American capitalism needed international rivalry—and periodic war—to 
create an artificial community of interest between rich and poor, supplanting the genuine 
community of interest among the poor that showed itself in sporadic movements.” See 
Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Vintage, 1955), 277-9; David M. 
Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1980), 3-12; and Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States, 
1492-Present (New York: HarperCollins, 1980), 359-64. 
251 Throughout American history, compulsory military service has emerged 
periodically in various forms. During the Revolutionary War, state governments assumed 
the colonies’ authority to raise short-term militia forces through conscription, if 
necessary. During the Civil War, the North adopted a Federal draft in 1863, but permitted 
men to hire a substitute or pay a commutation fee of $3000 to avoid service. Roughly 
eight percent of Union troops were draftees—the rest were volunteers. World War I was 
the first war in which the United States relied primarily upon conscription; there were no 
loopholes for men of age who wished not to fight (as there had been in the past). See 
John Whiteclay Chambers II, “Conscription,” in ed. John Whiteclay Chambers II, The 
Oxford Companion to American Military History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 180-2. 
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people of the United States were legally and rhetorically transformed (through language, 
law, and force) into subservient, expendable cogs of the national war machine. And by 
November of 1918, roughly 117,000 American men would die “over there,” on the other 
side of the Atlantic. 
Utilizing rhetorical theorist Kenneth Burke’s heuristic dichotomy of motion and 
action to analyze Wilson’s address252 and the nation’s subsequent war effort, this chapter 
offers a rhetorical analysis of the U.S. government and military’s wartime project and its 
profound effects upon Americans. In A Grammar of Motives,253 Burke builds his analysis 
                                                 
252 Considered one of the most important political speeches of American twentieth 
century history, Wilson’s 1917 war address has received considerable attention from 
historians and presidential rhetoric scholars. Producing works too numerous to engage or 
list exhaustively here, scholars have analyzed the speech from various perspectives. 
Some have engaged it through the spectrum of “the presidency and the rhetoric of foreign 
crisis.” Others have engaged it as an act of the presidential “selling of war.” Others have 
examined its deployment of rhetorical devices. Still others have viewed the speech as an 
articulation of Wilsonian Progressivism. Admittedly, I do not adequately account for this 
scholarship in this dissertation, but I intend to as I turn my dissertation into a book 
manuscript. My hope is that my analysis of Wilson’s speech, and the subsequent national 
war effort, through Burke’s heuristic concept of motion/action will supplement this 
already vast and excellent body of work. For examples of this scholarship, see Katherine 
H. Adams, Progressive Politics and the Training of America’s Persuaders (Mahwah, 
N.J.: L. Eribaum Associates, 1999); Denise M. Bostdorff, The Presidency and the 
Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994); Karlyn 
Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Presidents Creating the Presidency: Deeds 
Done in Words (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); Richard Ellis, Speaking to 
the People: The Rhetorical Presidency in Historical Perspective (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1998); Wayne Fields, Union of Words: A History of Presidential 
Eloquence (New York: Free Press, 1996); Amos Kiewe, ed., The Modern Presidency and 
Crisis Rhetoric (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994);  Robert Alexander Kraig, Woodrow 
Wilson and the Lost World of the Oratorical Statesman (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 2006); Eugene Secunda and Terence P. Moran, Selling War to America: 
From the Spanish American War to the Global War on Terror (Westport, Conn.: Praeger 
Security International, 2007); and, David Zarefsky, “Presidential Rhetoric and the Power 
of Definition,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34.3 (2004): 607-19. 
253 A canonical text for contemporary rhetorical scholars, this book explores 
human motives and the forms of thought and expression they take. As Burke puts it: 
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of human motives on his distinction between motion and action. Motions are events and 
behaviors that do not intentionally carry symbolic content. Exemplified by the realms of 
the natural world and “scientism” (which assumes that change is the result of purely 
physical, autonomous processes), motion is demonstrated by the rolling ocean wave, the 
bee pollinating a flower, the billiard ball rolling across a table, or a twitching human eye. 
But if that same eye twitch were actually a wink, it would be considered an action, a 
purposive human behavior that intentionally carries symbolic content. In other words, 
action is “motion with intent,” endemic to the realms of human affairs, ethics, and 
symbolism. Where motion implies inevitability and necessity, action implies agency, 
choice, and awareness of a behavior’s potential consequences. As they pertain to rhetoric, 
motion and action are useful conceptual frameworks for understanding, describing, and 
debating pressing social issues.254 And most importantly, people routinely characterize 
instances of motion as instances of action, and vice versa, in order to shift attitudes, 
blame, and responsibility.255 
                                                                                                                                                 
“What is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it? An 
answer to that question is the subject of this book.” Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of 
Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945), xv. Burke expands upon his 
discussion of motion/action in Dramatism and Development (Barre, MA: Clark 
University Press, 1972). 
254 A familiar example of this application of the framework of motion and action 
is the longstanding Christian debate regarding man’s free will under an omnipotent, 
providential deity. If God has predetermined all human behaviors and fates, then humans 
have been set in motion by powers beyond their control. If, on the other hand, God has 
given man free will to “respond to His grace,” then humans could be viewed as agents of 
action who are aware of the potential consequences of their behaviors and choices. 
255 An obvious contemporary example of the rhetorical alchemy that allows 
people to identify instances of action as instances of motion (and vice versa) is the recent 
BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Whereas environmental groups claimed that BP was 
ethically, legally, and financially responsible for the environmental disaster because the 
company had deliberatively chosen cheaper and riskier deepwater drilling procedures to 
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This chapter provides a comprehensive exploration of what I term Wilson’s 
“project of motion” (which, given Burke’s theory, was itself a project of action). 
Beginning with the President’s war address to Congress, I examine the wartime laws, 
policies, and agencies the Wilson Administration and the American Expeditionary Forces 
used to constrain and suppress U.S. citizens’ and soldiers’ abilities to act and express 
themselves freely.256 Uncovering the motives behind this wartime project and the forms 
of thought and expression that were built around them, I show how prominent 
governmental, military, media, and cultural figures strategically cast instances of action 
as instances of motion (and instances of motion as action) to shape public attitudes, 
enforce draconian laws and policies, shift responsibility and blame to alleged evil 
enemies (both foreign and domestic), and construct and propagate national war aims. 
Inevitably, U.S. belligerence entailed the destruction of American life on a grand scale—
a horrifying consequence and colossal material transformation that required appropriate 
and timely rhetorical compensations from the government. A controversy in late 1917 
surrounding the treatment of the bodily remains of the nation’s first casualties revealed 
the dormant anxieties and dilemmas that lurked just below the surface of the domestic 
war effort; for the first, Americans realized that their fallen soldiers would not return to 
                                                                                                                                                 
save time and money (and thus cast the event in terms of action), BP denied that it had 
any knowledge of the potential hazards of its methods and argued that (in the words of 
BP-apologist Senator Rand Paul) “sometimes accidents happen” (and thus cast the event 
in terms of motion). 
256 I do not mean to suggest that the government’s wartime project ended what 
had been a utopist period of democracy in which citizens had enjoyed and exercised the 
freedom to express themselves as autonomous members of society. Realities such as 
racial segregation and the persistence of women’s disfranchisement belie such a notion. 
Nor do I mean to say that the censorship and the suppression of free expression were 
unique to the American experience in the Great War, as similar things occurred during 
previous American wars. 
133 
the homeland for some time (if ever). Ultimately, soldiers who were drafted and sent to 
fight, kill, and die in foreign nations on the other side of the world (as well as their 
families), had little say in the matter. During the period of American belligerence, 
families of the dead were encouraged to view their profound and devastating losses as 
necessary sacrifices for the national war effort and the fight to make the world “safe for 
democracy” (rather than for independence from tyranny, the preservation of the Union, or 
the natural resources of distant colonial territories in Asia). At the same time, public 
expressions of grief and anger were effectively forbidden by the government’s wartime 
project of motion—thus, relatives of the dead were forced to keep their personal 
sentiments under wraps. 
As we will see in the following chapters, this wartime suppression of emotion and 
expression that could be conceived of as undermining the war effort would give way to 
an explosion of symbolic action after the war, as Americans forcefully began demanding 
explanations and compensations for the premature deaths of their men. In time, the U.S. 
government would learn to appropriate the sentimental and domestic vernacular of angry 
and grieving families into its own official rhetoric so that it might satisfy the needs of the 
American people and justify the nation’s participation in the war. In the years following 
the Great War, the U.S. government would incorporate this sentimental vernacular into a 
series of commemoration projects (most notably, the establishment of a network of 
American military cemeteries throughout Western Europe) that, in combination, would 
reframe the national war effort as a project of action in which the American people—
united around a shared set of principles and beliefs—had freely and willingly sacrificed 
their lives and their loved ones for the good of the world. 
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3.2 WILSON’S SPEECH TO CONGRESS 
On April 2, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson stood before Congress to ask for a 
declaration of war against Germany. For two months, Germany had attempted to knock 
Britain out of the World War by sinking all foreign ships, including American vessels, 
entering blockaded zones of the Atlantic Ocean. Germany’s unrestricted submarine 
campaign against ships capable of transporting resources to Britain and its allies resulted 
in the sinking of four unarmed American merchant boats and the deaths of thirty-six U.S. 
citizens. In light of these deaths and the controversy surrounding the Zimmerman 
Telegram, an alleged proposal from Germany to Mexico to make war on the United 
States, President Wilson had decided that the nation could no longer sit back and watch 
Germany’s “cruel and unmanly business” continue.257 The President who once had been 
“too proud to fight” and spoke of “peace at any cost” now urged those representing the 
people of the United States to support his call for war. 
In his war message to Congress, Wilson claimed that he and his fellow 
countrymen and women, a “great peaceful people,” had not wanted to fight, but that 
Germany’s recent actions—uncommon “wrongs” that had “cut to the very roots of human 
life”—had left Americans with little choice. “[W]e will not choose the path of submission 
and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated,” 
Wilson stated. “I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial 
German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the Government and 
                                                 
257 In his speech to Congress, Wilson cited the Zimmermann Telegram as proof of 
German “criminal intrigues” against U.S. national security: “That [the German 
government] means to stir up enemies against us at our very doors the intercepted 
Zimmermann note to the German Minister at Mexico City is eloquent evidence.” 
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people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus 
been thrust upon it.” According to Wilson, Germany’s actions had propelled the United 
States into war. “We enter this war only where we are clearly forced into it because there 
are no other means of defending our rights.” Americans were blameless, as the decision 
for war had already been made for them by the nation by Germany. “We are now about to 
accept [the] gage of battle with this natural foe to liberty and shall, if necessary, spend the 
whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its power.”258 Violently 
pushed into motion by Germany’s intentional and antagonistic actions, the United States 
would now meet German force with an even greater force. 
Casting American intervention as a just endeavor that would be conducted 
“without passion,” Wilson rhetorically dissociated the German people from their 
supposedly evil rulers. “We have no quarrel with the German people,” Wilson said. “We 
have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their 
impulse that their Government acted in entering this war.” Wilson argued that the 
German people were victims of a despotic regime—the kind of hated regime that 
generations of European immigrants had abandoned for a new life in America. Wilson 
stated that the German submarine campaign “was a war determined upon as wars used to 
be determined upon in the old, unhappy days […] waged in the interest of dynasties or of 
little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow men as pawns 
and tools.” Through these words, Wilson distinguished German autocracy, a system in 
                                                 
258 Wilson’s argument that Americans were a peaceful people who had been 
provoked into war was not new to presidential rhetoric, as McKinley had used a similar 
claim in his Spanish-American War address. See Robert L. Ivie, “Presidential Motives 
for War,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 60.3 (1974): 337-45. 
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which a select few could plunge millions of people into war, and American democracy, a 
system in which the President, at least theoretically, was constitutionally bound to consult 
Congress prior to military action. Of course, what Wilson did not say was that in order to 
defeat the German government, Americans would have to kill many German people.259 
(As we know, government officials are never the first to die in a war.) But Wilson’s 
statements and careful omissions preemptively exculpated Americans of the destruction 
of German people that belligerence and regime changes in Germany and Austria would 
entail. And just as importantly, the President’s words helped construct an identifiable, 
tangible enemy—the Kaiser and his cohort—in the minds of Americans.260 
Wilson laid out a series of lofty goals for the American war effort—goals that 
indicated his utopian vision of a world in which all nations were democratic and members 
of an organized “league of honor” where differences could be worked out peacefully. In 
an effort to tie his global dream to American interests and security, Wilson claimed that 
Germany’s sinking of U.S. commerce ships had constituted “warfare against mankind 
[…] war against all nations.” Wilson equated American belligerence to the preservation 
                                                 
259 Not that Wilson or too many of his appreciative listeners were necessarily 
worried about the deaths of Germans. 
260 Throughout the period of U.S. belligerence, American propaganda and media 
texts (newspapers, films, books) cast Kaiser Wilhelm II as the nation’s true enemy, the 
purest symbol of German savagery, and the one person most responsible for the war in 
Europe. The millions of German and Austro-Hungarian troops fighting on land and sea 
were consolidated into and anthropomorphized by caricatures of the Kaiser—his fate was 
his military’s fate (and vice versa). On the flip side, the U.S. military became embodied 
in the fictional character Uncle Sam—his needs were the military’s needs (and vice 
versa). Convenient and shorthand representations of good and evil, these icons appeared 
routinely, if subtly, in the everyday texts; consider the following title of a newspaper 
article that addressed Germany’s weakening control over the Atlantic Ocean: “Uncle Sam 
Tightens His Grip on the Kaiser’s Throat,” The Patriot (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania), July 
21, 1917, 18. 
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of “civilization itself,” and insisted that Americans would gladly fight for ideals that 
“shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.” These 
ideals included “the principles of right and of fair play”; “the right of those who submit to 
authority to have a voice in their own governments”; “the rights and liberties of small 
nations”; “the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish 
autocratic power”; and “the ultimate peace of the world and […] the liberation of its 
peoples, the German peoples included.” Americans, Wilson declared to Congress and 
countless mediated audiences around the world, would not fight for power, territory, 
wealth, or natural resources.261 Instead, they would fight (and by implication, if need be 
die) to make the world “safe for democracy”:  
To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are 
 and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has 
 come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the 
 principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has 
 treasured. God helping her, she can do no other. 
 
In a few short paragraphs, Wilson transitioned from the interests of the nation, to those of 
all of “civilization,” to those of all the peoples of the world, to those of all of God’s 
creation. By amplifying the United States’ subject position to the point where it 
enveloped all of humanity’s alleged hopes and aspirations for democracy and liberty, he 
effectively represented the nation as the potential savior of the world—something akin to 
a giant, modern-day Christian Crusader. 
                                                 
261 Wilson stated: “We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities 
for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are 
but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those 
rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them.” 
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But until that moment, it had not been evident to the majority of Americans that 
countrymen of theirs would, in fact, willingly fight, spill blood, and die in Europe for 
anything, let alone ideals as seemingly unattainable as “the ultimate peace of the world.” 
For two and a half years, Americans had witnessed from afar the horrors and 
unprecedented human destruction of the Great War. Just a few months prior, Wilson 
himself had mounted a successful reelection campaign on the slogan, “He Kept Us Out of 
War!” His victory had been considered by many to be a referendum against American 
belligerence. In October of 1916 (long after the sinking of the Lusitania), Wilson had 
justified American neutrality by publicly commenting that the Great War had been 
caused “by nothing in particular” and that the aims of the belligerents on both sides were 
“virtually the same.”262 In the months between his reelection and his war address to 
Congress, the President and his advisers had kept a close watch on public opinion and 
had found few expressions of desire to go to war. William C. Durant, the founder of 
General Motors, returned from a cross-country trip and reported to the White House that 
he had “met only one man between New York and California who wanted war.” And in 
March 1917, British observers, keen on finding a way to draw the United States into the 
fight against Germany, had determined that there was a “remarkable lack of excitement 
or enthusiasm [for war].” Despite the many groups that had previously been in favor of 
preparedness and intervention, the British agents concluded: “There is no indication […] 
of any pro-Ally enthusiasm except among that body of ardent pro-Allies intellectually 
important, but numerically far less important, which has shown its warm sympathy from 
                                                 
262 H. C. F. Bell, Woodrow Wilson and the People (Garden City, New York: 
Country Life Press, 1945), 211. 
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the very beginning of the war.”263 Now, just weeks after this telling British report, 
President Wilson stood before the American people, drawing a line in the sand. 
Likely recognizing the stark incongruity between his pre-election and post-
election attitudes, and anticipating the difficulties that such an incongruity would pose to 
corralling support from the already reluctant American polis, Wilson cast support for the 
war effort as a matter of compulsion, not choice. “What this will involve is clear,” Wilson 
preached. It would involve Wall Street extending “the most liberal financial credits” to 
“governments now at war with Germany.” It would involve “the organization and 
mobilization of all the material resources of the country to supply the materials of war.” It 
would involve supplying the Navy “with the best means of dealing with the enemy’s 
submarines”—a program that would be funded by a “well conceived taxation” of 
citizens’ incomes (rather than borrowing from other nations). Perhaps most importantly, 
victory would require a national draft. “It will involve the immediate addition to the 
armed forces of the United States already provided for by law in case of war at least 
500,000 men,” Wilson contended, “who should, in my opinion, be chosen upon the 
principle of universal liability to service, and also the authorization of subsequent 
additional increments of equal force so soon as they may be needed and can be handled in 
training.” Furthermore, Wilson warned that the government would not only commandeer 
citizens’ bodies, money, and labor, but would demand their minds and “allegiance” too. 
Americans, whether of German descent or otherwise, would be compelled to back the 
national war effort no matter what. “If there should be disloyalty,” Wilson ominously 
                                                 
263 H. C. Peterson, Propaganda for War: The Campaign Against American 
Neutrality, 1914-1917 (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1939), 309-10. 
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threatened, “it will be dealt with with a firm hand of stern repression.” Foreshadowing the 
draconian wartime laws and policies that, ironically, would contradict the supposed (and 
rarely, if ever, fulfilled) democratic ideals for which Americans were meant to fight and 
die in Europe, Wilson indicated his intention to compel loyalty (one could either 
wholeheartedly support the war effort or be a traitor), suppress opposition to the war 
effort, and replace every American’s will with the will of the U.S. government. 
When Wilson finished, all but a few Senators and Representatives jumped to their 
feet, applauded, waved flags, and shouted words of approval. Over the next few days, 
Republicans (who had wanted to go to war for some time) and Democrats (who wished to 
support their President) in both the House and Senate deliberated over the war measure. 
Only a relative handful of Congress members rejected Wilson’s call for war. The most 
vocal opponent was Senator Robert La Follette of Wisconsin (a staunch opponent of 
intervention), who (unsurprisingly) claimed that he had received from citizens 15,000 
letters and telegrams that opposed the war at a ratio of 9 to 1. Appealing to common 
knowledge of the deadly and ghastly conditions of the Great War, La Follete denounced 
Wilson’s push for war, which he claimed was, itself, autocratic in nature: “The poor, sir, 
who are the ones called upon to rot in the trenches, have no organized power, have no 
press to voice their will upon this question of peace or war, but, oh, Mr. President, at 
some time they will be heard!” Furthermore, La Follette predicted that Wall Street would 
be the only true beneficiaries of the fighting. As for making the world “safe for 
democracy,” he pointed out that of all the nations with which the United States was about 
to ally itself, only France and now the czarless Russia were democratic states. La 
Follette’s call for a national referendum on the war question was ignored. In the House, 
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Representative Jeannette Rankin of Montana—a social worker, suffragist, and the first 
female elected to Congress—took a similarly principled stance against the measure, and 
stated: “I want to stand by my country, but I cannot vote for war.” In the end, La Follette, 
Rankin, and their cohort were greatly outnumbered; the Senate adopted the war 
resolution by a vote of 82 to 6; the House by a vote of 373 to 50. On April 6, 1917, 
President Wilson signed the joint Congressional declaration of war against Germany.264 
The nation was officially at war. By the end of the year, the lives of young Americans 
would be claimed on the battlefields of Europe. 
3.3 MOTION, LEGISLATED 
The government’s wartime project began in earnest on April 5, 1917, the very day that 
Congress declared war on Germany. That day, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker 
submitted to Congress a preliminary version of the Selective Service Act, legislation that 
called for a national military draft. On April 6, President Wilson issued an executive 
order limiting the rights of “enemy aliens” and subjecting them to summary arrest and 
internment.265 Hours later, Justice Department officials, without reference to the courts or 
obtaining a warrant, detained “sixty alleged ringleaders in German plots, conspiracies, 
and machinations” in several major cities around the country. Representing just a handful 
                                                 
264 Edward Robb Ellis, Echoes of a Distant Thunder: Life in the United States, 
1914-1918 (New York: Kodansha International, 1975), 321, 324, 330-1. 
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of the thousands of “German operatives” that were supposedly under government 
surveillance, the group was sent to prison without possibility of bail for the duration of 
the war. Newspaper accounts of the arrests served as clear warnings to potential saboteurs 
and agitators.266 On April 7, Wilson issued a confidential executive order permitting the 
dismissal of civil service employees merely on the suspicion of disloyalty during 
wartime, a measure that preemptively silenced any government worker who might 
express opposition to some aspect of the war effort.267 On April 28, he authorized the 
Navy to censor transatlantic cables and radio stations while giving similar power over 
telephone and domestic telegraph lines to the army.268 American newspapers stated that 
the purpose of this censorship was to “prevent the transmission […] of information that 
might be of value to Germany.”269 Like other war-related orders, legislation, and policies 
enacted during the period of American belligerency, this executive order simultaneously 
indicated that subversives and enemies were, indeed, present in the United States (a 
notion that tends to increase public clamor for ‘governmental protection’ and justify 
governmental violations of civil liberties) and warned would-be subversives to watch 
their backs. 
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These initial activities and executive orders turned out to be only precursors of a 
series of broader, sweeping wartime laws that sought to transform autonomous American 
citizens into objects of motion for the war machine. The earliest, and perhaps most 
radical, of these laws was the Selective Service Act, which called for the United States’ 
first nationwide draft. In its original form, the bill provided that the army be brought to 
full war strength, that the National Guard be federalized, and that a half million men 
should be drafted, with a second 500,000 to be called when President Wilson deemed 
necessary (this process would quickly raise over 1,727,000 soldiers for the war effort.) 
All unmarried males between the ages of 21 and 30 were to be subject to the draft, and 
they would be drafted in proportion to the populations of the various states. (In actuality, 
as the war progressed and the need for soldierly bodies increased, the draft would expand 
to include men between the ages of 18 and 45, married and unmarried alike. By the end 
of the war, 23,456,021 men, or half the adult male population of the United States, would 
be compelled to register for the draft; of these, 4,800,000 would don a uniform in 
domestic training camps or in the battlefields of Europe.)270 Registrants would be called 
to duty through the random determinations of a national lottery—an ingenious method 
that shifted responsibility and blame from government officials (the very people 
responsible and blameworthy for sending American men to fight, kill, and die in Europe) 
to the gods of fate and chance (the gods of motion).271 
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The idea of the national draft, however, was highly controversial. For many 
Americans, the word “conscription” was a dirty word that held autocratic connotations; 
after all, Germany and Austria-Hungary—the United States’ newest enemies—had 
traditionally drafted men into their armies. Furthermore, since the American Revolution, 
the public had typically opposed (sometimes violently) the idea of federally mandated 
compulsory service.272 During Congressional debates over the proposed draft, a handful 
of Senators and Representatives cited these cultural and historical phenomena in 
denouncements of the bill. These nervous legislators equated “conscript” with “convict” 
and “slave”; predicted that anti-draft rioting “all over the United States” would “add more 
joy to the German heart than any other news which could be conveyed”; and claimed that 
a draft would “Prussianize America” and “produce a sulky, unwilling, indifferent 
army.”273 Opponents of the draft, however, were soundly defeated, and the bill was 
passed by a wide margin and signed into law by the President on May 18, 1917.  
Recognizing that public acceptance of conscription and a swift and smooth 
enactment of the draft were not givens, Wilson and the War Department attempted to cast 
conscription in terms of altruism and “service.” This project began with the very naming 
of the legislation: the Selective Service Act (emphasis added). As historian David M. 
Kennedy keenly observes: “‘Service’ was a kind of rhetorical vessel into which were 
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being poured the often contradictory emotional and political impulses of the day […] a 
fittingly ambivalent term, at once connoting the autonomy of the individual will and the 
obligation of the individual to serve a sphere wider than his own.” Insisting that the draft 
was something akin to a voluntary affair, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker and his 
Selective Service administrator, Provost Marshal General Enoch H. Crowder, established 
a series of “national registration days” during which draft-eligible men were encouraged 
(as well as required by law) to register with their local draft boards. Nationally, there 
were 5,000 draft boards, each made up of four or five appointed local citizens.274 
Newspapers across the country published Presidential proclamations (in Gothic font often 
associated with legal and religious documents) announcing national registration days 
under the headline, “Call to Arms.” In unambiguous terms, American men were urged to 
‘answer the call’ as if by choice and for love of country.275 By putting the administration 
of the draft into the hands of friends and neighbors of the men to be affected (these draft 
boards were designed to serve as buffers between the individual citizen and the Federal 
Government), and by giving draft-eligible men the opportunity to bring themselves 
physically to designated spots, the national registration days diverted and grounded 
resentment and discontent at the local level and advanced the dubious notion that the 
draft represented both local self-government at its finest and the willing and non-coerced 
“service” of American men.276 Here, it was useful and convenient for the Wilson 
administration and the War Department to cast this program of motion (the draft) as a 
program of action (voluntary enlistment). 
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Of course, conscription had very little to do with voluntarism. While the original 
Selective Service Act of 1917 allowed draft exemptions for married men, workers in 
industries essential to the war effort, members of “well-recognized” pacifistic religions, 
and “those found to be physically or morally deficient,” every other man between the age 
of 21 and 30 was compelled to register and if selected by a national lottery, to “serve” in 
the military. Those who refused to register or serve—and those who helped draft-eligible 
men avoid registering or serving—were subject to cruel and sometimes unusual 
treatment. Although the Selective Service Act stated that avoiding conscription or aiding 
draft dodgers was punishable by a fine of $1,000 or imprisonment for up to one year, 
government officials and private vigilante groups feverishly pursued and disciplined 
“slackers” in ways that greatly exceeded the language of the bill. In Springfield, Illinois, 
for example, an older couple was jailed for ninety days simply for privately advising their 
son not to register.277 In Pittsburgh, Chicago, Boston, New York, and other major cities, 
Justice Department officials, local police officers, vigilante groups, and armed soldiers 
and sailors descended upon streets and businesses to hunt delinquents. One such “slacker 
raid” in New York City led to the detainment of 50,000 draft-age men, many of whom 
were apprehended at bayonet-point in ball parks, restaurants, or on street corners and 
forced to show their Selective Service documents; of these, 13,000 turned out to be draft 
dodgers.278 Pitched battles between draft resisters and armed state and county officials 
led to the deaths of at least twenty people across the country.279 At prisons and military 
training camps throughout the nation, non-religious conscientious objectors suffered all 
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kinds of torture: many were beaten; forced to sleep on cement floors; forbidden to read or 
write or even talk; placed in extended solitary confinement; chained to the doors of their 
cells; hung upside down with their faces in human excrement; and in one infamous case, 
jabbed with bayonets. At Fort Riley in Kansas, an unlucky conscientious objector who 
went on hunger strike was tortured, forcibly fed, court-martialed, and sentenced to life 
imprisonment.280 Quite simply, able-bodied men of draft age had no choice but to register 
and if summoned, report for active duty.281 
The government’s tenacious pursuit of draft dodgers and cruel treatment of 
conscientious objectors were justified in public comments issued from prominent 
American elites. The canon of the Episcopal Cathedral of St. John the Divine in 
Manhattan, for instance, preached to his congregation that conscientious objectors were 
“wolves in sheep’s clothing.”282 Editors at the New York Times published the names and 
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residences of draft dodgers,283 and wrote that if a self-professed conscientious objector 
“puts his belief into practice, we should either put him to death or shut him up in an 
asylum as a madman.” The perpetual warmonger Theodore Roosevelt traveled around the 
country snarling that most conscientious objectors were “slackers, pure and simple, or 
else traitorous pro-Germans” who should “permanently be sent out of the country as soon 
as possible.” His cousin, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, issued 
similar statements that denounced “slackers.”284 Nicholas Murray Butler, the president of 
Columbia University, publicly claimed that conscientious objectors were “morally half-
witted,” while Secretary of War Newton D. Baker announced that any conscientious 
objector whose sincerity was questioned, or who engaged in propaganda, or who was 
“sullen and defiant,” would be “promptly brought to trial by court martial.”285 The effects 
of such statements could be felt across the country, as many Americans came to view 
draft dodgers as something akin to enemies of the state. Across the United States, robed 
members of the Ku Klux Klan hunted down draft dodgers, while other extremist groups 
called for all conscientious objectors and delinquents to be shot on sight. In cities 
throughout the nation, “patriotic women” scornfully handed yellow feathers to young 
men in civilian clothing so as to shame them into voluntarily enlisting.286  
Such sentiments even affected the attitudes and policies of local draft boards—
many local draft board members viewed conscientious objectors with abject disdain. A 
November 1917 Selective Service survey asked each local draft board to describe its 
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treatment of 1) religious objectors; 2) conscientious objectors; 3) the morally deficient; 
and 4) persons already under arrest or on bail on charges of crime. The draft board of 
Russell County, Alabama, responded: 
 Ans. 1. Send them to the front. 
 Ans. 2. Send them to the front. 
 Ans. 3. Send them to the front. 
 Ans. 4. Had none. 
 
Similarly, a draft board from Oakland California, answered: 
 
1- Should be Drafted. 
2- Should be Drafted. 
3- Had none. Should be Drafted – discipline might help him. 
4- Had one. Was treated as others.287 
 
Such comments reflected the pervasive attitude that the demands of the collective, 
national war effort trumped the personal desires and beliefs of individual citizens (and 
especially pacifists). Furthermore, these responses implied that religious and 
conscientious objectors were social parasites who, much like the “morally deficient” and 
criminal elements, needed to be eradicated. In many cases, they would be shipped off to 
war (and in time, return in coffins). 
Once drafted, recruits were sent to one of thirty-two hastily built military camps 
around the country to undergo “basic” training that would, in theory, quickly transform 
them into professional warriors. In reality, most of the nation’s training camps were little 
more than glorified barracks with muddy fields where recruits received deficient and 
outdated martial instruction. For starters, the traditional-minded leader of the American 
                                                 
287 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, 
Maryland in the Records of the Selective Service System, World War I (Record Group 
163), under “Provost Marshal General’s Office, Local Board Experience,” File Number 
163.470.78.16.00. 
150 
Expeditionary Forces (AEF), General John J. Pershing, considered trench warfare 
defeatist, and called for training in offensive, open warfare. Although machine guns and 
artillery were the main killing machines in Europe, Pershing demanded heavy instruction 
in the rifle and bayonet, which he considered “the supreme weapons of the infantry 
soldier.”288 To make matters worse, most camps lacked basic essentials: blankets, 
uniforms, machine guns, artillery guns, and worst of all, seasoned instructors. Lacking 
hand grenades, recruits practiced lobbing rocks. Lacking rifles, they marched with 
broomsticks. Many soldiers studied horseshoeing without horses. At Camp Colt near 
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, a young officer named Dwight D. Eisenhower struggled to 
train thousands of men in tank warfare without having a single, actual tank at his 
disposal.289 Many soldiers arrived in France without ever having fired a weapon—a 
reality that surely cost countless men their lives.290 
The difficulties of this quixotic venture were compounded by the heterogeneous 
makeup of the nation’s draftees. Camp instructors had roughly four months291 (in some 
cases, only four weeks)292 to mold country boys who had never seen indoor plumbing or 
automobiles, city boys who were afraid of the forest, uneducated men who could not tell 
their left hand from their right, and immigrants and aliens who could not speak English, 
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into an orderly and modern fighting force.293 Official postwar reports on the make-up of 
the American fighting force indicate the challenges (both real and perceived) of training 
such a diverse population of men, and reveal the military’s biased and racist opinions of 
immigrants (Germans in particular) and African-Americans:  
 The records show that country boys made a better physical record than city boys, 
 white than colored, native-born better than foreign-born. The differences were so 
 considerable that 100,000 country boys would furnish for the military service 
 4,790 more soldiers than would an equal number of city boys. The average 
 mental age of the United States soldier was between 13 and 14 years according 
 to the mental tests given in the [Selective Draft] examinations. Alarming 
 illiteracy conditions were found by means of the draft examination. Of men of 
 military age there 700,000 who could neither read nor write […] The total 
 number of aliens registered [for conscription] was 3,877,083 […] Enemy aliens 
 [non-citizen German immigrants] registered in the draft numbered 158,809.294 
 
Ironically, non-citizen German immigrants were officially classified as “enemy aliens” 
(clearly a pejorative term), yet were still swept up by the draft and sent to fight (and die) 
in Europe on behalf of the United States.  
 Considering the fact that the Great War was defined by trench warfare and new 
technologies like heavy artillery, machine guns, field telephones, trucks, tanks, and 
airplanes, American troops were, by and large, poorly trained. Who knows how many 
U.S. casualties resulted from this lack of proper instruction? Yet, by emphasizing General 
Pershing’s offensively oriented tactics, the U.S. military succeeded in instilling an 
aggressive instinct and spirit of attack in most recruits; like well-functioning cogs in the 
war machine, American soldiers learned to charge when ordered, whatever dangers lied 
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ahead.295 After the war, President Wilson would explain that the American army was 
raised so rapidly because the men were trained to go only one way—“forward.”296 The 
speed with which American men were rounded up, trained, and shipped to Europe was 
captured in the lyrics of George M. Cohan’s smash hit song, “Over There”: 
Johnnie, get your gun, get your gun, get your gun, 
Take it on the run, on the run, on the run; 
Hear them calling you and me, 
Every son of liberty. 
Hurry right away, no delay, go today.297 
 
Indeed, the U.S. military attempted to turn draftees with such diverse names as Acullo, 
Benitto, Dooley, Hajek, Moskala, Ozbourn, Perez, Smith, and Truemper, into an army of 
“Johnnies”—objects of motion racing from here (the United States) to “over there” 
(Europe) and into battle without delay. 
Now that the question of securing and sending soldierly bodies to Europe had 
been answered, the Wilson administration and Congress turned their attention to 
controlling wartime public discourse and behavior at home. Over a twelve-month period, 
Congress passed three sweeping and infamous pieces of legislation that restricted free 
speech and buttressed Wilson’s project of motion. The Espionage Act of June 1917 made 
it a crime, punishable by up to twenty years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine, to “make 
or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or 
success of the military or naval forces of the United States”; to “cause or attempt to cause 
insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty in the military or naval forces”; or 
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to “willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States.” It also 
empowered the Postmaster General to declare “unmailable” all letters, circulars, 
newspapers, pamphlets, books, and other materials that urged “treason, insurrection, or 
forcible resistance to any law of the United States.” Those who used the postal service to 
transmit such materials faced stiff fines and jail time. The Trading-with-the-Enemy Act 
of October 1917 legalized government censorship of all communications moving in or 
out of the United States, and allowed the Postmaster General to demand translations of 
newspaper or magazine articles published in foreign languages—a move designed to 
keep suspect German-language newspapers in check. And the Sedition Act of May 1918 
amended and broadened the Espionage Act by making it a federal crime to write, publish, 
or even utter 
any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of 
 government of the United States, or the Constitution of the United States, or the 
 military or naval forces of the United States, or the flag of the United States, or 
 the uniform of the Army or Navy of the United States, or any language intended 
 to bring [any of the above] into contempt, scorn, contumely, or disrepute. 
 
Aimed chiefly at Socialists, pacifists, anarchists, and other prominent agitators, the 
Sedition Act also enhanced the Postmaster General’s powers to ban publications deemed 
treasonable or seditious from circulation.298 While the intent of these three laws and the 
punishments they entailed were clear enough, the looseness of the laws’ language made it 
nearly impossible to determine the official boundaries of permissible discourse regarding 
the national war effort. What, exactly, constituted “disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or 
abusive language?” How were “treason,” “insurrection,” and “sedition” to be defined? 
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And who would define them? Perhaps intentionally designed, these ambiguities 
essentially granted government officials sweeping powers to interpret and enforce the 
laws as they saw fit. They also incentivized self-repression of behavior and speech that 
might be construed as illegal; every person living in the United States was wise to keep 
personal thoughts not wholly in line with the national war effort to her or himself. 
Ironically, the very anti-war language President Wilson had used to get reelected would 
now land the average American behind bars. 
Armed with the expansive powers granted by the Espionage, Trading-with-the-
Enemy, and Sedition Acts, Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson and Attorney General 
Thomas W. Gregory set out to crush domestic dissent and anti-war speech of any kind. 
Serving as President Wilson’s loyal henchmen, Burleson and Gregory stretched their 
newly acquired, wartime powers to the greatest limits and in doing so, helped usher in 
one of the most blatantly repressive periods of American history. At Wilson’s bidding,299 
Burleson directed most of his attention toward monitoring and silencing the radical press 
and foreign-language circulations. By October 1917, Burleson had begun stripping 
second-class mailing privileges from periodicals that had the audacity to, in his words, 
“impugn the motives of the government and thus encourage insubordination,” claim “that 
the government is controlled by Wall Street or munition manufacturers,” or criticize 
“improperly our Allies.” As a conservative, nativistic Southerner, Burleson was 
particularly interested in eliminating Socialist periodicals altogether. Publicly, Burleson 
declared that he would bar from circulation only those Socialist papers that contained 
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treasonable or seditious language. But, he added, “the trouble is that most Socialist papers 
do contain such matter.” The American Socialist was banned immediately and was soon 
followed by Solidarity (the journal of the Industrial Workers of the World), the Rebel (the 
publication of the Tenant Farmers Union), the New York Call, and the Milwaukee Leader. 
Most famously, Burleson banned from the mails the August 1917 issue of The Masses (a 
popular Socialist political and literary magazine) because it contained four antiwar 
cartoons and a poem defending anarchist anti-war activists Emma Goldman and 
Alexander Berkman. When editors at The Masses proposed to avoid such content in the 
future, Burleson still refused to restore the magazine’s second-class mailing privileges on 
the ground that it had skipped an issue—the very issue that Burleson had pulled from 
circulation!—and was thus ineligible for such privileges as a regularly issued 
“periodical.” This incident effectively brought The Masses to an end.300  
Burleson was just as aggressive with foreign-language (particularly German) 
publications, and demanded translations of all articles or editorials referring to the 
government, to any of the belligerent powers, or to the conduct of the war. Faced with 
such a costly procedure, many foreign-language papers either prudently adopted a 
position of unqualified support for the government’s war effort or simply shut down, 
many never to appear again. Within the first twelve months of American belligerence, 
forty-four major periodicals lost their mailing privileges and another thirty retained them 
only by agreeing to print nothing more concerning the war. Perhaps most disturbingly, 
Burleson gave local postmasters the authority to open citizens’ private letters and read 
them. Whenever local postmasters discovered a remark they considered treasonous, they 
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asked the government to prosecute. Conrad Kornmann of Sioux Falls, South Dakota, 
wrote to a friend that he opposed the idea of government war bonds; he was fined $1,000 
and sent to jail for ten years. L. N. Legendre of Los Angeles was sent to prison for two 
years for expressing in a letter: “This is a war fostered by Morgan and the rich.”301 Such 
cases served as warnings to all Americans, and showed just how much power the 
government had to invade the most personal aspects of citizens’ lives. 
Burleson’s zealous devotion to stamping out “disloyal utterances” was matched 
only by the efforts of his partner in crime fighting, Attorney General Thomas Gregory. 
Claiming that those who impeded the national war effort “sinned against the sovereignty 
of America and I know of no crime so serious as this,” Gregory feverishly wielded his 
new powers to pursue and prosecute all instances of wartime dissent. Having only a few 
hundred Justice Department employees at his disposal (at the time, the Justice 
Department was quite small, and the Attorney General did not yet have the power to use 
the fledgling Bureau of Investigation as a resource), Gregory turned to the quasi-vigilante 
group the American Protective League (APL) for help. Securing $275,000 from President 
Wilson’s emergency war fund, Gregory secretly bankrolled the APL and developed an 
“unofficial,” nationwide network of informants, commandos, and provocateurs for his 
immediate assistance.  While privately reassuring Wilson of the APL’s propriety, Gregory 
encouraged his 250,000 legionnaires to spy on and report neighbors, fellow workers, 
office-mates, and anyone of suspect character. 
Authorized by official-looking badges that read “American Protective League—
Secret Service,” many of these “agents” bugged, burglarized, slandered, and illegally 
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arrested fellow American citizens. Others opened mail, intercepted telegrams, committed 
outright physical assault against suspected dissenters, and helped conduct dubious 
“slacker raids” (Gregory was publicly embarrassed when an officer of the Bureau of 
Investigation inadvertently admitted to the press that, on average, 99 out of 100 men were 
mistakenly arrested in “slacker raids”). Predictably, under the guise of patriotism, APL 
members used their largely unchecked powers to promote right-wing social and 
economic views and harass African-Americans, German-Americans, and other ethnic 
minorities. Despite these nefarious activities, Gregory boasted in a letter to a friend that 
“I have today several hundred thousand private citizens—some as individuals, most of 
them as members of patriotic bodies, engaged in […] assisting the heavily overworked 
Federal authorities in keeping an eye on disloyal individuals and making reports of 
disloyal utterances.” Much like the civilian spy networks that would emerge in the 
U.S.S.R. and, decades later, Communist Cuba, the APL served as the government’s ears 
and eyes at the most local levels of society and generated an endless flow of 
“intelligence” for officials. Within the first two months of the national war effort, APL 
members were sending roughly 1,000 letters to the Justice Department each day. (Of 
these, however, an estimated 90 percent were of no value to Gregory’s war-related 
efforts.) By the end of the war, the APL claimed to have found 3 million cases of 
disloyalty. In a 1918 report to Congress, Attorney General Gregory gleefully declared: “It 
is safe to say that never in its history has this country been so thoroughly policed.”302 
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While his private army “thoroughly policed” the streets, Gregory oversaw and 
encouraged the prosecution of hundreds of alleged dissidents in court. Federal District 
Judges and U.S. Attorneys across the land eagerly supported the Attorney General’s war 
on disloyalty, seeking and handing down dubious convictions with near-reckless 
abandon. Assistant Attorney General John Lord O’Brian wryly noted that every U.S. 
Attorney had become “an angel of life and death clothed with the power to walk up an 
down in his district, saying, ‘This one will I spare, and that one will I smite.’”303 The 
chief targets of this nationwide judicial movement were Socialists, members of the 
Industrial Workers of the World (or “Wobblies), and anarchists (political activists whose 
worldviews were, generally speaking, antithetical to the spirit of the wartime laws). In 
Chicago, William D. Haywood and 100 other Wobblies were sent to jail—some for as 
long as 20 years—for encouraging “thousands to refuse to register or submit to the draft,” 
printing and circulating “disloyal, seditious and unpatriotic literature and periodicals,” 
and causing “insubordination and disloyalty by means of publications or speeches.”304 
Haywood’s colleague Eugene V. Debs was sent to prison for giving a seditious speech in 
Canton, Ohio. Denouncing war as a means of settling international disputes, condemning 
war profiteers, and declaring that “the purpose of the Allies is exactly the purpose of the 
Central Powers,” Debs had stated: 
And here let me emphasize the fact—and it cannot be repeated too often—that the 
 working class who fight all the battles, the working class who make the supreme 
 sacrifices, the working class who freely shed their blood and furnish the corpses, 
 have never yet had a voice in either declaring war or making peace. It is the ruling 
 class that invariably does both. They alone declare war and they alone make 
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 peace. ‘Yours not to reason why / Yours but to do and die.’ That is their motto 
 and we object on the part of the awakening workers of this nation.305 
 
Debs received a ten-year sentence for publicly elucidating who, exactly, would be 
shedding their blood and furnishing the corpses.306 In North Dakota, Socialist Kate 
Richard O’Hare was given a five years’ sentence for publicly comparing mothers who 
allowed their sons to become soldiers to “brood cows” (the implication being that they 
were breeding their sons like animal for slaughter).307 Socialist Charles Schenck was 
sentenced to six months’ hard time for printing and distributing a leaflet that recited the 
Thirteenth Amendment provision against “involuntary servitude” as an argument against 
the draft,308 while Socialist Rose Pastor Stokes received a ten-year sentence for stating in 
a letter to the Kansas City Star: “No government which is for the profiteers can also be 
for the people, and I am for the people while the government is for the profiteers.”309 
Anarchist Emma Goldman was handed a two-year prison term for publicly counseling 
“defiance of the Selective Draft law”; in her magazine Mother Earth, she had encouraged 
all conscientious objectors “to affirm their liberty of conscience, and to translate their 
objection to human slaughter by refusing to participate in the killing of their fellow men.” 
Her comrade Alexander Berkman received a similar sentence for publishing in his 
newspaper, The Blast: “Conscription is the abdication of your rights as a citizen. 
Conscription is the cemetery where every vestige of your liberty is to be buried. 
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Registration is its undertaker.”310 During the twenty months of U.S. belligerence, 
seemingly every prominent figure of American radicalism was swept up and effectively 
‘disappeared’ for committing speech acts that challenged officially sanctioned meanings 
of the national war effort. 
In one of the strangest cases, Los Angeles film producer Robert Goldstein was 
fined $500 and sentenced to ten years of hard time because his movie The Spirit of ’76—
a historically accurate piece on the American Revolution—depicted British atrocities 
against colonialists; the judge in the case stated that the film tended “to question the good 
faith of our ally, Great Britain.”311 Sadly, Goldstein was just one of 2,000 people 
prosecuted under the Espionage and Sedition Acts during the years of American 
belligerence.312 However justified or dubious in nature, such cases were highly 
publicized and had a ‘chilling effect’ the general public. As historian David M. Kennedy 
tells us, every American became keenly aware that to “speak up for immigrants or to 
defend the rights of labor was to risk being persecuted for disloyalty. And to criticize the 
course of the war, or to question American or Allied peace aims, was to risk outright 
prosecution for treason.”313 The government’s program to silence the political Left and 
stamp out all real and perceived domestic opponents of the war effort was so thorough 
and successful that by the time of Armistice, hardly a liberal voice could be found in the 
American public sphere—a fact resplendent in tragic irony. Bemoaning the Democratic 
                                                 
310 See “Emma Goldman and A. Berkman Behind the Bars,” New York Times, 
June 16, 1917, 1; and Giffin, 106-15. 
311 Zinn, 371. 
312 Paul L. Murphy, “Espionage and Sedition Acts of World War I,” in Whiteclay, 
251-2. 
313 Kennedy, 89. 
161 
Party’s Congressional losses in the November 1918 elections and anticipating Republican 
opposition to his idealistic vision for the post-war Versailles Treaty,314 President 
Wilson—the very man who had dispatched Burleson and Gregory to lead the wartime 
fight against sedition—asked a personal adviser where he could turn to for political 
support. He received the following, brutally honest answer: “All the radical or liberal 
friends of your anti-imperialist war policy were either silenced or intimidated. The 
Department of Justice and the Post-Office were allowed to silence or intimidate them. 
There was no voice left to argue for your sort of peace. When we came to this election 
the reactionary Republicans had a clean record of anti-Hun imperialistic patriotism. Their 
opponents, your friends, were often either besmirched or obscured.”315 Thus, by crushing 
democratic ideals and practices in the United States during the war, President Wilson was 
unable to obtain the necessary domestic support for his postwar campaign to extend 
democracy to the rest of the world.  
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3.4 “BODY AND SOUL AND SPIRIT” 
On April 5, 1917, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker submitted to Congress a 
preliminary version of the Selective Service Act, legislation that called for a national 
military draft. The next day, President Wilson established through executive order the 
Committee on Public Information (CPI), the nation’s first propaganda ministry. While 
compulsory military service would seek citizens’ bodies, the CPI would seek the “soul 
and spirit”316 of every American. Operating without specific powers of enforcement, but 
against the backdrop of forceful and draconian wartime laws like the Espionage and 
Sedition Acts, the CPI set out to make sure that the United States was represented to the 
masses “as a strong man fully armed and believing in the cause for which he was 
fighting.”317 If the American Expeditionary Forces carried the nation’s sword during the 
Great War, the CPI wielded its pen. 
President Wilson appointed George Creel as the CPI’s chairman. A former 
muckraking journalist from Kansas City who had worked for Wilson’s publicity team 
during the 1916 presidential campaign, Creel brought together, under one organizational 
umbrella, prominent journalists, advertisers, novelists, intellectuals, moral crusaders, and 
artists to create an all-pervasive system of communication that would touch nearly every 
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aspect of Americans’ private and civic lives. In early 1917, as the nation’s entry into the 
Great War seemed increasingly likely, Creel had privately suggested to Wilson that a 
successful war effort would require an independent government agency to coordinate 
“[n]ot propaganda as the Germans defined it, but propaganda in the truest sense of the 
word, meaning the ‘propagation of faith.’”318 As Creel later remarked after the war, 
victory depended on fostering “a passionate belief in the justice of America’s cause” and 
“weld[ing] the people of the United States into one white-hot mass instinct with 
fraternity, devotion, courage, and deathless determination.”319 With the creation of the 
CPI, Creel was able to enact his vision and oversee, as he put it, “the fight for the minds 
of men” in an ideological war that’s “battle-line ran through every home in every 
country.”320 Thus, while the CPI’s efforts would concentrate on America’s splintered and 
contentious society,321 the propaganda agency would, much like the U.S. armed forces, 
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extend its work overseas and “Carry the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the 
Globe.”322 Creel’s three main goals for the CPI were: 
1. To make America’s own purposes and ideals clear both to ourselves and to the 
world, whether ally or enemy. 
 
2. A thorough presentation of the aims, methods, and ideals of the dynastic and 
feudal government of Germany. 
 
3. Giving information which would help in a constructive way in the daily tasks 
of a nation at war.323 
 
Relatively benign, these stated goals masked, as historian David M. Kennedy puts it, 
Creel’s “overbearing concern for ‘correct’ opinion, for expression, for language itself, 
and the creation of an enormous propaganda apparatus to nurture the desire state of mind 
and excoriate all dissenters.”324 Given practically unlimited resources and independence 
to fight for the “second lines”325 (i.e., the hearts and minds of civilian populations), the 
CPI utilized every available means of (what scholars Robert Jackall and Janice M. Hirota 
term) “shaping opinion through symbol manipulation and management.”326 In so doing, 
the CPI advanced the government’s project of motion and dictated the parameters of 
permissible wartime symbolic action. 
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Creel’s mission to shape public opinion began with the implementation of a 
system of strict media censorship. For three years, the media had provided an uncensored 
and disturbing picture of the war in Europe to the American people. In Creel’s mind, 
American victory in the war depended on redrawing this picture. The U.S. War 
Department had started planning for censorship in 1914, shortly after the eruption of the 
war in Europe. In 1916, War Department researches released an internal memo entitled, 
“The Proper Relationship Between the Army and the Press in War,” which described the 
military’s needs as “paramount” when compared with those of the media and the 
American public and warned of the possibility for critical news accounts to damage the 
armed forces’ wartime efficiency.327  
In March of 1917, War Department officials got their hands on a copy of the 
“Censorship Book for the German Press,” a top secret, official German pamphlet that 
detailed the media censorship regulations issued by the Prussian Ministry of War. In what 
may have become the blueprint for American censorship practices, this pamphlet laid out 
the rules “as to what publications should be suppressed in the interests of the fatherland.” 
Among many things, the German pamphlet forbade the publication of: opinion-editorials 
that called for the extermination of foreign peoples and thus, besmirched Germany’s 
good name; anything “which might awaken exaggerated hopes, unfounded fears or 
downheartedness in the interior”; “critical comments concerning the conduct of military 
operations”; “picture collections and illustrated magazines” that might have undesired 
effects on “educated people”; “letters of members of the army or Navy without the 
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approval of the military authorities”; anything “which is calculated to disturb the unity of 
the German people and of the press,” anything that might harm “the maintenance of the 
spirit of sacrifice and resolution”; the word “Menschenmaterial” (man material) as an 
expression for “replacements”; “sensational descriptions of the horrors of war”; “reports 
concerning so called fraternization scenes between friends and enemies in the trenches”; 
and strangely, anything “concerning the phonographic recording of sayings, legends and 
songs of prisoners of war of various races which are to serve scientific interests.” Most 
importantly, unauthorized representations of soldierly dead were banned from circulation: 
Pictures of dead German soldiers are to be excluded from publication if the 
 features of the dead person are too clear that recognition is possible. Pictures of 
 wounded or mutilated German soldiers are allowed publication only if they carry 
 out the aim of bringing into relief the care and careful nursing which they receive 
 rather than the suffering of such men and if the names are given. […] The 
 publication of casualty lists before their official dissemination by military 
 authorities is forbidden […] The statistics of our losses may not be published. 
 
Though the pamphlet did not explicitly state why representations of the dead should be 
highly censored, the reason was patently clear: German officials believed that such 
representations would demoralize the German public, paint a negative image of the war 
and its human costs, and thus, disrupt the national war effort. Furthermore, censorship of 
representations of the dead corresponded with the German government’s desire to control 
news and information from the war zone in order to manipulate public discourse and the 
passions of the German people back home. German leaders believed that victory at the 
front lines depended on the cooperation of a loyal and subservient national press behind 
the lines. “Our newspapers should not write what the people like to hear and what would 
therefore increase the sale of the papers in the streets,” the pamphlet stated. “Instead of 
guessing as to what our generals and troops will accomplish in the field, basing these 
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hazards upon their imperfect knowledge of affairs, they should be much more concerned 
in calculating the effects of their publications at home and abroad.” In other words, the 
Germans figured that victory would not be possible without heavy-handed, governmental 
control over wartime symbolic action. The story of the war had to be officially regulated 
and maintained.328 
As director of the Committee on Public Information, George Creel immediately 
initiated an American program of media censorship that mirrored Germany’s. 
Throughout the period of U.S. belligerence, this program gave Creel and the powers he 
served more or less complete control over what Americans knew and understood about 
events overseas and in domestic military camps. On May 27, 1917, Creel issued a self-
censorship card (edited by President Wilson himself) to journalists and editors at every 
American newspaper and magazine. Seeking to avoid a First Amendment showdown, 
Creel requested that the media show “self-restraint” in publishing war-related news that 
had not gone through the Committee on Public Information first. The censorship card 
placed news in three categories: “dangerous” material that should not be published, such 
as information regarding current military operations “except that officially given out”; 
questionable war-related stories, such as rumors focused on the technology of warfare, 
which journalists were asked to clear with the CPI before publication; and material that 
had no connection to the national war effort and therefore could be broadcast as the editor 
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saw fit.329 Creel’s call for media self-censorship, however, was not a suggestion, but 
rather a direction. As a handful of journalists and editors discovered the hard way, if they 
ignored Creel’s command they could be prosecuted under the three federal laws 
discussed earlier in this chapter. In the rare instances during the war when media outlets 
disobeyed Creel’s self-censorship guidelines, or contradicted or challenged CPI-endorsed 
information, Creel was quick to accuse them of “having given aid and comfort to the 
enemy,” the very Constitutional definition of treason. Observing Creel’s modus operandi, 
U.S. Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels began calling the Espionage Act the “Big Stick 
behind voluntary censorship.”330 Indeed, it was in editors’ and journalists’ best interest to 
“self-censor.”  
On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, the American Expeditionary Forces 
imposed a complementary and effective system of combat-zone media censorship. War 
reporters were forced to sign a “Visiting Correspondent’s Agreement” that forbade 
publishing or repeating any information acquired without censorship by the Intelligence 
Section of the General Staff. Before beginning a tour, reporters were forced to post a 
bond, subject to forfeit for any violation of accreditation rules, including censorship. 
While reporters were allowed to carry personal photographic cameras, field censorship 
virtually killed objective photojournalism, as few images of modern warfare and life in 
the battle-zone were consistent with the romantic view of war still lingering from the end 
of the nineteenth century. All journalistic photographs and reports eventually fell to the 
CPI’s office in Paris. Anything deemed likely to injure national morale back home or 
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“cause unnecessary and unwarranted anxiety to the families of men at the front,” 
including images of death and other horrors, was suppressed. The Paris office even 
suppressed photographs of African-American and white soldiers relaxing together, which 
CPI officials feared would anger white Southerners. Similarly, images of American 
soldiers drinking were quashed so as not to offend teetotalers back home. Civilian combat 
reporters soon learned what would pass inspection and began censoring themselves; as a 
result, only bland upbeat, and blatantly patriotic reporting made its way back to the 
United States. Remarkably, but unsurprisingly, not a single image of a dead American 
soldier’s body appeared in print while the war was fought. Reports and photographs that 
passed muster in Paris were then sent on to CPI officials in the States. There, Creel and 
his underlings determined what was suitable for circulation and public consumption. This 
system of tight censorship made the CPI indispensable to the American media, for the 
CPI, alone, could release such materials as casualty lists and interviews with high-ranking 
government and military personnel. The CPI also operated the only clearinghouse for 
press questions about the war. In effect, every piece of war information that reached the 
average American was endorsed by Creel and the CPI.331 The uncensored view of the 
war Americans had enjoyed before U.S. belligerence had been blocked; it no longer 
existed. 
While overseeing this program of media censorship, Creel established a series of 
departments within the CPI, each charged with a different task, but all operating with one 
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vision.332 The News Division produced a daily journal, the Official Bulletin, with a 
circulation of 100,000 throughout the war, as well as regular dispatches, often complete 
with pre-prepared editorials, for distribution to U.S. newspapers. Delivered via wire, 
radio, and mail, these bulletins ensured that the CPI’s messages were uniformly 
transmitted and received each day in every corner of the country.333 The Publication 
Division enlisted academics at top universities to write pamphlets for the Red, White and 
Blue Series, the War Information Series, and the Loyalty Leaflets. Presented as works of 
rigorous scholarly thought, these essays—with titles like “How the War Came to 
America,” “Conquest and Kultur,” and “American Loyalty”—were little more than 
didactic and coercive articulations of the nation’s supposedly righteous role in the war. 
Millions of copies of these publications were distributed across the country and 
throughout the world, many translated into other languages.334 The Division of 
Syndicated Features employed American authors and essayists to write persuasive feature 
stories and articles for the nation’s press. Prominent writers like Samuel Hopkins Adams, 
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Mary Roberts Rinehart, and Walter Lippmann were crucial to the CPI’s relentless bid to 
frame the American war effort as a democratic crusade against German despotism.335 
Each day, these writers crafted news reports that depicted the average German soldier as 
a cold-blooded butcher and “undeveloped savage,” and the Kaiser and his cohort as evil 
puppet masters—“expert liars trained in the school of Prussian kultur [who] furnish the 
German people with the news they read.”336 And each day, newspapers published letters 
from local readers that echoed the CPI’s teachings.337 
The CPI’s Division of Advertising worked closely with New York City ad 
agencies to develop eye-catching newspaper and magazine advertisements for Liberty 
Loan drives, Red Cross fundraisers, the “Spies and Lies” campaign (which warned that 
German spies were operating in the States) and other CPI initiatives.338 Illustrated CPI 
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advertisements appeared in popular magazines like the Saturday Evening Post, 
ominously urging readers to report to the Justice Department any person “who spreads 
pessimistic stories […] cries for peace, or belittles our efforts to win the war.”339 Such 
ads brought the perverse nature of sanctioned wartime thought—which held the desire for 
peace as a vice rather than a virtue—further into the domestic sphere. The Division of 
Cartoons issued a weekly bulletin that synchronized the work of the nation’s cartoonists, 
those lowbrow artists who tickled the minds and funny-bones of children and adults alike. 
Each week, the Division of Cartoons “suggested” a number of particular themes that 
cartoonists should address. Examples included: to encourage women to take the industrial 
places of men fighting in Europe; to show workers the disastrous results of striking 
during wartime; to warn against the folly of overconfidence “even though the boys over 
there seem to have the Huns on the run”; to encourage families and girlfriends to send 
AWOL soldiers back to duty with a smile; and to discourage enthusiasm over premature 
“peace propaganda” “until the last vestige of Germany’s crime is atoned for.”340 Thus, 
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this section of the American newspaper, typically reserved for humorous escapism or 
farcical political commentary, became another site for the CPI to disseminate its direct 
messages. 
The CPI’s efforts were not confined to the written word. Rather, they extended to 
nearly every conceivable venue where public attention could be accessed. For instance, 
the CPI brought a traveling war exposition—complete with huge guns, the remnants of 
German U-boats and planes, and a mock battle—to state fairs and major cities throughout 
the country.341 The CPI created the “League of Oppressed Nations,” an organization that 
coordinated the patriotic activities of 33 ethnic “loyalty groups” and staged parades and 
rallies where foreign-born citizens—viewed with suspicion by native-born Americans—
could publicly demonstrate their allegiance to the United States.342 Such efforts sought to 
fuse unassimilated immigrant communities into one continuous unit around a single, 
consensual set of “American” values (including freedom, equality, justice, and 
prosperity).343 The CPI infiltrated public schools around the U.S.; students viewed war 
photographs issued by the CPI, recited war songs from a CPI brochure, studied CPI-
                                                                                                                                                 
the bestial “Hun,” usually depicted as bayoneted gorilla wearing a Prussian spiked 
helmet. See ibid, 143. 
341 Ibid, 141. 
342 Ibid, 155-6. 
343 The CPI translated propagandistic materials into a myriad of languages and 
distributed them to every major ethnic community in the United States. It hired bilingual 
university professors to monitor foreign-language publications in their areas to make sure 
CPI materials were being properly digested by the nation’s “hyphenates.” The CPI also 
encouraged ethnic groups to bring propaganda back to their European homelands, either 
through writing or in person. During the war, Creel personally urged General Pershing to 
let wounded Italian-American soldiers convalesce in Italy (rather return to more 
concentrated medical centers in France and England), where they could spread CPI 
doctrine to locals. See Kennedy, 65-6. 
174 
sponsored war maps with teachers, and brought CPI literature home for their parents.344 
Creel created the CPI’s Division of Industrial Relations, oversaw the establishment of a 
special propaganda arm within the Department of Labor, and bankrolled the American 
Alliance for Labor and Democracy (a flag-waving, anti-socialist workers’ union). 
Determined to keep working classes “industrious, patriotic, and quiet” during the war, 
these three organizations inundated factories and shipyards with posters, speakers, and 
slogans designed to counter the radical charge (proffered by the International Workers of 
the World and other labor agitators) that the Great War was a capitalists’ war in which 
workers had little to gain.345  
The CPI’s Speaking Division sent thousands of voluntary orators, including 
members of the Four Minute Men, to movie houses, fraternal lodges, labor unions, 
garages, lumber camps, churches, colleges, and even Indian reservations across the 
United States to give highly orchestrated speeches on topics such as “Why We Are 
Fighting,” “Unmasking German Propaganda,” and “Where Did You Get Your Facts?” 
Each week, the CPI sent its 75,000 orators a bulletin that provided a fresh list of 
“important points,” suggestions for outlines and opening remarks, and a couple of 
“typical illustrative speeches.” In turn, the veritable army of speakers broadcast the CPI’s 
messages through testimonial-like presentations, creating a nationwide echo chamber of 
pro-war talking points.346 Meanwhile, the Division of Pictorial Publicity contracted 
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346 Speech topics varied week to week to match the needs of the war effort. For 
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talented painters of various styles to produce hundreds of gripping visual images that 
were mass-produced as public posters. Notable artists like James Montgomery Flagg, N. 
C. Wyeth, and Edmund Tarbell created memorable images of wounded Allied soldiers 
bravely going “over the top” of trench walls, innocent women and children drowning 
after German U-boat attacks, and the “Spirit of America” as a re-embodied Joan of Arc, 
all of them designed to foster allegiance to the war effort, sympathy for citizens of allied 
nations, or hatred of the enemy.347 The most famous and perhaps most effective poster 
developed during this project was Flagg’s portrait of Uncle Sam, dressed in his red, 
white, and blue costume, looking potential recruits in the eye with the command “I Want 
You.”348 Displayed in general stores and post offices, on telephone poles and alley 
walls,349 these posters were designed to cut through processes of contemplation and elicit 
knee-jerk responses in favor of the national war effort. 
The CPI also spread its messages through the new visual medium of cinema. 
During the period of American belligerence, the CPI’s Division of Films produced, 
promoted, approved, or distributed for public consumption an endless stream of weekly 
newsreels, documentaries, and fictional films about American war technologies, the 
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social dimensions of life in the military, and the accomplishments of the American 
Expeditionary Forces in Europe. Propaganda films like Pershing’s Crusaders offered 
exciting, but carefully selected, documentary footage of American operations in 
Europe,350 and were billed to American audiences as showing “the grim earnestness of 
the United States Government in its war activities and its determination to stamp out 
Kaiserism”: 
You see Americans taking over the fighting trenches […] You see the first 
 German prisoners captured by our brave boys […] You also see what Uncle 
 Sam’s countless civilian army is doing ‘over here.’ Miles of cantonments grow 
 over-night. You see the raw recruit become the hardened fighter […] Mighty guns 
 and projectiles are made before your very eyes […]  You realize that every 
 American is doing his best to help win this war […] It is a picture that every  
soldier’s mother, wife, or sweetheart will want to see. YOU MAY SEE YOUR 
 BOY OVER THERE. 
 
Sold in part on the ludicrous notion that desperate American women might see upon the 
silver screen images of their beloved men who were stationed overseas, these films were 
nothing short of works of political indoctrination. While such movies were supposed to 
mobilize support of the national war effort, other CPI films were designed to encourage 
contempt for Germany and its leaders; advertisements for The Kaiser, the Beast of Berlin 
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claimed: “It makes Americans fighting mad.”351 Other CPI films, such as Our Colored 
Fighters and Woman’s Part in the War, were produced with niche audiences in mind.352 
 Americans, however, were not the Division of Films’ only targets, as the CPI 
hoped to manage foreign perceptions of American culture, policies, and military 
operations via the new and dazzling medium of cinema. Through an export licensing 
agreement, the Division of Films forced American producers of movies meant for 
international consumption to require their foreign exhibitors to show CPI propaganda 
films as well.353 This licensing agreement also enabled the Division of Films to end the 
exportation of gangster movies, which key members of the CPI believed were tarnishing 
the United States’ image abroad.354 In addition, the Division of Films worked closely 
with the National Association of the Motion Picture Industry—Hollywood’s most 
influential association of movie executives, actors, and theater owners—to produce short 
instructional films, arrange public speaking activities of movie stars, and create feature 
films in support of the war effort. Recognizing that there was much to be gained by 
helping the CPI achieve its goals, Hollywood studios released a series of films (such as 
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The Unbeliever) that deified the common U.S. soldier, vilified German soldiers, offered 
sanitized portrayals of trench combat (to ease the fears of American families), and 
exaggerated the positive effects that the war was having on national unity and American 
manhood.355 “In the whole undertaking the effort was to gain the greatest patriotic use of 
the camera and the drama and human interest it could convey, without endangering 
military secrets,” write historians James R. Mock and Cedric Larson.356 
Throughout 1917 and 1918, it was practically impossible for Americans to avoid 
CPI propaganda during their day-to-day routines. As Mock and Larson put it: “Through 
every known channel of communication the Committee carried straight to the people its 
message of Wilson’s idealism, a war to end war, and America to the rescue of 
civilization. [The Committee] was able to address itself directly to the minds and hearts 
of Americans, however isolated they might appear to be from the main stream of martial 
activity.”357 War-related information was categorized either as CPI-approved (and 
therefore “factual”) or as “rumor” (and therefore potentially “seditious” and “pro-
German”). A precursor to the propaganda machines of Nazi Germany and Stalinist 
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Russia,358 the CPI used its stranglehold on information to flood American consciousness 
with ideas, slogans, and arguments that effectively narrowed citizens’ possible ways of 
being down to two: one could either wholeheartedly support every aspect of the nation’s 
war effort, or one could be a traitor. According to the CPI, there was no room for 
anything in between. 
The CPI’s propaganda helped inflame tensions, fear, and intolerance across the 
country. Whether out of patriotic fervor or out of fear of being labeled traitorous, the 
American press and millions of private citizens imbibed, regurgitated, and acted upon the 
CPI’s carefully crafted system of thought and language. Dissent of any form became 
equated with disloyalty; anything English or French was to be extolled, while everything 
German was to be hated and treated with suspicion. German-Americans, once regarded as 
easily acculturated and upright citizens, became prime targets for those wishing to 
display their patriotism. Promotions in the business world, government, and military were 
denied to persons who had German names, while a German name was often sufficient 
evidence for the American Protective League to launch an investigation into the private 
affairs of a person. City officials across the country altered the names of towns, villages, 
streets, parks, and schools that bore German names. Germantown, Nebraska, was 
renamed Garland after a local soldier who died in Europe; East Germantown, Indiana, 
was changed to Pershing; Berlin, Iowa, became Lincoln. Everyday words like 
“hamburger,” “sauerkraut,” and “German measles” were replaced by “liberty sandwich,” 
“liberty cabbage,” and (unbelievably) “liberty measles.” Renowned symphonies and 
opera companies in Pittsburgh, Boston, Philadelphia, and New York banned the works of 
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Beethoven and other “disloyal music.” In the most infamous example of anti-German 
sentiment, a lynch mob in Maryville, Illinois, murdered Robert Prager, a German alien, 
under suspicion that he was a spy. A trial of the mob’s leaders followed, during which the 
defense counsel called their deed “patriotic murder.” When the judge read the jury’s 
verdict of not guilty, one jury member shouted: “Well, I guess nobody can say we aren’t 
loyal now!” The Washington Post remarked: “In spite of excesses such as lynching, it is a 
healthful and wholesome awakening in the interior of the country.”359 
German-Americans were not the only victims of this vigilantism, hatred, and 
suspicion. In such a cultural atmosphere, every citizen was a potential target. The head of 
the Iowa Council of Defense declared that every person in the United States should join a 
patriotic society, denounce all those persons who dared even to discuss peace, and 
generally “find out what his neighbor thinks.” To do anything less was anti-American.360 
Across the nation, chapters of the vigilante group the American Defense League 
compiled lists that classified every citizen as “loyal, disloyal, doubtful, [or] unknown.”361 
And newspapers published so-called “Slacker Lists” that publicly shamed individuals 
who did not purchase the appropriate amount of government war bonds. On October 15, 
1918, the Olympia (WA) Daily Recorder published a front-page exposé on W. L. Gregg, 
a local dentist who refused to purchase war bonds from the Thurston County Liberty 
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Loan Adjustment Committee. Publishing Gregg’s work address (presumably to invite 
hostile actions against Gregg and his clientele), the write-up stated: 
 Last spring Dr. Gregg considered his financial condition sufficiently 
 prosperous to trade his Buick for a new six-cylinder automobile, which we 
 understand is entirely paid for, and yet he refuses to buy bonds. 
 Many reports of Dr. Gregg’s pro-German tendencies have gone the 
 rounds, and so far as we can ascertain, he has bought no bonds of any Liberty 
 Loan. 
 Several days ago the Adjustment Committee notified Dr. Gregg that 
 $500.00 was his share of the Fourth Liberty Loan […] On being advised to use his 
 credit in buying bonds, whereby he could buy on the installment plan, he stated he 
 was “Unwilling to do so,” and was absolutely “Not in sympathy with this war or 
 this country in its conduct of the war.” 
 Alien enemies are truly undesirable, but the American who is a leach 
 on the community and does nothing to help his Government is still worse. 
 Citizens of this class are entitled to the Kaiser’s iron cross.362 
 
Offering innuendo, ad hominem attacks, and veiled threats of violence, this chilling 
public statement reflected the unmistakably undemocratic tenor of CPI propaganda. In 
Olympia, just as in every corner of the nation, the private individual was subject to the 
supposed will of the collective. Americans who did not enthusiastically support the war 
effort—in this case, those who did not purchase government bonds to fund mass murder 
on the other side of the world—could be compelled to do so, either through public 
shaming or more forceful means. 
3.5 “GRESHAM, ENRIGHT, AND HAY!” 
On November 5, 1917, headlines across the country announced that the United States had 
suffered its first official combat casualties of the Great War.363 The Washington Post 
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declared: “Germans Raid Trench, Kill 3.” The Los Angeles Times reported: “Three Are 
Slain by a German Raiding Party.” And the Pittsburgh Post proclaimed: “Huns Raid 
Trenches; Three of Our Boys Are Dead.” Though at first U.S. military censors withheld 
the names of the soldiers killed and the location where the skirmish took place, some 
crucial details emerged from the initial accounts. Readers learned that during the dark 
morning hours of November 3, a German raiding party stalked and attacked a much 
smaller group of U.S. soldiers who had been training with French forces somewhere in 
the trenches of the Western Front. Employing their “favorite trick” of targeting 
inexperienced opponents, the veteran “Teutons”364 launched “a desperate effort […] in 
the form of a heavy barrage fire, which isolated a salient of the American trench, and 
apparently left a small force of Americans at the mercy of their enemies.” Killing three 
Americans, wounding five, and taking twelve more as prisoners, the “Huns” hastily 
“retreated to the protection of their own earthworks before American reinforcements 
could arrive” to exact revenge. 
An account from a German prisoner who had witnessed the attack indicated that 
the three dead soldiers had “fought gamely” before they succumbed, thus the War 
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Department was confident that the Americans “did well” in their first test of battle. 
However, this German prisoner’s sentiments were not shared by his compatriots writ 
large; in a tone of nationalistic outrage, the Los Angeles Times described a Berlin 
newspaper opinion-editorial, entitled “Good Morning, Boys,” which mocked the U.S. 
casualties: “Perhaps your boss, Wilson, will reconsider his newest line of business before 
we grab off more of his young people,” the German newspaper purportedly stated. 
Encouraged to feel indignation over the nation’s first combat deaths in Europe, 
Americans were also reassured that the sacrifice was not in vain: “Though first blood 
may thus have been scored by Germany,” wrote the Washington Post, “officials see this 
advantage—Germany will know that the United States is actually on the firing line.” 
Furthermore, opined the Post, the American public would have to get used to the grim 
reality that many U.S. soldiers would die in the war: “it is part of the game.”365 
For months, government and military officials had hoped that the nation’s first 
combat deaths would invigorate the domestic war effort with a clear and productive sense 
of collective sacrifice and national purpose. Just before the American Expeditionary 
Forces’ arrival in Europe, British and French military leaders had conveyed to their 
American counterparts that U.S. citizens would not realize the urgency of the 
international crisis until American troops had been “well blooded.”366 Less privately, on 
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July 27, 1917, the New York Times had published an essay entitled, “First Casualty List 
Will Arouse American War Spirit,” in which British Captain John Hay Beith had argued 
that the first U.S. deaths would make “American enthusiasm kindled for the allied cause.” 
Beith had asserted that the ethnically heterogeneous people of the United States, “miners 
from Pennsylvania […] cowboys from Wyoming […] a polyglot laboring class from 
everywhere”—“a far larger and less amenable population” than the respective poleis of 
the Revolutionary War and Civil War eras—would be transfigured into one, unified 
collective by the first official combat deaths of American doughboys. Equating 
America’s tepid martial spirit with Britain’s initial wartime experience, Beith had written: 
Heaven knows, it took us long enough, and we were only a hundred miles 
from the very heart of things! An ounce of experience—a Zeppelin here, a 
torpedoed liner there—can awake more national spirit in five minutes than a ton 
of imagination can achieve in five years. 
So it is only natural that America, removed from all risk of actual 
invasion, should require a little time to adjust herself to new conditions and to 
reawaken that martial and indomitable spirit which has made her such a 
formidable fighting power in the past. The landing of Gen. Pershing’s troops has 
already done much. The first casualty list, alas! will do ten times more.367 
 
Thus, Beith had attempted to charge preemptively that inevitable moment when the first 
American soldiers would fall in battle, with intense, reverberating social power. 
During the summer of 1917, the American media had thirsted for a tale of 
wartime sacrifice, and had made much of any injury or death suffered by U.S. soldiers 
who, though not yet engaged in direct combat with the enemy, were moving closer to the 
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Western Front.368 For instance, the Washington Post had reported on the “first field 
casualty among the armed forces” (an American soldier who was injured while 
mishandling a French bomb).369 In August, the New York Times had announced “the first 
casualty in the Marine Corps expeditionary contingent” (a marine who was killed in a 
motorcycle accident).370 The most substantial of these ‘first’ stories had emerged in 
September 1917, when German warplanes attacked a field hospital and killed four U.S. 
army medics. “America’s first sacrifice to German frightfulness in Europe,” the 
Washington Post had exclaimed. Citing official reports, the media had described how the 
“defenseless” hospital staff, surrounded by the bursts of “death-dealing missiles,” tended 
to the casualties with “the utmost bravery.” One nurse “was slightly wounded about the 
face and her clothing was torn to shreds, but bravely she went on with her duties.” To add 
insult to injury, the German aviators had dropped coins over the demolished camp “as 
souvenirs that the Americans might not forget the raid and as tribute to America’s 
supposed love of money.” Reporters had been dispatched across the United States to the 
homes of the four medics killed, in some cases breaking the tragic story to the parents of 
the dead (it seems that in publicizing these deaths to the American newspapers, the CPI 
and the military had neglected to contact the families of the dead directly). “I regret that 
my son did not have a chance to die fighting,” one mother had responded to the news. 
“He had no chance to fight back in an air raid.” Another parent, Rudolph Rubino of New 
York City, had stood beside his weeping wife as he told the press: “I am an American. 
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Therefore, I have given up my son. I left Germany when I was fifteen. There has never 
been a spark of love left for the vile nation that gave me birth… I am more of an 
American now than ever.” M. D. Wood, a bricklayer from Streator, Illinois, who had 
been informed by his local newspaper that his son was dead, cried out loud: “Oh, God, 
how can I tell my wife; I’ve been half expecting this. He was our baby… But she is an 
American mother and she will understand.”371 Notably, each of these parents had been 
quick to cast their personal loss as a willing sacrifice for the nation—an indication that 
the government’s crackdown on “disloyalty” had sunk in—at least in the rhetoric 
displayed in news reports. 
Though entailing the real and provocative wartime suffering of American soldiers 
and families, as well as addressing certain themes of patriotic death and loyalty that 
would remain relevant throughout the war, each of these ‘first’ stories had disappeared 
within a few days of their publishing. Like the helpless victims of the Lusitania attack, 
the casualties in these vignettes had not died in the glory of battle for the nation. Instead, 
the dead had been more like passive victims of chance and German “barbarity”—hardly 
any national redemption could be found in the loss of a soldier’s hand, the slip of a 
motorcycle, or the wanton slaughter of unarmed medics. In a sense, these ‘first’ stories 
had emphasized the impotence of the casualties and their inability to fight back against 
the wartime forces of death. In the case of the hospital bombing, this figurative impotence 
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had been brought into starker contrast by the heavy presence of women who, whether 
tending to the wounded while semi-nude or grieving for their “babies” who “did not have 
a chance to die fighting,” had been the most central and active characters. The nation’s 
casualties had not yet embodied the masculine ethos associated with dying on the 
battlefield—an ethos upon which productive narratives of courage, sacrifice, and patriotic 
death could be more easily built. 
The reports of November 5, 1917, however, filled this conspicuous void. In 
accord with many of Beith’s predictions, the news of the nation’s first official combat 
deaths assumed a central and long-lasting place in the national discourse of the war. In 
the days, weeks, and months following the initial accounts, the media obsessively (and 
patriotically) reported on the three slain men, their families and hometowns, and the 
events surrounding their deaths. Americans learned that the dead soldiers—Thomas F. 
Enright of Pittsburgh, Merle Hay of Des Moines, and James Gresham of Evansville, 
Indiana—had “fought bravely against a numerically superior enemy force, a handful of 
men fighting until they were smothered.” Inflicting an untold number of casualties upon 
the Germans (who supposedly had removed their dead before retreating), the Americans 
had met the kind of violent ends befitting modern-day gladiators: the three men were 
beaten and stomped to death in hand-to-hand combat, their throats slashed with blunt 
German knives for good measure. “The whole American Expeditionary Forces are 
thrilled by the fight put up by their comrades,” wrote the Los Angeles Times, “and all are 
anxious to get a chance to deal a blow […] America has begun to pour out fighting blood 
on the battle grounds of Europe.” The Pueblo Chieftain echoed these sentiments, 
reporting that the Second Colorado Infantry had “inaugurated a custom of drinking a 
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toast to the memory of Hay, Gresham and Enright […] a grim pledge to do their 
uttermost against the foe.” The Pittsburgh Post compared their deaths to those of Davy 
Crockett and the “defenders of the Alamo,” while Life Magazine published a poem by 
Christopher Morley that read: “Gresham and Enright and Hay! / There are no words to 
say / Our love, our noble pride / For these, our first who died.” Practically overnight, the 
three soldiers were made into a kind of holy trinity around which political, economic, and 
cultural capital could be mobilized. Representing the nation’s baptism by fire, they 
became so familiar to the public that within months the U.S. government began placing 
melodramatic newspaper advertisements (underwritten by American banks and 
corporations) asking citizens to purchase war bonds “in memoriam” of Gresham, Enright, 
and Hay. The Red Cross, seeking private donations for its wartime efforts, did the same: 
“They gave till they died! What will you give?”372 While not all Americans could go and 
fight in Europe, most could sacrifice some money for the cause. 
Perhaps officials were surprised to discover that, just as swiftly as the deaths of 
Gresham, Enright, and Hay “kindled” America’s war passions, the event also ushered in 
sobering and contentious questions regarding the proper treatment and burial of 
American war dead. It became apparent that the meaning of American soldiers’ deaths 
might be bifurcated. On the one hand the war dead could be celebrated and venerated on 
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a somewhat abstract national level for their patriotic sacrifice. On the other hand the war 
dead might also represent the grim suffering and loss of American families and local 
communities that, despite the heroic rhetoric attached to the deaths of their men, would 
be deeply concerned about the treatment of fallen soldiers’ material remains. A troubling 
and, for relatives of drafted soldiers, morbid question started to percolate: What would 
happen to the average soldier’s body if, God forbid, he were killed in this savage and 
brutal war? This was a question that the government, intent on rapidly mobilizing the 
national war spirit, had not yet explicitly addressed. 
On November 5, the same day the initial story broke, Private Thomas Enright’s 
sister, Mary Irwin, mailed a short letter373 to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker 
requesting the return of her brother’s remains. It read: 
     QMC Washington D. C. 
      November 5-1917 
    Mr. Newton Baker 
 You informed me that my brother Private Thomas F. Enright was killed in 
 France. 
 I would like to know how his body is killed and if you would have the 
 body sent to Pittsburgh for burrial. 
      Sincerely Yours 
     Mrs Frank Irwin 
     6641 Premo St. 
      Pittsburgh Pa.  
 
Signing in her husband’s name and limiting her sparse message to two matter-of-fact 
sentences, Irwin cast herself not as a hysterical, grieving sister of the departed, but rather 
as a dutiful and somewhat stoic woman who simply wished to see that her brother’s body 
                                                 
373 Mary Irwin to the Quartermaster Corps, November 5, 1917, “Burial Case File” 
(BCF) for Thomas F. Enright, Records of the Office of the Quartermaster General (RG 
92), U.S. National Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, Maryland 
(NARA). 
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was treated properly. Her tone was one of simple inquiry, not confrontation or profound 
mourning. And the brevity of her note limited the chances of expressing something that 
might be misinterpreted as “seditious” or “treasonous.” 
As Gresham, Enright, and Hay were mythologized from coast to coast, the 
treatment and commemoration of Enright’s body became not only a private concern for 
Mary Irwin, but also a public matter for local groups that wished to stake a claim in the 
dead soldier’s immense and growing symbolic power. Over the following weeks, Irwin’s 
private appeal was expressed in loftier terms by a number of influential figures and 
groups from Pittsburgh.374 Guy E. Campbell, U.S. Representative of the 32nd District, 
Pennsylvania, wrote a letter to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker in which he made 
patriotic appeals for the return of Enright’s corpse: 
At a recent meeting of the United Spanish War Veterans, of Pittsburgh, 
Pa., resolutions were adopted requesting the co-operation of Members of 
Congress, public officials and civic organizations in seeking the return to the 
United States of the body of Private Thomas Enright, the first Pittsburgher to fall 
in France in the service of his country. 
While I appreciate that as the casualties increase, it will be impossible to 
forward the remains of stricken soldiers to the United States, it seems to me it 
would be a fitting and just tribute to the first of the fallen to return their bodies to 
their friends, for burial at home. Accordingly I respectfully ask that such action be 
taken in this case, and that the body of Private Enright be brought from France at 
the earliest opportunity [...]375 
 
Channeling the spirit of the Pittsburgh community’s growing demand for Enright’s body, 
the Allegheny County Commissioners adopted a resolution on the matter and sent it to 
Secretary Baker. The resolution read, in part: 
                                                 
374 A similar movement immediately took place in Evansville, Indiana, the 
hometown of Pvt. James Gresham. See “Memorial to Private Gresham,” New York Times, 
November 7, 1917, 8. 
375 Guy E. Campbell to Newton D. Baker, November 21, 1917, BCF for Thomas 
F. Enright, RG 92, NARA. 
191 
WHEREAS, Thomas Enright a native of the City of Pittsburgh, laid down 
his life at the call of his country on the battlefields of France, and 
 WHEREAS, we feel that the people of this city and county desire that this  
young man who has made the supreme sacrifice on the altar of patriotism 
should be laid at rest in his home city by the people who honor his name, and 
WHEREAS, the said Thomas Enright is the first Pittsburgher to give up 
his life under the flag of his country in this war and the people of this city and 
county would like to honor and cherish his memory, now therefore be it 
RESOLVED, that the County Commissioners do hereby request of 
Secretary of War Baker that the body of said Thomas Enright be transported by 
the War Department from France to Pittsburgh in order that he may be laid at rest 
in his home city.376 
 
In short order, Mary Irwin’s personal request for her brother’s bodily remains was 
consumed by a civic project that sought to establish a permanent link between the city of 
Pittsburgh and the nation’s first “supreme sacrifice” in the Great War. 
These publicized,377 official entreaties, however, failed to reflect the opinions of 
every citizen of Pittsburgh. In fact, they elicited a wave of negative reactions from many 
locals, who, like their counterparts, felt emboldened to share their thoughts directly with 
Secretary Baker. In a letter dated November 20, 1917, one woman, identifying herself 
only as “a very patriotic Pittsburgh Mother,”378 questioned the motives of Enright’s 
relatives and warned against the potential effects of immediate repatriation. Citing her 
                                                 
376 W. S. McClatchey to Newton D. Baker, BCF for Thomas F. Enright, RG 92, 
NARA. 
377 See, for example: “Americans Killed Must Lie in France Until War Ends,” 
New York Times, November 28, 1917, 1. 
378 By identifying herself only as “a very patriotic Pittsburgh Mother,” this letter 
writer simultaneously indicated her devotion to the country; established her credibility to 
speak about Pittsburgh affairs; implied that, as a mother, she might have a son in the war 
and thus, something at stake in the question of repatriation; and maintained her 
anonymity so as to avoid persecution should her words have violated the Espionage Act 
or some other wartime rule. 
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memory of Pittsburgh’s commemoration of Francis P. DeLowry, one the first U.S. 
soldiers to die in the Battle of Veracruz (1914),379 she wrote:  
When that young DeLowry the first Pitts. boy killed at the Mexican border 
was brought home, St. Mary’s church to which he belonged made a gala day out 
of the funeral. Vice Pres. Marshall who happened to be passing through Pitts. 
attended there were street parade which were filmed and run in the movies and the 
family certainly found he was more valuable dead than alive as he was a regular 
scamp when living. 
Now young Enrights people have about the same plan in view they are 
trying to arrange for a grand military funeral and have asked the Spanish War 
veterans to intercede are getting up a petition to have the name of the St. where 
his folks live changed to his name etc. so why bring his body home while other 
boys as dear to their people will be buried in France. I think this should be wisely 
considered + know it will be if you stop to think for in case he is brought home 
you will be besieged with like requests and we would be justified in making them 
[...]380 
 
With the tone of a jealous, petty neighbor, this “very patriotic Pittsburgh mother” urged 
the government to contemplate the Pandora’s Box that would be opened with the return 
of Enright’s remains. In a letter of similar content, James B. Cramer of Pittsburgh wrote 
to Secretary Baker: 
My dear sir:- It seems harsh to say so, but do you think it quite fair or just 
to have our government go to the expense of having the body of one soldier—
even tho he were among the first to fall brought over to his home city + not 
accord that same thing to the bodies of the first dozen or first score or first 
hundred who fell fighting as bravely as he did? […] Private Enright’s friends have 
in Pittsburgh say they’ll move heaven and earth but they’ll get his body here but 
the parents of others have no “pull” no influence, no money to get their loved sons 
brought back. Hundreds of us right here in Pittsburg protest against such 
discrimination, and ask you not to establish such a precedent at the expense of the 
feelings of thousands of others.381 
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Evoking the democratic principle of equality and the expectation that all U.S. citizens 
would be treated in an identical fashion, Cramer asked the government to consider the 
“feelings” of those whose sons might not die such noteworthy deaths. In essence, Cramer 
wanted to know if the death of one soldier (a cog in the machine) could be more 
meaningful that the deaths of all others. Clearly, the question of what to do with Enright’s 
body was one that had many possible answers. 
Predictably, government and military officials chose the answer that entailed the 
least amount of visible complications for the national war effort: the bodies of American 
soldierly dead would remain in Europe until the end of the war. In private letters of 
response to the writers mentioned above, the Quartermaster Corps stated that, on the 
recommendation of U.S. Commanding General John J. Pershing, and in “view of the 
difficulties in shipping [soldiers’] remains home,” Secretary Baker had requested that 
“bodies of deceased officers and soldiers be not shipped from France to the United States 
during the continuance of the war.”382 Publicly, the decision was also laid at the feet of 
French authorities; on December 30, 1917, a Washington Post headline announced: 
“France Wants U.S. Dead: Gen. Sibert Asks That First Three Soldiers Killed Be Buried 
There.”383 The French, it seemed, were not willing to part with these (potentially) 
rhetorically useful corpses. Skirting the personal, domestic, and emotional implications of 
denying the return of American war dead, the U.S. military settled, at least temporarily, 
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the matter of repatriation as efficiently as possible. Whether dead or alive, no cogs would 
be allowed to disrupt the war machine. Of course, the fact that an Allied victory was not 
guaranteed meant that American war dead might be left in Europe forever—a notion that 
surely terrified next of kin. 
Indications of a simmering controversy, however, spurred the military to conduct 
an elaborate funeral for Gresham, Enright, and Hay, which would help reduce the 
anxieties of Americans back home, whose men—inching ever closer to full out combat 
with the enemy—could meet similar ends. On November 9, 1917, the Washington Post 
reported that the three soldiers had received a beautiful and moving funeral. “The first 
three American soldiers killed in the trenches in France tonight are sleeping in French 
soil,” the Post stated. “With a guard of French infantrymen in their picturesque uniforms 
of red and horizon blue standing on one side and a detachment of American soldiers on 
the other, the flag wrapped caskets were lowered in the grave as a bugler blew taps and 
the batteries at the front fired minute guns.” At the ceremony, General Paul Bordeaux of 
the French Army delivered an emphatic eulogy, proclaiming, “[T]hey have fallen facing 
the foe in a hard and desperate hand-to-hand fight. Honor to them. Their families, friends, 
and fellow citizens will be proud when they learn of their deaths […] We inscribe on 
their tombs: ‘Here Lie the First Soldiers of the Republic of the United States to Fall on 
the Soil of France for Liberty and Justice.’” Much like Simonides’ ancient epitaph to 
Spartans killed at Thermopylae, Gresham, Enright, and Hays’ grave markers supposedly 
would mark and consecrate the spot where heroic soldiers had spilled their blood: “The 
passerby will stop and uncover his head,” Bordeaux stated. “Travelers and men of heart 
195 
will go out of their way to come here to pay their respective tributes.”384 Bordeaux 
insinuated that American sacrifices in Europe would be remembered for generations to 
come. 
A week later, General Pershing paid a personal visit to the three graves. The 
Washington Post described Pershing’s visit as a pilgrimage of sorts. Drawing attention to 
the material aspects of the men’s resting places, which were “situated on a green hill, 
overlooking a small village,” the Post described in a front-page article how Pershing had 
“showed especial interest in the simple markers upon the graves, recording the name, 
company and regiment of each of the Americans buried there, and in a wreath of native 
flowers hung within the inclosure [sic].”385 This intimate portrait of Pershing’s gravesite 
visit suggested that the man responsible for sending U.S. troops into battle would not take 
the deaths of his men lightly. For the first time since American entry into the war, 
government and military officials were fathoming the depths of emotion and grief that, as 
greater numbers of soldiers died, would engulf families and communities across the 
nation. 
Back in Pittsburgh, a civic plan to change the name of the road that Thomas 
Enright had lived on from “Premo Street” to “Enright Street” was derailed; opponents to 
the plan discovered that Enright had, in fact, never resided on Premo Street; furthermore, 
he had only lived in Pittsburgh for short periods of his life.386 In similar fashion, a 
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proposal to construct a Pittsburgh playground in Enright’s memory was never realized.387 
Instead of the return of her brother’s remains or the establishment of a public memorial in 
his name, the only memento Mary Irwin received during the war was a French “Croix du 
Guerre” medal.388 Sent by the French Army to the families of Privates Gresham and Hay 
as well, the medals were meant to stand as souvenirs of the dead soldiers’ ultimate 
sacrifice. On February 15, 1918, the Los Angeles Times described the “Croix du Guerres” 
sent to the three families in terms that stretched religious, pro-war rhetoric to the point of 
absurdity: 
In this case the cross of war is a cross of glory, just as truly as was the 
cross on which the Saviour died. The cross is an ancient symbol and has many 
meanings, but perhaps the greatest significance of the sign lies in the fact that it is 
an emblem of compromise, especially since the death of the Man of Galilee. The 
cross is an indication of an unsolved issue and signifies a compromise between 
matter and spirit, between God and man, between justice and mercy—a 
compromise that is necessary until the children of men shall come into a 
realization of the unity of life.389 
 
As we will see later in this dissertation, the “Croixe du Guerre” medals signified nothing 
this hyperbolic to the relatives of Gresham, Enright, and Hay. After the war, Gresham 
and Enright’s families would reveal in letters to the government that their desires 
regarding the treatment of bodily remains had little in common with the national, pro-war 
discourse that had coalesced around their loved ones’ deaths (a point I will return to in 
the following chapter). 
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The case of Gresham, Enright, and Hay, revealed the dormant anxieties and 
dilemmas that lurked just below the surface of the national war effort. Their deaths laid 
bare the tension between honoring the dead in a way that would satisfy the emotional 
needs of the living and treating each grieving family the same. Moreover, their deaths 
triggered public conversations about what it meant for U.S. soldiers to die on foreign soil 
and what would constitute the proper treatment and commemoration of dead soldiers. 
3.6 OVER THERE 
As late as August 1917, the American Expeditionary Forces was grossly unprepared for 
the crucial and inevitable task of handling dead soldiers’ remains properly. No clear 
system had yet been put into practice. This lack of preparedness became obvious on 
August 21, 1917, when U.S. Marine Frederick Wahlstrom of Brooklyn crashed his 
motorcycle, fractured his skull, and died of cerebral hemorrhage in Bazoilles, France. The 
first Marine to perish in Europe (albeit, not in battle), Wahlstrom was buried, along with 
his only identification tag, in a temporary grave next to a U.S. Army Hospital.390 His 
personal effects, including a ring and gold watch, were handed over to Chaplain G. 
Livingston Bayard of the U.S. Army, who in turn gave them to Major Henry M. Butler of 
the 5th Regiment Marines. On August 23, just two days after his passing, Wahlstrom’s 
possessions were, strangely enough, sold off in a public auction. Prior to 1917, U.S. 
Army regulations had authorized the auctioning of dead soldiers’ possessions, but only 
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under particular circumstances: “If there be no legal representatives present to receive the 
effects, a list of them will be sent to the nearest relative of the deceased. If not claimed 
within a reasonable time, they will be sold at auction and accounted for.”391 Thus, it 
seems that such a practice had been acceptable, if not common, in the years leading up to 
American belligerence. But the decision to sell Wahlstrom’s effects to the highest bidder 
after such a short period of time, and before contacting his next of kin on the other side of 
the Atlantic, indicated an appalling lack of consideration for the dead soldier and his 
loved ones—a point that become all the starker when Wahlstrom’s relatives inquired 
about his watch and ring. Their letters sparked a joint investigation by the Quartermaster 
Corps and the Marines, who both sought (unsuccessfully) to trace the whereabouts of the 
objects. Those individuals who were directly involved in the Wahlstrom affair were 
ordered not to repeat their actions, and were told that the War Department would soon be 
issuing to all the military branches a standard procedure for handling the dead.392 
 In fact, two weeks prior to the Wahlstrom affair, military officials back home had 
settled on a universal system for dealing with American war dead. The War Department 
recognized the fact that the process of retrieving, identifying, burying, and keeping track 
of soldierly remains during the war was no easy task, and was one at which the 
belligerent nations had mostly failed. When the United States entered the Great War, the 
lifeless bodies of an estimated one million soldiers, friend and foe, remained unburied in 
the Western Front’s No Man’s Land exposed to all sorts of degradation. Troops in the 
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trenches on both sides had learned to live and fight among the rotting corpses (a truly 
terrifying prospect), but such unsanitary conditions had helped spread diseases that were 
just as deadly as bullets, bayonets, bombs, and poison gas.393 On August 7, 1917, the War 
Department established the Graves Registration Services (a unit within the Quartermaster 
Corps) to mitigate this terrible reality of the Great War, provide some semblance of 
respectful treatment of American war dead, prevent U.S. bodies from falling into enemy 
hands, and avoid situations like the Wahlstrom affair (a controversy that occurred before 
the system could be universally applied in Europe).394 Comprised mostly of men who had 
been deemed incapacitated for active field service,395 the Graves Registration Service 
(GRS) tackled this sacred, pressing, ghastly, and dangerous duty. 
Under the guidance of Major (formerly Chaplain) Charles C. Pierce,396 the GRS 
attempted to fulfill six crucial tasks: to 1) position units along the battle lines to identify 
and mark graves during and immediately following combat activities; 2) establish and 
maintain all battlefield cemeteries and graves that contained dead American soldiers; 3) 
to keep strict records of the burials; 4) assist in identification when the remains of U.S. 
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dead were relocated from temporary battlefield graves to more permanent burial grounds; 
5) correspond with families and friends of the dead; and, 6) coordinate mortuary affairs 
with European governments.397 The conditions of the war zone made these undertakings 
extremely precarious—identification and burial efforts often were performed under fire. 
But, if one official account is to be believed, GRS men consistently and bravely risked 
their own lives to secure the proper treatment of U.S. war dead:  
Service became imbued with the spirit of service for their fallen comrades, that 
 fidelity of identification became almost a religion. No risk was too dangerous, no 
 effort too great, if it promised identification of a “buddy’s” remains. These units 
 followed closely our victorious troops, searching for the un-buried, exhuming the 
 hastily buried, and recording the burials. Many difficulties were encountered, but 
 the work went on ceaselessly.398 
 
The allusion to religion in this passage suggests several things about the attitude with 
which the GRS servicemen approached their job. First, religious faith calls for absolute 
devotion to one’s beliefs at all times, in any situation, and in face of any threat. The acts 
of recovering, identifying, burying, and providing ecclesiastical rites to fallen soldiers 
amidst mass artillery barrages and close-quarters fighting (a common scenario for GRS 
servicemen399) surely required a similar absolute devotion (specifically, a devotion to the 
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belief that every dead American soldier deserved to be treated properly). Second, 
religions tend to view death as an occasion of major significance and beauty—the 
moment of transition from this life to the afterlife. As a result, many religions emphasize 
the proper handling of the human corpse, for proper handling of the human corpse 
facilitates a more peaceful transition from this world to the next. By placing monumental 
importance on mortuary affairs and setting out specific guidelines for handling the dead, 
many religions imbue the corpse with a sacred quality and give the faithful the conviction 
and psychological tools necessary to overcome the repulsive dimensions of rotting human 
flesh. Military training surely instilled in GRS servicemen the compulsion to obey orders 
upon command but a religious sensibility or perspective must have been essential for 
enduring this intimate and constant interaction with badly decomposed bodies.400 As the 
block quote above indicates, many GRS servicemen must have viewed their work with 
                                                                                                                                                 
Germans, and were later retaken by American counter-attacks. Identification was 
especially difficult, all papers and tags having been removed and most of the bodies 
being in a terrible condition and past recognition. The Lieutenant in command 
particularly mentioned Sergeant Keating and Private Larue and Murphy as having been 
responsible for the most gruesome part of the work of identification, regardless of the 
danger attendant upon their work. This group of men was in charge of everything at 
Mandres from the time the bodies were brought in, until they were interred and marked 
with crosses and proper name plates were attached.” See History of the American Graves 
Registration Service, 14-15. 
400 It is hard to imagine or put into words just how badly decomposed most of the 
corpses the GRS handled must have been. One witness, Charles J. Wynne, 2nd Lt. Inf. 
U.S.A., gives us an idea in his account of GRS activity in the Chateau-Thierry area. 
According to Wynne, the GRS men labored under shell fire to recover, identify, and bury 
the bodies of American troops that had “been decaying for a period of two and three 
weeks, where the stench and rotten condition of the bodies made the works such that 
Burial parties feared and neglected to search these bodies even shortly after death for 
identification.” The GRS personnel discovered it “necessary to gather various parts and 
limbs of bodies together before burial.” See letter from Charles J. Wynne, 2nd Lt. Inf. 
USA, in J. Dell’s Notes, Graves Registration Service, NARA, RG 92, 5-6, quoted in 
Sledge, 46. 
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the dead as something more than a contribution to the war machine—as something 
approaching the divine. Such a view would have made it easier to suppress all-too-human 
reactions to dead bodies (abhorrence, grief, and fear) and complete the difficult task at 
hand—to turn the grotesque (rotting human flesh and bone) into something beautiful (an 
American soldier lying in his grave).401 
Often working in coordination with Red Cross volunteers,402 the GRS recorded 
data concerning the identity, burial location, personal possessions, and cause of death for 
the respective fallen soldier. This data was useful for both the GRS’ own mission and for 
passing along to next of kin back home (when deemed appropriate). In addition to dental 
records, dog tags, and descriptions of the state of the body (level of decomposition, 
missing limbs, etc.), GRS “Search Reports” contained eyewitness accounts from 
comrades of the deceased or those who worked to bury them. Providing a glimpse of the 
respective soldier’s last living moments, the typical account read something like this: 
  
 Co C – 58th Infantry – 
  4th Division.   CARTER, Lester G. – Priv. 2109410 
 
  Killed in action July 19/1918 
  Buried: Chevilion, France: Grave No 291. 
  After the attack on Chezy and while the Company was digging in 
 soldier was struck with shrapnel which tore off his leg, he died shortly after. 
                                                 
401 Ultimately, the task of burying American fallen could have a demoralizing 
effect on the members of the GRS. A song that spread through several GRS African-
American labor units reflected the impacts of this work: I’ve got a grave diggin’ feelin’ in 
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402 Despite its crucial role during the war, the Graves Registration Service faced a 
shortage of resources. Thus, it relied heavily on the support of the Red Cross. See Sledge, 
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   Informant: SCHMIDT, Lawrence, A. – Sgt. 2024853 
      Co C – 56th Infantry – 
 
   Signed: HOWES, Edward B. – 1st Lieut. 
      58th Infantry403 
 
or this: 
Hdqrs. Co. 7 Inf?    Emrich Chas. Louis. Cook. 
 
 Fell from train May 31st/18 
  
 At Troyes as the whole Div. was going up to the front some of us sat on 
 the ration wagon, as it went under a bridge Cook Emrich was killed instantly, his 
 head was torn off. The train coming after picked up his dead body. I was an eye 
 witness. Buried in Troyes. 
 Height 5’, stout, light complexioned, red hair and blue eyes, knew him one 
 year, from Pittsburg; Christian name Charles; no other Emrich in the Company. 
 
    Informant:  Carney William Sgt. 540117. 
        Emb. Center. 
        Hdqrs. Co. 7. Inf. 
     Home Address: Taunton, Mass. RFD. No. I. 
        Jan. 18th 1919. 
 
       Mary H. Carroll, Searcher404 
  
Once this detailed (and often disturbing) information was gathered by the GRS, the War 
Department would send (via telegram) a sanitized and succinct notice of death to next of 
kin. The parents of Clarence T. Sutcliffe, for example, received from the War Department 
this telegram concerning their son’s death: 
    Washington, August 3, 1918 
 Mrs. Humphrey D. Sutcliffe, 
  Miami, Fla. 
 Deeply regret to inform you that Corporal Clarence T. Sutcliffe, infantry, 
 is officially reported as killed in action July 19. 
    McCain, the Adjutant General405 
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For many recipients, the dissonance between the brevity of such a telegram and the 
monumental tragedy of its meaning must have been at once staggering and infuriating. 
Letters housed at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration indicate that 
the concise nature of the telegrams spurred many next of kin to seek additional 
information. For example, after receiving such a telegram, Mrs. O. S. Webb of 
Claremore, Oklahoma, sent a handwritten letter to her son’s commanding officer in 
which she pleaded for further details: 
 
Dear Sir: 
 Of course you must know that I another American Mother, most frantic 
 over the saddest news I ever received in my life in the message from the Adjutant 
 General, announcing the death of my precious boy, with Bronchial Pneumonia, 
 Oct. 10, and that boy was, Priv. Sam J. Web. We wired for particulars but of 
 course received none. We have been terribly uneasy for weeks […] Please let us 
 know – Did he have Influenza? Did he die on board ship – was he buried at sea? 
 Did he reach France, to die there? Was he cared for well – did he realize he was to 
 die? […] He had a few little things he wanted to send home […] among them was 
 a Kodak […] As we have no picture of him we would love to have those things 
 […] Please send us some word and his things C.O.D. if you can. Sam volunteered 
 – and made the supreme sacrifice for his country. I am proud to give him up – but 
 it hurts. I have another boy in the 306 # Motor Supply Train Quartermasters 
 Corps Co 5. Sergt H. S. Webb. If I have to give him up too, my grief will be 
 unspeakable. If you just could tell me it was all a terrible mistake! May I hear 
 from you soon? 
    Yours Respectfully 
     Mrs. O. S. Webb 
      Claremore 
       Okla. 
       U.S.A 
P.S. 
 Is there some way young soldier or the nurse whom Sam might have 
 known who would write me and tell me all about it? I enclose stamps for a 
 reply. 
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Four months later, Mrs. Webb received a letter of response from Major Charles C. Pierce 
(head of the GRS). Pierce provided certain details regarding the location of her son’s 
temporary grave, but stated: “I regret that I am unable to give you information relative to 
the death of your son […] However, I am today requesting the Chaplain of [your son’s] 
company to communicate with you, giving, if possible, the particulars of his death.” 
Whether Mrs. Webb ever received the information she so desperately sought remains 
unknown.406 In any event, few Americans were able (for both financial reasons and the 
impossibility of traveling to Europe during the war) to go and search for their loved ones’ 
graves as families had during the Civil War.407 
George H. Edwards, the Mayor of Kansas City, Missouri, received a telegram 
informing him that his son, George Jr., had died in Trieste, Italy. Ironically, when the 
U.S. had first entered the war, Edwards had been a vocal supporter of the national draft 
and had publicly argued to his constituents that “a man may be compelled by force 
against will without regard to personal interests, or even religious or political belief, to 
take his place in the army ranks.”408 Eighteen months later, Edwards experienced the pain 
shared by so many Americans whose loved ones had been drafted, sent abroad, and 
consumed by the war. Like Mrs. Webb of Claremore, Oklahoma, and countless other 
grief-stricken parents, Edwards sought further information regarding his son’s death and 
body. “Please wire details death Lieut. George H Edwards Jr Qm Corps,” he requested in 
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a succinct telegram to the GRS. In a letter of reply, the War Department told the mayor 
that the “particulars relating to this soldier’s death have not yet reached this office from 
overseas.” In reality, the War Department must have known the truth of the matter, which 
had been previously recorded in his GRS report: 
First Lieut George H Edwards Jr QM Corps died midnight […] from self inflicted 
 pistol wounds in head. He was on duty with Colonel McIntosh, American Food 
 Commission. Board of officers finds that deceased was insane and that death was 
 in line of duty and not due to his own misconduct. 
 
Why the War Department withheld this distressing information at that time—and whether 
Mayor Edwards and his family ever learned the true circumstances of George Jr.’s 
demise–remains unclear. The only public statement issued by the mayor’s office makes 
no reference to the fact of suicide: “A message was received yesterday by George H. 
Edwards […] from the War Department, informing him of the death of his son […] The 
message was meager and gave no details other than death was from illness.”409 It seems 
likely that a person of Mayor Edwards’ stature would, in time, get the full story if he so 
desired. Perhaps he did learn of his son’s suicide, and in light of his previous patriotic 
posturing, felt ashamed of his son’s suicide (a complex and taboo form of death, devoid 
of heroic glory); for just a few months after expressing his desire for repatriation, the 
mayor reversed his position and told the War Department that he did not want his son’s 
body returned home. Today, George Jr.’s grave can be found in the Suresnes American 
Cemetery (just outside Paris).410 
In many cases, it was simply impossible to provide grieving next of kin with any 
information beyond the fact of death. Given the intensity and relentlessness of the 
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fighting along the Western Front, fallen soldiers were often hastily buried in shallow, 
haphazard graves with minimal attention to identification. Frequently there were mix-ups, 
such as when, in the heat of battle, identification markers were placed above the wrong 
graves. In countless instances, solders’ bodies were decimated or decomposed in such a 
way as to make identification unfeasible; in time, these soldiers would be permanently 
classified as “unknown.” Throughout the war, the bodies of living and dead soldiers alike 
were torched by flamethrowers, obliterated by high explosive shells, and crushed beneath 
tanks, their bodily remains incinerated, atomized, pulverized, and lost forever. This is to 
say nothing of the infamous, almost-alive mud of the war zone, which sucked fallen 
soldiers into the surface of the earth. Thus, despite the GRS’ best efforts, it was not 
uncommon for the identity or whereabouts of a dead body to be lost forever.411 Towards 
the end of the war, and in the months following Armistice, the GRS and the War 
Department began receiving letters from families who sought information regarding the 
whereabouts of missing soldiers’ (and their bodily remains). Some next of kin clung to 
the hope that a mix-up had been made, and that their loved one might still be alive 
somewhere in the war-torn expanses of Europe. For instance, Mary De Long of Chicago 
wrote:  
My son [Hez] was reported killed in action between August 3rd and 13th, 1918 
 […] I feel that he might possibly be a prisoner and somebody else accidently 
 identified as my son. There were so many boys over there, that mistakes might 
 happen […] I read in the paper how the Ex-Kaiser had been using a place called 
 the “Kadinen Estate” as an experimental agriculture and cattle breeding farm […] 
 Is there any way of investigating to find out if there could be any prisoners on that 
 estate or any place else in the interior of Germany? 
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The War Department sent a letter of response saying that, although Hez’s whereabouts 
were not known, the military would do everything in its power to find him. In 1921, 
nearly three years after the war’s end, the GRS finally located Hez De Long’s body in a 
shallow, isolated grave near the Vesle River in St. Thibaut, France. Unlike many grieving 
Americans whose sons, husbands, brothers, and boyfriends were never found, Mary De 
Long eventually was able to have her son’s body returned home to Chicago.412 
Despite the dedicated work of the GRS, infantrymen (who were usually untrained 
in funerary practices) were the ones initially responsible for, and capable of, burying 
comrades who fell in action—a fact that ultimately made proper treatment and 
identification of the dead a problematic affair. Though soldiers did their best to honor the 
fallen and meet the protocol of the War Department, the chaos of war often made the task 
difficult (or impossible). Often, necessity dictated the mass burial of fallen U.S. soldiers. 
As the GRS noted in a 1920 report: 
 When there were a considerable number of dead, it was often found 
 convenient to bury them in long trenches, partitioned off, to keep the bodies 
 separate. Over each one, when possible, a cross was erected to which was 
 attached one identification tag, the other being buried with the body. When a 
 chaplain superintended the burials, brief prayers were said over the graves. 
 Naturally, by the very character of the circumstances of warfare, many individual 
 burials were made hastily by the comrades of the soldiers. They were often 
 accomplished under shell-fire, sometimes at night, often in isolated and not easily 
 accessible places; but orindarily the endeavor was made to observe as much care 
 and system in the burials as the circumstances would permit.413 
 
Such battlefield circumstances caused many soldiers to be misidentified, not only in 
name, but also in religious affiliation. Because the modern American Expeditionary 
Forces was composed of conscripted citizen-soldiers from every ethnic and religious 
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community in the nation, this lack of proper treatment resulted in unintended 
consequences that shook the spirits of soldiers at the Front and families back home alike. 
Describing the actualities of a temporary American battlefield cemetery, Lisa M. Budreau 
writes: 
 Across the spacious fields of uniformly lined American crosses, 
 intermittent Star of David headboards marked the dead of the Jewish faith. During 
 the war, orders were issued that triangular headboards, instead of crosses, should 
 be placed over known Jewish graves, but many people claimed it was nearly 
 impossible to enforce those regulations. “Great difficulty is experienced in 
 determining whether a dead soldier is Roman Catholic, Protestant, or a Jew,” 
 explained a chaplain in 1918. But the mistakes did not go unnoticed by other 
 soldiers. “Yesterday, I visited the cemetery where our dead comrades were laid to 
 rest, and there were our Jewish boys, the sons of Moses and Jacob with a cross at 
 the head of their graves,” wrote an AEF private to his rabbi […] So it was not 
 surprising that in May 1919, when the Red Cross began sending grave 
 photographs home to families, many of the dead had not been identified as Jewish 
 and still bore the symbolic cross. The image proved shocking to recipients of both 
 faiths.414 
 
Thus, during and immediately following the war, it became clear that the initial 
battlefield treatment of American soldierly dead could emit emotional and spiritual 
reverberations that spread through the trenches of Europe, across the Atlantic, into the 
homes of grieving families. 
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3.7 DEATH: THE SOLDIER’S PERSPECTIVE 
The bulk of the GRS’ work did not begin until the second half of 1918. Though the 
United States declared war on April 6, 1917, it took more than a year for the nation to 
mobilize its vast potential and make an effective battlefield contribution to the Allied 
effort. This delay, which frustrated French and British political and military leaders, was 
due in large part to General John J. Pershing’s refusal to amalgamate American troops 
with the Allied forces. If U.S. soldiers were going to die on the battlefields of Europe, the 
ever-nationalistic General reasoned, it would be under the direction of an American 
command and under the colors of an independent fighting force. Pershing also believed 
that this war of attrition might extend into 1919 or 1920 (an alarming notion that was 
tactfully kept secret from both the American public and U.S. troops). Taking this long 
view, Pershing determined that the nation’s manpower should be trained, strengthened, 
and preserved for as long as possible. Thus, even as hundreds of thousands of American 
soldiers poured into France throughout late 1917 and early 1918—and while the Allied 
nations depleted their male populations at an unsustainable pace—Pershing successfully 
kept American troops out of the fighting long enough to create a separate, autonomous 
army that (in his mind) might deliver a final and decisive blow against the staggering 
enemy forces.415 
When the American Expeditionary Forces finally engaged in battle at Cantigny in 
May 1918, at Belleau Wood in June, along the Marne River in July, and near Chateau 
Thierry in August, U.S. troops experienced firsthand the carnage and terror of the Great 
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War—the very horrors that the Committee on Public Information endeavored to hide 
from Americans back home. By the end of the summer, the AEF endured roughly 25,000 
casualties.416 Although seeing limited action as an independent army near St. Mihiel in 
September, the AEF nonetheless suffered 7,000 casualties in just four days. During the 
frightful Meuse-Argonne campaign of mid-October and November, the AEF sustained 
100,000 casualties, including over 15,000 killed in action. Over the course of six brutal 
months (May-November, 1918), the United States suffered roughly 320,000 casualties, 
including more than 115,000 dead.417 
As the numbers of killed, wounded, and missing soldiers increased exponentially 
throughout 1918, senior U.S. commanders attempted to maintain and project a positive 
attitude. Recognizing the correlation between their battle orders and the daily destruction 
of American men, most military brass maintained a safe distance from the frontlines so as 
to avoid physical contact with the realities of the slaughter. Those senior leaders who did 
experience the horrors of the war were (like every other witness) deeply shaken. General 
Robert Bullard, for example, Commander of the 1st Division at the Battle of Cantigny, 
was traumatized by the wretched sight of an American soldier lying on the ground with a 
“helmet crushed into his brain.” During a visit to a battlefield hospital, General Pershing 
noticed a dent in the covers where a convalesced soldier’s right arm should have been. 
The young man apologized and said to Pershing: “I cannot salute you, sir.” Afterward, 
Pershing privately wept in his vehicle and told an aide that he found it difficult to see 
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soldiers who had been maimed as a direct result of his orders. Such interactions became 
rare as American commanders decided that it was better not to let such terrible realities 
cloud their judgments. No, the thinking went, in this war of attrition it was far more 
practical to think of soldiers—whether dead or alive—as numbers and expendable, if 
valuable, pieces of the greater war machine (in other words, as objects of motion). 
Perhaps in an effort to ease their burdens, senior officers began to see the number of 
“acceptable” U.S. casualties as something that could be measured in proportion to risk. 
Some even went so far as to measure a unit’s fighting spirit and effectiveness by the 
number of casualties it suffered—a simultaneously logical and illogical proposition that 
encouraged some younger field officers to gamble with their men’s lives in the name of 
glory. For instance, during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, General Charles Summerall 
visited Brigadier General Douglas MacArthur’s 84th Brigade on the night before an 
assault. “Give me Chatillon or a list of five thousand casualties,” Summerall told 
MacArthur, to which the young officer replied: “If this Brigade does not capture 
Chatillon you can publish a casualty list of the entire brigade with the Brigade 
Commander’s name at the top.” Such psychological approaches to (and rhetorical 
compensations for) the inevitability of mass death helped commanding officers suppress 
feelings of guilt (which were kept private in any case).418  
In contrast to their superiors, junior officers in the field became intimately 
familiar with the day-to-day mass murder upon which victory apparently depended. In 
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the words of Captain John Thomas of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, officers in the field 
“lived obscenely in the cellars with the dead, and saw men die in the orange flash of 
minenwerfer shells, terribly and without consolation of glory.” Younger officers and 
future army leaders like George Patton, George Marshall, Joseph Stilwell, Ernest 
Harmon, and Mark Clark could not help but bear witness to the terror that senior 
commanders wished to avoid at all costs. Stilwell, for example, was haunted by “heads 
lying around still in helmets, hunks of bodies, thigh bones, jaws, hands, pieces of old rags 
hanging to them and a leg sticking out of a dugout which a soldier had utilized on which 
to hang things.” Even gung-ho figures like Patton and MacArthur were permanently 
shaken by the nature of the Great War; Patton would later remember that “men were 
being blown to bits” all around him, while MacArthur would recall that the dead were so 
thick during the Aisne-Marne Offensive that “we tumbled over them. There must have 
been at least 2,000 of those sprawled bodies […] The stench was suffocating. The moans 
and cries of wounded men sounded everywhere.” Such terror—such depraved 
bloodletting and suffering—caused many field officers to measure the success of a given 
operation by the number of their men who survived intact (a far different standard than 
the one held by senior officers).419 
As field officers struggled to keep casualty rates low, many came to believe that 
incompetence and indifference within the higher echelon of command was contributing 
to unnecessary deaths. Most historians agree that American commanding officers—and 
especially General Pershing—failed to comprehend the speed and complexity of modern 
tactics and operations. Battle plans were often based upon obsolete methods developed 
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years before during U.S. military campaigns in Cuba, Manila, and Mexico. A large (if 
ultimately unquantifiable) portion of American deaths in the Great War has been 
attributed to Pershing’s relentless bid to utilize outdated “open warfare” tactics—a 
process of “driving the enemy out into the open and engaging him in a war of 
movement”—instead of trench warfare methods. Pershing’s beloved tactics proved to be 
ineffective against enemy machine guns, which mowed down exposed American troops 
with ease. During the war, the Germans soberly noted that the AEF’s “close, deeply 
arranged” attack formations created “absolutely colossal [American] casualties.” 
Following the war, one AEF lieutenant lamented: “We learned small unit tactics from the 
Germans. They were costly teachers.” To make matters worse, incompetence, 
miscommunication, and bad planning at the senior level sparked incidents of friendly 
fire—perhaps the most tragic, senseless, and irredeemable kind of battle death.420  
Because of this perceived mismanagement from above, seasoned field officers 
learned to ignore dubious orders or conduct them in ways that might diminish the loss of 
American life. For instance, after driving the Germans out of the French town of Sergy, 
MacArthur disregarded official orders to stay put, and pursued the withdrawing enemy; 
in that moment, he justified the decision by claiming it would “save us many thousands 
of precious lives” in the future. Unfortunately, on-the-ground leaders like MacArthur and 
Patton became rare commodities as young officers were killed in battle at disturbing and 
unanticipated rates. In response to a ceaseless hemorrhaging of battlefield leadership, the 
AEF developed an officer’s training school that, by mid-1918, rapidly graduated a 
staggering 5,000 infantry officers each month. What should have been taught over a 
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period of many months was taught in mere weeks as the AEF rushed to funnel officers 
into the field. Quickly thrust into battle, the vast majority of replacement officers lacked 
simple but necessary skills, like the ability to locate map coordinates accurately. These 
deficiencies could have deadly effects; as one U.S. officer quipped during the war, “[A] 
lot of men are buried in the Argonne because” of them.421 
It should be noted that not every U.S. field officer attributed the nation’s high 
casualty rates to incompetent commanders and inexperienced replacement officers. 
Second Lieutenant Leland C. Stevenson of the 3rd Division, AEF, for example, believed 
that U.S. losses—“much higher than those of our allies”—were “largely due to the spirit 
and temperament of the American soldier.” In a memo to the Division’s Chief of Staff 
concerning the lethal effects of the German machine gun, Stevenson opined: 
The American is always anxious to attack. Rather than slow up the attack and 
 reduce the Machine Gun by the proper methods, the American will rush the gun 
 with utter disregard for the danger, and usually capture it, with the result that 
 many are killed and wounded. Many gallant deeds have been performed by our 
 men in this manner and many brave soldiers have given their lives because of 
 their utter disregard for enemy Machine Guns. I am convinced that this is due to 
 the temperament and training of the American, not to tactical errors. Recklessness 
 and willingness ‘to take a chance’ are purely American characteristics and 
 naturally, are going to manifest themselves in battle. Much experience will help to 
 overcome losses from these cases, but they will always be high.422 
 
Whether or not Stevenson’s analysis was accurate, U.S. military brass certainly 
encouraged troops to attack upon command and without regard for personal safety. 
Immediately following successful (and invariably terrifying and bloody) assaults, 
commanding officers (including General John J. Pershing himself) issued “General 
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Orders” that praised infantrymen for their courage. “You rushed into the fight as though 
to a fete,” soldiers of the 28th Division were told after conducting a harrowing 
counterattack in the Second Battle of the Marne. “Your magnificent courage completely 
routed a surprised enemy and your indomitable tenacity checked the counter-attacks of 
his fresh divisions. Furthermore, you have really felt your superiority over the barbarous 
enemy of the whole human race, against whom the children of Liberty are striving. To 
attack him is to vanish him.”423 Such commendations often eulogized specific fallen 
soldiers for moving forward at the cost of their own lives and thus, exhibiting 
“fearlessness,” “bravery,” and “extraordinary heroism in action.”424 Yet, while praising 
the departed, such commendations encouraged survivors not to dwell on their fallen 
comrades, but rather to keep moving forward. In August of 1918, an AEF General Order 
delivered to the 4th Division ended thusly: “We mourn our dead. For the living, there is 
the work of to-morrow.”425 That same month, Major General Charles Charles H. Muir 
issued a General Orders asking soldiers of the 28th Division to focus on the enemies’ 
casualties rather than their own: 
[We have] inflicted on the enemy far more loss than [we have] suffered from him. 
 In a single gas application [we] inflicted more damage than the enemy inflicted on 
 [us] by gas since [our] entry into the battle […] It is desird that these fact be 
 brought to the attention of all, in order that the tendency of new troops to allow 
 their minds to dwell on their own losses to the exclusion of what they had done to 
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 the enemy may be reduced to the minimum […] Let all be of good heart. We have 
 inflicted more loss than we have suffered; we are better men individually than our 
 enemies. A little more grit, a little more effort, a little more determination to keep 
 our enemies down and the Division will have the right to look upon itself as an 
 organization of veterans.426 
 
To show that he was not indifferent to the emotional traumas of combat death, General 
Pershing himself sent a memo to the entire AEF, reminding them that their fallen 
compatriots would live on in glory after the war was over: “We have paid for our success 
in the lives of many of our brave comrades. We shall cherish their memory always, and 
claim for our history and literature their bravery, achievement and sacrifice.”427 Perhaps 
these official expressions of admiration brought some measure of comfort to tired (and 
certainly traumatized) soldiers; perhaps it helped steel them for whatever lied ahead. 
Whatever the case, it should be noted that the ceaseless enjoiners to keep moving forward 
were reinforced by a draconian policy that gave infantrymen little choice but to obey 
every order: in September of 1918, General Pershing authorized field officers to shoot on 
sight any American soldier who ran away or refused to attack. A memorandum from the 
Headquarters of the 28th Division AEF stated: “Officers and non-commissioned officers 
are authorized and directed to KILL any man so conducting himself it is necessary to 
bring an end to such conduct.”428 
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Those who came closest to the terror of combat were, of course, the infantrymen 
who were called upon to do the killing, the dying, and the taking of enemy lines. Either 
drafted by the federal government or serving voluntarily out of patriotic devotion, 
hundreds of thousands of American citizen-soldiers—teachers, students, farmers, clerks, 
factory workers, and so on—found themselves on the muddy battlefields and ravaged 
forests of Europe, surrounded by the apocalyptic nightmare that was the Great War. It did 
not take long for the average combat soldier to realize that the ghastly “meat grinder” the 
press had described in great detail in the years before American belligerence—the 
senseless, state-sponsored holocaust that, in time, would be represented again and again 
in the postwar disillusionment literature of Ernest Hemingway, John Dos Passos, e.e. 
cummings, William Faulkner, Harry Crosby, and others—was all too real. Within the war 
zone, the specter of death hung over every man at every moment, threatening to touch 
down (in the form of an artillery shell), emerge from the muddy ground (in the form of a 
disfigured corpse), or call out (in the form of a temporary grave marker) at any instant. 
Death was everywhere; it was relentless; and in all likelihood, it consumed the thoughts 
of most American fighting men. 
We can be sure of this last point thanks to the wartime diary of Fred Wertenbach, 
a draftee from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Stationed at the Western Front in France as a 
member of Company G, 111th Infantry, 28th Division, AEF, Wertenbach secretly 
recorded his daily experiences in a personal journal. At that time, U.S. military 
regulations forbade soldiers from carrying diaries for fear that they could fall into enemy 
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hands and reveal valuable intelligence.429 With his German name, and with the 
knowledge that such a diary was contrary to orders, Wertenbach had to be careful so as 
not to be considered a spy. Thankfully, Wertenbach took the risk and created a permanent 
record of the Great War from the infantryman’s perspective. Housed at the Soldiers and 
Sailors Memorial Hall and Museum in Pittsburgh, his diary provides an extremely rare, 
authentic, and uncensored look at the war—in all its banality and terror—and reveals the 
physical and psychological traumas suffered by American soldiers in Europe. Perhaps 
more than anything, Wertenbach’s written words display his obsession with death—an 
obsession that intensified with each passing day.430 
Much like Paul Bäumer, the young German soldier in Erich Maria Remarque’s 
classic World War I novel, All Quiet on the Western Front (1929), Fred Wertenbach 
entered the war as an apple-cheeked youth brimming with naïve fantasies of battlefield 
glamour. His entries from January to mid-May 1918 exude enthusiasm for the macho 
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aspects of military training,431 anxiety as to whether the war will be over before he’s 
shipped to Europe,432 and an unwavering devotion to the nation. Although they 
occasionally address the challenges of homesickness, bad food, incompetent officers, and 
endless marches through the woods, Wertenbach’s entries from this period remain 
wholeheartedly upbeat and gung-ho. Fancying himself to be a poet, Wertenbach jots 
down this original, star-spangled rhyme early in the diary: 
“Our Life and Our Flag” 
  
Here’s to our life and our flag 
God grant when comes the worst 
We may give up the first to save the last 
But never yield the last to save the first.433 
 
The Committee on Public Information could not have put it better. 
The most startling aspect of reading Wertenbach’s diary is to witness the speed 
with which the war’s evil and deadly realities transform this young citizen-soldier into a 
jaded, grizzled, and traumatized combat vet. Similar (again) to All Quiet’s Paul Bäumer, 
Wertenbach quickly shed his innocent worldviews after he was deployed to the Western 
Front and experienced the incomprehensible physical pain, mental suffering, and mass 
murder entailed by the Great War. As days and weeks are marked in his diary, initial rosy 
observations regarding the thrills of traveling to France through submarine-infested 
                                                 
431 For instance, on January 16, Wertenbach describes the thrills of training for 
trench warfare: “As the weather was nice we went over the top. It was great. We went 
crouched in the trenches and at our commander’s command ‘Over!’ we went over. We 
left from the raised trench down upon the prone dummies, then left a trench in the 
retreating Bosche; then into the double lines of dummies. It was great, I tell you.” 
432 Bemoaning the vast distance between Camp Hancock in Georgia and the 
battlefields of Europe, Wertenbach writes on January 13: “I should have joined the regs 
and been over. We will never go, as Pershing wants no boys scouts […] I wonder if we’ll 
ever get over. Wish I was in the Marines.” 
433 Wertenbach, February 19, 1918, diary. 
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waters and witnessing a German bombing raid (“a baptism of fire”)434 give way to 
somber, disenchanted reports teeming with disgust for the nature of state-sponsored 
warfare. For example, just days after arriving in France, Wertenbach bemoans the hatred 
and inhumanity that is instilled in soldiers (a bayonet instructor tells Wertenbach, “If a 
German pleads that he has a wife and eleven children you tell him, ‘Your wife’s a widow 
and your kiddies are orphans now’ and let him have it!”) and addresses the gaps between 
domestic perceptions of the war and the on-the-ground realities: “This life here is not 
what it is pictured in the U.S. I’d like to be back […] Believe me, I am going to let the 
next war take care of itself […] The U.S. double crossed us […] Bless the U.S. but God 
save the greatest country on earth from militarism.”435 Notably, in a description of a 
daylong training march somewhere near the Front, Wertenbach reflects upon the 
dehumanizing nature of military service: “We arose at 500 AM and left at 600 AM. From 
600 AM until 700 PM is 13 hrs. Not bad, Uncle Sam. 13 hrs. gone for you. We are 
animals. Rise, eat, work, eat and go straight to bed in our billets, as it is called.”436 Here, 
Wertenbach compares himself to an animal—an object of motion that has no choice but 
to hand over every waking moment—his total self—to the war effort (an effort he no 
longer wholeheartedly believes in). His only reprieve from this routine—his only 
reminder that he is human after all—is his diary, which he has to keep secret from 
everyone around him. Ruing his condition, Wertenbach writes: “I keep thinking of home 
and mother and—and all the things that are good and true.” Having received his earlier 
                                                 
434 Wertenbach, May 10-12, and 15, 1918, diary. 
435 Wertenbach, May 23-25, 27, and 30, 1918, diary. 
436 Wertenbach, June 5, 1918, diary. 
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wish of getting to Europe in time to fight, he now confesses: “I wish the war would end 
soon.”437 
By mid-June, 1918, Wertenbach found himself directly in the war zone. In his 
journal, previous laments regarding military life seem downright rosy. In essence, his 
entries from June to December 1918 stand as one long disquisition on death. Consider the 
following progression of selected entries: 
 
        Sunday, June 23  
We are marching to Chateau-Thierry as replacement American troops. Went 
 past ripening fields of crops and grains. The grave fields make me think of 
 soldiers […] One fellow said “There’s a cemetery” another  drummed in “Oh, 
 don’t bother pointing it out.” 
 
        Friday, June 28 
Rumor has it we are to leave tomorrow to 2nd line […] I wonder if I will get 
 killed, crippled, or pass through it all unscathed. 
 
        Monday, July 8 
Heard the drone of planes overhead. Ominous sound, these Bosche bombers […]  
heavy, portentous. 
  
        Tuesday, July 16 
At 3:00 AM pulled into a woods having gone through a barrage of H.E. + gas 
 shells. We were to remain there until daybreak. I saw an entrance to a dugout and 
 crawled in. You can bet I got out of there promptly. There was a man lying dead 
 inside, an American soldier. I slept in a trench because of the artillery fire. At 
 about 800 I strolled around the woods, only to find dead Am. Soldiers 
 everywhere. 
 
        July 18-20 
Tonkowsly got killed and about 20 of our men wounded by shrapnel […] I can 
 feel myself going to pieces because of the lack of sleep and the strain […] I heard 
 Berbeich died and Red Gelman had an arm blown off.  I do  hate to look at these 
 dead men […] Thompson + I took a dead German Lieut.’s  field case and would 
 have buried him but he lay in open ground and it was too dangerous. 
 
        July 23-26 
                                                 
437 Wertenbach, June 4, 1918, diary. 
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I have been given a dead or wounded man’s equipment. My specialty is dead 
 men’s equipage […] German equipment and dead are about everywhere […] 
 Damn Jerry; damn war + damn everything […] If I ever have children and I say 
 war to them and they don’t cry, I’ll paddle them until they do […] Our death list 
 is going up. Snipers. Damn.         
            
        Sunday, July 28 
Am leaving out casualties because we are forbidden to tabulate them […] GOT 
 STRICT ORDERS—NO DIARIES SO I CAN’T MENTION ANY OF WHAT 
 REALLY HAPPENS 
  
        July 31-August 1 
There is a depressing feeling in the company because of our dead […] We lost 
 quite a bit up in Agremonte Woods—known as Dead Man’s Woods—when we 
 attacked from there. Only had two killed, but— 
 
        Monday, August 12 
Summerfield, Hagstiohn, Signrolla and Carmali were killed and more injured. 
 Our company captured 30 machine guns. German dead were lying everywhere 
 unburied, because German snipers shoot, wait, fire at us when we tried to get our 
 wounded. I went down with rations and saw an American foot with his shoe. It 
 had been blown off by a shell. I heard Mud and Lazer were killed by our own 
 barrage. 
 
                 Wednesday, August 21 
Heat and flies here are terrible. The flies think we are dead and refuse to leave  
until touched. 
  
        Tuesday, September 3 
Saw an aeroplane scrap today, nine Bosche against three Amer. One Amer. fell  
from a height of 10,000 ft to certain death. Things here are quiet but the scene will 
 soon change. There we will pay for our quiet moments. Always some one dying. 
 When I look back at our dead—whew! If only these maggoty bodies didn’t haunt 
 us so. Damn War! But above all, damn these slim meals—and no meals. 
 
                 Thursday, September 5 
Moved toward the front, up past 3 khaki clad bogs along the road, killed. Then, on 
 the side of the hill an Amer doughboy, asleep in death, in a shallow trench. It gave 
 me a chill in the stomach. I’m sick of this damn war. I want to go home. War is all 
 right—when you dont have to kill or be killed. Hell with it all. In morn we go in  
 the thick of it. We are on the side of a hill about 100 yds from the Germans. More 
 to be killed. I’m sick, sick, deniably sick of it all. If I could, I’d chuck it. 
 
        September 6-8 
Pool + Heiser are killed, quite a few wounded while I narrowly escaped death 
 several times. I am hit on the knee, wrist, elbow, shoulder and twice on the head 
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 from shell fragments […] Bert, Lang, Atkinson, Atricna, Hailman killed […] 
 Every bush had them Zam! And a few guys lie kicking. Andy Sehalt and I 
 dragged in a shell shock man after his buddies wouldn’t help me. Then Andy + 
 Chalsey. Hast almost went shell shock in the barrage. Kerns showed white the 
 white feather, pretending shell shock after got the ammo through. McNeily + I got 
 three Bosche […] We were released at 4:00 A.M. this morning. Last night will 
 live always with me […] Out of shellfire, out of hellfire our casualties are seven 
 killed and about thirty or more in the hospital. The glory of war! Humor for the 
 ammunition sellers. 
 
            Wednesday, September 11 
We are about eight kilos back of the Marne. Saw several Iconic Allemande graves 
 and many French ones. 
 
                  Sunday, September 15 
I went to church. Father Conmidy had the mass and I expected him to mention 
 Chaplain Keith but he did not. Chaplain Keith was gassed when we were up the 
 line and died from it. I am kept busy on requisitions. 
 
        September 25-26 
I am writing this in a hospital at Vichy. I remember hiking into the Argonne, 
 getting sicker and sicker. Then over the top. The machine guns stopped us but we 
 went on. Our Capt Schlosser was sniped off. We made a second attack and then 
 things went woozy. There was a dead German in a shell hole. I was so sick I made 
 sure he was dead and then I lay down and everything went black […] I thought 
 the sky was the ocean up side down and then it came to me stretcher bearers were 
 carrying me back somewhere. 
  
        Tuesday, October 1 
Vichy is a town whose welfare depends on tourists. Its water is famous. One hotel 
 here the Rub is one of the biggest hotels in France. The doctors remodel men who 
 have been deformed here and wonderful cures are made. 
 
        Tuesday, October 15 
I wrote Ish sometime ago to hold my mail until I return to the company. If he has, 
 it means “bakoo” mail when I get back. But I miss Edith and Ellen Kafer. But 
 love is gone from the world only comradeship remains. And hate—hate of men, 
 of my own Germanic blood, who would kill and destroy our soul. 
 
                Wednesday, October 16 
I wonder if I am to die “up there.” Twice have I been offered bomb proof jobs 
 and each time I have refused. I could remain here as a strong up here. 
  
 Tis all a checker board of nights and days 
 Where Destiny with men for pieces plays 
 Hither + Thither moves and mates and slays 
225 
 There one by one back in the cupboard lays (Omar Khayyam) 
 
We cant stop Fate. My path is there; my feet must follow it. Whither it leads I 
 know not. But Kismet, grant please grant, that I die bravely, if die I must. 
  
        Thursday, October 17 
How strange life is—why should I have been born in 1895 and sentenced to this 
 hell of slaughter? I dont want to take any one’s life—what happened up there was 
 not my fault. I  had to do it. I am still seeing the kid holding on to his mother’s 
 hand and his German dad so stalwart beside her! Why should he have brought  
 such a picture in his map case, anyway? Why why why? 
 
        Friday, October 18 
Sometimes I wish I were a clod—and could not feel so acutely fear, hate, etc as I 
 do. Some of my buddies here are like that. But these nights on patrol when I 
 touched a lifeless body I shivered. And when we captured those three I almost 
 murdered them in cold blood I was so taut. 
 
        Saturday, October 26 
We had inspection today but I did not stand it. We have to sleep by our lonesome 
 because of fear of influenza. One man has his head at the top next to man has his 
 feet at the head so as not to inhale each others breath. 
  
        Tuesday, November 5 
Rtd to company at noon today. Krews told me Isherwood was dead. I feel too bad 
 to write home of it. Edith and his mother are in my thoughts constantly. He died a 
 brave man’s death. Only a boy—I always called him the Kid—he performed in a 
 way creditable to many an older man. Enlisted in Freedom’s defense at 15 years, 
 died at age of seventeen. May God rest his soul and grant I die as bravely if die I 
 must here in France. I believe I will see him sometime. 
  
                  Thursday, November 7 
Going to and from the place I kept thinking of the Kid. So near the end of the war 
 and then to be killed. Perhaps I will join him if we go in. We are slated to leave 
 here very soon, perhaps after I go asleep I will be awakened and ordered to roll 
 my pack. 
    
        Friday, November 8 
Ramello has been seriously wounded and may die. Damn war, the glory of war—
 if these war makers had eaten their meal near decaying human bodies; if they 
 would see what the rats feast upon if they could stand beside wrecks of men, God 
 knows their thoughts would be of peace too. 
  
                  Saturday, November 9 
We are to leave tonight, so the Loop says. Our packs are rolled and we are ready. 
 Damn Rumor reports Germany and an armistice is soon to begin. I hope it comes 
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 after we take one final fling at Jerry. I will try not for revenge but square accounts 
 for the kid. The Jerry bullet was explosive and was a dirty thing. If I shall die up 
 there, I hope I die quickly and bravely. 
 
                 Monday, November 11 
We slept last night on the bare damp ground. There was ice on the water in shell 
 holes. At 11:00 A.M. our barrage and the enemy’s ceased. From Purgatory to 
 Paradise in sixty seconds. We were half doubtful of an armistice for a while. 
 Gruber + I went over to the enemy but got cold feet when we could hear them 
 talking. We heard them shooting and singing when 11:00 came and also a German 
 bugler blowing Taps. Thank God it is over. We had nine killed in our btn. Pvt 
 Paul was killed in our company two minutes before 11:00 A.M. 
 
                Thursday, November 21 
Why, oh why must I go to school to learn to throw bombs after a war is over. But 
 the school goes on. 
 
                Thursday, November 28 
Dreamed last night of Isherwood and our Captain. They are both dead but some 
 how I cannot realize Ish is gone. I always think of him at night and sometimes I 
 imagine he is to come near me sometime again. 
 
        Sunday, December 1 
At last we had a day again in which there was no bloody rain. When I go back to 
 God’s own land I’ll dream of France to beat the band and in these dreams most of 
 all the time I’ll see a land of mud and slime of towns by huge shell racked and 
 torn, a fugitive, perhaps, forlorn upon a highway where the breeze sings songs of 
 sorrow in the trees a land of broken hearts of men who passed through hell to 
 peace again. 
 
            Wednesday, December 25 
Christmas there comes a sadness tonight. So many dead—for what? How am I 
 ever going to pick up the old existence again? A clerk! And dead men’s faces 
 leering at me from the row of figures. Peace on earth—shall I ever find it again? 
 
        December 29-31 
   “To 1918” 
 Oh! Nineteen eighteen! What is thou thoast bought 
 This taste of hell like Satan clutch to me 
 Ths disregard of lessons so long taught 
 Of Christian life that meant so much to me 
 Oh! Nineteen eighteen! Traitor art thou now 
 To take from life its sweetness are the youth 
 Has fled the blood—and then to teach me how 
 To sneer at Honor, Virtue, Freedom, Truth 
 Oh! Nineteen eighteen! My hast thou of me 
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 Acquire made—and I just twenty-three 
 And Yet—who knows Perhaps I am to bless 
 This world some way of which I do not know 
 Perhaps to bring to some one happiness 
 Or else to ease the load of others’ woe 
 God grant it may be so—and when I did 
 And seek a dwelling in that strange Somewhere 
 I may find comfort in the thought that I 
 Helped lighten oft some mortal’s weight of care 
 That facing my Creator I may say 
 “I helped my brother in a by gone day” 
    FSW 
    Andilly Langres, France 
  
          Undated [presumably 1919] 
   “ALONE” 
 I SHARED HIS GRUB ON A MARINE HILLSIDE  
 WHEN WE FIRST HEARD THE BULLETS HUM 
 WHEN WE THOUGHT THAT THE BOSCHE WOULD COME  
 WITH HIM I DREAMED THE WORLD OLD DREAM  
 OF HOME—AND BRIGHT HEARTHSTONE 
 FATE RULED HE SHOULD DIE A SOLDIER’S DEATH 
 AND I……………. CAME BACK…………….. ALONE 
    FSW 
 
   “THE RAIN” 
 AND THEN, WHEN THE BUGLE SUMMONS 
 WE SOLDIERS TO MARCH AND DRILL 
 TO LEARN OF GRENADE AND TRENCHES 
 THE MOST MODERN WAYS TO KILL 
 IT ISN’T THE THOUGHT THAT PERHAPS WE’LL LIE 
 ‘NEATH A FOREIGN SOIL THAT MAKES US SIGH 
 IT’S THE RAIN, RAIN, RAIN 
    FSW 
 
The war Wertenbach describes is sickening and devoid of heroism, redemption, and 
meaning. It is a war in which planes are “ominous” and “portentious.” It is a war in 
which a fighter pilot’s fiery plunge to earth is not dazzling in its terror, but rather just 
another banal reminder of the “certain death” that lingers above each soldier’s head. It is 
a war in which average men like Wertenbach—office clerks back home—are forced to 
see, smell, and touch dead men in trenches, dead men in scarred forests and shell holes—
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“maggoty,” “lifeless” bodies everywhere—and abandoned appendages torn from men’s 
bodies. It is a war in which the true enemy is, perhaps, less the German boy whose wallet 
contains a picture of his mother and father, and more the “ammunition sellers” and “war 
makers” of the world. It is a war in which haphazard battlefield cemeteries remind the 
living that they, too, might “lie ‘neath a foreign soil” forever. It is a war in which death 
threatens to strike at any moment—even in one’s sleep—in the form of a bullet, bomb, 
bayonet, gas cloud, or comrade’s infectious cough; no one can escape “Kismet” (or fate). 
It is a war in which one is unable to bury and remember the dead properly. It is a war that 
makes one “taut,” capable of slaughtering helpless prisoners. It is a war that needlessly 
and brutally transforms young men into ghosts that will haunt survivors forever: “So 
many dead—for what? How am I ever going to pick up the old existence again? A clerk! 
And dead men’s faces leering at me from the row of figures. Peace on earth—shall I ever 
find it again?” It is a war—a “Damn War!”—without beauty, reason, or the celebration of 
life. 
As the famous works of postwar disillusionment writers and artists would later 
reveal, Wertenbach’s attitudes about the war were not uncommon: for those who 
experienced its endless terrors, the Great War was nothing short of a living nightmare. 
Although the U.S. military banned diaries and personal journals during the war, 
information about the hideous realities of the war zone occasionally leaked and circulated 
to troops both near and far from the Western Front. In one notable instance, an officer 
disseminated grim casualty statistics from the Front to recruits at an Army training camp 
in Virginia; the conscripts became depressed upon learning that the average life span of 
an artillery officer in battle was an hour and thirty-five minutes, the average lifespan of a 
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lieutenant just two to three hours.438 For many American men, the experience of being 
drafted, plucked from home, and sent to fight on the other side of the ocean was traumatic 
enough; such glimpses of the doom that awaited them could be almost too much to 
handle. Thus, during the war, the U.S. military did everything it could to monitor the 
morale of American soldiers (especially those who had not yet witnessed the realities of 
the war) and censor distressing information from the Front.  
These official efforts came in several forms. One tactic was to censor each piece 
of mail sent and received by soldiers in Europe. Upon arriving in France, every American 
soldier received a pamphlet that explained this censorship policy and the reasons behind 
it:   
THERE ARE ONLY TWO WAYS TO MAIL LETTERS: 
 
1—Hand them unsealed to your company officer. Remember that he reads many 
 letters in his capacity of company censor and your letter is to him an entirely 
 impersonal communication, of which he does not remember the details or the 
 writer once it has been read. 
 
2—Place your letters unsealed in a “blue envelope,” seal the envelope, and mail it 
 to the Base Censor, A.E.F., Paris. Each “blue envelope” may contain several 
 letters, providing all are written by the same man and that each is enclosed within 
 its. 
 
DON’T TALK TOO MUCH: 
  
Officers, enlisted men, and militarized civilians with the American Expeditionary 
 Forces in France are forbidden to discuss or mention in public places, or to impart 
 to anyone except in the official discharge of their duties, anything of military 
 nature or anything whatever concerning information directly or indirectly 
 obtained through connection with the A. E. F. 
 
Do not express your opinion on military matters nor on the general situation. Be 
 loyal to your Government and your superiors. Trust them to conduct the war 
 while you attend to your own particular part in it. 
                                                 
438 Huelfer, 3. 
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Avoid in any way giving the impression of pessimism either in your conversation 
 or you attitude. In all ways be confident in the success of our armies and of our 
 cause. 
 
All members of the American Expeditionary Forces are forbidden to take 
 photographs, unless photography is a part of their official duties… 
 
WHEN YOU WRITE A LETTER OR POST CARD: 
  
DON’T put too much faith in the discretion of the people you write to. They may 
 be very patriotic, yet quite unable to recognize an enemy agent or what 
 information may be of value to the enemy. 
 
REMEMBER that writing or receiving of letters in war time is a privilege, not a 
 right. In many wars of the past soldiers were not allowed to write letters at all.439 
 
This policy was the most straightforward and practical way of suppressing the 
dissemination of frank and honest information about the atrocious realities of the war 
zone. It also allowed military intelligence officers to identify soldiers who posed a threat 
to morale at the front lines. For instance, Private Mike Molata was targeted for 
investigation after censors intercepted the following letter: 
November 4th, 1918 
 
A letter from your brother Michel – 
 
Hellow dear Brother Andrew – 
 I am in haste to inform you that thanks to the Lord I am enjoying good  
 health. Wish you the same. I pray the Lord that we should meet again. 
 I have not yet arrived to destination and I don’t know when we will reach 
 our place. 
 They have already taken away from me all that I carried. Soon I’ll go to 
 the front line, perhaps in about a week I will go into the trenches. 
 Good-bye, I remain your brother 
 
   Michel 
                                                 
439 “Press/Censorship,” Record Group 120, Records of the Expeditionary Forces 
(World War I), Box 6127, File: “Censorship Rules of Press,” National Records and 
Archives Administration II, College Park, Maryland USA. 
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Perhaps we will no more see one another. I thus request you to try to get the 
 Insurance because I may be killed. Good-bye. Greetings to all, wish you the best 
 of luck. 
 
It’s bad brother. 
 
Molata’s gloomy tone and straightforward, honest assessment of the situation—“It’s bad 
brother”—seems to have been enough to draw the attention of his superiors.440 
The military recognized that it could not completely control the flow of 
information between soldiers and correspondents behind the lines and back home. 
However, military officials believed that they could identify, filter out, and perhaps, 
reprogram fresh recruits who possessed low morale before they entered the trenches and 
tainted the spirits of their comrades. By August of 1918, the American Expeditionary 
Forces had set up a covert spy system within the Le Mans Classification Camp, the 
facility where every new U.S. soldier was processed upon arrival in France. Each day, a 
team of undercover intelligence officers posed as fresh recruits and engaged suspicious 
characters in conversation with the hope of weeding out “defeatists” who lacked the 
fighting spirit or harbored antiwar sentiments. Daily reports of this covert operation (now 
housed at the National Archives) reveal the military’s deep suspicion of ethnic and racial 
minorities, the pervasive antiwar streak that, despite official efforts, coursed through the 
U.S. ranks, and the insufficient training that many soldiers (who were about to face the 
test of battle) had received. Predictably, the undercover operatives directed much of their 
                                                 
440 “Reports Related to the Morale of American Troops, 1917-18,” Record Group 
120, Box 1, Entry 195, National Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, 
Maryland USA. 
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attention to first generation Americans, many of whom could not speak English or even 
provide papers proving their U.S. citizenship. A report dated August 19, 1918, stated: 
  
An unusually high percentage of men of alien birth- mostly Italians, with a few 
 Russians, Lithuanians and Russian poles- was contained in the morning group. 
 Now and then men of Austrian or German birth make their appearance- but in 
 every instance they said they had early emigrated to the United States and had no 
 near relatives in enemy countries and were more than willing to go to the front 
 […]  
 The morale of the replacements was invariably good. A number of men- 
 with enemy alien blood in their veins- professed a disinclination to go to the front- 
 but additional conversation with them showed that if they once reached the front 
 there was little doubt but that they could be trusted. Several cases of near-
 malingering were also noted […] 
 Two defeatists- both of them of Russian birth- were discovered among the 
 men and together with another Russian who is disinclined to go to the front to 
 fight- but prefers to go into quartermaster work (he is a Jew)- are being held in the 
 camp awaiting disposition from this office. The two men are: 
  
 Private Andy Stavisky, 2427338, born in Russia of Russian parents […]  
  He is sullen and generally refused to answer questions put to him in  
  English […] 
  
 Private Joseph N. Levitas […] His main contention is that he was forced to  
become a citizen of the United States against his will. It is believed that 
 this man should be put in the guardhouse pending disposition of his case. 
 Native-born Americans have been jeering at him and goading him on- 
 making him worse- if anything.441 
 
On August 27, the agents reported that 317 soldiers had passed through the clearinghouse 
that day and that the “general morale of the men was high- most of them being 
southerners of native birth.” They cautioned, however, that several individuals would 
“bear further watching”:  
 Private Joseph Francis, 3168467, a Turk. This man has brothers in the 
 Turkish army and does not want to fight against the Germans for fear his brother 
 may be with the Germans. He was in the United States for 15 years but has no 
 naturalization papers […] 
                                                 
441 Ibid, report dated August 19, 1918. 
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 A number of Italians who came through the camp on this date were not  
citizens of the United States. This situation appears frequently.442 
 
Despite their skepticism of non-White Anglo-Saxon Protestant recruits, the agents 
believed that most replacement troops had been properly conditioned by government and 
military propaganda to accept their lot and trust in the supposed righteousness of the 
national war effort: 
Conversation with the average soldier at the camp shows that he gives but little 
 thought to the American aims in the war, according to a report from one of the 
 operatives. The latter states that the men believe we tried our utmost to keep out 
 of the war by preserving our neutrality and that Germany persistently sunk our 
 ships and killed our citizens until we had to go to war. They take the situation for 
 granted without going into the detailed reasons for its existence.443 
 
If the hearts and minds of most recruits were well prepared for combat, the physical 
conditioning of many soldiers—particularly African-American troops—was occasionally 
called into question. For instance, on October 2, 1918, the agents at Le Mans issued the 
following warning: 
1. Most of the members of the 539th Engineers (colored) who are now 
undergoing training at the Forwarding Area, have been in the service less than 
two months and many of them have been in a little more than a month. Some 
of the men arrived at Camp Gordon on one day and were shipped out with the 
organization early the next morning for Hoboken. A little more than four 
weeks ago many of these negroes were working on southern plantations in 
their bare feet. 
 
2. The above resume accounts for the fact that there is so much sickness and 
death among them. They were sent to France without any training at all. Since 
they were not hardened even to a slight degree makes them easy victims for 
pneumonia. Forty of them were taken to the hospital in one day. The sick 
calls, from all information the writer could obtain, run as high as from 25 to 
40 per cent. Of course some of this is imaginary but the biggest part is not. 
 
                                                 
442 Ibid, August 27, 1918. 
443 Ibid, August 28, 1918. 
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3. The system of training at the Forwarding Area, especially the gas defense 
work, is very efficient. The non-commissioned officers there know their 
subject and are a hard-working lot. These specialists tell me that if these 
negroes are ever subject to a gas attack they will probably all be killed 
because their minds cannot grasp the training. 
 
4. It was a wanton waste of life and money to bring the 539th Engineers to 
France. By no means should they be kept in this area for the winter. What is 
left of them should be made into labor battalions and sent to a warmer part.444 
 
Beyond revealing the AEF’s racist assumptions about African-Americans and the 
subordinate role black soldiers were meant to play in the national war effort, this report 
provides further evidence of just how inadequately trained and prepared many 
conscripted U.S. soldiers were. We can only imagine what members of the 539th 
Engineers felt and thought as they were plucked from their communities, transported to a 
different part of the country, and shipped to Europe to fight for a nation that considered 
African-Americans second class citizens—all within a matter of weeks; what they felt 
and thought as they witnessed scores of their comrades perish from pneumonia.;  what 
these untrained men felt and thought as they waited for their marching orders. We do 
know, however, that, like every other conscripted soldier in the AEF, members of the 
539th Engineers had little power over their fate. Against their will, they had been turned 
into useful objects of motion for the war machine. 
During the period of U.S. belligerence, the Wilson Administration embarked upon 
a bold, yet dubious, project that sought nothing less than the complete transformation of 
every American into a compliant and useful object of motion for the nation’s war 
machine. Entailing the heavy-handed repression of dissent, the censorship and 
manipulation of war information and death reports, the pursuit for control over the “body 
                                                 
444 Ibid. 
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and soul and spirit” of each private citizen (and non-citizen), and the management of 
public imaginations concerning the emotional and politically-charged issues of patriotic 
death, just killing, collective sacrifice, proper burial, and public commemoration, this 
governmental venture successfully and severely constrained Americans’ abilities to act 
and express themselves freely on these and other war-related matters.  
While this suppression of symbolic action helped facilitate the rapid mobilization 
of resources, bodies, and collective will seemingly required for victory “over there,” it 
fostered a giant yet (because of the stringent federal and military laws and policies) often 
concealed reserve of emotion and resentment in the hearts and minds of many 
Americans—particularly those whose loved ones were drafted and eventually lost in the 
fighting. As we will see clearly in the remaining chapters, this reserve of emotion and 
resentment would explode like a powder keg, as thousands of grieving American families 
would publicly express their feelings concerning the meaning of their loved ones’ deaths 
in Europe and the government’s duty to treat soldiers’ bodily remains properly. In other 
words, the U.S. government’s wartime project of motion would spark a postwar reaction 
of symbolic action. But in time, the government would learn to compensate for this 
backlash by appropriating the emotional and sentimental vernacular of grieving families 
into both its own official rhetoric and the final visual presentation of permanent 
American military cemeteries in Europe—sites where dead U.S. soldiers, once objects of 
motion for the war machine, would become useful objects of symbolic action for the 
nation-state. And ultimately, those responsible for the design and establishment of 
America’s overseas military cemeteries would blend aspects of the lofty, nationalistic 
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rhetoric found in Wilson’s war address to Congress with the more personal, emotional, 
and domestic sensibilities found in citizens’ expressions of sorrow. 
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4.0  A SENTIMENTAL VERNACULAR: FAMILY LETTERS AND THE 
BURYING OF WORLD WAR I SOLDIERS 
“No. Since it is impossible to see him would rather his remains rest in France.”445 
4.1 A MOTHER’S LETTER 
In November 1920, the United States War Department received a note from Emma Cuff, 
an African-American cook from Eckman, West Virginia, whose son William had died in 
the so-called Great War: “mY DEAR SIR MY SON HAS NO CHILDREN NOR WIFE I 
AM HIS MOTHER his father is dead an i have no place that i can call my own and i dont 
believe that i want my sons body destearbed, if he is in france let him remain untill the 
judgment in france YOURS as ever.” Like tens of thousands of grieving citizens across 
the nation, Cuff had received inquiries from the War Department seeking consent to bury 
                                                 
445 Elizabeth Somerville, note to Grave Registration Service (GRS), n.d., BCF for 
James Jackson, RG 92, NARA. Unless otherwise noted, the personal correspondence 
discussed and images shown in this essay can be found at the U.S. National Archives and 
Records Administration II, College Park, Maryland in the Records of the Office of the 
Quartermaster General, Record Group 92 (RG 92), under “Burial Case Files” (BCF). All 
grammatical errors and original capitalization in the correspondence have been preserved 
unless otherwise noted. Misspellings and errors can be attributed to the probability that 
many letter writers had no formal education or spoke English as a second language. Most 
of the personal information regarding the occupations of letter writers was obtained 
through the 1910 and 1920 national censuses. 
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her son’s remains in one of the nascent permanent American military cemeteries in 
Europe. Assuming the subject position of a widowed mother, Cuff spoke plainly, yet 
eloquently: Since she was homeless and William was wifeless, the government could 
assume responsibility for his dead body and bury it in France. In a few short lines Cuff 
gave up her son, her most precious treasure, once more to the American nation and 
invoked an unspoken ethical contract that would hold the government accountable for the 
proper treatment of his body until judgment day. Moreover, her note represented one 
more crucial ‘vote’ cast in favor of the government’s controversial plan to construct 
monumental military cemeteries on foreign soil, where public memory of U.S. sacrifice 
in the war would be kept alive through the permanent display of soldiers’ graves.446 
In this chapter, I will bring forth the voices of ‘ordinary’ U.S. citizens who, 
following the First World War, responded to government inquiries regarding the final 
disposition of their loved ones’ bodies. This section is based upon hundreds of letters 
housed in the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).447 Although 
many relatives simply filled out and returned forms issued by the War Department, others 
crafted messages of varied, and often poetic, rhetorical appeals to express their opinions 
regarding the plan to bury American war dead in distant lands. These letters serve as what 
historian Robert S. McElvaine terms “immediate testimony” – personal statements that 
                                                 
446 Emma Cuff to Charles C. Pierce, 16 November 1920, BCF for William Cuff, 
RG 92, NARA. 
447 Within RG 92 there are 5,400 boxes, organized alphabetically, containing 
burial case files of soldiers killed in World War I. Each box holds roughly twenty 
individual files. To collect correspondence related to the final disposition of 400 soldiers, 
I requested every fourteenth box from the 5,400 available. From each of these boxes I 
collected data from the first file that contained what I call ‘extra communication’ – 
letters, notes, telegrams that went beyond the filling out of forms. 
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reveal the contemporary views of people who lived through a particular historical 
moment.448 While historical letters have limitations as primary sources of evidence,449 I 
have done my best to interpret each individual letter within all of its available contextual 
information.450 The following pages recover the immediate testimonies of a range of 
American citizens: from those who relinquished the care of corpses to the government, to 
those who demanded, sometimes bitterly, the return of loved ones’ remains to the U.S., to 
members of the African-American community whose men had fought and died for a 
nation that treated blacks as inferior citizens. The correspondence discussed here offers 
views into the complexities of the feelings, ideologies, traditions, and rights of U.S. 
citizens who were prompted by the death of their kin to consider both their own relation 
to the nation and the human costs that U.S. intervention in global affairs entailed. 
Beyond capturing the sentiments of a past generation of Americans, this textual 
corpus may have also served as an inventional resource for officials developing an 
administrative rhetoric that at once could satisfy the needs of U.S. citizens and advocate 
for the establishment of symbolic and monumental cemeteries in Europe. I will suggest 
that through the process of communication it initiated with grieving families, the War 
Department learned to temper its highly bureaucratic speech with a personal and 
                                                 
448 Robert S. McElvaine, Down and Out in the Great Depression: Letters from the 
Forgotten Man (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 5. 
449 Such letters often provide only fragments of an ongoing correspondence, and 
they can tempt one to take the letter writer’s words at face value. See Mary Jo Maynes, 
Jennifer L. Pierce, and and Barbara Laslett, Telling Stories: The Use of Personal 
Narratives in the Social Sciences and History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 
82-90. 
450 I consider the subject position of each letter writer; the desires expressed by 
the writer in all accessible letters; the most likely motives of the writer; and how each 
letter fits within the larger chain of correspondence between the writer and the 
government. 
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sentimental vernacular appropriated from the letters of citizens. This vernacular became 
not only part of the government’s official discourse regarding the final disposition of the 
dead, but was also instantiated in the visual presentation of America’s eight World War I 
cemeteries in Europe, still seen by thousands of international visitors each year.451 Thus, 
the story of the process of transnational commemoration initiated by these monumental 
American burial grounds begins with the letters examined here. 
The remaining pages of this chapter are divided into nine sections. The first 
provides a brief genealogy of the plan for American overseas World War I cemeteries. 
The next five uncover the varied sentiments and arguments expressed in families’ letters 
concerning the final disposition of U.S. war dead. The seventh section analyzes 
correspondence from African Americans and posits that grieving black families felt less 
entitled to the same discursive space claimed by whites. The eighth section examines the 
various ways the government responded to families’ resistance to the plan to leave the 
soldierly dead in Europe. Finally, I argue that U.S. military and political leaders adopted 
and deployed the personal vernacular found in letters from grieving families in their 
efforts to acknowledge the government’s social contract with relatives of the dead and to 
construct permanent burial grounds throughout Europe. 
 
                                                 
451 These sites are Aisne-Marne American Cemetery and Memorial (ACM), 
Belleau, France (Fr.); Brookwood ACM, England; Flanders Field ACM, Waregem, 
Belgium; Meuse-Argonne ACM, Romagne, Fr.; Oise-Aisne ACM, Fere-en-Tardenois, 
Fr.; St. Mihiel ACM, Thiaucourt, Fr.; Somme ACM, Bony, Fr.; and Suresnes ACM, Fr. 
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4.2 AMERICAN WAR DEAD 
Following the First World War, the task of memorializing fallen soldiers was far more 
problematic for the United States than for most other combatants. The nation had lost 
116,516 soldiers in defense of territory that was not its own. Furthermore, threats to the 
American homeland and its interests were not as obvious, direct, or imminent as for 
European belligerents. Following Armistice, public doubts over the costs paid through 
casualties of conscripted U.S. citizens became common and eventually led to 
congressional investigations of wartime profiteers – the so-called “merchants of death.”452 
Moreover, wartime rhetoric of preserving Western democracy against the “autocratic 
Hun” revealed lingering domestic contradictions. For example, African Americans who 
had bravely served their country returned home to find that any measures of social 
equality they had attained in Europe meant little in the U.S., with its continuing Jim Crow 
segregation and increasing racial violence. In light of soldiers’ bodies still lying in 
haphazard, makeshift graves in battle-scarred fields and forests throughout Europe, many 
                                                 
452 The notion that America’s participation in the Great War was simply a 
financial windfall for U.S. “Big Industry” was common, among conservatives and 
progressives alike, both during and after the war. See, for instance, H. C. Engelbrecht and 
F. C. Hanighen, Merchants of Death: A Study of the International Armament Industry 
(New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1934); Frederick C. Giffin, Six Who Protested: 
Radical Opposition to the First World War (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat 
Press, 1977); John Edward Wiltz, “The Nye Committee, 1934,” in Congress Investigates: 
A Documented History, 1792-1974, ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and Roger Bruns (New 
York: Chelsea House, 1975), 2735-2919; and Rebecca Zurier, Art for the Masses 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), 58-81. 
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citizens rightfully wondered for what, and for whom, had Americans died in what seemed 
strictly a European affair?453 
By war’s end in November 1918, U.S. Army General John J. Pershing anticipated 
the postwar requisite of memorializing America’s fallen. Having found that many troop 
units had already built sporadic battlefield monuments that “bore inexact relation to the 
scope of the achievements they were commemorating” and “for the most part were 
poorly designed,” he believed that “the entire story of the American Expeditionary Forces 
should properly be monumented from the national viewpoint.”454 Arguably the most 
internationally famous military figure at the time, Pershing became a main catalyst 
behind a federal plan to consolidate 2,400 temporary battlefield cemeteries and isolated 
graves into a few carefully designed, monumental cemeteries.455 Constructed on or near 
                                                 
453 Historian David J. Goldberg describes the post-war years as a period of 
discontent for American public life. Domestic debates over what constituted the proper 
identity of the American citizen that raged during the Great War extended into the post-
war years—it seemed that the war had exacerbated, not resolved, American social, racial, 
and ethnic tensions. The post-war years saw the rise of Ku Klux Klan; increased violence 
(symbolic and real) against African-Americans, German-Americans, Catholics and Jews; 
the demise of progressivism; conflicts over women’s recently-earned right to vote; and 
the development of governmental programs designed to “Americanize” those who 
seemed to be not of “American stock.” See David J. Goldberg, Discontented America: 
The United States in the 1920s (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). In the 
following chapters, we will explore the collective role that the American overseas 
military cemeteries played against this backdrop of national tension and unrest. 
454 Thomas North, General North’s Manuscript (unpublished manuscript, courtesy 
of Oise-Aisne American Cemetery and Memorial Superintendent David Bedford, 2006), 
1. 
455 On February 28, 1919, as the American Expeditionary Forces prepared to start 
transporting U.S. soldiers home, General Pershing issued a General Orders to the entire 
A.E.F. that thanked the men for their service and indicated that many fallen comrades 
would be left behind. “Now that your service with the American Expeditionary Forces is 
about to terminate, I can not let you go without a personal word […] In leaving the scenes 
of your victories, may I ask that you carry home your high ideals and continue to live as 
you have served—an honor to the principles for which you have fought and to the fallen 
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the fields and forests where “Doughboys” had fought and perished, these burial 
grounds—sacralized as American sites—would help link the dead symbolically back to 
U.S. soil, and the national purpose rooted there. Objects of motion for the war effort in 
life, the soldiers would be objects of symbolic action in death. Helping to assuage public 
concerns over the war, these sites (not coincidentally) might also express the nation’s 
emerging prominent role on the world’s stage to a transnational audience (the subject of 
Chapter 4). 
However, unlike its Australian, British, and Canadian counterparts, whose “losses 
in the Great War were so large as to make the choice of removal impossible,” the U.S. 
government was not in a position to force families to leave their dead in continental 
Europe.456 The precedent for repatriating soldiers killed abroad had been set twenty years 
earlier when, after the Spanish-American War, the U.S. government returned all war dead 
to the homeland; thus, most Americans assumed that Great War casualties eventually 
would be brought back to the U.S.457 Furthermore, as early as 1917, the War Department 
told families that it was “the intention of the Department to have the remains [of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
comrades you leave behind […] It is with pride in our success that I extend to you my 
sincere thanks for your splendid service to the army and to the nation.” See Association 
of the 110th Infantry, History of the 110th Infantry (10th Pa.) of the 28th Division, U.S.A., 
1917-1919: A Compilation of Orders, Citations, Maps, Records and Illustrations 
Relating to the 3rd Pa. Inf., 10th Pa. Inf., and 110th U.S. Inf. (Greensburg, Pennsylvania: 
The Association, 1920), 151. 
456 John W. Graham, The Gold Star Pilgrimages of the 1930s (Jefferson, North 
Carolina: McFarland 2004), 35. 
457 G. Kurt Piehler, Remembering War the American Way (Washington: 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995), 94. 
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dead] disinterred and shipped to [the legal next of kin] at the expense of the Government” 
as soon as possible.458 
Despite these lingering promises of repatriation, the War Department set out to 
pursue the burgeoning plan for permanent American military cemeteries in Europe. In 
early 1919, the Quartermaster Corps (QMC), a branch of the War Department, began a 
campaign to register the sentiments of families whose loved ones had been identified in 
improvised graves and cemeteries across the continent. That year 75,000 families were 
mailed a letter and a small card of inquiry regarding their kin’s final disposition. Each 
card, inscribed with the respective soldier’s name, Army serial number, and rank and 
organization, unsympathetically expressed the following: 
State your relationship to the deceased _______________________ 
Do you desire the remains brought to the United States? ___________ (yes or no) 
If remains are brought to the United States, do you wish them interred in a 
national cemetery? ___________ (yes or no) 
If you desire the remains interred at the home of the deceased, give full 
information below as to where they should be sent: ________________________ 
 
Approximately 65,000 inquiry cards were returned to the War Department that year. 
Seventy-one percent of the respondents were in favor of bringing the dead home.459 This 
percentage irked General John J. Pershing, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, and other 
military leaders, who publicly campaigned to leave the dead in European soil, where 
“[t]he graves of our soldiers [would] constitute […] a perpetual reminder to our allies of 
                                                 
458 Henry G. Sharpe to Mattie Hicks, 24 July 1917, BCF for Clifton R. Hicks, RG 
92, NARA. 
459 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on Authorizing the 
Appointment of a Commission to Remove the Bodies of Deceased Soldiers, Sailors, and 
Marines, from Foreign Countries to the United States, and Defining Its Duties and 
Powers, 66th Cong., 1st sess., 1919, 6. 
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the liberty and ideals upon which the greatness of America rests.”460 In October 1919, 
Congressional leaders who feared that Pershing and other military figures might unduly 
use propaganda to influence public sentiment over the repatriation of soldier dead 
attempted to wrest control of the burial policies from the War Department, but to little 
avail.461 In 1920, the Graves Registration Service (GRS), a division within the QMC, 
began issuing GRS Form 120 to relatives of the dead. This form asked next of kin to 
indicate (again) whether they desired the respective soldier’s body returned to their 
address, buried in a domestic national cemetery, or left in Europe.462 Over the next two 
years those who requested the return of bodily remains through GRS Form 120 were 
required to jump through one more hoop and send a telegram to the GRS (paid for by the 
government) to confirm this decision. On March 31, 1922, the War Department stopped 
accepting requests for the return of bodies except in cases of families whose loved ones 
had not yet been identified; thereafter, all unclaimed bodies would rest in perpetuity in an 
overseas cemetery.463 In the following pages, I will bring forth and examine the 
responses that were elicited by this process of consultation that occurred between 1919 
and 1922. 
                                                 
460 “Pershing Against Removal of Dead,” New York Times, August 24, 1919. 
461 See House Committee. These fears were not unfounded, as many kin indicated 
that reports of the plan for overseas cemeteries had persuaded them to leave the dead in 
Europe. Mrs. Georgia V. Reager of Shreveport, Louisiana, wrote to the QMC: “Some 
months ago I filled out the card sent of my husband […] be returned to the United States 
as soon as possible. However, after further consideration and learning the views of 
General Pershing and others concerning this matter, I have concluded that it is best to let 
the body rest where it has been placed.” See Georgia V. Reager to QMC, September 20, 
1919, BCF for Wallace C. Reager, RG 92, NARA. 
462 The government claimed that this form allowed families who had changed 
their minds regarding final burial to issue new instructions (“‘Village’s’”). 
463 “30,496 A. E. F. Dead to Be Undisturbed in European Graves,” Washington 
Post, April 9, 1922. 
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4.3 ANXIETY AND ANGER 
For many families the process of extracting accurate information and conveying their 
wishes to the proper authorities was one of anxiety and uncertainty. A common problem 
was that newspaper reports of governmental burial policies often countered the 
information next of kin received from the War Department. In August 1921, Charles 
Hubert, a salesman from Yonkers, New York, wrote to the War Department: “I read in 
several papers lately that all the American soldiers that died in Europe are to be sent 
home! My son Harold W. Hubert was killed and buried over there, and we do not want 
his body sent here.” The QMC responded: “Newspaper reports to the effect that the 
remains of all soldier dead are being returned to this country are in error. The remains are 
being returned only in those cases where the legal next of kin definitely request such 
action.”464 Other next of kin were anxious to make sure that their wishes were properly 
expressed and received. For some this meant writing not only in spaces designated on 
cards and forms, but in the margins and on the back of government-issued documents as 
well. For instance, Nora Dooley of New York City indicated on the front of her GRS 
Form 120 that she wished to leave her son’s remains in Europe. On the back of the form 
she emphasized this request: “Yes. Leave him rest in peace.”465 Jennie Peters, a Native 
American from the Menominee Indian Reservation in Keshena, Wisconsin, indicated on 
the margins of her War Department inquiry card that she would properly handle her son’s 
                                                 
464 Charles Hubert, correspondence with War Department, August 4-12, 1921, 
BCF for Harold W. Hubert, RG 92, NARA. 
465 Nora Dooley to War Department, September 2, 1920, BCF for Frank W. 
Dooley, RG 92, NARA. 
 247 
corpse herself: “I will take care of the body when it gets to [me].”466 Some next of kin 
betrayed a near paranoia in their attempts to make sure that the authorities had the 
information necessary to carry out their wishes. In a series of letters, Josie Kneale of 
Oakland California, who requested the return of her brother’s body, continually 
mentioned that she no longer lived at 2412 11th Avenue, but now resided at 2117 11th 
Avenue – even after the QMC stated that the change had been recorded.467 
Anxiety often spilled over into anger for families who felt that their wishes were 
not being fulfilled in a timely and proper fashion. Addressing complications concerning 
the return of his son’s body, Patrick Ayres, a farmer from Heflin, Alabama, complained 
to the War Department: 
[I]n Reply to your letter [of recent date], I never have signed for him to Stay in 
france I signed for his boddy to be braught back home I will send you A letter I 
received from the War Department that shows that I have ask for him I waunt him 
returned home […] read careful mark your record I dont waunt no more mistakes 
please write me by return mail dont forget to return his boddy.468 
 
Marie Jewell of Mix, Louisiana, expressed similar frustrations. Throughout 1919 and 
1920, Jewell sent seven letters to the QMC, each asking for her son’s corpse. On August 
8, 1919, she claimed, “There seems to be a growing sentiment in favor of leaving their 
bodies in France, among those who have never loved and lost like Gen. Pershing; but 
they can never feel, nor ever know the great yearning desire we mothers, who have given 
our all, have to get back all that is mortal of our precious sons.” When Jewell received a 
second GRS Form 120 in June 1920, she pasted a scathing note to the back of the form. 
                                                 
466 Jennie Peters to War Department, n.d., BCF for John J. Peters, RG 92, NARA. 
467 Josie Kneale, correspondence with War Department, BCF for Richard H. 
Dashwood, RG 92, NARA. 
468 Patrick Ayres to War Department, April 25, 1920, BCF for Joseph I. Ayres, 
RG 92, NARA. 
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Perhaps sensing that her previous, and thoughtfully crafted, correspondence had been 
ignored, she stated, “My wish has been expressed many times as to the return of my son’s 
body. Records must not be accurate. Hewitt Charles Jewell’s father, Ben Jewell, is 
deceased, and I am next nearest living relative, his mother. Ship body to [me].”469 
Likewise, Jacob Hablitzel Sr., a farmer from Eustis, Nebraska, was none too pleased with 
the War Department’s recordkeeping. On the back of an inquiry card returned to the 
QMC, he angrily scrawled: “You must have your records in a hell of a shape. Just 
received word from the Capt. Francis G. Coates, Battery E, 8th F. A. that my Son J. 
Hablitzel jr. was never a member of his organization. What garantee have I got that his 
identical bones and not somebody else’s are shipped back to me […] I think it is 
rotten.”470 Some next of kin expressed indignation over seeing other families receive 
remains before they did. Frances Schmidt of Urbana, Ohio, grumbled, “Twice I have 
requested the return of the body of [Cpl.] Ivan F. Schmidt [...] Why do I not get some 
word? The rest of the boys are being returned. Why not my son?”471 These letters reveal 
that the process of communication initiated by the War Department gave voice to 
grieving families who might otherwise have remained silent on the matter of repatriation. 
But this process of consultation also raised the expectations of next of kin, who were 
often disappointed when their expressed wishes were not fulfilled in a flawless manner. 
                                                 
469 Marie Jewell, correspondence with QMC, 1919-1920, BCF for Hewitt C. 
Jewell, RG 92, NARA. 
470 Jacob Hablitzel Sr. to QMC, April 16, 1919, BCF for Jacob Hablitzel Jr., RG 
92, NARA. 
471 Frances Schmidt to Charles C. Pierce, n.d., BCF for Ivan F. Schmidt, RG 92, 
NARA. 
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4.4 LEGAL NEXT OF KIN 
As much as the War Department may have wished to ameliorate any anger felt by 
relatives of the dead, it enacted and enforced a peculiar policy that unnecessarily 
antagonized mourning families. The final resting place of a soldier’s remains was 
governed solely by the desires of the “legal next of kin,” which the War Department 
defined as the soldier’s widow or children. If a dead soldier had been unmarried (as was 
common), or if his widow had remarried since his death, then the right to dictate 
disposition was given to the soldier’s father.472 The patriarchal bias of this policy 
disappointed many women whose claims to bodily remains were denied. Nellie 
McDonald of Binghamton, New York, requested the body of her nephew, whom she had 
raised as her own child:  
Dear sir I am the Soldurs Aunt and one Who have looked after him for 
years and one Who he has given as his nearest relative and it is my desire and 
Wish to have his Body sent home to me. he Was as dear to me as any son could 
be to a mother he has a father Who never cared for him in years. he gave me as 
his nearest relative all through the time he served his country you Will find it in 
the War Department red cross and Every place he Went I will close hopin to hear 
from you about sending the body to me 
 
In reply to this heartfelt letter, the QMC wrote: “[I]t is requested that you furnish 
documentary evidence of your appointment as legal guardian […] or submit affidavits of 
two responsible citizens who have knowledge of the fact that you were responsible for 
the care of the late soldier until just prior to his enlistment in the Army.” As McDonald 
was unable to produce such evidence, the QMC sent the body to the soldier’s father per 
                                                 
472 If a dead soldier left no widow, children, or father, the right to dictate final 
disposition went to the mother, then to the nearest male relative. See War Department, 
“Cemeterial Division Bulletin No. 10-F-W,” BCF for John A. James, RG 92, NARA. 
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his request.473 Sarah Jane Jaires of Quinlan, Texas, whose husband Elmer J. McCann had 
been killed by bomb shrapnel, wrote: “I see by the paper that all those who lost [their] 
lives in France were to be brought home. I have re married and living out west and will 
you please notify me if my [husband’s] body comes back.” In response, the QMC told 
Jaires that as a result of her remarriage she had lost the preferential right to direct final 
disposition. Sadly, because the QMC did not receive any requests from McCann’s “legal 
next of kin,” his remains were ultimately left in Europe.474 
Sometimes the patriarchal bias of the War Department’s policy led to outright 
conflict between estranged family members, who involved the government in their feuds. 
For instance, Victor Christensen, a factory worker from Mohawk, New York, mailed this 
scathing letter to the War Department: 
You [sent] me sometimes ago a card to fill out concerning bringing the dead 
soldier back from Europe. I should consider it an outrage to ever do any such 
thing if you couldn’t bring them back alive it is of no use (there is more dead ones 
in this country now than there ought to be) but the soil here is good enough for 
them, but I should think The Government would be satisfied they had done a good 
job to get rid of these young men, that they could let them alone now and let them 
rest in peace in the sacred soil where they lie now and not bring them back to this 
condemned country. If any body have filled out the card to the contrary and 
signed it with my name it is false. 
 
A few months later, the QMC received a letter from Victor’s estranged wife, Amelia 
Christensen: “The Father wrote and requested you not to return the body just to be mean 
to the Boy’s Mother. I am his mother and think I have just as much right to have him 
returned to this Country.” The QMC responded to Amelia with a less than hopeful letter: 
                                                 
473 Nellie McDonald, correspondence with QMC, May 1920, BCF for Charles J. 
McGraw, RG 92, NARA. 
474 Sarah Jane Jaires, correspondence with QMC, April 4, 1920-July 19, 1925, 
BCF for Elmer J. McCann, RG 92, NARA. 
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“[Y]ou are advised that the action of this office in the disposition of the remains of 
soldier dead in Europe is governed solely by the desires of the legal next of kin […]. If 
the father will advise this office concurring with your request that the body of your son be 
returned to this country for private interment, same can be made a matter of record.” To 
its credit, the QMC sent a series of letters to Victor asking if he would relinquish the right 
of determining the disposition of his son’s body to Amelia. Receiving no response, the 
QMC wrote to the Postmaster of Mohawk: “Please endeavor to locate Mr. Victor 
Christensen […] [W]ill you kindly secure a signed statement from him as to whether he 
concurs in the request of Mrs. Amelia Christensen […] to have the remains returned to 
the United States and shipped to her.” A few weeks later, the QMC received the letter 
they had sent to the Postmaster. Scrawled at the bottom of the page was the following: 
“Mr. Christensen refused to answer any question and said that you must take the matter 
up direct with him. You will find him a hard man to deal with.”475 
The case of the Christensens illustrates the breakdown of communication between 
the government and private citizens that could (and did) occur now that the military had 
relinquished some physical control over the bodies of soldiers back to relatives (who 
often disagreed on the question of burial).476 But more importantly, it highlights the 
patriarchal bias of the War Department’s policies – a bias that pushed many grieving 
women to reconsider the wartime rhetoric of the ‘silent, supportive heroine’ female 
                                                 
475 See BCF for Archibald P. Christensen, RG 92, NARA. 
476 Lt. Col. Charles C. Pierce, Chief of the GRS, eventually recommended that in 
such a case the parent “designated by the deceased soldier in his emergency address” 
would be “held entitled to direct disposition of his remains.” Quoted in Michael Sledge, 
Soldier Dead: How We Recover, Identify, Bury, and Honor Our Military Fallen (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 41. 
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subject position. Before and during the war, the bulk of government and pro-war 
propaganda had tied ‘patriotic womanhood’ directly to the success of America’s fighting 
forces. In light of the crisis of a foreign conflict and the reality of a national draft, women 
had been called upon to offer up their husbands and sons to service and to fulfill quietly 
any roles in the domestic front asked of them.477 Surely many women were stunned to 
discover that after all of their wartime sacrifices (including the offering up of their men to 
the fates of war), the political gains they had made through war work, they were being 
bypassed in the process of determining their son’s or husband’s final resting place. The 
War Department’s miscalculated assumption that women would passively maintain the 
accommodating role prescribed to them during war raised bitter feelings among those 
whose claims to the dead were disregarded. 
4.5 ECONOMIC CLASS 
Although the Selective Service Act of 1917 had effectively ‘democratized’ the process of 
wartime conscription in the U.S. by drawing upon able-bodied males of all economic 
classes and prohibiting the hiring of substitutes, following the war many next of kin 
believed that their wealth, or lack thereof, might play a crucial role in the final disposition 
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of the dead.478 For example, despite public statements by the War Department that 
American bodies would not begin to return to the U.S. until late 1920, some next of kin 
attempted to use their wealth to expedite the process. In a March 1919 telegram to the 
GRS, Fred Keithan of Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, stated: “My son Frederick H Keithan 
died in Coblentz Germany […] can I have his body will send a representative to 
Washington and post with you any amount of money to defray all expenses of the return 
please do not deny this request I want my boys remains.”479 Others referenced their 
working class status or poverty in emotional appeals. In November 1918, Eugene Head, a 
dairy farmer from Mahopac Falls, New York, wrote to the War Department: “I want very 
much to have my boys body returned, but as I am simply a laboring man working by the 
day, I feel unable to bear the expense myself. Will you kindly advise me on this 
subject.”480 In a January 1919 letter to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, William 
Buente, a machinist from Pittsburgh, whose son Howard was killed in action, argued 
against the construction of overseas cemeteries that, in his view, could only be visited by 
the rich: 
As we are patiently waiting for our dear son’s body to be returned to us, we ask of 
you as a sec of war, if you will do your utmost in bringing his body back to the 
good old ‘U’ ‘S’ ‘A’ where he was born and raised […] I think as every mother 
father brother wife or sweetheart whose a member of the “Bring home the soldier 
                                                 
478 This belief was wrong, as the financial condition of legal next of kin had no 
official bearing on the final disposition of soldierly remains. The government returned all 
bodily remains to any legal next of kin who desired them free of charge. Furthermore, the 
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Department, “Cemeterial.” 
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dead” league thinks that as he was a brave American with American blood 
running through his veins. Why should he be deserted by us and our government 
and left sleeping on the other side. As the old saying of these fellows (NOT MEN) 
who did not lose anybody in the war ‘Let them sleep where they fall.’ This saying 
is not the truth as the majority of the bodies have been removed several times and 
finally to this large plot where hotels are now being built to accommodate the rich 
(those who lost NO ONE) but coming for curiosity and also for the French to 
make a little coin, and the poor (yes the poor) can stay at home look at the picture 
and never have an opportunity to lay flowers on his grave.481 
 
In this letter, Buente makes the powerful suggestion that his son’s bodily remains might 
become part of a larger spectacle that would make money for the French. We see in 
Buente’s letter his keen awareness of the characteristics of twentieth century commercial 
culture – a culture in which even cemeteries could be marketed for mass consumption – 
and his consciousness of the dissonance between the personal pain of his family and the 
notion that the overseas cemeteries might become a curiosity for the wealthy. 
In the end, William had the body of his son, Howard, buried in the Buente family 
plot at the Allegheny Cemetery in Pittsburgh. Nestled in the side of a secluded, unkempt 
grassy hill, Howard’s inconspicuous headstone reads: 
CORP. HOWARD A. BUENTE 
Co.M., 320th Inf. 80th Div. 
BORN SEPT. 6, 1895 
KILLED IN ARRAS FRANCE 
AUG. 14, 1918 
 
It is uncertain how many people still visit Howard’s grave. When I found his grave on 
Memorial Day of 2009, no one had yet planted an American flag in honor of his military 
service. But standing among the headstones of other Buente family members in this tiny 
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corner of Allegheny Cemetery, Howard’s headstone bears a quiet dignity befitting his 
father’s intentions. 
4.6 BRING THEM HOME 
As one might easily imagine, two distinct collective voices emerged from the 
correspondence sent to the War Department: one demanded the repatriation of war dead 
and the other requested foreign burial.482 Generally, those in favor of returning the bodies 
of their sons, brothers, and husbands perceived a threat that the government, in its desire 
to construct symbolic cemeteries abroad, would somehow prevent the removal of 
American war dead from Europe. Such concerns were not baseless; at the time, 
newspaper headlines trumpeted Pershing’s desire to leave the bodies in foreign soil, 
Congressional leaders called for the establishment of overseas cemeteries, and French 
health policies barred the immediate evacuation of war dead from France. Furthermore, 
despite the documents sent by the War Department to next of kin, as well as public 
assurances from Secretary Baker in late 1919 “that no body will remain abroad which is 
desired in this country,”483 actual legislation guaranteeing families’ rights to the bodies of 
soldier dead was not passed until March 4, 1921 – nearly two and a half years after 
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Armistice. Even after the enactment of Public Law No. 389, many next of kin, still 
waiting for their beloved’s remains, seemed unable to take the government at its word. 
Thus, between 1919 and 1922, the War Department received countless emotional 
correspondence from citizens calling for the return of America’s fallen. 
Those who sought the return of bodily remains offered a range of arguments and 
pleas. Some relatives, such as Lydia Campbell of Mankato, Minnesota, employed 
patriotic rhetoric: “Any parents who gave their loved son to the great cause, should have 
the right to the body of that boy, who was given to his country, returned for interment in 
the country that he fought for & loved.”484 Lewis Brown, a teamster from Staten Island 
argued for the return of his son’s body by evoking the inherent ‘American-ness’ of the 
dead: 
[O]ur boys were good Enough to be taken away over there they should be good 
enough to Be Brought Back Again though they are Dead he was an american Bred 
& Born & his Forefathers Befor Dont you think this country of ours should Keep 
its word – American First Please Record my Application for the Return of my 
Boy and you will Oblige his Father who wants it.485 
 
For Campbell and Brown, then, the only proper place for the interment of American 
soldiers would be the U.S. – the country for which they fought and died; the land where 
they were “Bred & Born.” To them, the notion that the government might not honor the 
minimal commitment of returning America’s sacrificed war dead to the soil of their 
homeland was too outrageous to believe. 
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Other next of kin eschewed patriotic language and crafted letters that expressed 
more familial, tender sentiments instead. Such letters often focused on specific funerary 
practices. Henry Beyer, a coal truck driver from Chicago, wrote of his son’s corpse: “We 
would like to have his body returned to […] Chicago […] where his body will be taken 
care of and placed in a vault for a few days.”486 Martha Swain, a family nurse from 
Norfolk, Virginia, wrote of her dead son David: “I truly want his body [sent] home so I 
can look after it as long as I live and to Know that I can be near it.”487 Addie Blosser of 
Bryon, Ohio, echoed this sentiment: “Sir i want my Dear boy body if can have it i Be sure 
it him and Burried it in our home grave yard it will pleas me so for he was so close to me 
then i Can go to his grave when i want to it seem so hard to have our boys die over there i 
wil be so thankful to get his body.”488 Such expressions indicated that many Americans 
adhered to traditions in which bodily death is not the final moment of life. Indeed, many 
next of kin believed in the resurrection of an individual’s spirit in the afterlife; this 
resurrection depended on the proper treatment and burial of the dead. For many grieving 
relatives, this meant burying loved ones nearby, where they could constantly renew their 
contact with the spirit of the dead by being within the presence of their beloved’s bodily 
remains.489  
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Sometimes next of kin insisted that they were fulfilling the wishes of the dead. 
For instance, Leta Matsler of Centralia, Illinois, claimed: “I am writing this as a request 
for the body of my dear son […] to be returned to me, that his body may rest in his 
homeland which he loved and to which he longed to return.”490 Rosie Hajek of Chicago 
eloquently stated that her son had always been adamant about his final resting place: “His 
only wish was to be buried next to his father, he begged his Friends when he was in 
Rockford in Camp that if anything should happen to him in the battle they should tell his 
mother to fill out his dying wish […]. All I want is to fulfill his dying wish and you could 
do it with gladness for laying down his young life.”491 Through romantic depictions of 
their sons’ longings for the homeland these women argued for the privileged position of 
the next of kin as the best representatives and interpreters of the desires of the dead. 
Other relatives made no such pretenses about fulfilling the wishes of the dead, but 
rather sought the return of bodily remains through emotional references to their own 
broken hearts. Carrie Bruce of Lawrence, Massachusetts, confessed: “[O]ur human hearts 
cry out in grief and loneliness, for the pitiful bit of comfort that can come in feeling sure 
that their dead bodies are being cared for.”492 Anna Sullivan of Scranton, Pennsylvania, 
whose son Richard had been killed during the Meuse-Argonne offensive, sadly stated: 
“The news of my son being killed in action was indeed a terrible shock to me, but the 
delay […] in returning his remains to me has affected my heart almost to the breaking 
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point.”493 And Charles Joyce, a fireman from Pittsburgh, whose sister Katherine had died 
while serving as a volunteer nurse in France, channeled his physical grief into prose: 
I send this letter […] to see if My Dear Sister will be sent over her bodie I have so 
I can lay her where I can see her last resting place How Happy I would feel to 
have her near me so far she is I am hear Hartbroken as she was all I Had […] but 
what it would mean to see my Dear Sister once again that sleeps in a lonely Grave 
among other Mothers Dear loved ones I am chocking must quit writing but please 
ansir this and I thank the War Dept for all there kindness I got her efects from 
france and not her O how I felt when they came with out her Dear Deasent Face 
for she was loved and and is Sadly mised by all whom Knew her Kindly ansir.494 
 
For Joyce, just writing about the final disposition of his sister’s remains was nearly too 
much to bear. He had been separated from his sister twice: once when she left for Europe, 
and again when she died. A third separation – this time her burial in foreign soil – would 
be just as wrenching, if not more so, than the previous two. 
4.7 LET THEM REST 
While the large majority of next of kin asked for repatriation, others were content to leave 
the dead in Europe. Many in this latter group crafted correspondence explaining why, 
even though simple responses to government-issued inquiry cards and forms would have 
guaranteed their wishes. It seems that the initial reaction for many next of kin – including 
those who supported the plan to build overseas cemeteries – to the bureaucratic inquiries 
was to respond as openly, fully, and personally as possible. John W. Graham, author of 
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The Gold Star Mother Pilgrimages of the 1930s, writes, “The decision […] to leave [a 
soldier’s body] forever overseas must have been one of the most difficult choices a parent 
could have faced.”495 Many families attempted to make this point clear to the 
government. 
It might seem ironic, but in correspondence from kin who wished to leave the 
dead in Europe, we can find references to the same feelings expressed by kin who 
advocated repatriation. For example, Eggert and Martha Martens of St. Louis used the 
power of patriotic rhetoric to express themselves: “In regards to the Remains of our Son 
Charles Martens (Deceased) [we] will say that he Died Like a true American Soldier and 
done his Duty for his Country and the ones he left behind him and Let him rest in peace 
with all his Comrades over there who fought Side by Side with him.”496 Others portrayed 
themselves as representatives for the dead. Clara Gagnon of Worcester, Massachusetts 
wrote of her son’s body: “I think that it is better to leave his body there and I also think 
that were he able to speak it would be his wish.”497 Still others alluded to their broken 
hearts. Josephine and William Dugan of Brookline, Massachusetts, pasted a simple, yet 
touching, message on the back of their GRS Form 120: “[We wish Frank’s] body to lay 
in the land where it fell though our hearts grieve for our Darling.”498 Thus, it seems that 
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those in favor of foreign burial and those in favor of repatriation drew upon a familiar, 
universal discourse about war and sacrifice to mount opposing arguments.  
Despite these similarities, testimonies from those in favor of foreign burial 
contained an assortment of separate arguments that supported the War Department’s 
predisposition to leave the dead in Europe. Of these arguments, the most common 
centered upon a fear of “disturbing the dead.” James Anderson of Phoenix, Mississippi, 
wrote of his son William’s body: “I prefer that the body be not disturbed […]. That 
troubles me more than any thing else about it remaining over there.”499 Ada Garner of 
Philadelphia, whose son lied in a temporary cemetery in St. Mihiel, France, stated: “I do 
not like the idea of him being disturbed and would like to have him remain in a 
permanent American Cemetery [in France].”500 And Emily Dixon of Haverford, 
Pennsylvania, returned her War Department inquiry card with the following message: “I 
feel very strongly that the body of my husband should not be disturbed at all.”501 Perhaps 
by expressing this tender concern for letting the departed rest in peace, these kin were 
also attempting to reclaim the dead from their service to a government that, at least in 
these women’s minds, may have been unconcerned with such matters. Others made 
religious allusions to an afterlife in which they might one day reunite with the dead. For 
example, Naomi Meily of Kansas City, Missouri, wrote: “[T]his is a hard problem to 
solve, that of leaving all that remains of the only one that is so near and dear to a Mother 
so far away from home and friends. But I have the blessed assurance of meeting him in 
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that upper and better land where there will be no parting.”502 Some expressed gratitude 
for the government’s promise to tend to the graves of American dead in perpetuity. Anna 
Fatout of Cumberland, Indiana, stated: “I wish to let [my son’s body] remain in France. It 
will always be cared for there. Were I to bring it to my home the grave when I am gone 
will perhaps be neglected. If I send it to Arlington Nat. Cem. I will feel it is almost as far 
away as it now is. So let his body rest in France.”503 Charles Pancoast of Woodstown, 
New Jersey, revealed: “[I]t surely is a comfort and satisfaction to know that the 
government is taking good care of the bodies of soldiers who have given their lives in the 
cause civilization over in France.”504  
And some next of kin, still reeling from the initial shock of losing their beloved in 
the war, stated that the return of bodily remains would reopen wounds that had only 
started to heal. Mary Markle of Lore City, Ohio wrote: “i once advised the Government 
that i did not wont my Sons Body Brought to the States he will rest Just as Easy over ther 
as here and Please dont Bother me any more as it was hard anought to give him up with 
out having him Bring ofer here for me to See.”505 Mary Sanders of Indianapolis told the 
War Department: “I just can not think of bringing him back across that offul water again 
and while he died and was buried in France we will let him remain there for we could not 
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see him any way.”506 Sanders, like many in her cohort, projected herself as a mother who 
simply wished no further suffering for her son or herself. We might question the notion 
that one more trip across the Atlantic – “that offul water” – could actually bother a 
corpse. But we can empathize with those who wished to forgo the pain that would come 
with the return of the dead. In a very real way, the government’s offer to bury American 
fallen overseas saved many grieving families from experiencing the sorrow that a 
domestic burial might bring. Instead of seeking closure through familial rituals of death, 
people like Sanders clung to a hope that the dead could now rest in heavenly peace. 
4.8 SECOND CLASS SOLDIERS, FIRST CLASS CORPSES 
At the outbreak of U.S. participation in the Great War, leaders within the African-
American community issued general support for the national war effort. Despite some 
undercurrents of resistance within the community, many blacks accepted W. E. B. Du 
Bois’ prewar contentions that the conflict in Europe represented an opportunity to show 
one’s devotion to country and that the black community’s grievances could be put on 
hold until war’s end.507 Unfortunately, any enthusiasm blacks felt for the war effort was 
coldly met with widespread discrimination from the U.S. military. For example, just 
before the U.S. declared war, Lt. Col. Charles Young, the highest-ranking black officer in 
the Army, was found physically unfit for duty and put on the retired list. Many African 
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Americans believed that Young’s forced retirement was meant to prevent the possibility 
of a black officer commanding drafted white soldiers in battle.508 Additionally, the 
Army’s violent reaction to the Houston Riot of 1917509 led some prominent leaders, such 
as Rev. Dr. George F. Miller, to declare that the military would only serve as an 
extension of the racist U.S. society in which African Americans were forced to live.510 
 In most respects it was. During the war, the U.S. military utilized the majority of 
African-American recruits as laborers far from the battlefronts, labeling 89 percent of the 
370,000 black draftees as too “moronic” to serve under fire. However, two “colored” 
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divisions, the 92nd and 93rd, were formed and fought admirably on the front lines, often 
under the command of the French. Despite the fact that these divisions earned praise and 
respect from French soldiers and citizens, black soldiers faced increased segregation and 
racial violence from white Americans both abroad and upon return to the U.S., at 
home.511 For stark evidence of the U.S. military’s racist views towards black soldiers, 
one can turn to the memo, “Secret Information Concerning Black American Troops.” 
Written in August 1918 by Colonel Linard, a French liaison officer to General Pershing’s 
staff, this document was distributed to French troops as a reminder of American color 
lines:  
 
 Although a citizen of the United States, the black man is regarded by the white 
American as an inferior being with whom relations of business or service only are 
possible. The black is constantly being censured for his want of intelligence and 
discretion, his lack of civic and professional conscience, and for his tendency 
toward undue familiarity. The vices of the Negro are a constant menace to the 
American who has to repress them sternly… We may be courteous and amiable… 
but we cannot deal with them on the same plane with white American officers 
without deeply offending the latter. We must no eat with them, must not shake 
hands or seek to talk or meet with them outside the requirements of military 
service.512 
 
This memo, linked directly to General Pershing’s office, explicitly enunciates the U.S. 
military’s bigoted, if unofficial, attitude towards African-American servicemen. This 
racist attitude was manifested and reinforced, often quite subtly, in the everyday life of 
the American soldier serving in Europe. Consider the article entitled “Huns Starve and 
Ridicule U.S. Captives,” which appeared on the front page of the first edition of ‘the 
soldiers’ paper,’ The Stars and Stripes. Through the words of a Frenchman who had 
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escaped a German prisoner camp, the article details the abuse and humiliation of three 
American prisoners of war at the hands of their captors. Starving and downtrodden, the 
Americans “were obliged to clean the streets and the latrines of the Crown Prince […] in 
order to make them appear ridiculous.” But worse than that, the soldiers were publicly 
photographed “standing between six negroes from Martinique; and when the photograph 
was taken the negroes were ordered to wear tall hats.” That this staged photograph would 
count (in the words of The Stars and Stripes) as “ridicule” and “inhumane treatment”—
and that the description of the event was designed to foster soldiers’ hatred for the “Hun” 
enemy—shows just how engrained the anti-black attitude was in American military 
culture.513 
Following war’s end, African-American troops returned to a largely ungrateful 
nation steeped in the Jim Crow mentality. Limited opportunities to fight in the war had 
given black soldiers few opportunities to prove themselves to white America. Historian 
Jennifer Keene writes: “Instead of receiving acclaim, the achievements and contributions 
of black soldiers went underappreciated by mainstream society.” For example, American 
Legion headquarters in the Southern states rejected applications from black posts; across 
the nation, only 1,862 black veterans of the war were admitted to the Legion. The United 
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States Army itself advised black soldiers returning to the South, where 80% of the 
African-American population lived, not to wear their uniforms so as to avoid 
antagonizing whites. And ten of the seventy-seven African Americans lynched by mobs 
in 1919 were veterans of the war. It was apparent that little had changed for black 
veterans and their families, who probably agreed with W. E. B. Du Bois’ somber postwar 
statement: “We return, we return from fighting, We return fighting.”514 
Ironically, although the U.S. military treated African-American troops as second-
class soldiers throughout the war, the bodies of fallen black soldiers became just as 
symbolically valuable as their white counterparts after Armistice. The War Department 
had every intention of burying dead African-American soldiers with white soldiers in 
Europe, for every dead black soldier left overseas represented one more headstone to be 
seen in a symbolic U.S. cemetery. Relatives of black soldiers received the same inquiry 
cards, letters, and forms as white families, and were encouraged to express their desires 
regarding the final disposition of loved ones’ remains. Given the socioeconomic 
conditions of a large percentage of the African-American population at the time (nearly a 
quarter of the community was completely illiterate), it is likely that many black families 
were unable to effectively express their personal wishes and feelings.515 Furthermore, we 
should consider how the patriarchal bias of the policies regarding the final disposition of 
war dead affected African-American widows. Given the explicit racist and sexist nature 
of American society at the time, we can safely assume that for many African-American 
widows, economic survival meant quickly remarrying another man; in getting remarried, 
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widows forfeited their right of determining the final resting place of their dead husbands. 
But despite these social circumstances, the Record Group of the Office of the Quarter-
master General does hold the correspondence of many African-American next of kin. 
While most African Americans requested the return of their loved one’s body, the 
percentage that did so is on par with the percentage of whites that asked for the return of 
bodily remains. 
Most African Americans who wrote back to the government were succinct. For 
example, Albert Dubose, a farmer from Bolivar, Tennessee, whose son had been killed in 
action during the Meuse-Argonne offensive, sent a telegram to the GRS stating: 
“Forward Private Will Dubose body here for burial.”516 Caesar Bradford, Principal of the 
Alto Colored Public School in Alto, Texas, wrote to the GRS: “It is my desire that you 
have the remains of my son Henry Etheridge Bradford returned to the United States and 
shipped to me, Caesar Bradford Alto, Texas, Cherokee County. Hope this is plainly 
understood.”517 But some African Americans crafted messages of longer and deeper 
expression. For instance, Stella Mitchell of Beaumont, Texas, whose son Leon Gilder had 
died of heart disease in France, wrote on the back of her GRS Form 120: “I have been 
thinking the matter over I would rather not to destirve the dead My belove son died over 
there that is the lords will not mine. Many thanks to you for your kindness and at the last 
day we will be brought togathere yet I Love him over there.”518 Other African 
                                                 
516 Albert Dubose, telegram to GRS, August 31, 1921, BCF for Will Dubose, RG 
92, NARA. 
517 Caesar Bradford to GRS, January 4, 1921, BCF for Henry E. Bradford, RG 92, 
NARA. 
518 Stella Mitchell, note to GRS, April 26, 1920, BCF for Leon Gilder, RG 92, 
NARA. 
 269 
Americans, perhaps doubting their ability to secure their beloved’s remains from the 
government, hired lawyers to express their desires forcefully and effectively. In August 
1919, the War Department received a letter from the law offices of Gilmer & Graves, 
who represented Etta Bouling of Charlottesville, VA. The letter read: 
 Charles Bouling (1968130) Co. I, 365th Inf. was killed about the 28th of Oct. 1918, 
while his company was located in the Marbach sector near Metz. Mrs. Etta Bouling, 
an old colored woman of this city, the mother of Charles Bouling, is very anxious to 
have his body returned to this country. Request information as to what steps should 
be taken and the prospects of having the body returned. (Graves, John S. Letter to 
War Department. 12 Aug. 1919. BCF for Charles A. Bouling. RG 92, NARA.519 
 
Some African Americans who requested burials at national cemeteries in the U.S. 
indicated that they could not afford to come to the funeral, as if they felt obligated to 
acknowledge some unspoken guardian role that they could not fulfill. Henry Creed, a 
laborer at a meat packing company in Chicago, whose son was to be buried in the 
Arlington National Cemetery, sent a telegram to the GRS, simply stating: “Have Corporal 
Abraham Creed buried cannot attend funeral.”520 Mattie Lou Fuston of Topeka, Kansas, 
sent a similar telegram message: “Bury Elmer Fuston in National Grave Yard I am unable 
to attend funeral.”521 A small percentage of African-American next of kin explicitly 
asked for the dead to remain in Europe. For some members of this group, the return of 
loved ones’ bodies would take too much of a toll on their health. Willie Mae Bedford of 
Memphis wrote to the GRS: “I [received] your letter in regards to my husband remains 
Oscar Bedford Cook, serial no 1401628, Co A 370th Infantry. I do wish for the remains 
                                                 
519 John S. Graves to War Department, August 12, 1919, BCF for Charles A. 
Bouling, RG 92, NARA. 
520 Henry Creed, telegram to GRS, May 17, 1921, BCF for Abraham Creed, RG 
92, NARA. 
521 Mattie Lou Fuston, telegram to GRS, December 24, 1921, BCF for Elmer 
Fuston, RG 92, NARA. 
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to […] stay in france on the account of my illness.”522 Others simply refused to play the 
game of memorialization that returning the dead entailed. Elizabeth Somerville of 
Hackensack, New Jersey, whose foster son had died of pneumonia in Europe, responded 
to the burial inquiry card’s question, “Do you desire the remains brought to the United 
States?” with the statement: “No. Since it is impossible to see him would rather his 
remains rest in France.”523 
Correspondence from African Americans regarding the final disposition of war 
dead was, generally speaking, succinct and void of the rhetorical flair often found in 
letters from whites. Though some grieving African Americans, like Emma Cuff, made 
references to both their familial relationships with the dead and the social contract they 
expected the government to fulfill, most correspondence from black families contained 
simple, straightforward requests unadorned with sentimentality. Perhaps African 
Americans felt less comfortable expressing private emotions to a government that had 
never treated them as full citizens. Maybe they did not feel entitled to, or properly 
equipped for, the same discursive space so many whites eagerly claimed. In light of the 
fact that African Americans had had little say in the events that led to the deaths of their 
beloved, as well as the reality that blacks faced increased disenfranchisement and racial 
violence in the U.S. during the postwar years, it seems probable that many grieving 
African Americans simply felt defeated. Instead of engaging the government in a 
personal process of negotiation, most grieving black families simply chose the most 
straightforward route to securing a peaceful resting place for their fallen men. 
                                                 
522 Willie Mae Bedford to J. F. Butler, March 15, 1921, BCF for Oscar Bedford, 
RG 92, NARA. 
523 Somerville. 
 271 
4.9 OFFICIAL APPROPRIATION OF A SENTIMENTAL VERNACULAR 
Ultimately, the correspondence between the War Department and grieving families 
centered on the fundamental and sacred obligation of the government to care properly for 
citizen-soldiers who had willingly died for the nation. Those in favor of repatriation and 
those in support of foreign burial alike invoked this social contract, sometimes in 
concrete terms. For instance, John Lingle of Paoli Indiana, whose son had died of 
pneumonia in England, claimed that the plan to keep American dead in foreign soil 
constituted “a direct violation of the implied contract to those who went over never here 
to return as before.”524 William Roth, a grocer from New York City, wrote: 
As the father of one of those boys who paid the Supreme Sacrifice in France […] 
allow me to protest against the cowardly newspaper propaganda which has for its 
object the influencing of our Government to change its policy in regards to the 
returning of the bodies of our soldier dead […]. Now that he gave his life for that 
cause, can I (who gave him wholeheartedly to our government for that cause) […] 
not have all that remains of him, his earthly clay, to revere and cherish while I live 
[?]525 
 
And Mollie Roycroft of Coker, Alabama, expressed her expectations to the government: 
“[Our] request is that Special care be taken of [our son’s] Grave. [H]e was our only dear 
Son. So we gave all we had, and trust that you will take Special care of his Grave for his 
dear parents.”526 Families of the dead counted on the government to hold up its end of 
this tragic bargain. 
                                                 
524 John Lingle to War Department, October 21, 1919, BCF for John A. Lingle Jr., 
RG 92 NARA. 
525 William Roth to Senator Nicholas J. Wadsworth, April 28, 1921, BCF for 
Benjamin W. Roth, RG 92, NARA. 
526 Mollie Roycroft to GRS, January 21, 1919, BCF for William T. Roycroft, RG 
92, NARA. 
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The War Department was slow to account for the prominent place this social 
contract held in the hearts and minds of soldiers’ relatives.527 Instead of immediately 
addressing the pain and expectations of grieving families, the War Department 
maintained the distant, highly bureaucratic voice it had used in its wartime 
communication with the bereaved.528 Throughout 1919, all grieving families received an 
official form letter from the War Department that explained in further detail their options 
for burial of the dead. It read in part:  
The original plan […] was to deliver the body in every case at the home address 
of the deceased to the person legally entitled to dispose of the remains. A desire 
has been expressed, however, in numerous instances to have the body remain 
abroad, and General Pershing is likely soon to enter into negotiations with the 
French and Allied Governments with the view of establishing permanent 
cemeteries for members of the American Expeditionary Forces […]. A bill is now 
before Congress for the establishment of ‘Fields of Honor’ abroad, which will 
insure future care by the United States Government as national cemeteries are 
now cared for […]. The Department is unable to state when it will be possible to 
begin the removal of the remains of the soldiers, but the information requested is 
                                                 
527 Besides the fact that military personnel tend to communicate in a stoic, rather 
than emotional or sentimental, fashion, another cultural phenomenon may have 
contributed to the War Department and government’s tone-deafness. As communication 
scholar Brenton Malin reveals in a forthcoming article, throughout the early decades of 
the twentieth century, American speech teachers championed a style of persuasion that 
privileged force and clarity over emotion. “Good vocal performance,” Malin writes, “was 
to be controlled, controlling, and efficient.” Brenton Malin, “Electrifying Speeches: 
Emotional Control and the Technological Aesthetic of the Voice in the Early 20th 
Century,” U.S. Journal of Social History 45.1 (forthcoming). 
528 In 1917, Mattie Hicks of Caryville, Florida, inquired about the return of her 
son’s corpse: “Just rec’d a letter from the Adjutant Gen’l telling me the Sad news of my 
Sons death Clifton R. Hicks Company I, 28 Infantry at St. Nazaire France July 9. And I 
want the body Sent back home to me as he was only a boy not yet 17 years of age […] 
Let me know at once.” Hicks received a letter from the QMC that coldly stated: “In reply 
you are informed that it will not be practicable at this time to transport the remains of 
your son to the United States but as soon as it can be done it is the intention of the 
Department to have the remains disinterred and shipped to your address at the expense of 
the Government.” See Mattie Hicks, correspondence with QMC, July 21-24, 1917, BCF 
for Clifton R. Hicks, RG 92, NARA. 
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being collected at this time in order that there may be no delay when the times 
comes for such removal.529 
 
While addressing certain questions of burial, this official form letter, like others sent by 
the War Department after Armistice, lacked the personal touch needed to show 
appreciation for the wartime sacrifices of citizens, let alone persuade next of kin to bury 
their beloved in distant lands. The few attempts War Department officials made to speak 
directly to the suffering of bereaved families530 were further undermined by highly 
publicized comments from leaders like Secretary of War Baker, who implored relatives 
of the dead to “sympathize with the feeling of the department that it is the wiser and 
better course to leave those bodies in France.”531 George Huddleston, U.S. 
Representative from Alabama, caused a mini-controversy when he intimated that next of 
kin who wanted the return of soldierly remains “were indulging in the luxury of 
sorrow.”532 Even when political and military figures seemingly regurgitated certain 
                                                 
529 P. C. Harris to Anastaceo Rodriguez, May 1919, BCF for Juan M. Rodriguez, 
RG 92, NARA. 
530 During the postwar years, Lt. Col. Charles C. Pierce, Chief of the GRS, stood 
out for his efforts to comfort next of kin. A strong advocate for the rights of citizens to 
claim their beloved’s remains, Pierce wrote many letters to families in an attempt to put a 
human face on the military. In a letter to Robert E. Buglune of Hubberston, 
Massachusetts, Pierce wrote of the Graves Registration Service’s efforts to care for the 
temporary graves of soldiers in Europe: “It is a matter of grief to me that word must go 
from my office that is sure to cause sorrow to people at home, whose brave men have 
made war’s supreme sacrifice for the sake of civilization. You have probably already 
received some notice of the regrettable casualty that causes me to write you; and if so, it 
may be that you will derive some measure of comfort and satisfaction from the fact that 
the body you cherish has been buried as noted above… May I count myself as your friend 
and be permitted to hope that you may have Divine comfort in your grief!” Although his 
letters made no guarantee of the return of the dead, they surely brought consolation to 
countless families. See House Committee, 45; and Charles C. Pierce to Robert Buglune, 
February 1919, BCF for Arthur R. Sargent, RG 92, NARA.  
531 House Committee, 9. 
532 Ibid, 17-18. 
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arguments put forth by relatives in favor of foreign burial, they seemed unable to 
convince the public at large of their concern for the average American family’s 
suffering.533 
By the early 1920s, Pershing and his cohort recognized the necessity of a new 
rhetorical approach. In April 1923, Pershing issued an order, published on the front page 
of the New York Times, urging the military to adopt a new literary style that contained 
“the personal touch so often lacking in correspondence with the public.”534 He knew that 
in order to secure the political will and economic resources necessary for the 
establishment of U.S. cemeteries in Europe, military and political figures needed to 
express fully, and continually, their deepest appreciation for the losses families had 
sustained in the war. In light of the growing opposition to the plan for overseas 
cemeteries,535 the War Department adopted a discursive style clearly tempered by the 
sentimental vernacular found in the correspondence of grieving families.   
                                                 
533 As early as 1919, Pershing candidly lifted arguments from the letters of next of 
kin in his efforts to secure the establishment of overseas American cemeteries. For 
instance, Pershing claimed that by leaving bodies in Europe, the War Department was 
fulfilling the wishes of the dead: “Believe that could these soldiers speak for themselves 
they would wish to be left undisturbed in the place where, with their comrades, they 
fought the last fight.” Borrowing from the sentimental vernacular of family letters, 
Representative George Huddleston of Alabama argued that repatriation would lead to 
“the reopening of heartbreaks, a reopening of grief and sorrow in every community when 
one of these bodies is carried back.” Many next of kin were deeply offended by such 
statements. As one father said: “Shall anybody criticize me if I care to have my feelings 
stirred by the bringing back of my boy’s body?” See “Pershing Against Removal of 
Dead,” Washington Post, August 24, 1919; and House Committee, 18-21. 
534 “Pershing Criticises Army Literary Style; Urges Clarity and the Personal 
Touch,” New York Times, April 13, 1923. 
535 Representative Oscar E. Bland of Indiana opined that “France is and has been 
throughout all the centuries the great battle ground of the world, and we do not know but 
what the cannon of future inventors may dig up those very graves in years to come.” See 
House Committee, 6. Some opponents claimed that if “American dead are left in France, 
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As early as November 1919, the War Department began closing its letters to all 
next of kin with the statement: “It is desired to express to you the deep and sincere 
sympathy of the Department on account of the loss you have sustained in the death of 
your” husband brother, or son.536 Over the next few years, War Department officials 
honed their literary skills, crafting messages that accounted for a range of emotions 
grieving families might have felt: “The Department is gratified that you have confided 
the mortal remains of this soldier to his country’s care. He will rest, forever, in […] 
France, with his many comrades, under the flag in defense of which he gave his young 
life and where his grave will be reverently cared for by a grateful nation.”537 In June 
1920, Secretary Baker announced a rather progressive policy that would allow a friend or 
relative to accompany the body of a dead soldier from its port of arrival to the home of 
the deceased. “This arrangement is made in order that relatives who wish to do so may 
secure early control of the bodies of their loved ones and bestow upon them that 
sympathetic care which they so naturally desire to give.”538 In May 1921 President 
Warren G. Harding issued a proclamation that established Memorial Day, an annual 
holiday of commemoration for American war dead: “I invite my fellow citizens fittingly 
to pay homage on this day to a noble dead who sleep in homeland beneath the sea or on 
foreign fields, so that we who survive might enjoy the blessings of peace and happiness 
                                                                                                                                                 
the necessity for preserving the inviolability of our burial places will be more likely to 
involve the United States in future European wars” (qtd. in Robin 56). The plan faced 
intense opposition from the U.S. funeral industry as well, which stood to gain much from 
the return of war dead (Graham 40-41; Piehler, Remembering War 96-97). 
536 War Department to Argyle Pitman, November 21, 1919, BCF for Henry S. 
Pitman, RG 92, NARA. 
537 QMC to J. E. Lowery, May 17, 1924, BCF for Robert W. Lowery, RG 92, 
NARA. 
538 “To Accompany War Dead,” New York Times, June 9, 1920. 
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and to the end that liberty and justice, without which no nation can exist, shall live 
forever.”539 At the third “Armistice Day pilgrimage” in Washington, D.C., former 
President Woodrow Wilson delivered an address to thousands of World War veterans – 
some disabled – on the accomplishments of the “most ideal army that was ever thrown 
together.” Though the speech was highly impersonal and jingoistic, Wilson broke down 
into tears three times at the sight of the men before him – a performance the veterans 
found deeply moving.540 And in the late-1920s, the War Department sent a form letter 
and card to each of the 30,000 families that had left their beloved in Europe. The card, 
which stated the final resting place of the respective dead soldier, was marked with a gold 
star – a nod to the powerful Gold Star Mother movement that had spread throughout the 
U.S.541 The form letter read: “The Quartermaster General desires to invite your attention 
to the [enclosed] card which gives the permanent cemetery location of the soldier’s grave 
in which you are interested […]. Please be assured that in effecting removal of the dead, 
the utmost reverential care was exercised by those who performed this sacred duty. For 
the future, these graves will be perpetually maintained by the Government in a manner 
                                                 
539 “Harding, in Memorial Day Proclamation, Asks General Homage to War Dead 
on May 30,” New York Times, May 4, 1921. 
540 “Wilson Overcome Greeting Pilgrims; Predicts Triumph,” New York Times, 
November 12, 1923. 
541 Founded in 1918, the Gold Star Mothers was a grassroots organization of 
mothers and widows of U.S. soldiers killed in the Great War. Dedicated to honoring the 
sacrifice of American soldiers, the group was a powerful advocate for the rights of 
veterans and their families. See Graham, 12-17; and Lotte Larsen Meyer, “Mourning in a 
Distant Land: Gold Star Pilgrimages to American Military Cemeteries in Europe, 1930-
33,” Markers: Annual Journal of the Association for Graestone Studies 20 (2003): 31-75. 
We will return to the subject of these pilgrimages later in the dissertation. 
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befitting the last resting place of our heroes.”542 Thus, appropriating the sentimental 
vernacular of grieving families, the War Department and politicians increasingly learned 
how to articulate and acknowledge the government’s social contract with the families of 
soldierly dead. 
In June 1923, President Harding appointed Pershing to head the American Battle 
Monuments Commission (ABMC).543 Created by act of Congress, this seven-member 
board of politicians, military figures, and citizens, was given total authority over the 
planning, constructing, and maintaining of America’s military cemeteries in Europe.544 
Over the following decade, Pershing played a dominant role in designing the sites and 
securing the appropriations necessary for the board’s monumental visions.545 Although 
the Commission would eventually tend to favor, in one scholar’s words, “either pseudo-
medieval styles or ponderous variations of classical designs” that evoked abstract 
democratic ideals and romantic notions of the Medieval Crusades,546 the ABMC also 
incorporated the sentimental vernacular of grieving families into the final visual 
presentation of the cemeteries. For instance, eschewing the “tablet grave marker model” 
                                                 
542 F. H. Pope to John MacIntyre, May 16, 1926, BCF for Harold V. MacIntyre, 
RG 92, NARA. 
543 The following comments about the ABMC’s intentions and the final visual 
presentation of America’s overseas World War I cemeteries are introductory. We will 
examine these issues much more closely in the subsequent chapters. 
544 Elizabeth Nishiura, ed., American Battle Monuments: A Guide to Military 
Cemeteries and Monuments Maintained by the American Battle Monuments Commission 
(Detroit: Omnigraphics, 1989), 3. 
545 Ron Robin, “‘A Foothold in Europe’: The Aesthetics and Politics of American 
War Cemeteries in Western Europe,” Journal of American Studies 29.1 (1995), 55-72: 
58; “Pershing Arranges for War Memorials,” New York Times, June 26, 1927; and X. H. 
Price to John J. Pershing, February 12, 1925, in “Correspondence of the ABMC 
Chairman, Gen. John J. Pershing, 1923-45,” Records of the American Battle Monuments 
Commission, Record Group 117, NARA. 
546 Robin, 60. 
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found in Arlington National Cemetery, the ABMC opted for white marble headstones in 
the shape of the Latin cross, which connote familiar religious allusions of sacrifice, 
redemption, and rebirth.547 At each site, the Commission constructed a ‘non-sectarian’ 
(though clearly Christian) chapel, where visitors (including, presumably, relatives of the 
dead) could contemplate the sacrifices of U.S. soldiers and offer prayers in their memory. 
On the walls of the chapels, the ABMC inscribed statements of a tender and spiritual 
nature. For instance, an engraving in the Meuse-Argonne American Cemetery chapel 
states, “This chapel is erected by the United States of America as a sacred rendezvous of 
a grateful people with its immortal dead,” while the inscription across the face of the altar 
of the Somme American Cemetery chapel reads, “Thou O Lord has granted them eternal 
rest.” And in one exceptional case, the ABMC would allow the mother of Lt. Walker 
Blaine Beale to erect a statue of her son in the St. Mihiel American Cemetery.548 An 
accompanying engraving, written in French above the soldier’s head, states: “He sleeps 
far from his family in the gentle land of France.” This stirring stone figure still occupies a 
prominent place in the site’s landscape.  
There is little doubt that the process of consultation between the War Department 
and grieving families had deeply impacted Pershing. As one of the most instrumental 
figures in the creation of America’s overseas cemeteries, as well as the catalyst behind 
the Army’s adoption of a new affective style of communication, Pershing evolved from a 
warrior who ordered his men to battle (and death) into a symbol for the government’s 
                                                 
547 A small percentage of the headstones are in the shape of the Star of David to 
mark the graves of Jewish soldiers. We will discuss the various designs of American 
headstones later in the dissertation. 
548 Nadia Ezz-Eddine, “Re: St. Mihiel Cemetery statue,” email to the author, 
December 11, 2008. 
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efforts to address the suffering of private citizens. The New York Times portrayed the 
general as a keeper of the dead who tenderly watched over Doughboys buried in 
Europe.549 Over time, he became an outspoken advocate for the “Gold Star Mother 
Pilgrimages” of the 1930s, a federally funded program that enabled mothers and widows 
of the dead to visit their loved ones’ graves in Europe.550 And in 1931, he told a party of 
Gold Star pilgrims visiting France that “mothers would realize […] when they look out 
over the white crosses of the cemeteries where their sons and husbands lie, that the 
sacrifice was not in vain, and that their memories would be tenderly cherished down 
through the years.”551 Influenced by the unprecedented dialogue between the U.S. 
government and relatives of war dead, Pershing helped usher a new, sentimental 
discourse on soldierly sacrifice into both American public life and the ongoing project of 
transnational memory that the U.S. overseas military cemeteries have entailed. 
4.10 “AMERICA SHOULD KEEP HER PROMISE” 
Between January of 1920 and March of 1921, the sisters of Thomas F. Enright (one of the 
first three Americans combat casualties of the Great War) sent a series of heartbreaking 
(and progressively angrier) letters to the War Department in which they pleaded for the 
return of their famous brother’s body: 
                                                 
549 “Pershing Seeks a Plan to Preserve Memorials,” New York Times, September 
6, 1931. 
550 Lotte Larsen Meyer, “Mourning in a Distant Land: Gold Star Pilgrimages to 
American Military Cemeteries in Europe, 1930-33,” Markers: Annual Journal of the 
Association for Gravestone Studies 20 (2003), 31-75: 48. 
551 Graham, 142. 
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     West Etna Pa 
     Jan 11th – 20 
Dear Mr Baker. 
 I am the Sister of Thos F Enright Co. F 16th Infintry first Division killed in 
 France Nov. 3rd 1917. i would like to have my brother body brought home  as soon 
 as possible and all the dead Soldier to. America should keep her promise and 
 bring our dead soldier back home. Our boys should never sleep in France it is 
 terrible the French dont want to send them back. Mr Baker i wish you would do 
 all you can to get our dead boys back home my brother was one of the first three 
 soldier killed in the great worlds war. 
   Your Truly 
   Mrs Johanna Trunzer 
   80 Dewey St 
   W. E. Pittsburg Pa 
     Agust 7-1920 
 
Dear Mr Sharpe 
A few words concerning the remains of my brother who died in France Nov 3-
 1917 Thomas F. Enright who body ye promised me to be brought bak after the 
 war was over now the war is over almous 2 years and ye have not done it yet ye 
 have brought other bodys home I think thoes 3 first boy should be brought first it 
 seems terrible it almost 3 yers since they have being killed my brother had served 
 the Goverment 8 yeares I think they owne it to him just last week ther was a 
 young man brough home from oure neighborhood it makes me feel afull to hink 
 he is dead 3 years and this young man died last yeare I have moved from 
 Pittsburgh I would like to heare from you soon 
   Very Truly Yours 
   Mrs Mary Irwin 
   1212 Mohanning Ave 
   Alliance Ohio 
 
     Alliance 
      Ohio 
     March 17-1921 
Dear Sir I recived your letter concerning the remains of my brother Thomas F. 
 Enright Co F 16 Inf I am sorrey to say his Mother has being dead fore 20 years 
 and also his Father fore 7 yeares I am his oldest Sister he Maid his home with me 
 since Mother died he was a boy 14 years when oure Mother died I have told the 
 War Dept fore 3 years that Mother and Father was dead I think it about time they 
 should do something and brg him back to the land where he was born and raised 
 the War Dept told us soon as the War was over they would bring him back now it 
 over 2 years and not back yet he dont belong to France he belong to this Country 
 we should have the Credit Thomas Mothe and Father is dead he 2 brother and 2 
 sister a sister dont seem able alike a Mother but I was a Mother to Thomas I have 
 4 sons my self and I bored that brother as much as my sones I do hope ye have his 
 remain back soon Mrs Mary Irwin 
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  1212 Mahoning Ave 
   Alliance Ohio 
 
In July of 1921, Thomas Enright’s body was finally returned to his family in 
Pittsburgh.552 In fact, the bodies of Private Merle Hay and Corporal James Gresham were 
returned by family request as well. Thus, nearly four long years after the infamous 
murders of America’s wartime ‘holy trinity,’ these men’s families ultimately chose not to 
leave their loved ones’ bodily remains in Europe. The decision upset some portions of the 
country, as an op-ed in the Davenport Democrat and Leader indicated: “Sleeping 
together in the soil of France, the graves of Enright, Gresham and Hay would have been a 
shrine not only for Americans but for lovers of liberty from all parts of the world. 
Scattered in their home land, they cannot speak the message for freedom that they spoke 
from that resting place where France so frankly hoped that they might remain.”553 On 
July 24, 1921, ten thousand people gathered in Omaha, Nebraska, to witness the burial of 
Private Merle D. Hay and, thus, proved the Davenport Democrat and Leader editors 
wrong.554 
                                                 
552 BCF for Thomas F. Enright, RG 92, NARA. 
553 “The World Loses a Shrine of Freedom,” Davenport Democrat and Leader, 
July 6, 1921, 6. 
554 “10,000 Honor War Victim,” Oregonian, July 25, 1921, 5. 
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5.0  LIFE, DEATH, GOD, AND NATION: THE CEMETERIES’ FINAL 
VISUAL PRESENTATION 
The first problem involved in the treatment of the American cemeteries in Europe is the 
adequate, reverent care of the remains of our soldiers—such care as shall justify the 
action of the relatives who elected to allow the bodies of their dead to remain in the soil 
for which they fought and died. […] They had confidence that the Government would see 
to it that these graves would not be neglected, but would be held in respect and honor.555 
5.1 INTRODUCTION: A KAIROTIC MOMENT 
The immediate postwar years can be understood as a kairotic moment556—a period of 
contestation and contingency in which prevailing meanings, understandings, and 
                                                 
555 The National Commission of Fine Arts, Ninth Report, July 1, 1919-June 30, 
1921 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1921), 45-7. 
556 As opposed to the Ancient Greek conception of chronos, the scientific 
measurement and passing of time, kairos has been understood by rhetoricians as the 
“right,” “opportune,” or “propitious” moment for symbolic action. Much more fluid, 
plastic, and ambiguous than chronos, kairos represents the moment (whether a second, 
minute, hour, day, year, or more) when one can use language to strike with maximum 
impact. As rhetoric scholar John Poulakos tells us: “Springing from one’s sense of timing 
and the will to invent, kairos alludes to the realization that speech exists in time and is 
uttered both as a spontaneous formulation of and a barely constituted response to a new 
situation unfolding in the immediate present. According to this realization, time is 
understood as ‘a succession of discontinuous occasions rather than as duration or 
historical continuity’ while the present is conceived not ‘as continuous with a causally 
related sequence of events’ but as ‘unprecedented, as a moment of decision, a moment of 
crisis.’” See John Poulakos, Sophistical Rhetoric in Classical Greece (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1995), 61; and Jane Sutton, “Kairos,” in 
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memories of the United States’ participation in the Great War had not yet been settled, 
but were highly desired. It was an opportune moment for individuals and collectives—
official, vernacular, or otherwise—to express publicly competing (and often directly 
opposing) statements about the perceived and real human, material, and ideological costs 
and benefits of the national war effort.557 The torrent of letters sent from grieving 
American families to the War Department regarding the final disposition of dead soldiers 
had revealed a postwar crisis of official language, an exhaustion of state-sanctioned 
vocabularies that could no longer (if they had ever been able to) account adequately for 
the feelings and suffering of private citizens (and non-citizens) whose loved ones had 
been sent to fight and die in Europe. Although the government had learned to appropriate 
the sentimental vernacular of grieving families into its own public rhetoric and had 
successfully secured its plan to bury dead Americans in permanent overseas military 
cemeteries, the symbolic action of ordinary mothers, fathers, wives, sisters, and brothers 
(who were no longer bound by draconian wartime laws to remain silent) revealed just 
how difficult it might be for the government to shape, determine, and control public 
memory of the war. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, ed. Thomas O. Sloane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 413-17. 
557 The signing of the Armistice on November 11, 1918, essentially ushered in the 
last few (if extended) moments of the last act, so to speak, of the war’s saga—the 
moments in which the meaning of the war seemingly would be determined. Discussing 
the rhetorical power of endings, Kenneth Burke reminds us: “a history’s end is a formal 
way of proclaiming its essence or nature, as with those who distinguish between a 
tragedy and a comedy by the outcome alone and who would transform ‘tragedy’ into 
‘comedy’ merely by changing the last few moments of the last act.” Despite the 
Armistice, the end of the history of America’s participation in the war had yet to be 
written. See Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1950), 13. 
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Countless unofficial commemoration projects were instigated just as soon as the 
war ended. When the guns stopped firing, American soldiers still stationed in Europe 
immediately began erecting unsanctioned, haphazard battlefield monuments in memory 
of their fallen comrades and the wartime accomplishments of their divisions and 
companies.558 Across the United States, communities commissioned and erected public 
memorials—usually a generic bronze statue of a “Doughboy” or a tablet listing specific 
soldiers’ names—in honor of local men who had fought and died overseas. Such 
memorials were meant to honor the wartime sacrifice, courage, and deeds of average U.S. 
soldiers and citizens. Often placed next to the booty of war (German artillery pieces that 
were distributed by the federal government across the nation) and alongside older Civil 
War monuments, these publicly visible memorials helped connect local communities to 
the events that had taken place in Europe and, as historian G. Kurt Piehler puts it, remind 
citizens how the national war effort “had continued the long process of reconciliation 
between North and South.”559 In Evansville, Indiana, the American Legion (a patriotic 
veterans organization established in 1919) began work on a memorial to local hero James 
                                                 
558 Thomas North, General North’s Manuscript, unpublished and undated 
manuscript (given to author by David Bedford, Oise-Aisne American Cemetery and 
Memorial Superintendent in 2006), 1, 3, 11. 
559 G. Kurt Piehler, Remembering War the American Way (Washington D.C.: 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995), 111. The government’s distribution of this ‘booty’ 
across the country revealed its desire to symbolize the national war effort, in general, and 
the argument that the United States had won the war, more specifically, to the American 
people. Whereas the outcomes and consequences of most wars fought throughout human 
history could be determined by materials gains or losses (territory, natural resources, 
precious treasures, slaves, etc.), the material benefits of the United States’ participation 
and alleged victory in Europe were not patently clear (especially to the average American 
citizen). What good were decimated and captured German artillery pieces, aside from 
their symbolic value? For more on the American public’s uncertainty over what the war 
had accomplished, see Piehler, 93. 
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Bethel Gresham (one of the first three U.S. casualties of the war) with the hope that it 
might become “an international shrine” to Americans who died in the war.560 In South 
Carolina, Governor Robert A. Cooper appointed a commission to erect a memorial chapel 
in honor of local “white soldiers, sailors, marines and others who served in the world 
war” on the grounds of the University of South Carolina, and a separate commission to 
establish a “negro memorial” on the campus of the State Agricultural and Mechanical 
College (“a negro school”).561 
Other projects entailed less traditional forms of memorialization. For instance, the 
New York Athletic Club in Manhattan unveiled a “memorial window commemorative of 
the twenty members of the [club] who lost their lives in the world war”; today the 
window still appears as it did years ago above the main entrance between the first and 
second floors of the club.562 In Washington, D.C., Georgetown University planted 54 
trees in memory of its fifty-four students who perished in Europe (a shockingly high 
casualty statistic) with the hope of representing the “intimate connection” between the 
school and the national war effort.563 And politically progressive groups across the nation 
publicly campaigned for the establishment of alternative “living memorials”—public 
auditoriums, pools, gymnasiums, classrooms for adult education, office spaces for 
community organizations, bridges, and buildings erected in honor of the war dead—
                                                 
560 “Plan a National Shrine to Those Who Died in the War,” New York Times, 
August 12, 1924, 1. 
561 “Raise Memorials to Gallant Sons,” State (Columbia, South Carolina), May 
18, 1919, 1. 
562 “Window for War Dead,” New York Times, June 13, 1922, 18. 
563 “Famous University Plants Forest for Its Hero Dead,” Dallas Morning News, 
June 24, 1919, 11. 
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which would reflect the egalitarian and democratic spirit of the American war effort.564 A 
supporter of the new “living memorial” movement wrote the New York Times: 
 Have we no better way to keep alive the memory of the gallant men who 
 died in the World War than by erecting memorials in cold, dead stone, such as 
 arches, shafts  or buildings for religious or communal use? 
 If they could speak, which would they choose, these formal and lifeless 
 memorials, or would they long to live in the memory of coming generations 
 through new opportunities given to the growing soul of man, new and ever new 
 life? 
 Why not use the money planned for these votive offerings to endow 
 scholarships in our public high schools, freely to be contended for by boys and 
 girls who are eager for new opportunities of deepening life? Scholarship for 
 college or university, scholarships for the arts, for research, for travel, all these 
 possibilities firing the young soul with new endeavor, enriching each 
 generation.565 
 
These words betrayed both a common belief that traditional memorials made of stone or 
metal alloy were somewhat gloomy, depressing, and archaic and an assumption that 
every American memorial to the Great War held the possibility of being a vehicle for 
political action or social change. 
Some memory projects eschewed nationalistic and life affirming sentiments in 
order to express (whether implicitly or explicitly) critical or disenchanted evaluations of 
the American war experience, in particular, or modern state-sponsored warfare, in 
general. Take, for example, the History of the 110th Infantry of the 28th Division, U.S.A., 
1917-1919, one of the many “official” eyewitness accounts published by veterans groups 
during the 1920s. Chockfull of lofty and dramatic tales of individual and collective 
battlefield bravery, the book also provided uncensored details regarding the final 
moments and resting places of regiment members who had been killed, “not for the 
                                                 
564 Piehler, 105-9, 
565 “Opportunity for the Living Is Urged Instead of Tributes in Stone,” New York 
Times, May 2, 1924, 18. 
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purpose of glorifying those who [had died],” but rather “as a convenience for those 
seeking information,” especially “relative or friends” of the fallen.566 A subtle, yet 
subversive, dig at the military and the federal government’s joint inability to provide all 
grieving American families with sufficient information concerning their loved ones’ 
demise, these unflinchingly graphic death reports revealed the disturbing fact that many 
Doughboys had suffered nothing close to the “good death” that had been so important to 
next of kin during the Civil War.567 Consider this entry for Samuel Crouse of Somerset, 
Pennsylvania, whose bodily remains were still missing in France: 
Statement given by Pvt. Raymond I. Davis, Co. C, 110th Inf. “Lt. Crouse was 
 killed on the morning of July 15, 1918, in the woods north of St. Agnan. I saw Lt. 
 Crouse and W. Zimmerman run up a road and heard a volley of shots fired a few 
 minutes later. Some time later, I saw him lying dead on the road. He had been hit 
 in the forehead and died instantly.” 
 
Statement given by Pvt. Daniel McGuire, Co. C, 110th Inf. “Lt. Crouse and Pvt. 
 Zimmerman were in a small trench together, when word was received that the 
 Germans were behind them. Lt. Crouse jumped up and with Zimmerman came 
 along the bushes about ten yards to the road along the hill. He then turned and ran 
 up the  road with the rifle. I was a prisoner and standing with six or eight 
 Germans to the left of the road on a bank in the brush. Neither Lt. Crouse or 
 Zimmerman saw us standing there. I called to them but they did not hear. Had the 
 Germans not fired when they did, Lt. Crouse and Zimmerman would have 
                                                 
566 Association of the 110th Infantry, History of the 110th Infantry (10th Pa.) of the 
28th Division, U.S.A., 1917-1919: A Compilation of Orders, Citations, Maps, Records 
and Illustrations Relating to the 3rd Pa. Inf., 10th Pa. Inf., and 110th U.S. Inf. (Greensburg, 
Pennsylvania: The Association, 1920), 171. 
567As Drew Gilpin Faust shows throughout her monumental book, This Republic 
of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), 
families of soldiers killed in the Civil War were fundamentally concerned about the 
question of whether their loved ones’ had died “the Good Death”—that they had been 
conscious in their final moments and had properly declared their devotion to Christianity. 
Soldiers of the North and South were expected to send letters to the families of their 
fallen comrades detailed accounts of the dead soldiers’ final words, or “dying 
declarations,” as proof of “the Good Death” (whether the respective soldier, had in fact, 
died appropriately or not). See 6-17, 18, 23, 25-6, 28-31, 85, 109, 124, 144, 163, 167, 
174-5, 183, and 198. 
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 continued on past us. The Germans fired when they  were within fifteen feet and 
 hit Lt. Crouse in the head, tearing off one side of the skull.”568 
 
Taking matters into their own hands, veterans of the 110th Infantry gathered and 
published all and any available information regarding missing and killed comrades, 
however disturbing or traumatizing the news might be for next of kin. Antithetical to the 
wartime propaganda of the Committee on Public Information and the sparse death 
notification telegrams that the War Department had initially sent families of the fallen, 
these published death reports exposed the terrible things that had actually occurred “over 
there” and provided citizens valuable details that the government and military seemed 
unable or reluctant to give.  
Other memory projects were simply melancholic, and sought to attend to the 
profound and intimate suffering of grieving American women. For instance, Annie 
Kilburn Kilmer, mother of famed poet-soldier Joyce Kilmer, dedicated her 1920 book, 
Memories of My Son Sergeant Joyce Kilmer, to “the mothers who mourn with a proud 
heart for their sons who gave their lives for honour’s sake.” The book’s first page 
displayed a touching photograph of Annie sitting next to her apple-cheeked son, 
captioned: “Joyce Kilmer (Columbia, 1908), in graduation gown, with his mother.”569 
Amidst this swirling sea of commemoration movements and practices, the bodily 
remains of roughly 80,000 soldiers were shipped back to the United States (by families’ 
requests) during the early 1920s.570 Delivered to next of kin in every state, to rural 
                                                 
568 Association of the 110th Infantry, 173. 
569 Annie Kilburn Kilmer, Memories of My Son Sergeant Joyce Kilmer: With 
Numerous Unpublished Poems and Letters (New York: Brentano’s, 1920). 
570 Exhumations of American bodies for shipment to the United States began in 
1920. The first exhumation was made at Gosport, England on February 3, 1920, the first 
 289 
hamlets and giant urban centers alike, to every corner of the nation, these repatriated 
bodily remains presented 80,000 opportunities for individuals and communities to 
remember the dead—and perhaps more importantly, America’s participation in the World 
War—as they best saw fit. Whatever political affiliations or feelings about the national 
war effort next of kin might have held, each dead soldier—lying silently and concealed in 
his coffin—represented a tangible and powerful reminder of the tragic (if apparently 
noble) human costs and sacrifices of American belligerence. Each dead soldier, his life 
taken prematurely overseas, bore witness to the death and destruction of the distant war. 
And each dead soldier required a proper burial ceremony of some kind, where individuals 
could give eulogies that might question the local, national, and international benefits of 
such a personal loss.571 
                                                                                                                                                 
transatlantic shipment of bodies on February 23. During 1921, repatriation of bodily 
remains was nearly completed, and the exhumation and concentration of bodies for burial 
in overseas cemeteries commenced. Nearly every dead U.S. soldier was laid in his final 
resting place—whether in the States or in Europe—by the end of 1922. See U.S. National 
Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, Maryland, Records of the Office 
of the Inspector General (Army), Record Group 159, Box 772, “Brief History of 
Organization and Operations of Graves Registration Service from Origin to July 31, 
1930,” October 24, 1930, 2. 
571 Local newspapers often publicized the details of funeral services held for 
fallen soldiers who had been returned to the U.S. For example, in 1921, the Philadelphia 
Inquirer reported on a “solemn” burial ceremony that had been held for several men 
whose families lived in the same Philadelphia neighborhood: “Yesterday’s solemn 
ceremonies closed the public mourning for our heroes who fell in France during the late 
combat […] There was no pride, pomp and circumstance of glorious war evident; there 
was no intention of magnifying military operations. The silence for a few seconds when 
the city’s pulse seemed to stop while prayers ascended to make war impossible was a 
finer tribute than all the fanfares which might have been made.” See “Taps for Our 
Soldier Dead,” Philadelphia Inquirer, October 24, 1921, 12. The ability of these dead 
bodies to bear witness to the atrocities and devastation of the Great War relates to 
communication scholar John Durham Peters’ insightful analysis of “witnessing.” Peters 
writes: “Aristotle noted that witnesses in a court of law testify at risk of punishment if 
they do not tell the truth; he considers dead witnesses more trustworthy than living 
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While the U.S. government could not possibly have expected to contain, dictate, 
or suppress this explosion of diverse postwar commemoration projects, it had 
successfully retained legal control over the bodily remains of 35,000 dead American 
soldiers—the decaying remnants of men’s bones, tissue, and skin—that would, in short 
order, become the focus and symbolic capital of an unprecedented network of 
monumental U.S. cemeteries in Western Europe. Government and military officials 
hoped that the graves and tombstones of these 35,000 soldiers, displayed to international 
audiences in aesthetically pleasing, emotionally moving, and most vitally, American 
cemeteries, would constitute permanent visual and material arguments for the United 
States’ righteous role in the Great War, and buttress the emerging and useful (if 
somewhat antagonistic) claim that the young nation had “rescued” Europe from itself. As 
G. Kurt Piehler indicates, those in charge of planning and creating these burial grounds 
approached the project with an overarching belief that each “individual soldier’s grave 
would serve as an enduring monument to the cause of freedom for which they bled and 
died.”572 In communicating such sustained and loaded messages to the peoples of Europe 
(and elsewhere), these overseas cemeteries—if constructed properly—might also impact, 
or perhaps even trump, the meanings and rhetorical work of the countless domestic 
commemoration practices simultaneously taking place back home. 
                                                                                                                                                 
ones—since they cannot be bribed.” See John Durham Peters, Courting the Abyss: Free 
Speech and the Liberal Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 251. 
572 Piehler, 96, 114. 
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5.2 THE COMMISSION OF FINE ARTS 
The task of designing America’s overseas military cemeteries was initially assigned to 
the purview of the Commission of Fine Arts (CFA).573 Established by Congress in 1910, 
the CFA was the nation’s preeminent voice on cultural and artistic matters during the 
early twentieth century: 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
 America in Congress assembled, That a permanent Commission of Fine Arts is 
 hereby  created to be composed of seven well-qualified judges of the fine arts, 
 who shall be appointed by the President […] The President shall have authority to 
 fill all vacancies. It shall be the duty of such commission to advise upon the 
 location of statues, fountains, and monuments in the public squares, streets, and 
 parks in the District of Columbia, and upon the selection of models for statues, 
 fountains, and monuments erected under the  authority of the United States and 
 upon the selection of artists for the execution of the  same […] The commission 
 shall also advise generally upon questions of art when required to do so by the 
 President, or by any committee of either House of Congress.574 
 
                                                 
573 On June 2, 1919, U.S. Representative Simeon D. Hess of Ohio introduced a 
bill to Congress that called for the incorporation of the American Field of Honor 
Association, a citizens’ group that would work closely with the National Commission of 
Fine Arts to design the nascent overseas burial grounds. Representative Fess believed that 
regular American citizens should play a major role in the establishment of these 
permanent cemeteries, which would honor “those who have made the supreme sacrifice 
in the cause of freedom and humanity” and the “perpetual bond of union between 
America and the nations with whom we have been associated in the World’s War.” Fess’ 
populist bill, however, did not pass. In all likelihood it was defeated behind close doors 
by the War Department, which surely did not want to relinquish control over the 
symbolic sites (nor the soldierly remains it had worked so hard to obtain). Sidestepping 
the American people, the Quartermaster General of the Army approached the 
Commission of Fine Arts directly in 1919, and brought them into the military’s fold. By 
early 1921, the power of determining the visual presentation of America’s overseas 
cemeteries was securely in the hands of the CFA and Secretary of War John Weeks. See 
Leo R. Sack, “Association Is Formed to Lay Aside Estate in France for an American 
Cemetery,” Fort Worth Star-Telegram, June 3, 1919, 12; and National Commission, 39-
41. 
574 Establishing a Commission of Fine Arts Act of 1910, 40 U.S.C. § 104 (1910). 
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The CFA of the 1910s and early 1920s was comprised of titans of American art, 
architecture, and civic planning. Its first Chairman was Daniel Burnham, who famously 
designed the Flatiron Building in Manhattan, Union Station in Washington, D.C., and the 
fairgrounds of the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago. Its original members 
included sculptor Daniel Chester French (who in 1920 would design the marble statue of 
a seated Abraham Lincoln in the Lincoln Memorial), landscape architect Frederick Law 
Olmsted, Jr. (whose father had planned New York City’s Central Park), architect Thomas 
Hastings (designer of the landmark New York Public Library in Manhattan), and 
architect Cass Gilbert (former president of the American Institute Architects).575 
Committed to the ideologies of the “City Beautiful” movement576 and the McMillan 
Plan,577 and given a direct line to the power that coursed through the White House and 
                                                 
575 “Washington Is to Be Most Beautiful City in America,” Duluth News Tribune, 
June 19, 1910, 1. 
576 Developed and propagated during the 1890s and early twentieth century by 
influential Progressive architects and urban planners like Daniel Burnham, the “City 
Beautiful” movement sought to transform decaying urban centers into beautiful spaces in 
order to improve the lives of the poor; inspire American citizens to moral and civic 
virtue; and, display the young nation’s greatness to the world. The Department of 
American Studies at the University of Virginia writes: “Generally stated, the City 
Beautiful advocates sought to improve their city through beautification, which would 
have a number of effects: 1) social ills would be swept away, as the beauty of the city 
would inspire civic loyalty and moral rectitude in the impoverished; 2) American cities 
would be brought to cultural parity with their European competitors through the use of 
the European Beaux-Arts idiom; and 3) a more inviting city center still would not bring 
the upper classes back to live, but certainly to work and spend money in the urban areas.” 
See Kirk Savage, Monument Wars: Washington, D.C., the National Mall, and the 
Transformation of the Memorial Landscape (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2009), 13, 18, 152, 158, and 183; and American Studies at the University of Virginia, 
“The City Beautiful Movement,” n.d., 
http://xroads.virginia.edu/~CAP/CITYBEAUTIFUL/city.html (accessed April 12, 2011). 
577 As Washington, D.C., approached its centennial, there was a call (by cultural 
and political elites) to develop the city’s landscape into one worthy of a modern national 
capital. In 1900, Senator James McMillan of Michigan formed a small but powerful 
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Capitol Hill, this elite group of civic reformers enjoyed and exercised sweeping authority 
to shape early twentieth century American public culture. When it assumed total creative 
control over America’s permanent, overseas military cemeteries in 1921, the CFA was 
already managing the redesign of Washington, D.C.—a grand plan “to make the city of 
Washington conspicuous among national capitals in respect of dignity, orderliness, 
convenience, and beauty”578–and virtually rewriting the nation’s patriotic visual 
lexicon.579 The postwar plan for a network of monumental military cemeteries in Europe 
                                                                                                                                                 
commission to work on the redesign of the city’s appearance. The commission included 
future CFA members Charles Moore, Daniel Burnham, and Frederick Law Olmdsted, Jr., 
and was backed by the influential American Institute of Architects. A “war against 
disorder,” the commission’s so-called “McMillan Plan” sought to unify the city (which 
had been fragmented by Pierre L’Enfant’s eighteenth century principle of “dispersed 
centers”) with grand spacious avenues that would accommodate the flow of human 
bodies and cars. Somewhat akin to a military operation, the plan entailed the razing of 
slums (which were deemed unclean, unseemly, and morally corrupt); the removal of old 
monuments, fountains, trees, gardens, and buildings that served as obstacles to the 
commission’s vision; and the construction of grand museums, federal buildings, and 
memorials designed in a neoclassical or Beaux-Arts style. The plan also involved 
clearing the National Mall—polluted with haphazard monuments, meandering paths, and 
seemingly randomly placed flowers gardens—and transforming it into a “flow of space.” 
In 1910, Congress established the Commission of Fine Arts, which took control over the 
McMillan Plan. Most of the CFA’s initial members, appointed by President William 
Howard Taft, had served on the McMillan Commission. See Savage, Monument Wars, 
147-92; and The Commission of Fine Arts, A Brief History 1910-1995 (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 1-7. 
578 National Commission, iii. 
579 In 1921, President Warren G. Harding signed an executive order that extended 
to the CFA authority over “essential matters relating to the design of medals, insignia and 
coins” produced by the federal government. This edict gave the CFA virtually unchecked 
powers to determine the appearance of common, but symbolically significant, objects—
big and small, grand and banal—that circulated and appeared in everyday American life. 
For instance, in 1923, the CFA declared that the American flag was “too long in 
proportion to its width to be artistic.” As the New York Times reported: “In consultation 
with a committee of Government officials appointed for the standardization of the flag, 
the commission decided on a ratio of 1.67 to 1 instead of the present 1.90 to 1. The 
decision was reached through tests of various sized flags flown from the Arlington 
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became a unique opportunity for the CFA to extend its symbolic action beyond national 
borders. In effect, the cemeteries would become a conceptual extension of the National 
Mall. 
5.3 A CONSTRAINED RHETORICAL POSITION 
Although the CFA was the authoritative (and often determining) voice on matters related 
to public art, architecture, and culture in the United States, the commission had to 
approach its plans for the visual presentation of the overseas military cemeteries with 
great care and tact. While the CFA certainly wanted to extend its preferred aesthetic style 
(a neoclassical, Beaux-Arts style that mimicked and venerated Greco-Roman traditions) 
and its ideologies regarding public space to the European sites without interference from 
outside parties, the network of cemeteries was a beast altogether different from the 
landscape of Washington, D.C., government coins, or the American flag. To begin, the 
nascent sites were cemeteries—inherently sacred and emotionally charged spaces of 
profound social significance that would have to incorporate and display the remains of 
dead human beings appropriately.580 Thus, the CFA would have to take contemporary 
                                                                                                                                                 
Amphiteatre flagpole.” See Commission, A Brief History, 242-3; and “Plans to Shorten 
Our Flag to Get Better Proportion,” New York Times, May 6, 1923, 1. 
580 The sacred character, social function, and cultural meaning of a cemetery—the 
place where a community buries and venerates its dead—seem obvious, but should be 
explained further here. Religion and American Culture scholar Gary Laderman states: 
“How the dead body is cared for, and the practices employed for its disposal, can tell us 
as much about the animating principles within a given society as about how that society 
understands the meaning of death.” Rhetoric scholar Richard Morris writes: “As 
fundamentally rhetorical and cultural in origin and orientation, overt responses to death 
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reveal worldviews, cultural premises, manners of organizing, parsing, combining, 
interpreting, and responding to the world. When displayed in public space, they also 
commonly rehearse explicit cultural lessons.” Rhetoric scholar Nicole Loraux has 
famously argued that Pericles’ funeral oration (and the burial practices related to it) 
actually invented the classical city of Athens that Western society and subsequently, the 
United States, have venerated ever since. Communication scholar John Durham Peters 
argues that in the United States, “[p]erhaps even as much as money, the archmedium may 
be the cemetery, the place where the bodies of the dead are held in suspended animation, 
as the term itself suggests: ‘cemetery’ comes from the Greek koimeterion, meaning a 
sleeping place, quite literally a dormitory.” As Peters’ term “archmedium” indicates, the 
cemetery is, like most sacred sites, a place where the distances between life, death, and 
rebirth are bridged—a site where that unknowable question (the experience of death) is 
addressed and, at least in part, answered. History of Religion scholar Mircea Eliade 
expands upon this point, arguing that the cemetery is “a space where communication 
between Heaven, Earth, the Underworld takes place,” a material space that makes 
possible “the passage from Earth to Heaven.” According to Eliade, most societies 
consider the grave—a hole carved into the ground—to be an entryway to the afterlife (a 
provocative notion when we consider that the carefully planned graves of America’s 
overseas military cemeteries were antithetical to the muddy battlefields of the Great War 
that had swallowed soldiers whole and thus denied men a safe passageway to the 
afterlife). French intellectual René Guénon claims that the cemetery is place where one 
can become a “Universal Man”—the person who effectively realizes and confronts her or 
his “multiple states” (pre-birth, life, death, and afterlife). Michel Foucault synthesizes the 
cultural and metaphysical significance of the cemetery in his famous essay, “Of Other 
Spaces.” Foucault considers the cemetery to be a “heterotopia”—“something like [a 
counter-site], a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real 
sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and 
inverted.” According to Foucault, every human society has heterotopias (like cemeteries); 
every heterotopia “has a precise and determined function within a society”; and the 
particular function of a heterotopia can change with time as the needs and sensibilities of 
society shift. Ultimately, Foucault argues, the cemetery (a heterotopia) incorporates and 
juxtaposes things that are seemingly “incompatible” (such as life and death); allows 
people to step outside of “traditional time” and into a “quasi-eternity” (or sacred time); 
demands a certain level of decorum from visitors; and helps organize, define, and 
regulate the territory of a given community. See Mircea Eliade, Symbolism, the Sacred, 
and the Arts (New York: Crossroad, 1985), 107-8; Michel Foucault, “Of Other Spaces” 
(1967), http://foucault.info/documents/heteroTopia/foucault.heterotopia.en.html, n.d. 
(accessed April 14, 2011); René Guénon, Symbolism of the Cross, trans. Angus Macnab 
(London: Luzac, 1958), 1-3; Gary Laderman, The Sacred Remains: American Attitudes 
Toward Death, 1799-1883 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 1; Nicole Loraux, 
The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City, trans. Alan Sheridan 
(New York: Zone Books, 2006); Richard Morris, “Death on Display,” in Rhetorics of 
Display, ed. Lawrence J. Prelli (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2006), 
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sensibilities regarding the function and appearance of the American gravescape into 
account. The sites would not just be cemeteries, however—they would be military 
cemeteries. Therefore, the CFA would have to meet the expectations of leaders in the 
armed forces who would want the cemeteries to serve as decidedly pro-war celebrations 
of American military prowess, and governmental officials who would want the burial 
grounds to do the same rhetorical work that federally controlled Civil War cemeteries 
(like Gettysburg National Cemetery and Arlington National Cemetery) had done over the 
preceding decades (namely, suture critical social divides and display the dead soldier as 
an ideal model of the American citizen). Of course, the planned sites were not only 
military cemeteries—they were overseas military cemeteries. The CFA was compelled, 
therefore, to design sites that would simultaneously match the monumentality of other 
nations’ World War cemeteries, convey discernable and effective messages to 
heterogeneous international audiences, and symbolically re-link the interred soldiers to 
their homeland thousands of miles away—no small order.581 On top of this, the CFA 
would have to weigh every aesthetic decision against economic considerations (the cost 
                                                                                                                                                 
204; and John Durham Peters, Speaking Into the Air: A History of the Idea of 
Communication (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 152. 
581 Displaying the wartime sacrifices of the American people to Europeans 
became all the more necessary in 1924 when Belgium sought $88,000,000,000 in 
reparations from the United States for the sacrifices that Belgium, Britain, and France 
had made in defense of the American people. Henri La Fontaine, Vice President of the 
Belgian Senate, forwarded the proposal as a counter-measure to tariffs the U.S. had 
placed on Belgium and other debtor nations in the years following the war. “It cannot be 
denied that we fought for America and that we saved her,” La Fontaine said in an address 
to the Belgian Senate. “Consequently we are entitled to expect effective help from her 
[…] Counting every killed soldier as representing 100,000 francs of capital destroyed, 
and each mutilated soldier 50,000 francs […] this represents for the three countries one 
thousand and sixty-five billions.” See “Says America Owes Europe $88,000,000,000,” 
New York Times, January 13, 1924, 7. 
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of obtaining suitable construction workers and masons in Europe, for example) and 
material realities (such as the relatively small number of dead bodies that had been left 
overseas). Finally, and most importantly, the CFA—an organization that held the 
emotional sensibilities of nineteenth century Victorian culture in contempt582—would 
have to account for both the sentimental vernacular that the government had appropriated 
into its own postwar public rhetoric and the feelings of grieving (and often dejected or 
disenchanted) Americans whose sons, brothers, and fathers—destroyed in the prime of 
their lives supposedly for the good of the nation—required a proper and meaningful 
burial. In short, the CFA found itself in a highly constrained rhetorical position. 
The CFA’s aesthetic sensibilities and ideologies regarding public space were 
exhibited in its dramatic renovation of the National Mall in Washington, D.C. Pursuing 
and expanding upon the ideals of the McMillan Plan, the CFA spent the first half of the 
twentieth century attempting to transform the Mall into, as Kirk Savage puts it, “a 
monumental center that was both concentrated and coherent, a well-regulated ensemble 
of memorials, museums, and other public buildings.”583 From its inception in 1910, the 
CFA set out to convert the Mall into a “flow of space”—a systematized, ordered, and 
“clean” expanse where carefully designed, harmonious, and awe-inspiring monuments 
displayed abstract, yet powerful, national ideals to visitors walking or driving on a 
                                                 
582 As Savage explains throughout Monument Wars, the CFA and its professional 
and political cohorts rejected (what they viewed as) outdated Victorian and Romantic 
ideals of sentimentality and nature-worship. Savage states that, “The reformers of the 
early twentieth century were cut from a different cloth. They belonged to a world 
organized by monopoly capitalism, where expertise and efficiency were the watchwords. 
It was perfectly natural for [them] to compare urban design to modern methods of 
military conquest and industrial production” (158). 
583 Savage, Monument Wars, 159. 
 298 
predetermined grid of pathways and avenues.584 As Savage explains, the project 
represented (and helped usher in) a radical “shift from the nineteenth-century concept of 
public grounds to the twentieth-century concept of public space.”585 No longer would 
pedestrians meander along winding paths and linger in the shade of beautiful (but, in the 
eyes of the CFA, haphazardly situated) tree gardens; no longer would visitors direct their 
attention to small monuments of various and incongruent meanings and distracting flower 
beds on the ground; no longer would tourists cut across grassy lawns, choosing to stop 
and go when and where they pleased, experiencing the natural beauty and exploring the 
eclectic diversions of the Mall as they best saw fit. Instead, pedestrians would be guided 
along newly constructed paths and roads (lined with freshly planted, uniformly spaced, 
gigantic elm trees586) that met at right angles, their eyes transfixed on the Washington 
Monument (that abstract, phallic, and disorienting white obelisk that obliterated human 
scale and dominated the Mall’s vista), the dome of the Capitol, or the Lincoln 
Memorial.587 The transfiguration of the Mall from public grounds into public space 
                                                 
584 Ibid, 147-52, 191-2. 
585 Ibid, 13-14. 
586 It is safe to say that, in planting these trees, the CFA was less concerned with 
providing shade for pedestrians and more interested in creating designated, natural 
hallways of sorts that would lead people where they were supposed to go. 
587 Ibid, 147-92. With regard to the Washington Monument’s convenient and 
essential role within the CFA’s plan to transform the Mall into a “flow of space,” Savage 
writes on page 148: “Low horizon lines emphasize [the Washington Monument’s] 
presence and compress the ground plane beneath it. Nothing on the monument’s blank 
surface compels us to stop and ‘read’ it. The obelisk’s sharp lines keep the eye in 
movement, at once lifting our gaze up off the ground and speeding vision longitudinally 
across vast distances. The monument draws us into and through space, subordinating the 
ground to a new compositional logic.” Ironically, the CFA’s transformation of the Mall 
from a conglomeration of flower gardens, small forests, and outdated monuments into a 
sweeping, wide-open space, had a major unintended consequence: it turned the Mall into 
a gathering space for public assembly and social protest. Setting out to create a space that 
 299 
completely altered the visitor’s agency and role. No longer the addresser—the person 
who stopped to consider natural or manmade objects tucked away into the Earth’s 
surface, the agent whose attention breathed life into otherwise ignored and ignorable 
objects—the visitor became nothing more than the addressee, the receiver of the 
unavoidable, abstract messages of this ordered, dominating, regulating, and symbolic 
space. In essence, the visitor of the National Mall became little more than a prop in a 
grand panorama (a phenomenon the CFA would try to reproduce in the overseas military 
cemeteries). 
Backed by the force of federal law, the CFA pursued its vision by evacuating 
alley dwellings (a “‘cancer’ in the life of Washington”588) and “cleaning up Pennsylvania 
Avenue”—tearing down “rooming houses, laundries, the cheapest class of hotels, and 
junk shops [that lined] the chief thoroughfare”589 (in other words, forcibly displacing 
large portions the city’s ethnic, minority, and underprivileged communities)—and 
erecting beautiful museums and federal agency buildings made of finest stone along the 
Mall’s borders (the museums and buildings we see today). The CFA cut down ancient 
trees, uprooted gardens, and removed old memorials that violated the uniformity and 
                                                                                                                                                 
would guide and control individual’s bodies, the CFA had assumed that future visitors 
would (as Savage puts it) “follow the same genteel decorum practiced in old public 
grounds.” However, as history has proved, the Mall would become a space for collective 
political behavior that is anything but “genteel.” Ibid, 173-4. 
588 “Purchase Assured of Belleau Woods,” Washington Post, February 13, 1923, 
2. 
589 National Commission, 29. “Cleaning” became a key metaphor for supporters 
of the CFA, who sought to eliminate anything that polluted their vision of the Mall. As 
George B. Ford, a famous architect and CFA advocate, publicly stated, the CFA’s plans 
for the Mall would help make Washington “the cleanest, most dignified, the most 
impressive, the most beautiful city in the world.” See “Says Ugly Buildings Mar 
Washington,” Washington Post, February 6, 1927, SM5. 
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symmetry of the envisioned space.590 As Kirk Savage reveals, many D.C. residents 
viewed the CFA’s aggressive attack on the established topography—and most 
importantly, the razing of the Mall’s natural beauty—as something akin to a masculine 
“rape of the Mall.” Savage writes: “[For them,] trees represented shade, comfort, 
companionship—all elements of the therapeutic sympathy”—a decidedly feminine set of 
concerns.591 Advocates of the CFA’s plan, however, dismissed these charges and publicly 
branded the CFA’s critics as “ground-huggers.”592 The CFA was so committed to 
applying its aesthetic system to the National Mall and diminishing the previously 
multivocal nature of the space that, following the World War, it denied many veterans 
                                                 
590 The constant removal of undesired memorials served as a stark reminder that 
no monument is necessarily permanent. In Standing Soldiers, Kneeling Slaves, Kirk 
Savage writes: “Monuments attempt to mold a landscape of collective memory, to 
conserve what is worth remembering and discard the rest.” By conserving useful 
memorials and discarding the rest, the CFA in essence dictated what would be worth 
remembering through the National Mall’s landscape. Of course, the CFA itself ultimately 
designed and constructed colossal monuments like the Lincoln Memorial that would be 
all but impossible to remove in the future. See Kirk Savage, Standing Soldiers, Kneeling 
Slaves: Race, War, and Monument in Nineteenth-Century America (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), 4. 
591 According to Mircea Eliade, shade symbolizes many cosmological meanings 
that are common to most cultures. For instance, shade can represent the marking of time 
(embodied by the sun dial). It can signify the cosmological distortion of space, for the 
length of one’s shadow changes with the sun’s elevation angle. Shade can be understood 
in terms of “Cosmic Night”—a return from the chaos of the world to the safety of the 
mother’ womb (within the context of the National Mall debates, this is a very relevant 
meaning). Finally, shade can imply the moment before transition from one state of being 
to another—the moment before one returns to the light (“Even though I walk through the 
valley of the shadow of death…”). See Eliade, Symbolism, 6-9. 
592 Savage, Monuments Wars, 179-91. The use of the term “ground-huggers” can 
be understood not only as a reflection of the CFA’s attack on public grounds, but also as 
a jibe against the feminine connotations of ground and soil. As Mircea Eliade states, 
cultures have tended to understand the soil in terms of female fertility and the womb; for 
thousands of years, farmers have used spades and other phallic-like tools to till the soil 
and plant seeds that eventually blossom into foods and grains. See Eliade, Symbolism, 6. 
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groups and divisions from erecting their own permanent memorials on the Mall.593 In a 
similar vein, the commission adamantly opposed a 1920 Congressional plan to establish 
on the Mall “a memorial to Negro soldiers and sailors” of the Great War. The CFA 
claimed: “While recognizing the services of the Negro soldiers and sailors and that of 
other divisions of the population, the Commission thought that no action with regard to 
designating a site for a memorial proposed should be taken until such time as in the 
judgment of Congress it shall be decided to signalize in some appropriate way the 
participation of the United States in the World War.” Punting the matter to the future, the 
CFA effectively haulted the proposal (which, if enacted, would have complicated and 
disrupted the CFA’s carefully composed visual ensemble).594 
The CFA, however, constructed two elaborate Civil War monuments at the 
opposite ends of the Mall—the Lincoln Memorial and the Grant Memorial—with the 
intention of displaying a condensed and discernable timeline of the nation’s history. 
Savage writes: “With the Washington Monument in the center, representing in abstract 
form the birth of the nation, the outer poles of their composition could be devoted to the 
solemn story of the nation’s rebirth: what Lincoln at Gettysburg called ‘a new birth of 
freedom.’”595 At first glance triumphant in nature, the Lincoln and Grant memorials 
were—artistically speaking—revolutionary for their emotional and psychological 
complexity. As Savage argues, at the Lincoln Memorial—where “the colossal effigy” of 
                                                 
593 As Savage tells us, the CFA prevented “the forty-two individual army 
divisions that had fought in Europe from each erecting its own independent monument” 
on the Mall. Ultimately, three World War I memorials, “two of which featured long lists 
of names of the dead,” were permitted to be built on the Mall (of course, the design plans 
were approved by the CFA). See Savage, Monument Wars, 241-2. 
594 Commission, Ninth Report, 80. 
595 Ibid, 169. 
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an intense and pensive Lincoln simultaneously beckons visitors to approach him and 
gazes past them into the distance—“we are asked not to celebrate Lincoln’s triumph but 
to experience in our own way the tragic load he had to carry.”596 And the Grant 
Memorial—“animated by the anonymous figures of soldiers engaged in desperate 
action”—lacks any kind of “redemptive narrative”; instead, Savage claims, it offers “an 
intense focus on the individual experience of combat” that threatens “to turn the 
monument’s soldiers from heroes into victims, and the monument’s viewers from 
reassured citizens intro traumatized witnesses.”597 Furthermore, the Lincoln and Grant 
memorials revealed the CFA’s preference for a new type of memorial: the “spatial 
monument” (as Savage terms it)—a monument elevated above a broad flight of steps 
that, much like the Washington Monument, always transcends the subject position of the 
viewer below.598 Thus, the CFA transformed the Mall into a tightly organized “flow of 
space” that amplified visions of American white male heroism through the careful 
placement of innovative and dominating, if somewhat abstract and cerebral, permanent 
memorials.599 
                                                 
596 Savage argues that this portrayal of Lincoln as a strong but apparently worried 
leader responded to “a broader cultural anxiety that the United States, in its new 
affluence, was becoming overcivilized and effeminate.” Echoing the sentiments of Teddy 
Roosevelt’s call for a masculine return to the “strenuous life […] a life of toil and effort, 
or labor strife,” the Lincoln statue, Savage claims, helped advance the “ideal of 
unflinching commitment in the face of suffering and despair […] the sort of ‘intellectual 
conception’ that the stock [Civil War] soldier monument lacked” (217-28). 
597 Savage argues that the Lincoln and Grant memorial’s “attention to suffering 
opened a space for a new consciousness of trauma and victimization, even though neither 
monument was yet couched in the vocabulary of victimhood we have come to recognize 
today” (228-37). 
598 Ibid, 197-210. 
599 Permanence was a key concept for the CFA, as the commission intended to 
create a visual ensemble that would last forever. As Charles Moore, Chairman of the 
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The CFA’s work on the National Mall also extended across the Potomac River, to 
Arlington National Cemetery. Possessing “the cooperation and support of Maj. Gen. 
Harry L. Rogers, Quartermaster General, United States Army,” the CFA attempted to 
connect (both physically and symbolically) the cemetery to the National Mall, and apply 
an ordered aesthetic system to that sprawling and under-planned burial ground. 
Established in 1864, Arlington National Cemetery reflected nineteenth century principles 
of landscape composition: the headstones swept across rolling and irregular hills; random 
trees claimed prominent space to break up the order of the headstones; undulating (and 
poorly paved) roadways adapted to the land’s contours, cutting back and forth throughout 
the cemetery; and grave markers came in different shapes and sizes, and often expressed 
personal, sentimental, and unique messages. In short, the eclecticism, disorder, and 
dissymmetry of the cemetery’s physical presentation violated the fundamental 
sensibilities of the CFA. Furthermore, Arlington was a place of exploration, where the 
visitor was always the addresser and rarely the addressee. 
In 1920, the CFA publicly announced its design plans for Arlington in a 
Washington Post op-ed. Recognizing the perceived sacredness of the site and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
CFA from 1915-1937, told the New York Times, “A memorial should be made to last a 
thousand years.” The CFA, however, recognized the challenges of communicating 
constant and enduring messages across time. “No living person can foresee or even 
imagine the future of the United States in wealth and power,” the CFA wrote in a 1921 
report of its work on the Mall. “The utmost one can do is to build as wisely and as 
adequately as his limited vision will permit. No plan is final in so far as 
comprehensiveness is concerned. No plan will be large enough for the future.” But 
despite these words, the CFA did attempt to create a symbolic space “large enough for 
the future” by erecting grand monuments that displayed abstract but discernable 
messages concerning democratic ideals of freedom, justice, courage, and sacrifice, that 
could not easily diminish or alter with time. See “Efforts to Prevent Inartistic War 
Memorials,” New York Times, March 23, 1919, 73; and National Commission, 38. 
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complexities of reworking a space where human bodies were buried, the CFA introduced 
its objectives by expressing a profound appreciation for the cemetery’s purposes and 
meanings: “Arlington is a national shrine, sacred to the memory of the thousands of 
soldier dead, named and unnamed, who lie buried under the shade of its trees. This sacred 
character should be protected and fostered.” Following these opening lines, the CFA laid 
out its plans. First, the commission proposed renovating and preserving Robert E. Lee’s 
“Arlington House” on Mount Vernon, a domestic structure of “historical importance” 
(these words indicated that the cemetery, much like the Mall, could be a space for 
displaying the nation’s historical timeline). Because “Arlington prospectively is a portion 
of the great central composition of Washington, extending from the Capitol through the 
Mall to the Monument and on to the Lincoln Memorial,” the CFA advocated the 
construction of a grand and artistically beautiful bridge that would link “Arlington to the 
park system of Washington” (what we now know as the Arlington National Bridge).600 
The CFA recommended that a newly constructed amphitheater at Arlington “serve the 
double purpose of an auditorium [and] place for [burial services]”—in other words, a 
designated venue for certain kinds of sanctioned, patriotic rhetorical activity. It argued for 
“the improvement and development of roadways” that would accommodate cars and link 
neglected burial areas “now cut off from the main cemetery and rarely visited excepting 
by people searching for an individual grave.” The CFA also hoped to instigate a new 
“planting scheme” (i.e., a human taming of wildlife) that would accentuate the sites’ 
                                                 
600 In all likelihood, the CFA’s desire to build a connecting bridge between the 
cemetery and the National Mall represented a hope that some of the perceived sacredness 
of the burial ground would rub off on the newly redesigned Mall.  
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natural beauty, instill the site with a more masculine character,601 and address particular 
deficiencies in the cemetery’s visual presentation: 
 This means the immediate selection and planting of thousands of trees in 
 the now vacant spaces of Arlington. Today these treeless portions, so out of 
 harmony with the general appearance of the cemetery, give on the idea that the 
 graves of our latest heroes are being placed rather in a potter’s field than in an 
 honored location. 
 Elaborate flower beds of gaudy flowers are a disturbance in Arlington. 
 Until trees have been planted and roads and buildings repaired the money spent 
 on the maintenance of flower beds should be minimized. 
 
Finally, the CFA wanted to instill a greater sense of uniformity by eliminating the 
eclectic nature of the sites’ grave markers and spacing all soldiers’ headstones evenly. 
Highlighting the fact that many officers’ plots were elaborate and overweening 
(presumably because most Civil War officers had come from well-to-do families who 
could afford expensive, artistically beautiful headstones), the CFA stated: “The 
regulations against mausoleums, portraits, and unusual designs, should be enforced for 
the protection of the many against the self-assertion of the few. The officers whose 
careers need eulogy on a tombstone should not be accorded in Arlington the credit that 
history denies.” Thus, the cemetery would begin to express forcefully the democratic 
ideal of equality. In conclusion, the CFA defended its plan with a somewhat overwrought 
appeal to the memory of the dead and the feelings of grieving families: “So much the 
Nation owes to the last resting place of those who have fought its battles, and to the 
relatives and friends who pay tribute to the memory of the heroes.” Advancing the same 
                                                 
601 Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Americans 
understood flowers to be “ornamental” and feminine in character—traits that the CFA 
generally detested. See Elias A. Long, Ornamental Gardening for Americans: A Treatise 
on Beautifying Homes, Rural Districts, Towns, and Cemeteries (New York: Orange Judd 
Company, 1907). 
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principles that guided its work on the National Mall, the CFA effectively argued for the 
overhaul of Arlington (its plans would, in time, come to fruition).602 
The CFA’s project in Arlington not only represented the aesthetic philosophy of 
the commission, but also coincided with emerging contemporary American gravescape 
practices. In his essay, “Death on Display,” rhetoric scholar Richard Morris historicizes, 
describes, and compares the aesthetic attributes and cultural receptions of (what he 
identifies as) the three major epochs of American “gravescape” design: “memento mori” 
(practiced until the early nineteenth century), “garden romance” (practiced throughout 
most of the nineteenth century), and “epic heroism” (practiced since the late nineteenth 
century). Memento mori gravescapes refer to early American church graveyards that 
were often situated in the heart of bustling urban life. Typified by cemeteries like the 
Granary Burial Ground in Boston, Massachusetts, memento mori gravescapes (as Morris 
puts it) “presented visitors with a singular rhetorical and cultural imperative: remember 
death, for the time of judgment is at hand.” Asking passers-by to “remember death” 
(hence, “memento mori”), the cemetery’s gravestones (often haphazard, chaotic, and 
unkempt in appearance) usually displayed gloomy inscriptions and (to the modern eye) 
startling death-related icons (such as skulls, crossed bones, coffins, shovels, picks, 
funeral shrouds, crashing waves, and hourglasses) that spoke to the literate and illiterate 
alike. Eschewing celebration of the heroic deeds and accomplishments of the deceased, 
and exhibiting messages regarding the presumably vast separation between the here and 
now and the afterlife, the memento mori gravescape offered a constant reminder of the 
                                                 
602 Ed Streeter, “Proposed Improvements for Arlington,” Washington Post, 
December 19, 1920, 72. 
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traditional Christian worldview that life is little more than one long preparation for death 
(thus, one must live according the morals and standards of religious faith).603  
With the rise of Romantic and Victorian sensibilities regarding life, death, and 
aesthetics, a very different kind of American gravescape was popularized throughout the 
mid-nineteenth century: the garden romance gravescape. A countryside (or “rural”) 
cemetery that united the charm of nature and art, the garden romance gravescape sought 
to represent a more “humanistic” worldview that held death not as an otherworldly 
experience, but rather as a natural process. Epitomized by the Mount Auburn Cemetery in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, the garden romance gravescape effectively cast death as a 
natural process, the deceased individual as a source of emotions (e.g., loss, grief, 
inspiration, serenity), and the cemetery as a social attraction—a place of congregation 
(with others and with nature) and recreation (day-tripping, picnicking, and hiking). As 
Morris tells us, visitors of the garden romance gravescape usually found rolling hills, 
meandering pathways, and “an extraordinary garden luxuriously adorned with nature and 
appointed with the most remarkable works of art money could supply.” Often displaying 
inspirational nature and/or art icons (as opposed to somber religious and death-related 
symbols), grave markers were eclectic material and visual celebrations of the respective 
deceased individual’s life and accomplishments. Typically bourgeois and exclusive (the 
poor usually could not afford to bury, nor visit, their dead there, while African-Americans 
and people of color were often barred altogether from interring their departed), the garden 
romance gravescape advanced an elite, enlightened, and white belief that “death is far 
                                                 
603 Morris, “Death on Display,” 205-9. 
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less a struggle against chaos than an opportunity to understand and become” one with 
thyself, fellow human beings, nature, and the supernatural.604 
The third epoch Morris identifies is the epic heroism605 gravescape (established in 
cities, suburbs, and rural communities alike). Reflecting certain aspects of capitalist 
democracy and the industrial revolution,606 and counteracting the exclusivity, eclecticism, 
and sentimentality of the garden romance gravescape, the epic heroism gravescape was 
personified by the lawn cemetery, “an open vista, unobstructed by fences, memorials, 
aesthetic renderings, and flora” (as Morris puts it), where the dead were identified by 
seemingly identical, evenly-spaced, flat markers that were level or nearly level with the 
ground. Developed during the mid- and late-nineteenth century and ubiquitous by the 
early twentieth century, the epic heroism gravescape did not “invite viewers to 
contemplate nature or art or one’s ‘finer sentiments.’” Instead, much like the Washington 
Monument on the National Mall, the lawn cemetery displayed “an accomplishment of 
labor rather than of artistic skill,” equated “size with significance,” asserted “dominance 
over its environment, over nature,” and privileged reason, reality, and the ideals of 
meritocracy over emotion, speculations on the afterlife, and liberal individualism. 
Eliminating all things that suggested death, sorrow, or pain, and instilling an undeniable 
sense of homogeneity, this “deathless” space made efficient use of valuable land offered 
ordinary citizens an inexpensive and accessible place to bury their dead, and shifted 
                                                 
604 Ibid, 209-15. 
605 Morris claims that this gravescape echoed the aesthetics and meanings of the 
Washington Monument, “a structure of such monumental proportions [that] announces 
both the dominance of the species over nature and the consequences of epic heroism” 
(hence the term, “epic heroism gravescape”). See Morris, 215-6. 
606 Uniformly designed and presented, these gravestones were the perfect 
embodiments of the ideologies and practices of the age of mechanical reproduction. 
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aesthetic decision-making power from plot owners to a newly created professional 
position, the cemetery superintendent—who, much like the CFA, was authorized to 
dictate and manage the visual composition of crucial civic space.607  
Although the underlying principles and cultural meanings of the lawn cemetery 
dovetailed with many of the sensibilities and ideologies of the CFA, certain aspects of the 
epic heroism gravescape posed complications for the CFA’s project in Europe. First, the 
epic heroism gravescape practically hid its headstones in the grass; from a distance, the 
typical lawn cemetery looked like a golf fairway or empty pasture. Given the CFA’s 
orientation toward public space rather than public grounds, as well as its general 
aspiration to dominate vistas with transcendent, vertical structures, the flat headstones—
affixed in the soil and drawing each visitor’s attention to the ground—were inherently 
antithetical to the CFA’s protocol. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the epic 
heroism gravescape’s erasure of emotion and sentimentality could not (and certainly 
                                                 
607 Ibid, 215-21. For more on the evolving history of American cemetery design 
and practices, see Thomas Bender, “The ‘Rural’ Cemetery Movement: Urban Travail and 
the Appeal of Nature,” The New England Quarterly 47.2 (June, 1974): 196-211; 
Margaretta J. Darnall, “The American Cemetery as Picturesque Landscape: Bellefontaine 
Cemetery, St. Louis,” Winterthur Portfolio 18.4 (Winter, 1983): 249-69; Stanley French, 
“The Cemetery as Cultural Institution: The Establishment of Mount Auburn and the 
‘Rural Cemetery’ Movement,” American Quarterly 26.1 (March, 1974): 37-59; Jack 
Goody and Cesare Poppi, “Flowers and Bones: Approaches to the Dead in Anglo-
American and Italian Cemeteries,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 36.1 
(January, 1994): 146-75; David B. Knight, “Cemeteries as Living Landscapes,” Ottawa 
Branch: Ontario Genealogical Society Publication 73.8 (April, 1974): 1-55; Gary 
Laderman, “Locating the Dead: A Cultural History of Death in the Antebellum, Anglo-
Protestant Communities of the Northeast,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 
63.1 (Spring, 1995): 27-52; Lynn Rainville, “Hanover Deathscapes: Mortuary Variability 
in New Hampshire, 1770-1920,” Ethnohistory 46.3 (Summer, 1999): 541-97; 
Elizabethada A. Wright, “Reading the Cemetery, Lieu De Mémoire Par Excellance,” 
Rhetoric Society Quarterly 33.2 (Spring, 2003): 27-44; and idem, “Rhetorical Spaces in 
Memorial Places: The Cemetery as a Rhetorical Memory Place/Space,” Rhetoric Society 
Quarterly 35.4 (Fall, 2005): 51-81. 
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would not) be an attribute of the European sites. On the one hand the CFA hoped to 
establish a network of overseas cemeteries that would honor the nation’s war dead who 
had “fought bravely and successfully,” become “objects of pilgrimages by our people,” 
and make “American valor” “conspicuous” to “our own succeeding generation” and “our 
associates in the war.”608 That is to say, the overseas burial grounds would be overtly 
rhetorical in nature—not just “deathless” spaces like lawn cemeteries, devoid of 
emotion.609 On the other hand the physical composition of the overseas cemeteries would 
have to acknowledge, in some noticeable way, the sentiments and feelings of next of kin 
who had relinquished the care of their loved ones’ remains to the government. 
Of course, the cemeteries the CFA hoped to build in Europe would be military 
cemeteries—therefore, they would have to function in the same ways that domestic 
military cemeteries had during the decades preceding the Great War. Throughout the 
nineteenth century, Americans had turned to the natural splendor and majestic wilderness 
of the United States as a primary source of national identity. Encompassing the 
Adirondacks, the Florida Everglades, the Gulf Coast, the Colorado Rockies, the Sierra 
Nevada, the Mississippi River, the Grand Canyon, and the Great Lakes, the young nation 
boasted a diverse and majestic set of natural splendors and environmental climates that 
could be matched by few nations (if any). According to History and Environmental 
Studies scholar Roderick Frazier Nash, during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
                                                 
608 National Commission, 43. 
609 As Aristotle shows throughout Rhetoric—and as all contemporary rhetoricians 
assume—rhetoric always entails some degree emotion (pathos). Whereas philosophy tries 
to limit itself to matters of reason (logos), rhetoric always entails the interplay of ethos 
(character), pathos, and logos. 
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centuries it was “widely assumed that America’s primary task was the justification of its 
newly won freedom”: 
The nation’s short history, weak traditions, and minor literary and artistic 
 achievements  seemed negligible compared to those of Europe. But in at least one 
 respect Americans sensed that their country was different: wilderness had no 
 counterpart in the Old World  […] nationalists argued that far from being a 
 liability, wilderness was actually an American asset […] by the middle decades of 
 the nineteenth century wilderness was recognized as a cultural and moral resource 
 and a basis for nation self-esteem.610 
 
The paintings of Thomas Cole and the other members of the Hudson River School, and 
the writings of Thoreau, Emerson, and Whitman, celebrated the American wilderness as 
the nation’s most defining and virtuous characteristic.611 By the 1890s, however, the 
United States had sufficiently developed its own literary, artistic, and musical canons; 
had conquered and domesticated most of its frontier (thus fulfilling the mandates of 
Manifest Destiny); and had become an industrial and economic power in the international 
arena. Therefore, the U.S. had little time or incentive to worship its natural resources in 
the ways it had over the previous hundred years.612 Moreover, given the traumatic social 
ruptures still troubling the nation in the wakes of the Civil War and Reconstruction, the 
American wilderness must have seemed like a particular deficient, or at least peripheral, 
rhetorical resource for articulating the ‘re-birthed’ country’s identity—not least because 
the respective natural wonders of the North and the South shared so little in common. 
                                                 
610 Roderick Frazier Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 4th ed. (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 67. 
611 Ibid, 44-84.  
612 Ibid, 143. The establishment of Yellowstone and the other U.S. National Parks 
during the late 1800s and early 1900s reflected less a veneration of American wilderness 
and more the necessity to defend the prestigious, untouched lands from greedy loggers, 
miners, and railroad companies. By the 1890s, American corporations saw the frontier 
less as a national shrine and more as an economic opportunity and resource for the 
industrial revolution. See Nash, Wilderness, 108-121. 
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In light of these cultural complications, during the 1890s, Civil War military 
cemeteries emerged as viable and effective political and rhetorical devices for expressing 
American identity and suturing critical national divides. Usually situated on or near the 
battlefields where Confederate and Union soldiers had killed each other and spilled their 
blood, these cemeteries were capable of simultaneously fostering therapeutic 
reconciliation between the North and the South (through relatively evenhanded 
commemoration of fallen soldiers from both sides) and displaying the dead citizen-
soldier (whether Confederate or Union) as a paradigmatic symbol of supposedly 
American democratic virtues: fidelity, bravery, strength, sacrifice, and duty.613 
Established by the Northern and Southern armies, private individuals, and 
grassroots veterans groups during the war itself, the 1860s, and the 1870s, the major 
burial grounds at Chickamauga and Chattanooga, Antietam, Shiloh, Gettysburg, and 
Vicksburg, had initially served as gathering places for next of kin and regiments from 
various states and regions to hold reunions and practice (often antagonistic) 
commemoration rituals in honor of the fallen. In keeping with the aesthetic sensibilities 
of the contemporary garden romance gravescape, these bucolic and sylvan cemeteries 
tended to feature grassy hills, giant boulders, shady paths, wildflowers, gently rolling 
creeks and springs, rustic stone walls, small forests, and haphazardly situated trees, for, as 
historian Timothy B. Smith tells us, each of these cemeteries was originally intended to 
                                                 
613 See, especially, Edward Tabor Linenthal, Sacred Ground: Americans and 
Their Battlefields (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1991), 1-7, 87-126, 213-
17; and Timothy B. Smith, The Golden Age of Battlefield Preservation: The Decade of 
the 1890s and the Establishment of America’s First Five Military Parks (Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 2008). 
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be “a revered land rather than a landscaped and beautified commercial attraction.”614 As 
historian Edward T. Linenthal points out, the natural beauty of these “picturesque 
pastoral” cemeteries—constructed on or close to the fields of battle—made it difficult to 
think of the “great violence” and “horror” of combat.615 Still, the violence of the Civil 
War was always present, for, as one of the founders of the Gettysburg Cemetery put it, 
the burial grounds were sacred in character because of their close proximity to the 
battlefields—the “contested and hallowed soil, already stained with the blood of the 
fallen.”616 
Much like the headstones and mausoleums erected in Mt. Auburn Cemetery and 
other “rural” burial grounds, the monuments that first appeared in these Civil War 
cemeteries were eclectic in nature, varying in size, design, material, and meaning.617 And 
reflecting the mid-nineteenth century American cultural emphasis on liberal 
individualism, these sites displayed an unprecedented pattern in American military 
funerary practices: that of memorializing each individual soldier with his own grave 
marker.618 As Smith writes:  
                                                 
614 Smith, Golden Age, 8, 19, 131, 164-5. 
615 Linenthal, Sacred Ground, 89-90. 
616 Ibid, 93. Since time immemorial, human societies have considered soil where 
blood has been shed (whether through war or rituals of sacrifice) to be sacred. See Eliade, 
Symbolism, 108. Following the Great War, the belief that the blood of U.S. soldiers had 
consecrated Europe’s battlefields became prevalent. As Charles Henry Brent, the Bishop 
of Western New York, publicly stated: “Bony is forever eloquent of the successful assault 
on the Hindenburg line on the St. Quentin Canal, where on September 29th, 1918, much 
precious American blood watered anew the already blood-soaked soil of Flanders.” See 
Charles Henry Brent, “Forever Overseas,” Word’s Work 43 (December, 1921): 135-7.  
617 Ibid, 105. 
618 Until this historical moment, collective memories of American soldierly dead 
had been maintained through abstract celebrations of iconic military figures. For instance, 
when George Washington died in 1799, towns throughout the republic held observances 
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Before the Civil War, military dead were generally memorialized as a group, 
 often with a single monument or marker. The […] cemeteries of the 1860s, 
 however, utilized individual plots with individual headboards or grave 
 identifications. Perhaps Thomas B. Van Horne, a chaplain in the United States 
 Army [in charge of the cemetery at  Chattanooga] best summed up this 
 developing attitude [when he] noted that extreme care would be taken to “secure a 
 short military history of every officer and soldier interred in the cemetery whose 
 remains have been identified […] It seems eminently fitting that this should be 
 done [as it] accords with our intense individualism as a people, and with the 
 value we attach to individual life.”619 
 
But while the individual grave markers were meant to “secure a short military history of 
every officer and soldier interred,” the cemeteries, in general, were not intended to 
preserve history in a completely factual manner, for each of them elided a thorny, 
inconvenient, but crucial aspect of the Civil War’s narrative: black slavery. From their 
inceptions onwards, none of these major cemeteries incorporated the graves of black 
soldiers, celebrated the accomplishments of African Americans in the war, nor mentioned 
the institution of slavery as a central point of stasis between the Union and the 
Confederacy.620 Even Arlington National Cemetery—established by the federal 
government on Robert E. Lee’s estate (a decidedly provocative act intended to signal 
Northern supremacy)—failed to honor fallen African Americans in any discernable way. 
At Arlington, the graves of white Union soldiers were situated on the prominent and 
visible heights of Mt. Vernon, while the graves of African-American Union soldiers were 
placed at an inconspicuous section in the northeast corner of the estate; thus, at Arlington, 
                                                                                                                                                 
and funerary rituals as if Washington’s body was actually present. Through these 
celebrations of Washington’s absent body—“a potent symbol of national unity”—
communities across the country simultaneously honored the sacrifices and achievements 
of all the soldiers who had fought for American independence. See Laderman, The 
Sacred Remains, 16-17, 20. 
619 Smith, Golden Age, 21-2. 
620 Linenthal, Sacred Ground, 91; and Smith, Golden Age, 33-4. 
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African American soldiers were racially segregated and marked in death just as they had 
been in life.621 
By the 1890s, it was evident to veterans and politicians alike that Civil War 
cemeteries—and American war memorials in general—could be powerful symbolic 
resources for articulating national identity and healing festering social wounds. Between 
1875 and 1877, Congress had funded the erection of monuments on eight Revolutionary 
War battlefields, where official celebrations of the centennial of the nation’s 
independence could be held. One of the first documented gatherings of both Northern and 
Southern veterans came in 1875 at a centennial celebration for the Battle of Bunker Hill. 
According to Timothy B. Smith, “One hundred years after the birth of the nation, 
Americans of both sections celebrated their common heritage and their shared fight for 
independence. Both Northern and Southern whites could agree on the dedication and 
dominance of the American military and thus celebrated together their quest for 
independence and a republican government.”622 The lessons of the centennial festivities 
were not lost on the federal government. As Smith tell us, it became clear that Civil War 
sites of historical importance could serve a similar function: 
Rather than fight over race, [white] Americans sought common bonds that would 
 tie them together. What could be more honorable and reconciling than to 
 concentrate on the passing veterans of the Civil War and their courage, bravery, 
 and manliness on Civil War battlefields? […] The primary celebration of the Civil 
 War generation’s bravery and courage [came] to be extolled on the original 
 battlefields [and cemeteries], preserved as military parks.623 
 
                                                 
621 Marilyn Yalom, The American Resting Place: Four Hundred Years of History 
Through Our Cemeteries and Burial Grounds (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
2008), 262. 
622 Smith, Golden Age, 32-3. 
623 Ibid, 33. 
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During the 1890s, veterans groups, veteran-lawmakers in Congress, and the War 
Department worked in unison to pass legislation that would make Civil War cemeteries 
and their surrounding battlefields federally funded, protected, and controlled military 
parks where memories of soldiers from both sides would be preserved for all time.624 
Their joint plan called for honoring aging white Southern and Northern veterans before 
they died, protecting the cemeteries and historic fields from the intrusions of the second 
industrial revolution (railroads, transportation routes, and urban sprawl),625 purchasing 
private land on which some cemeteries and memorials had been constructed, and 
instilling rules of decorum and standards for the design of monuments and other objects 
placed in the parks (so as to prevent divisive rhetorical acts and combat visual 
eclecticism).626  
In time, the legislation passed, and by the early 1900s, the federal government had 
established the country’s first official military parks—sites that, as advocates put it, 
would “be of great interest and importance […] to the country at large and to future 
generations,”627 serve as “object lesson[s] of patriotism [of] absolute verity,”628 celebrate 
                                                 
624 Ibid, 35. In 1912, Congress passed legislation that shifted sole authority over 
the military parks to the Secretary of War. In 1933, this power was handed over to the 
National Park Service. Ibid, 48-9, 133-4. 
625 During the First World War, the American Expeditionary Forces used the 
battlefields of Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park as training grounds. 
Ironically, the military severely damaged the park, constructing trenches, polo fields, golf 
courses, and “temporary” barracks throughout the historic property—an indication that, at 
this time, the military did not fully appreciate the symbolic power and sacred character of 
the national military parks and cemeteries. See Smith, The Golden Age, 73. 
626 Linenthal, Sacred Ground, 87-126. 
627 Civil War veteran Stephen B. Elkins made this statement in an 1891 official 
report to Congress. See Smith, Golden Age, 37. 
628 Secretary of War Russell A. Alger wrote these words in his 1897 annual report 
to Congress. See Smith, 42. 
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the North and the South’s “joint and precious heritage,”629 and radiate with the “golden 
mist of American valor.”630 Designed to ignore the accomplishments, sacrifices, 
hardships, and status of African Americans, these sites were used to foster and promote 
the ideology of reconciliation between the North and the South as the young nation 
transitioned from a turbulent inaugural century to its next, and more promising, hundred 
years of existence. On July 4, 1913, President Woodrow Wilson highlighted this 
whitewashed spirit of reconciliation in his keynote address at the fiftieth anniversary of 
the battle at Gettysburg. Speaking before a group of Union and Confederate veterans on 
the Gettysburg battlefield, Wilson stated: 
How wholesome and healing the peace has been! We have found one another 
 again as brothers and comrades, in arms, enemies no longer, generous friends 
 rather, our battles long past, the quarrel forgotten—except we shall not forget the 
 splendid valor, the manly devotion of the men then arrayed against one another, 
 now grasping hands and smiling into each other’s eyes.631 
 
By the late 1910s and early 1920s, the Civil War cemeteries had evolved from unofficial, 
vernacular burial grounds into pilgrimage destinations, official national memorials, and 
beautiful tourist attractions632—sacred places that fostered reconciliation between 
politically and culturally divided white citizens, offered visitors a powerful imaginative 
                                                 
629 These are the words of Virginia Governor Angus W. McLean, a vocal 
advocate for the preservation of Civil War battlefields and cemeteries. See Linenthal, 
Sacred Ground, 90. 
630 These words, too, belonged to Governor McLean. See Linenthal, 90. 
631 Smith, Golden Age, 174. 
632 For more on this evolution, see Jim Weeks, Gettysburg: Memory, Market, and 
an American Shrine (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 13-84. 
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entry into the past,633 and served as holy sites where Americans could performing the 
emerging rituals of a new and powerful form of civic religion.634 
                                                 
633 As future military icon George S. Patton remarked in a 1909 personal diary 
entry: “This evening […] I walked down alone to the scene of the last and fiercest 
struggle on Cemetery hill. To get in a proper frame of mind I wandered through the 
cemetery and let the spirits of the dead thousands laid there in ordered rows sink deep 
into me. Then just as the son [sic] sank […] I walked down to the scene of Pickett’s great 
charge and seated on a rock just where Olmstead and two of my great uncles died I 
watched the wonder of the day go out. The sunset painted a dull red the fields over which 
the terrible advance was made and I could almost see them coming growing fewer and 
fewer while around and beyind [sic] me stood calmly the very cannon that had so 
punished them. There were some quail calling in the trees near by and it seemed strange 
that they could do it where man had known his greatest and his last emotions. It was very 
wonderful and no one came to bother me. I drank it in until I was quite happy. A strange 
pleasure yet a very real one.” George S. Patton, Jr., The Patton Papers 1885-1940, ed. 
Martin Blumenson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972), 173, quoted in Linenthal, 
Sacred Ground, 116-7. 
634 In their essay, “National Park Landscapes and the Rhetorical Display of Civic 
Religion,” S. Michael Halloran and Gregory Clark argue that the Civil War and 
Revolutionary War military parks that the federal government established at the turn of 
the century helped foster a new civic religion that combined nineteenth century 
veneration of nature with the rhetorical power of military relics and memorials (which 
signified notions of sacrifice, martyrdom, and patriotism). Halloran and Clark point out 
that the Saratoga Military Park became a New York State historical park in 1927, when 
the Model T Ford was introducing millions of Americans to the ritual of scenic tourism; 
this fact explains the “tour road” that cuts through the park, along which contemporary 
visitors found stops marked by pictorial and textual aids meant to assist in the visualizing 
of battle events. The authors posit that, much like believers who participate in the 
Catholic ritual known as the stations of the cross, visitors of the park were encouraged to 
follow a narrative by moving through the actual (and imagined) landscape, pausing along 
the way to meditate on specific persons and events understood to be representative of 
Americans’ collective identity. Names, labels, and narratives directed visitors’ attention 
to whatever purportedly was significant or desirable about visually displayed objects, 
thus turning the seemingly ordinary—tombstones, a restored eighteenth century 
farmhouse, and musket balls, for example—into sacred symbols of a new civic religion. 
Achieving the central goals of epideictic rhetoric—which seeks to amplify and display 
the supposedly shared virtues, beliefs, and identity, of the community to community 
members—the Saratoga Park (much like the Civil War cemeteries) afforded visitors the 
opportunity to undergo a transcendent and inspirational experience through their 
immediate and visceral encounter with symbolic representations of the ideals of the 
American nation. See Halloran and Clark, in Prelli, 141-56. For more on the nature and 
political function of epideictic rhetoric, see Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. John Henry Freese 
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Thus, by the time the CFA began formulating its design plans for the burial 
grounds in Europe, military cemeteries situated on or near the killing fields where 
interred soldiers had died had become effective vehicles for sustained articulations of 
national identity and the common heritage of all (or, at least white) Americans. Honoring 
each individual as a citizen-soldier (rather than, say, as a taxpayer, husband or participant 
in democratic processes), amplifying the American democratic virtue of sacrifice by 
displaying seemingly countless numbers of head stones,635 obfuscating and revealing the 
violence that had caused the dead soldiers’ demise, and smoothing over unsavory and still 
unresolved contradictions of national history (e.g., slavery, Southern secession), the Civil 
War cemeteries (and surrounding government-sanctioned military parks) had become 
sites where the living could associate themselves with the causes, meanings, and 
democratic virtues supposedly embodied by the temporally distant, but always present, 
violence that had occurred in those very same spaces.636 Re-mediated as war memorials, 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1911); and Yun Lee Too, “Epideictic Genre,” in 
Sloane, 251-7. 
635 In her incredibly insightful treatise on audience reception to representations of 
war and suffering, Regarding the Pain of Others, Susan Sontag argues that photographs 
have the ability to make previously abstract death tolls (e.g., the eighty thousand Chinese 
civilians killed during the Japanese “Rape of Nanking”) tangible and meaningful. We 
might say the same thing about the individual headstones that, for 150 years, have 
appeared in American military cemeteries. Whereas iconic memorials, or sepulchers 
containing the remains of many men, condense and minimize individual sacrifices into a 
single representation of loss, individual headstones displayed side by side indicate a 
collective sacrifice that seems almost greater than the sum of its parts. See Susan Sontag, 
Regarding the Pain of Others (New York: Picador, 2003), 84-5. 
636 In her on-going study of contemporary funerary and commemoration practices 
in inner-city Baltimore, Maryland communication scholar Katie O’Neill has argued that 
when a deceased person is aligned with a particular territory, the living who align 
themselves with the deceased automatically become aligned with that same territory (and 
its meanings or symbolic values). The theory she is developing is useful for 
understanding sites like the Civil War cemeteries and the American World War I 
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these burial grounds also revealed that public memory could be a dominant rhetorical 
resource for expressing national identity, that individual grave markers could effectively 
stand in place of dead U.S. soldiers as virtual replicas of human life (which 
simultaneously made the dead seem more alive and softened the profound loss of the 
nation’s men),637 and that military cemeteries could enlarge temporal horizons by 
situating particular crises within the nation’s broader historical narrative.638 While the 
CFA must have been troubled by the nineteenth century aesthetic sensibilities exhibited 
by the visual presentation of the Civil War Cemeteries, it surely apprehended the fact that 
natural beauty still held rhetorical appeal for many Americans. And given the fact that the 
overseas military cemeteries would have to exhibit American democratic ideals like 
equality, the CFA would be compelled to incorporate the bodies of African Americans in 
a manner that the Civil War cemeteries had not (for to do otherwise would, in all 
likelihood, seem absurd, hypocritical, and confusing to international audiences). Still, the 
Civil War cemeteries—considered sacred by virtue of their proximity to tracts of land 
                                                                                                                                                 
cemeteries in Europe, and I plan to use and build upon throughout my future work. Katie 
O’Neill, “A Mournful Fashion: Form, Function, and Meaning of Baltimore's R.I.P T-
Shirts,” (Agora lecture, Department of Communication, University of Pittsburgh, 
Pittsburgh, PA, October 26, 2007). 
637 I have argued elsewhere that immovable material objects placed in important 
civic spaces can be effective vessels for sustained symbolic action and the representation 
of those whose bodily presence is not otherwise possible. See David W. Seitz, “A 
Material Diatribe: Gaudencio Fernandez’s ‘Liberty Wall’ and the Fight for Latino 
Immigrants,” Queen: A Journal of Rhetoric and Power 5.2 (September 2010) online 
journal, n.p. 
638 By situating the Civil War within a longer national timeline (“Four score and 
seven years ago…”), Lincoln’s “Gettysburg Address” effectively broadened temporal 
horizons in a way that would help the American people cope with the tragedies of the 
war. 
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where American blood had been shed—were useful and instructive templates and 
references for the CFA as it undertook its project in Europe. 
Of course, unlike soldiers of the Revolutionary War and the Civil War, American 
soldiers of the Great War had not shed their blood on American soil. Rather, their blood 
had been spilled on distant foreign territories. The reality that the nation’s World War 
cemeteries would be constructed thousands of miles away from the homeland raised 
several daunting challenges for the CFA. First, the commission would have to discover 
ways of symbolically re-linking the cemeteries and the bloodstained killing fields of 
Europe (once the old world, and now, in a sense, the new world) with American soil.639 
Second, if the overseas burial grounds were going to serve as pilgrimage destinations for 
U.S. citizens (as the CFA hoped), the sites would have to feature particular aesthetic 
attributes and ideological meanings that Americans had been conditioned to expect and 
recognize in their national military cemeteries (and the National Mall). Third, given the 
cemeteries’ location and the rhetorical work that U.S. political and military officials 
hoped to conduct through the sites,640 the burial grounds would also have to speak to the 
hearts and minds of Europeans (and presumably, peoples from around the world)—an 
                                                 
639 As Drew Gilpin Faust reveals, during the Civil War, American families had 
been shocked by the fact that their men (most of whom had never left their local counties) 
would be fighting and dying many miles away from home. As one South Carolina 
woman remarked in 1863, it was “much more painful” to give up a “loved one [who] is a 
stranger in a strange land.” With respect to the World War, one can only imagine the 
trauma families experienced when their loved ones were drafted and shipped overseas to 
fight and die (This Republic, 9). 
640 According to cultural historian Ron Robin, the federal government and the 
U.S. military hoped the permanent overseas cemeteries would “dramatize [the nation’s] 
accomplishments” in the Great War and “establish powerful and uniform symbols of the 
national spirit abroad.” See Ron Robin, “‘A Foothold in Europe’: The Aesthetics and 
Politics of American War Cemeteries in Western Europe,” Journal of American Studies 
29.1 (1995): 55-72 (56-7). 
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enormously difficult task that struck at the heart of epideictic rhetoric (ceremonial 
speech).641 Finally, since the cemeteries were intended to be symbols of both the young 
modern nation’s decisive role in the Great War and its newfound place on the world’s 
stage, the sites would have to match, and perhaps even exceed, the monumentality and 
beauty of the cemeteries that France, England and other European states (nations that 
already possessed older, famous, and respected aesthetic traditions) had constructed in 
honor of their respective fallen soldiers during the immediate postwar years (a point that 
will be addressed later in the chapter). 
The CFA was further constrained by material realities. For instance, whereas the 
Commonwealth War Graves Commission (of the United Kingdom) had more than 
400,000 dead bodies to work with as it designed and established over 500 permanent 
cemeteries throughout Continental Europe, the CFA had just over 30,000 American 
bodies at its disposal. Thus, it was evident that the CFA would not be able to construct 
hundreds of cemeteries (as the U.K. and France had done), for each of these burial 
grounds would display only a small number of headstones—a visual characteristic that 
would diminish each site’s grandeur and make the task of exhibiting American sacrifice 
in the Great War all the more difficult. Furthermore, the CFA was compelled to squeeze 
as much symbolic power as possible out of each dead American; this meant that even the 
bodies of African-American soldiers (typically ignored in American war commemoration 
projects) and U.S. troops who had died less than manly and glorious deaths (disease, 
                                                 
641 As historian Seth G. Benardete writes: “To praise the Athenians at Athens, 
Socrates remarks, or the Spartans at Sparta is not very difficult; but to praise the 
Athenians at Sparta or the Spartans at Athens demands great rhetorical skill. See 
Aeschylus, The Suppliant Maidens: The Persians, trans. and intro. Seth G. Benardete 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 44–5. 
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suicide) were invaluable to the CFA’s project, and would have to be seamlessly 
incorporated into the visual presentation of the overseas cemeteries.642 Of course, the 
bodily remains of U.S. soldiers were not pieces of stone, metal, or soil that could be 
roughly handled, manipulated, and used like construction materials. No, they were pieces 
of human flesh and bone belonging to American war dead that demanded careful and 
downright reverent treatment.643 This point became patently clear in 1925, when, while 
visiting one of the nascent permanent U.S. burial grounds in France, Senator David A. 
Reed was horrified to discover that soldiers’ coffins were routinely removed from the soil 
and rearranged to suit the aesthetic presentation of the cemetery. “From this I heartily 
dissent,” Reed proclaimed. “These graves ‘not yet re-arranged’ are graves made in war 
time, many of them made immediately after battle, and their irregularity is readily 
pardoned by everyone who understands this fact […] It is possible to have cemeteries 
altogether beautiful without re-arranging the graves […] Surely after seven years the 
                                                 
642 Gary Laderman shows that throughout American history, suicide has been a 
taboo (and for many religious communities, a sin guaranteeing damnation). Thus, the 
bodies of those who commit suicide have, generally speaking, been problematic for 
families and communities, because, as Laderman writes, “the body of a suicide [is] an 
outcast from the social order. What was once a living human being [is] now a pure and 
insignificant object, thoroughly desacralized and empty of meaning.” Because they 
needed to keep numbers high, the planners of America’s overseas cemeteries would 
incorporate the graves of soldiers who committed suicide or died of disease just as they 
would include the graves of soldiers who died “nobly” in action. Of course, the causes of 
all soldiers’ deaths would be whitewashed and obfuscated nearly to the point where one 
would not know that they had died violently and prematurely. See Laderman, Sacred 
Remains, 18-20. 
643 Gary Laderman describes human society’s fundamental concern with proper 
treatment of the dead body thusly: “While most societies have turned to religious 
authorities and teachings to make metaphysical sense of death, confronting the reality of 
the human corpse has been a particularly compelling dilemma for survivors. As 
sociologist Robert Hertz observed, the death of a societal member ‘is tantamount to a 
sacrilege’ because society itself ‘is stricken in the very principle of its life, in the faith it 
has in itself.’” See Laderman, Sacred Remains, 1. 
 324 
bodies of the men are entitled to be left in peace.”644 Senator Reed was shocked that such 
an action would take place, even without the force of public scrutiny. 
Several other material realities presented complex, if not overtly apparent, 
challenges to the CFA’s project. For instance, the CFA faced the difficult task of properly 
marking the graves of the 1,600 dead U.S. soldiers whose identities were still unknown. 
What, exactly, would be the appropriate inscription for these men’s headstones? 
Additionally, if constructed near battlefields of the Great War, the American cemeteries 
necessarily would be situated in rural areas that lacked functioning roads (either because 
they had never been built or because they had been destroyed by four years of fierce 
fighting). How would visitors make their way to these pilgrimage destinations if there 
were no roads (or accessible accommodations for food and rest)? These scarred, 
decimated, and still muddy territories, however, were not only isolated; they were also 
extremely hazardous. Besides containing thousands of yet-to-be-discovered human 
corpses, the killing fields and forests were still riddled with active landmines, bombs that 
had not detonated, and unexploded chemical shells—objects that posed great danger to 
anyone traveling to the American cemeteries or exploring the former war zone.645 On top 
of being unsafe, the battlefields did not connote meanings that would be easily 
                                                 
644 Quoted in Ron Theodore Robin, Enclaves of America: The Rhetoric of 
American Political Architecture Abroad 1900-1965 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1992), 40. 
645 Soldierly remains and unexploded armament and chemical shells from the 
Great War are still routinely discovered in the fields and forests of Western Europe today. 
For instance, in February of 2011, Canadian authorities successfully identified the 
remains of Private Thomas Lawless of Calgary (killed in 1917), which had been 
discovered by a French farmer. See “WWI soldier found in France identified as 
Albertan,” cnews.ca, February 24, 2011 
(http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2011/02/24/17396621.html), accessed April 29, 
2011. 
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recognizable to American visitors. In comparison to names like “Valley Forge,” 
“Gettysburg,” “Antietam,” and “Shiloh,” which were immediately familiar to U.S. 
citizens, “Saint Mihiel” and “Bony” were certainly less than household terms. Moreover, 
whereas famous battles like Gettysburg had lasted just a few days, had been contained to 
a relatively small area of land had entailed discernable (and thus easily glorifiable) acts of 
individual and collective military bravery, and had ended with clear winners and losers, 
American operations in Europe had been drawn out, massive battles of attrition involving 
tens of thousands of men, had taken place in unfamiliar and distant regions along the 
Western Front, had generally not entailed discernable acts of individual and collective 
military bravery (because of the technologies and tactics of modern warfare), and had 
rarely ended with clear victors and vanquished. Consequently, the battlefields on which 
American overseas military cemeteries would be constructed—ravaged terrain devoid of 
natural beauty—would not easily, nor inherently, indicate the glory of the U.S. military’s 
accomplishments in the war. 
The CFA was also confronted with the quandary of procuring construction 
materials (such as stone, concrete, and steel) in Europe that would meet its needs and 
lofty standards. While the United States certainly had ample resources for the CFA’s 
overseas project, shipping blocks of Vermont marble (for example) across the Atlantic 
would be a costly affair. Furthermore, such an action held the potential of being 
construed as a kind of American invasion of Europe (a symbolic, rather than military, 
invasion, but an invasion nonetheless)—something the Wilson Administration certainly 
would not appreciate as it delicately negotiated postwar treaties with European allies and 
enemies alike. Therefore, the CFA would have to make due with the materials it could 
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afford to purchase in Europe. Of course, the CFA would be unable to obtain materials 
from Germany or Austria (just as it would be unable to erect cemeteries in those nations), 
and the CFA would have to anticipate the possible connotations of any material it used 
(Italian marble, for instance, might communicate to American visitors something entirely 
different than American marble).646 Finally, the CFA would have to consider the feelings, 
psychologies, and political goals of European military and governmental officials as it 
formulated and pitched its design plans (which would inevitably trumpet American 
greatness) and secured appropriate tracts of foreign land in perpetuity, for the permanent 
sites. Whereas the CFA wielded immense power in Washington, D.C., to do whatever it 
pleased, the commission would have to take into account, and satisfy, the sensibilities of 
foreign dignitaries so as to accomplish its goals and not offend. Ultimately, all of these 
material realities made it patently clear that few (if any) aspects of the CFA’s overseas 
project would be devoid of signification—that no material or object could ever simply be 
a symbolically neutral or inert piece of matter. 
The final, and perhaps most critical, constraint on the CFA was the implied 
mandate to recognize and represent through the cemeteries’ physical presentation the 
feelings, deep personal sacrifice, and expectations of grieving American families who 
                                                 
646 In fact, when the cemetery planners selected Italian Carrara marble for 
soldiers’ headstones, the Gold Star Mothers and Gold Star Fathers Associations 
(organizations for men and women who had lost their sons in the war) protested, and 
demanded the use of a more ‘patriotic’ stone, such as American granite (ultimately, the 
planners went with the Italian marble). See Lisa M. Budreau, Bodies of War: World War 
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had left their loved ones in Europe.647 The postwar correspondence between the 
government and relatives of dead soldiers during the immediate postwar years had 
exposed a complex and turbulent reserve of emotions—anxiety, anger, confusion, 
sadness, heartbreak, fear, and concern for the state of loved ones’ souls—that, in time, the 
government had learned to attend to and appropriate into its own official public rhetoric. 
Thus, while the nascent overseas cemeteries were going to be permanent sites that spoke 
to audiences across time, they would certainly have to speak to relatives of the dead who 
would be alive for some time. Given the fact that the CFA generally rejected overt 
sentimentality as a source for artistic expression, this imperative must have been 
frustrating and inconvenient. But as it began devising its plans for overseas burial 
grounds, the CFA was careful to express publicly a profound appreciation of the suffering 
of next of kin. Editors at the Washington Post were key advocates for the CFA’s project, 
and during the immediate postwar years the newspaper helped the CFA articulate its 
commitment to the needs and beliefs of next of kin. For instance, in 1921, the Post 
assured readers that the “many relatives of the glorious dead who elected to allow the 
mortal remains of their loved ones to lie in the soil for which they fought and fell will 
assuredly derive comfort and consolation” from the CFA’s plans, which would 
undoubtedly design “tender and reverent” sites “where the American heroes sleep their 
last sleep and await the trump of the great accounting day.”648 
                                                 
647 As historian Elizabeth G. Grossman argues, the CFA was compelled to design 
sites that would signify that the government had been right “to induce Americans not to 
repatriate their kin.” See Elizabeth G. Grossman, “Architecture for a Public Client: The 
Monuments and Chapels of the American Battle Monuments Commission,” Journal of 
the Society of Architectural Historians 43 (May 1984), 119-143: 120. 
648 “American Graves Abroad,” Washington Post, August 26, 1921, 6. 
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In summary, the Commission of Fine Arts was in a constrained rhetorical 
position. Yet, at the same time, these aforementioned ideological, rhetorical, and material 
constraints necessarily pushed the CFA to consider aesthetic options and choices that it 
might not have otherwise contemplated. In other words, these limitations allowed the 
CFA to explore unforeseen possibilities that had not been evident, plausible, or fitting 
during its previous work on the National Mall and Arlington National Cemetery. Forced 
to take a seemingly countless number of undesired, external variables into account, the 
CFA was, in a way, simultaneously free to develop through the European sites a new, and 
potentially just as powerful, way of expressing its aesthetic ideals and political 
commitments (to an even larger audience, no less). In short, the CFA had the opportunity 
to invent an original form of American war commemoration that might announce to the 
world long-lasting and effective messages concerning the young nation’s supposed 
political superiority, military prowess, and newfound and starring role on the 
international stage. 
5.4 THE CFA’S PLANS 
In March, 1921, three members of the Commission of Fine Arts—Chairman Charles 
Moore, architect William Mitchell Kendall, and landscape architect James L. 
Greenleaf—traveled to Europe with officials from the War Department and the Graves 
Registration Service “with a view to preparing plans for the permanent American 
cemeteries in France and England.” Visiting four potential cemetery sites in France 
(Suresnes, Romagne, Belleau Wood, and Bony) and one near London (Brookwood), 
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these CFA members assessed the on-the-ground realities that would inevitably influence 
and shape their design plans for the overseas military cemeteries. Gathering information 
and ideas from temporary American burial grounds and permanent British and French 
cemeteries already established, Moore and his cohorts came face-to-face with distant 
lands that, until then, had been understood by most Americans as “over there.” Upon 
returning to the United States, Moore and the CFA submitted to the President and 
Congress an official and carefully crafted report that described the European tour and laid 
out the CFA’s visions for the overseas burial grounds. The CFA’s 1921 report was the 
commission’s first public expression649 of its ideas for America’s permanent World War 
cemeteries—ideas that, in time, would become material realities.650 Containing 
photographs of the sites the CFA had visited in Europe and blueprints for the future 
permanent cemeteries (drafted by Major George Gibbs, Jr., formerly an engineer in 
Frederick Law Olmsted’s landscape architecture firm),651 the report was, just as 
importantly, a carefully crafted pitch for Congressional funding. 
The 1921 report began with a statement about the general condition of America’s 
1,700 temporary cemeteries in Europe. Preemptively assuaging any public concerns 
regarding the treatment of the nation’s war dead, the CFA claimed that “the existing 
cemeteries were excellently cared for, being neat, orderly, and well kept […] even in the 
case of small cemeteries of isolated graves there was evidence of respectful and reverent 
care. There was no instance of neglect.” Furthermore, Graves Registrations Service 
                                                 
649 Newspapers offered extensive coverage of the CFA’s 1921 report. See, for 
example, “Plan 6 Cemeteries for A.E.F. Abroad,” New York Times, August 23, 1921. 
650 National Commission, 39-41. 
651 Grossman, “Architecture,” 121. 
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members “had done and were doing their work with painstaking care and with a close 
attention to the many and exacting details involved in identifications, the transshipment 
of bodies to the United States, and the reinterment of those which were to remain.” While 
on their tour, the CFA representatives had encountered next of kin who had been 
searching for and visiting their loved ones’ graves. The CFA was happy to report that the 
“provisions for relatives visiting the cemeteries were excellent, considering the changing 
conditions and the uncertainty of visits,” and that “France has sufficiently recovered from 
the shocks of war to provide good food and shelter to visitors and at normal prices.” In 
other words, it was perfectly reasonable to expect that Americans would be able to visit 
the overseas cemeteries without any apprehension or difficulty throughout the future 
(given the state of the land in these regions, this was a dubious assertion).652 The CFA 
also addressed next of kin directly. Echoing the sentimental postwar rhetoric of the 
government and military, the CFA wrote: 
 The first problem involved in the treatment of the American cemeteries in 
 Europe is the adequate, reverent care of the remains of our soldiers—such care as 
 shall justify the action of the relatives who elected to allow the bodies of their 
 dead to remain in the soil for which they fought and died. In a majority of cases 
 this action on the part of relatives in itself was an act of patriotism and sacrifice. 
 They felt that by foregoing their right to have the bodies brought to the United 
 States they were setting their mark and seal on the sacrifice made by sons and 
 husbands and brothers. They had confidence that the Government would see to it 
 that these graves would not be neglected, but would  be held in respect and honor. 
 
Speaking to relatives of the dead (as well as any American who might take interest in the 
matter), the CFA professed its fundamental concern with the proper handling of soldierly 
remains.653 
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Because U.S. casualty statistics were “small when compared with the losses of 
France and England” (“due to our entry late in the war”), the CFA advised concentrating 
“American dead in a comparatively few cemeteries” (as opposed to hundreds of little 
ones) so as to save on maintenance costs and magnify the visual effect of U.S. graves. 
The CFA recommended the establishment of six or seven cemeteries. Though some of 
these consolidated burial grounds might contain fewer headstones than those displayed in 
other nations’ cemeteries, each would effectively serve as a “permanent visible symbol in 
France of the entire strength and soul of America, devoted without reserve to the decision 
of a great cause.” The CFA stated: 
Whether there are 1,000 or 10,000 graves in a given cemetery has no relation to 
 the condition in which that cemetery should be maintained. The treatment of each 
 burial place retained should be just as adequate as if all the American dead had 
 found permanent rest in the land in which they perished […] The fact that the 
 graves of our soldiers in France are few as compared with those of the French and 
 the English, few even as compared with the Americans who fell, does not 
 signify.654 
 
The nation’s smaller casualty statistics would not “signify,” it seemed, as long as enough 
fallen soldiers were interred at each overseas cemetery—and more importantly, as long as 
the United States invested properly in the establishment and maintenance of each site. 
Referencing Arlington National Cemetery—the iconic military cemetery that was 
immediately familiar to most Americans—the CFA argued: “The treatment of our 
cemeteries […] should be adequate […] The lands occupied should be ample to secure an 
appropriate amount of space for each grave. By an appropriate amount is meant the same 
amount as is now allotted in the most adequately developed portions of the Arlington 
Military Cemetery.” For the CFA, the rhetorical success of each cemetery depended on 
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the acquisition of “an appropriate amount of space” (a claim that makes perfect sense 
when we consider the CFA’s general philosophy of communicating through vast 
expanses of land, or space): “Unless the area of land included within them shall be 
increased appreciably and that land treated according to a well-considered plan, our 
participation in the war, in so far as it is visible to the eye, will be negligible.” The CFA 
was happy to report that the United States’ European allies were happy to offer land for 
the cemeteries in perpetuity, “as a free gift,” but asserted, “Either the cemeteries should 
be well developed and well maintained or they should be abandoned”: 
If this Government shall provide as suitably and as adequately for the World War 
 cemeteries in Europe as it has provided for the military cemeteries in the United 
 States,  then the field of battle will also be the field of honor. Otherwise, the 
 sooner all the bodies shall be withdrawn from France the better. Money will be 
 saved and a more suitable treatment will be accorded to our dead. The time to 
 decide the question is at the beginning. The cost should be counted now.655 
 
Equating the nascent World War burial grounds with the popular Civil War cemeteries in 
the U.S., the CFA effectively drew a line in the sand: the government should either fund 
the CFA’s project without concern for expenses, or it should jettison the idea of 
permanent overseas cemeteries all together. 
So what did the CFA want the American overseas cemeteries to look like? The 
CFA began its exposition of its design plans by discussing the aesthetic attributes of the 
nation’s temporary military cemeteries and British cemeteries that it admired. (Perhaps 
betraying a bias towards Anglophone culture, the CFA did not offer an analysis of 
France’s or any other country’s military burial grounds.) With regards to American 
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temporary cemeteries, the CFA was impressed by their proximity to the battlegrounds 
“where our troops were engaged” and had fallen: 
They occupy sections of the battle fields over which our men fought bravely and 
 successfully. They mark historic spots dear to the American heart. [The 
 permanent cemeteries] will be the objects of pilgrimages by our people. Therefore 
 they should be maintained permanently in all those places where American valor 
 was conspicuous. Otherwise our participation in those historic battles is in danger 
 of being lost sight of.656 
 
Like the cemetery at Gettysburg, the overseas burial grounds would be situated on or near 
the fields where the interred had met their fate. The CFA was also taken with the white 
uniformly spaced wooden headstones in the temporary sites, which were “smaller and 
simpler than either the French or British.” This comparative smallness enabled them “to 
be set farther apart […] so that the green grass counts and the sense of quiet is greater.” 
This was an effect that the CFA hoped to reproduce in the permanent cemeteries. 
Whatever the final design of the permanent headstones (ultimately made of durable 
stone) would be, the CFA believed that “the stones used should be uniform in size and 
design […] All display of an individual character is as much out of place as civilian 
clothing worn by individual soldiers in a regiment drawn up on parade […] the uniform 
size of the stone should be the rule”—something the CFA had so adamantly tried to 
implement in its redesign of Arlington.657 
As for the U.K. cemeteries, the CFA praised their artistic beauty and utilization of 
symbolically significant natural elements. The CFA noted that Canadian maple trees had 
been planted in cemeteries where Canadian soldiers lied, Tasmanian eucalyptus trees 
where Australian soldiers were buried, the daisy bush in sites that held New Zealanders, 
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and the scarlet poppy in predominantly English graveyards; and that “the best art of the 
empire” had been employed for the design of the cemeteries’ landscape, headstones, and 
monuments. Each British cemetery was contained by “a wall, within or without which is 
a hedge of thorn, beech, hornbeam, yew, or holly, or a screen of pleached and trained 
limes or hornbeams”; thus, each site was explicitly demarcated from the surrounding 
land—a quality that subtly compelled visitors to feel as if they had entered British 
territory (even when if they happened to be in rural France). The CFA also highlighted 
the fact that each UK cemetery displayed a large “Cross of Sacrifice and an altar-like 
Stone of Remembrance bearing the inscription ‘Their name liveth forevermore’”—
objects that, through name and appearance, immediately conveyed the pseudo-religious 
notion that British soldiers had willingly offered up their lives in defense of a greater 
good. There were also more explicit nods to religious devotion: each headstone bore a 
cross or other religious symbol to indicate the interred soldier’s faith. Although relatives 
of the dead were permitted to “plant dwarf polyantha, rose bushes, or bulbs on a 
particular grave”—eclectic and sentimental rhetorical activity that the CFA would likely 
frown upon in its own sites—the commission praised the work of the Imperial War 
Graves commission, which had approached its mission “with the view of ‘so designing 
and planting their cemeteries that they shall serve for all time as worthy and permanent 
memorials to those who have so gallantly laid down their lives for their countries and 
empire.’”658 Again and again the CFA insisted that the American cemeteries, like the 
British sites, should be “permanent” cemeteries that would ensure that the sacrifices and 
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accomplishments of U.S. soldiers in the Great War would never be “forgotten or 
neglected.”659 
After praising these aspects of the temporary American and permanent British 
cemeteries, the CFA formally proposed its plans for the future U.S. sites. The CFA began 
by pointing out a fundamental problem that would require immediate correction: 
regrettably (in the eyes of the CFA), the temporary American cemeteries were, much like 
the military cemeteries of other nations, situated on flat—and thus, lackluster—terrain. 
“The impression an American now gets on approaching one of our cemeteries if of a 
handkerchief spread out on the grass to dry,” the CFA reported. “The white spot has no 
vital relation to the great expanse of rolling country; it is a speck, and incident.”660 
Offering a delicate jab at the romance garden gravescape (which encouraged visitors to 
lounge on picnic blankets) and the epic heroism gravescape (distinct for its level and 
unimposing surface), the CFA argued that the permanent overseas cemeteries should be 
established on sites that were not only historically important, but that also featured steep 
slopes or hillsides that could serve as natural pedestals for soldiers’ headstones. Places 
like Suresnes (a hilltop town overlooking Paris), Belleau Wood (the site of the U.S. 
Marines’ first ever combat engagement), and Romagne-sous-Montfaucon (situated in the 
heart of the Meuse-Argonne war zone) were symbolically significant locales that also 
were endowed with naturally beautiful inclines, elevated plateaus, or gentle slopes. The 
grassy and forest-covered hills of towns and regions like these would be ideal for 
amplifying the splendor and presence of the (in relation to other nation’s cemeteries, 
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comparatively fewer) American headstones. And by situating the U.S. cemeteries on 
elevated land the CFA would be able to extend its ideology of verticality and space (as 
exhibited in its work on the National Mall) to Europe. 
Wherever they were ultimately located, the U.S. cemeteries would require 
“[b]uildings for service, gateways, and fences” that would contain and clearly designate 
the sites as American. The CFA believed that each site should feature a furnished rest 
house [something absent in the cemeteries of other nations] that would meet “the 
necessity of providing for American visitors.” But while the buildings, gateways, and 
fences would be designed to signify a sense of Americaness, the CFA promised that all of 
these structures would “be of such design and construction that they will appear to be at 
home in the country. This means simplicity, good proportions, and absence of ornament 
for the sake of ornament […] and the eschewing of anything approaching boastfulness. 
We should remember that we are building in countries with fine architectural traditions 
and long histories.”661 Thus, the CFA indicated its awareness of both the needs of future 
American visitors and the potential danger of offending the sites’ permanent European 
hosts. Within the cemeteries themselves, the CFA planned to plant carefully situated trees 
and shrubs. “Almost any tree that will grow in America will grow in France,” the CFA 
wrote. “Trees are enduring and require less care and attention than any other forms of 
planting.” Trees would be the most prominent natural feature of the sites, as the CFA 
detested the thought of incorporating flowerbeds and the like (which carried so many 
outdated and non-militaristic nineteenth century sentimental meanings). “Shrubs should 
be used sparingly, and flowers not all. Invariably attention given to flower beds is 
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exercised at the expense of trees and grass, which are of first consideration.” However, so 
as not to completely dismiss the possibility of the visual display of flowers, the CFA 
stated that on “Decoration Day and like occasions the use of flowers to express 
remembrance and honor is to be encouraged, but the existing rule requiring the removal 
of flowers before they are withered should be adhered to.”662 In all likelihood, these 
words were meant to soothe the minds of grieving American women who expected that 
their departed loved ones would rest in peaceful cemeteries, not just colossal and 
somewhat sterile national war memorials. 
The 1921 report also revealed the commission’s desire to organize and manage 
(within reason) the immediate territories surrounding the nascent permanent burial 
grounds. “All care should be taken to relate each cemetery to the town near which it is 
situated,” the CFA argued. “There should be no parched and uncared-for area through 
which one must pass to go from town to cemetery.” To secure this result, the CFA would 
attempt to line the roads between the towns and the cemeteries with newly planted, 
evenly spaced trees (something akin to the elm-lined pathways on the National Mall). 
“No one feature will count more than the adequate treatment of those short stretches of 
roadway into which one turns from main highways to reach the American cemeteries.”663 
As for the battlefields and inevitable war monuments that would surround the burial 
grounds, the CFA advised Congress to pass legislation that would allow the commission 
to impose a system of order, uniformity, and artistic beauty.  “If the history of our 
national dealings with battlefields where Americans have fought and died may serve as a 
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guide,” the commission wrote, “the people of this country will not be satisfied merely 
with providing a God’s acre for the bodies of the dead.” Casting the war, not as the 
destructive, apocalyptic event that Americans had viewed from afar between 1914 and 
1917, but rather as the nation’s noble participation in the fight for the defense of 
civilization beyond its borders, the CFA claimed: 
The places where our men lie are historic places. They are parts of that far-
 stretching line along which civilization itself, as we believe, set barriers against 
 the onslaughts of brute force. They represent our part in that struggle, and in that 
 part justly we take pride and satisfaction […] It has not been possible, even were 
 it desirable, to  control the design and location of monuments that have been 
 erected in France by divisions, regiments, or organizations […] The American 
 monuments to be placed in the park spaces connected with our cemeteries, 
 however, should be controlled first as to historical accuracy of the inscriptions by 
 the historical branch of the War Department and as to design and location by the 
 Commission of Fine Arts.664 
 
To give a concrete example of this problem, the CFA described the visual chaos of the 
region surrounding Belleau Wood (one of the locales the CFA had selected): 
Near by are squares of French white crosses and German black crosses. The 
 approach to the [future] American cemetery is like a labyrinth. The improvised 
 landscape effects [of haphazard, unofficial monuments] bear eloquent testimony 
 to the  feelings of the men who paused in their grewsome [sic] tasks to pay 
 tribute to the heroism  of the brave boys [who died]. These designs, crude and 
 amateurish, were the foretaste of what thought and training may provide when the 
 time comes to make permanent improvements.665 
 
Here we see that the CFA wanted to establish the cemeteries in physical spaces that 
would be, at least to some degree, harmonious with the visual composition of the burial 
grounds themselves. While the CFA knew that it could not completely dictate the 
transformation of these foreign territories in the same way it had been able to oversee the 
razing, sculpting, and transfiguration of Washington, D.C., the CFA desperately wanted 
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to minimize and ameliorate the visual bedlam of the unruly war torn areas that, in time 
(and for all time), would serve as the entryways and backdrops to the permanent 
American cemeteries. 
The CFA’s report concluded with brief descriptions of the sites deemed suitable 
for the cemeteries. The first was Suresnes, a small commune in the western suburbs of 
Paris. Mostly containing the remains of soldiers who had died of illness in Parisian 
hospitals, the Suresnes cemetery would be “reached from the Arc de Triomphe in Paris 
by a drive down the Avenue du Bois de Boulogne, through the wooded park and across 
the Seine, and a climb up the steep slopes to the Boulevard George Washington […] a 
direct and short approach from the railway station is provided for those visitors who 
[would] not motor thither.” Because of its nearness to Paris, and its potential to provide a 
beautiful view of the city skyline and the Eiffel Tower, the Suresnes cemetery would 
surely be “the most visited of all the American cemeteries in France.” Thus, the CFA 
reasoned, the cemetery “shall represent adequately the deepest sentiment, expressed in 
terms of good taste. Suresnes should be the gem.” Other French locations included 
Belleau Wood in the Chateau Thierry region, the site of a famous and bloody battle 
between U.S. Marines and German forces; Bony, a rural town in the infamous Somme 
sector; Romagne-sous-Montfaucon, where the remains of tens of thousands of U.S. 
soldiers who had perished in the Argonne Forest were interred; Thiaucourt, “a shadeless 
plain near St. Miehel” (it would not be “shadeless” once the CFA dealt with it); and Fere 
en Tardenois, a quiet, isolated village nestled between the Oise and Aisne Rivers. The 
CFA also suggested the establishment of a cemetery near Flanders Field in Belgium 
(where hundreds of American soldiers still rested in temporary graves), and burial ground 
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in Brookwood Cemetery, a famous rural gravescape thirty miles southwest of London 
(English land was at a premium, but the CFA had been able to secure from the British 
government a small, but “no less fitting and significant,” space within this necropolis for 
the graves of U.S. sailors and soldiers who had died in England or the surrounding waters 
during the Great War).666 The CFA claimed that each of these sites would be an ideal 
venue for the establishment of a permanent American cemetery that would “be as sacred 
as a temple or a church.”667 In closing, the CFA urged the President, Congress, and the 
American people to support its work in Europe, whatever the financial costs might be. “If 
our cemeteries are not to fall behind those of Great Britain and France, we must adopt 
some comprehensive plans and carry them out thoroughly, as those nations are doing.” 
Evoking the memory and spirits of distant fallen U.S. soldiers, the commission stated: 
“No question of expense should stand in the way of carrying out each and everyone of 
these requirements. So much our self-respect and the duty we owe to our dead 
require.”668 With that, the CFA rested its case. 
The CFA’s 1921 report was persuasive. Editors at the Washington Post publicly 
supported the commission’s official proposal, and opined that the appropriation the CFA 
sought “for this highly decorative and comprehensive, yet simple, scheme is modest in 
amount, something like $3,000,000.”669 In December of 1921, the federal government 
formally approved the CFA’s plans and gave Chairman Charles Moore the funds required 
“for the beautification of American military cemeteries in France, England and Belgium” 
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and “the purchase of adjacent lands to protect” the burial grounds.670 By late 1922, the 
CFA had secured (and in some cases, purchased) appropriate tracts of land for eight 
permanent cemeteries.671 In October of 1922, the Graves Registration Service began 
transferring soldierly remains from temporary cemeteries to the designated burial 
grounds, “except in cases where grading of permanent cemeteries held up re-interments.” 
And by early 1923, the reburials were completed, contracts with local construction 
workers and craftsmen were finalized, and the erection and maintenance of the sites 
commenced.672 The CFA’s visions for these gravescapes started coming to life. 
On November 11, 1921 (the third anniversary of the Armistice), the federal 
government performed a carefully choreographed burial of an “Unknown Soldier” at 
Arlington National Cemetery. Mimicking similar postwar ceremonies conducted by 
France and Britain, this unprecedented civic ritual was meant to forge national unity 
around the remains of an identified soldier (a powerful and self-evident token of 
American wartime sacrifice),673 situate the Great War within the country’s greater 
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history,674 and signify the government’s appreciation of its women who had sacrificed 
their men for the good of the nation and the world.675 As the Kansas City Times stated 
earlier in the year:  
The proposal to bring back from France the body of an unidentified American 
 soldier  for burial with military honors in the Arlington National Cemetery has the 
 approval of General Pershing and should have that of the nation. In no better way 
 could the republic pay tribute to its mighty dead than at the bier of one who lost 
 not life alone but name and identity. This is the seal of our democracy […] The 
 spectacle of these things strikes deep into human hearts and minds. Every 
 mother’s loss is also the nation’s loss, let the nation bow its head with mothers 
 and mingle with hers its tears. They will turn from that bier with strengthened 
 hearts, renewed faith and fresh courage for the future.676 
 
While symbolizing both the strength of American democracy and the government’s 
concern for grieving next of kin, the burial of the Unknown Soldier also helped link the 
CFA’s project in Europe back to the homeland. A few months prior to the memorial 
service in Arlington, the Unknown Soldier had been selected during a solemn ceremony 
at the City Hall of Châlons-sur-Marne, France. There, General John J. Pershing had 
ushered Sergeant Edward Younger, a wounded veteran of the war, into the building, 
where four caskets—each containing the remains of an unidentified soldier—had awaited 
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him. These four caskets had been exhumed from the CFA’s military cemeteries at Aisne-
Marne, Meuse-Argonne, Somme, and Saint Mihiel—each contained a dead soldier that, 
in effect, stood in place of all dead American soldiers left overseas. With a bouquet of 
white roses in his hands, Sergeant Younger had circled the coffins three times, laid the 
flowers on a casket of his choosing, and thus selected the body of the nation’s Unknown 
Soldier. Escorted across the Atlantic by General Pershing, the body of this unknown 
American symbolically shortened the distance between the overseas military cemeteries 
and American soil.677 And like the citizen-soldiers who had been conscripted during the 
war, the Unknown Soldier had been randomly selected (this time in death, not in life). 
5.5 THE AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION 
As the Commission of Fine Arts began its work in Europe, two related, but antithetical, 
problems arose. In the United States, a substantial coalition of veterans, next of kin, and 
politicians expressed anger over what they perceived to be the CFA’s unchecked 
authority to develop the visual presentation of the permanent overseas military cemeteries 
as it best saw fit. Major General John S. O’Ryan, of New York, articulated this criticism 
best in a public letter to the War Department. Demanding the creation of a commission 
composed of veterans of the American Expeditionary Forces that would assume control 
of the cemeteries abroad, O’Ryan asserted that the CFA (in essence, a group of elite 
intellectuals) had conducted “its activities in France without due regard to the wishes of 
                                                 
677 John Francis Marion, Famous and Curious Cemeteries (New York: Crown 
Publishers, 1977), 158-9. 
 344 
the families of the dead,” and that the partially constructed permanent cemeteries 
“furnished another example justifying the criticism that when official America undertakes 
to express sentiment it measures its sentiment by the number of dollars to be 
expended.”678 Meanwhile, on the other side of the ocean, the CFA felt that it did not 
possess enough authority to impose its aesthetic system on the European sites and their 
surrounding regions. Despite its best efforts, the CFA had been unable to stop private 
individuals and veterans groups from erecting their own unsanctioned memorials on the 
battlefields that were to serve as the cemeteries’ backdrops.679 Additionally, it seemed the 
CFA—which, as we know, was composed of artists and architects, not politicians and 
generals—was having trouble securing foreign officials’ approval for a plan to erect 
giant, permanent “relief map monuments, outline sketch map monuments, special 
monuments and bronze tablets” on battlefields where Americans had fought and died.680 
Whereas the Commission of Fine Arts dominated discussions of culture in the United 
States, it seemed to hold little sway with foreign dignitaries (whose own countries had 
older, and perhaps, more impressive, “fine arts” traditions). 
In the eyes of CFA Chairman Charles Moore, the solution seemed to lie in the 
establishment of a formal “battle monuments commission” composed of civilians, 
                                                 
678 “Criticizes Graves Service,” Washington Post, January 25, 1922, 6. 
679 The cemetery planners also felt it necessary to take the feelings of local 
Europeans into account. As one local official in the Meuse region of France told the 
planners: “We Frenchman cannot be expected to differentiate—Pennsylvania, Ohio, 28th 
Division […] all are Americans to us. Their monuments are American monuments. And 
in these economically difficult times when many of our own bombed-out people still lack 
roofs a Frenchman can hardly be enthusiastic at the prospect of so many monuments 
springing up on every side.” See North, 28. 
680 “Harding Proposes Battle Monuments,” New York Times, March 2, 1922, 17. 
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cultural experts, and political and military figures alike.681 Officially approved by 
Congress and the President, such a body, it seemed, would be capable of deflecting 
domestic criticisms of the European project and executing the CFA’s ambitious and ever-
evolving plans for the overseas memorial landscape. In March of 1922, Senator Henry 
Cabot Lodge introduced (at President Harding’s bidding) a bill providing for the creation 
and funding of an “American battle monument commission” that would develop and 
supervise the cemeteries and memorials abroad.682 The Washington Post supported the 
legislation, asserting: 
 Monuments commemorating the deeds and achievements of Americans in 
 Europe are due those who served and those to whom heritage of their glory will 
 descend. The bill provides for the raising of markers to the American forces as an 
 organization. They would be commemorative of all who participated in the great 
 conflict. And this is as it should be. The expenditure in money that would be 
 required for the construction of the proposed monuments would be as nothing to 
 the expenditure in sacrifice by those who made the raising of them in order.683 
  
In March of 1923, Congress, at the urging of the Commission of Fine Arts,684 passed 
Lodge’s bill and formally established the American Battle Monuments Commission 
(ABMC). Composed of seven commissioners, each appointed by the President at his 
discretion, the ABMC became responsible for 
establishing or taking over from the Armed Forces permanent burial grounds in 
 foreign countries and designing, constructing and maintaining permanent 
 cemetery memorials at these burial sites; controlling as to design and materials, 
 providing regulations for and  supervising erection of all monuments, memorials, 
 buildings and other structures in permanent United States cemetery memorials on 
 foreign soil; and cooperating with American citizens, states, municipalities, or 
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682 “Proceedings of Congress and Committees in Brief,” Washington Post, March 
30, 1922, 6 
683 “For Battle Monuments,” Washington Post, January 15, 1923, 6. 
684 Piehler, Remembering, 98. 
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 associations desiring to erect war memorials  outside the continental limits of the 
 United States.685 
  
A few months later, President Harding named the first members of the board: General 
John J. Pershing (who would serve as its first Chairman); Robert G. Woodside, of 
Pennsylvania, a wounded veteran of the 3rd Division and twice National Commander-in-
Chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars; Senator David A. Reed of Pennsylvania, and 
former Representative Thomas W. Miller of Delaware, both 79th Division veterans; 
Representative John Philip Hill and Colonel D. John Markey, of Maryland veterans of the 
29th Division; and Mrs. Fred W. Bentley of Illinois, a representative of the Gold Star 
Mothers who had lost her son in the war (Major Xenophon H. Price, a career army 
engineer, was named Secretary).686 Although the ABMC was, much like the CFA, 
entirely white and dominated by men, this new commission signaled (to grieving families 
and foreign dignitaries alike) a radical shift in the way the United States would handle its 
overseas commemoration projects. Filled with political movers and shakers, heroes who 
had seen the blood and terror of the war firsthand and a mother who had sacrificed her 
son for the betterment of France and all of Europe, the ABMC looked nothing like a 
board of stuffy cultural know-it-alls who had never gotten their hands dirty. Rather, each 
member of the ABMC knew what it meant to fight and die in battle (or send others to 
fight and die in battle). More importantly—from General Pershing (arguably the most 
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famous man in the world at that moment687) to Mrs. Bentley (a grieving mother)—each 
commissioner possessed symbolic capital that was easily identifiable to the American 
people and their European counterparts. 
By all appearances, the newly formed ABMC had usurped the CFA’s authority 
over the design and development of the overseas cemeteries. In reality, this was hardly 
the case (a crucial point that scholars have overlooked).688 Section 124 of the American 
Battle Monuments Act—a small provision quietly slipped into the lengthy legislation—
stipulated: “Before any design for any memorial is accepted by the [ABMC], it shall be 
approved by the National Commission of Fine Arts.”689 The bill also prohibited any U.S. 
governmental figure or agency from helping private citizens or groups erect memorials in 
Europe without the prior consent of the CFA.690 Thus, as progress on the sites continued 
                                                 
687 Bestowed the title, “General of the Armies,” General Pershing was the highest-
ranking military figure in American history (an honor he held until 1976, when Congress 
passed a law that permanently elevated George Washington to a higher rank). Upon his 
return to the United States after the war, hundreds of thousands of people gathered at a 
New York City port to greet him. As the Philadelphia Inquirer reported: “On the eve of 
the greatest celebration in its history, New York is agog with excitement. Never before, 
not even when Presidents and princes were given the freedom of the city, has Manhattan 
Island seen the like of the celebrations planned to greet General John J. Pershing.” His 
travels to European countries elicited similar reactions. Throughout the remaining years 
of his life, Pershing enjoyed a degree of international fame probably unmatched by any 
other contemporary. See “General Pershing is Guest of Honor in London Today,” Wilkes-
Barre Times Leader, July 15, 1919, 1; “Pershing Reception Will be Greatest in N. Y. 
Annals General and Famed First Division,” Philadelphia Inquirer, September 8, 1919, 1; 
and “Rest Easy: Historical Updates with Honor,” Washington Post, August 15, 1976, 
152. 
688 Scholars have overlooked the essential fact that the CFA was really the brains 
behind this operation. Most studies of the sites begin and end with the ABMC (a point I 
return to later in the chapter). At best, scholars state that the ABMC worked “in 
consultation with the Commission of Fine Arts.” See, for example, Budreau, Bodies of 
War, 149. 
689 Commission, A Brief History, 245. 
690 North, 2. 
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throughout the 1920s, the ABMC was compelled to send every design plan and aesthetic 
decision to Washington, D.C., where it was scrutinized and rubber-stamped (or not) by 
the CFA, then sent back to Europe for the approval of foreign dignitaries. Inheriting sites 
already near completion, desperate for the professional guidance of Charles Moore and 
his cohort,691 and compelled to submit every aesthetic decision to the CFA, the American 
Battle Monuments Commission actually had very little control over the physical 
presentation of American battle monuments in Europe. In effect, the ABMC was a kind 
of Trojan Horse—an impressive and symbolically potent, but ultimately empty, vessel 
that could clandestinely smuggle the CFA’s plans across the Atlantic and European 
borders. With international superstar “Black Jack” Pershing at the helm, the ABMC 
effectively publicized the overseas cemeteries to domestic audiences, enforced the 
moratorium on unsanctioned battlefield monuments,692 negotiated land deals with 
                                                 
691 Senator Reed was the only member of the ABMC who had any significant 
experience in military park and cemetery design, as he previously served Shiloh National 
Military Park Commission. See Smith, The Golden Age, 235. None of the ABMC 
commissioners, however, possessed formal training in art, architecture, or landscape 
design. Thus, the ABMC turned to the CFA as a student would a professor. This 
asymmetrical relationship commenced on October 2, 1923, when the ABMC met with 
CFA Chairman Charles Moore to receive firsthand the CFA’s conception of the 
cemeteries. See Grossman, “Architecture,” 121. 
692 General Pershing himself took great interest in enforcing agreements between 
the United States and France that would prohibit the erection of unsanctioned American 
battlefield monuments. Consider the following eyewitness account, as told by Pershing’s 
personal aide, Major General Thomas North: “One day while working on guidebook 
business Major Eisenhower reported that a monument to the 316th Infantry crowned 
Cornwilly Hill: General Pershing very naturally took the position that this constituted a 
deliberate defiance of the governments of both France and the United States. He proposed 
to the French government that the monument be demolished. This was embarrassing. The 
matter dragged on for months, occasionally flaring up in newspapers or spoiling the day 
for Embassy officials” (North, 28). Publicly, Pershing and the ABMC defended their 
censorship of unsanctioned battlefield monuments by arguing that private citizens and 
veterans groups were not aware of how offensive their well-intentioned monuments could 
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governments and private citizens in France and Belgium,693 and attended to daily 
oversight tasks at the eight American burial grounds. Meanwhile, the CFA was free to 
concentrate on, and dictate, the creative aspects of the project. 
Further evidence of the CFA’s ongoing and somewhat shadowy influence can be 
found in the fact that the ABMC hired Paul Cret as its supervising architect. One of the 
most influential Beaux Arts style architects, neoclassical activists, and proponents of the 
City Beautiful and McMillan Plans in the United States, Cret had previously served as a 
member of the CFA (in fact, Charles Moore and the CFA had nominated Cret for the 
ABMC position).694 Famous among elite circles for his conservative yet innovative and 
inspiring designs for the Organization of American States Building in Washington, D.C., 
the National Memorial Arch at Valley Forge National Historical Park, the Indianapolis 
Central Library in Indiana, and the Benjamin Franklin Bridge that connected Philadelphia 
and Camden, New Jersey, Cret opposed the self-aggrandizing excesses of the previous 
                                                                                                                                                 
be to Europeans. Many battlefield monuments that had been constructed immediately 
after the war displayed the braggadocios remark: “We won the war.” Bemoaning the 
apparent insensitivity of such memorials, and justifying their destruction, the ABMC 
stated: “It should be considered that our country was fighting during the latter part of the 
war only and had fewer troops engaged and lighter losses than either France, England or 
Italy.” See “Pershing Blocks Marking of World War Sites with Merely Ornate American 
Memorials,” New York Times, April 26, 1926, 1; and “War Memorials Rising Throughout 
the World,” New York Times, November 7, 1926, XX16. 
693 Though the French and Belgian governments had agreed to allow the United 
States to enjoy the land upon which the cemeteries were built “in perpetuity without rent 
or taxation,” the ABMC’s ambitions often exceeded the amount of land available. Thus, 
the ABMC was often forced to negotiate with private landowners (who were, more often 
than not, unwilling to sell their properties at a reasonable price). According to General 
North’s manuscript, the ABMC found clever ways to obtain the land they needed, 
including: getting landowners drunk on wine so they would sign the deeds; stirring up 
trouble between rivaling siblings until one of the signed away land rights to spite the 
other; and working behind the scenes with local officials to pressure citizens into selling. 
Ibid, 12, 14, 16, 18-19. 
694 Grossman, “Architecture,” 126. 
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Gilded Age, yet sought to create civic architecture that transcend the everyday and 
utilitarian.695 Criticizing the progressive push to establish “living memorials” after the 
Great War, Cret publicly stated: “Does our belief in ‘utility,’—however temporary that 
utility may be,—denote a spirit superior to that which inspired the […] Egyptian and 
Roman builders, who, intent upon conquering time, were willing to pay the price 
required, or does it bear witness only to a mean and short-sighted parsimony? […] 
Suffice it to say that a work of commemorative architecture which has little chance of 
enduring is hardly worthy of the name.”696 In short, Cret was a CFA man through and 
through—his visions of a timeless, tasteful, awe-inspiring, yet modernist, brand of 
American civic architecture mirrored those of the CFA. Overseeing the day-to-day work 
of the ABMC’s other architects (each of whom had strong ties to the CFA),697 and 
designing the final visual presentation of the Flanders Field American Cemetery and 
Memorial in Belgium himself, Cret made sure the overseas project never strayed from the 
CFA’s chosen path. 
This is not to say that the ABMC’s role in the design process was completely 
negligible. Chairman Pershing, in particular, took great interest in the day-to-day progress 
of the sites. Having always fancied himself a renaissance man of sorts,698 Pershing did 
                                                 
695 Robin, Enclaves, 41-2. 
696 Paul Cret, “Memorials—Columns, Shafts, Cenotaphs, and Tablets,” 
Architectural Forum 45 (December 1926): 333, quoted in Robin, Enclaves, 43-4. 
697 For more on the ABMC architects and their ties to the CFA, see Grossman, 
“Architecture.” 
698 In February of 1918, Pershing personally handpicked eight renowned 
American painters and illustrators to travel with him and record scenes of the U.S. 
military’s experience in Europe. After the war, Pershing authored and published a 
complete history of the A.E.F’s actions and accomplishments in the Great War. See 
“Eight Artists Commissioned for Service with Pershing,” Dallas Morning News, 
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not hesitate to share his opinions with ABMC architects as they made important on-the-
spot decisions.699 Because “Black Jack” was, more or less, the face of the ABMC,700 
architects (including Cret) and other ABMC workers must have found it difficult to take 
his words lightly. Known for his blunt speaking style and willingness to express his 
beliefs (no matter how controversial),701 Pershing surely cast a dominating presence 
                                                                                                                                                 
February 22, 1918, 9; and John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War (New 
York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1931). 
699 North, 22. 
700 In the media, the terms “Pershing” and “the American Battle Monuments 
Commission” were synonymous. Pershing was cast to the American people as a vigilant 
guardian of the U.S. soldiers buried overseas. As the New York Times stated in 1928: “No 
soldier in his days of retirement, Washington to Grant, had such a task in the evening of 
life as has fallen to the lot of Pershing. Nothing becomes the great commander, so modest 
in his bearing, so generous toward the merits of others, more than his sympathy for 
veterans broken in the great adventure, and his solicitude that those who laid down their 
lives shall be fittingly honored on the fields of service.” And on his 76th birthday in 1936, 
the Washington Post reported that the aging leader of the ABMC’s principal interest was 
still “the boys who were left ‘over there.’” See “Pershing Arranges for War Memorials,” 
New York Times, June 26, 1927, 16; “Pershing is 76 Today with Few Signs of Aging,” 
Washington Post, September 13, 1936, AA7; “Pershing Publishes Battlefield Guide for 
U.S. Tourists,” Washington Post, August 21, 1917, M4; and “Pershing’s Work in 
France,” New York Times, February 27, 1928, 18. 
701 Pershing was never one to suppress his feelings, beliefs, or political leanings. 
Take, for example, his 1923 comments on “the pacifist menace”: “It is the duty and 
should be the earnest desire of every loyal American citizen to support the War 
Department in its efforts […] This support is particularly essential at this time when an 
active campaign against preparedness is being conducted by pacifist associations, some 
of which are fostered and supported, either directly or indirectly, by alien or other 
agencies which are inimical to our form of government.” Or consider this 1923 New York 
Times report about a speech he gave to a group of Pennsylvania National Guard Troops: 
“General Pershing said he hoped the day would come when every American girl would 
demand that the man who sought her in marriage should be on who had served his time 
as a volunteer, willing to face every duty of American citizenship. ‘I am going to say a 
word in the ear of our American girls for that purpose,’ he added.” Or, consider the fact 
that General Pershing accompanied fellow ABMC commissioner David A. Reed to 
President Calvin Coolidge’s signing of the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act, a xenophobic piece 
of anti-immigrant legislation that that severely restricted Southern and Eastern Europeans 
from immigrating to the U.S., as well as prohibiting the immigration of East Asians and 
Asian Indians all together. See “Pacifist Menace Seen by Pershing,” New York Times, 
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during his visits to the burial grounds. And while Pershing and the other members of the 
ABMC could not speak authoritatively on matters of architecture and landscape design, 
they felt empowered to weigh in on smaller, but ultimately pivotal, aspects of the 
cemeteries’ visual presentation. Most notably, at its third official meeting on November 
8, 1923, the ABMC announced that, “it was the sense of the commission that the form of 
the headstone used in the cemeteries abroad should be that of a cross.” Until that 
moment, the CFA had planned to erect standardized flat markers like those seen at 
Arlington. Senator Reed, a religious conservative, was particularly adamant about 
imbibing the overseas cemeteries with a Christian character since, as he put it, “the 
United States is a Christian nation.” (Following a series of heated negotiations with the 
Jewish Welfare Board, the ABMC would also advocate the inclusion of headstones in the 
shape of the Star of David for fallen Jewish soldiers.)702 The ABMC’s decision to erect 
headstones in the shape of iconic religious symbols was an inspired and radical 
modification of the CFA’s plans—but one that ultimately coincided with the CFA’s 
ideological emphasis on “space.” As cultural historian Ron Robin states, the “Latin 
crosses or Star of David perched on thin supports […] created an optical illusion of even 
greater spaciousness and increased the ‘private territory’ of each individual plot.”703 In 
time, this grave marker design would become the most prominent feature of America’s 
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703 Robin, “‘A Foothold in Europe,’” 64. This design also allowed the planners to 
magnify the presence of each individual soldier (an important accomplishment given the 
comparatively few bodies the planners had at their disposal). 
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cemeteries abroad, and would help distinguish the sites from domestic military burial 
grounds and the World War cemeteries of other nations. Still, every aesthetic decision—
including the question of headstone design—had to meet the standards and approval of 
the CFA. Thus, the CFA retained its control over the visual presentation of the overseas 
cemeteries. 
In June of 1924, the ABMC commissioners embarked on a six-week tour through 
Western Europe to examine the progress of each permanent American cemetery and 
acquire information and inspiration from the cemeteries of other nations. Two years later, 
it submitted a report of this tour to President Calvin Coolidge and Congress. 
Conventionally titled, Annual Report of the American Battle Monuments Commission to 
the President of the United States for the Fiscal Year 1925, the report systematically, yet 
eloquently, recounted the expedition’s findings: “Each of the eight American military 
cemeteries was visited for the purpose of obtaining accurate first-hand knowledge of its 
condition and determining what further works of architecture and art were need to make 
it a fitting resting place for our heroic dead.” Although pleased to announce that the 
general condition of the U.S. cemeteries was satisfactory, the commission offered a 
caveat: “There is […] much still to be done.”704 Composed of seventy-five pages of text 
and photographs depicting the physical attributes of the evolving American cemeteries 
abroad and the World War cemeteries of other European countries, the ABMC’s 1926 
report served as an appraisal of the overseas project, an visual and verbal exposition of 
the monumental cemeteries’ splendor and beauty, a declaration of the work still yet to be 
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done, and a request for continued and adequate funding from Congress (as the CFA and 
the ABMC’s ambitions had expanded, the project’s costs had ballooned).  
From a present-day perspective, the 1926 report stands as the most concise and 
transparent statement about the motives and decisions that led to the final visual 
presentation of American World War I cemeteries in Europe. Most notably, analysis of 
the document reveals the cemetery planners’ fundamental concerns for meeting the 
physical needs and influencing the emotions of itinerant visitors. Throughout the report, 
the commissioned articulated how the cemeteries’ physical characteristics—locations, 
careful presentation of natural foliage, appearance of upkeep and investment, artistic and 
architectural aesthetics, displayed lists of information, and general sense of uniformity 
and order) would frame audience reception of the visual expressions of America’s 
participation in the Great War. 
Consideration of the aesthetic value of each cemetery began with a description of 
its geographical location and surroundings. The ABMC revealed a distinct affinity for the 
burial grounds that were situated on hills and provided panoramic views for visitors (such 
as Suresnes Cemetery), or utilized peaceful, wooded inclines as scenic backdrops 
(Brookwood Cemetery). (Whereas the IWGC cemeteries and most of the French 
cemeteries were situated on flat lawns, the ABMC cemeteries would be elevated on grass 
slopes whenever possible). The burial grounds that were positioned directly on 
battlefields still pock-marked with shell craters and blemished by corroding trenches and 
fossilized trees were, instead, praised for their proximity to historically significant (rather 
than naturally beautiful) surroundings; for instance, Meuse-Argonne Cemetery, the 
largest of the U.S. cemeteries (where 14,045 soldiers were interred), was credited for 
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containing the remains of men who had given “their lives in the Meuse-Argonne 
operation, the greatest battle in American history and one of the most decisive offensives 
of the war.” The ABMC suggested that the publication of an American guidebook to the 
devastated battlefields might amplify the significance of the cemeteries that were 
unfortunately situated and, just as vitally, combat the dissemination of “a large amount of 
inaccurate and misleading information concerning the work of the American forces.” The 
most popular battlefield guidebooks, the ABMC stated, “have been prepared by 
Europeans and present everything from their own rather than the American point of 
view.”705 Because the U.S. cemeteries were surrounded by battlegrounds, these 
“inaccurate and misleading” histories would likely alter visitors’ understandings and 
perceptions of the American burial grounds. 
The report continued with a description of the cemeteries’ presentation of natural 
foliage. “It has been stated by the National Commission of Fine Arts that in preparing the 
plans for these cemeteries the older parts of the Arlington National Cemetery, near 
Washington, were used as a model,” the ABMC wrote. “In these parts, the headstones are 
small, of a uniform type and spaced rather far apart. The entire area is covered by large 
trees, and the combination of the headstones and trees, with the attendant light and shade, 
produces a very beautiful and restful effect.” The report included a photograph of an old 
section of Arlington to reinforce the ABMC’s point.706 Natural foliage, consisting of 
                                                 
705 Ibid, 5, 9, 66. 
706 Though the CFA often cited Arlington National Cemetery in discussions of its 
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an easily recognizable reference in reports, correspondence, and presentations to 
interested parties. While certain aesthetic attributes of Arlington (and Civil War 
cemeteries in general) would find their way into the World War I burial grounds, there is 
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carefully managed trees and shrubbery, was an inherent aspect of the CFA and the 
ABMC’s plans. “The cemeteries have been designed with the idea that trees and shrubs 
will furnish the main element of beauty,” the commission reported. “These of course are 
still in their early stages of growth, and the ultimate appearance of the cemeteries can 
only be visualized in imagination.” Emphasizing the importance of natural beauty, the 
ABMC argued for the immediate funding of the planting process: “The growth of trees 
and shrubs should be encouraged by all possible means, and ample appropriations should 
be made for this purpose. The first step in this direction is to insure that the water supply 
at each cemetery is made adequate and certain.” The future foliage, however, was not to 
detract from the permanent nature of the individual headstones themselves: “Growing 
flowers are not placed on each grave. In our cemeteries this was thought undesirable, 
because flowers bloom only at certain seasons of the year and the expense of growing 
them is very great.” Thus, the cemetery planners were acutely aware of the status of the 
cemeteries as a work of art in which the landscape played almost as great a role as the 
visual organization of the dead themselves. In light of the plan to expand the use of trees 
and flowers, the commission stated that the natural elements of the cemeteries were to 
                                                                                                                                                 
little reason to believe that the CFA—an organization that detested the characteristics of 
the romance garden gravescape—would hold up the nineteenth century military 
cemeteries as models for the overseas projects. Ultimately, the World War I cemeteries 
looked and functioned much differently than their domestic predecessors. Scholars have 
mistakenly perceived the CFA’s early references of Arlington and the subsequent 
“departure” from the Civil War model the key piece of evidence power had entirely 
shifted to the ABMC. I believe this misinterpretation of the CFA’s intentions and 
rhetorical use of “Arlington” has led scholars astray—in essence, they have been barking 
up the ABMC’s tree when they should have been barking up the CFA’s. See Carole 
Blair, V. William Balthrop, and Neil Michel, “Arlington-sur-Seine: War Commemoration 
and the Perpetual Argument from Sacrifice,” Sixth Conference of the International 
Society for the Study of Argumentation, Amsterdam, Holland June 27-30, 2006; 
Grossman, “Architecture,” 120-1; and Robin, “‘A Foothold in Europe,’” 59. 
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remain well tended and kept up, as the ABMC members had been “impressed by the fact 
that the cemeteries have been well cared for, and in general are well arranged. The 
combined effect is altogether pleasing, especially when it is considered that the trees and 
shrubs have had such a short time to grow.”707 In time, the proper maintenance of 
landscape would become a permanent custom at each ABMC cemetery.  In his memoir, 
William P. Jones, Jr., Director of Engineering and Maintenance for the ABMC from 1967 
to 1974, recounts how he and other ABMC officers “literally became concerned if we 
found any weeds at all in the graves areas, lawns, or plantings.” According to Jones, in 
comparison with the meticulously tended ABMC cemeteries, the Arlington Cemetery in 
Virginia “was a weed patch.”708 
The ABMC made it clear that Mother Nature, however well tended, could not 
alone provide the visual splendor required for cemetery visitors; additional architectural 
and artistic structures were still greatly needed at each site. The commission lamented the 
lack of decoration and artistic splendor visible at the undeveloped cemeteries: “Nothing 
has been done in these cemeteries in the way of works of architecture and art, except 
necessities, and these, as a general rule, are of the plain type. The caretakers’ and rest 
houses are the only buildings. These are prominently located and are conspicuous for 
their lack of ornamentation.”709 The commission determined that each cemetery was to 
contain carefully planned architectural and artistic works that would complement the 
beauty and harmony inherent in its natural settings and foliage. For the most part, the 
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708 William P. Jones, Jr., “Service with the American Battle Monuments 
Commission, 1 April 1967 to 30 June 1974,” 4, 5, William P. Jones, Jr. Papers, U.S. 
Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. 
709 ABMC, Report, 17. 
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expressiveness of these works would appeal to a religious sensibility. Nothing was to be 
of “the plain type.” One of the commission’s most forthright aesthetic decisions was to 
remove the wooden crosses that had marked the graves since the war and replace them 
with headstones made of white marble—a Star of David for those of Jewish faith, a Latin 
cross for all others: 
 Dr. Paul P. Cret, architect, of Philadelphia, was then asked to design suitable 
 headstones of the same general dimensions as the wooden ones. As a result of this 
 request Doctor Cret submitted to the commission a complete study of the question 
 and four different designs for each headstone. Full-sized models were made of 
 these and other designs by the Engineer reproduction plant of the Army and 
 erected on the lawn at Washington Barracks. They were then inspected by the 
 commission, which after much deliberation adopted unanimously the headstones 
 shown in the accompanying photograph, these to be constructed of white stone or 
 marble. 
 
The ABMC supplemented this description with a photograph of Cret’s final designs for 
the Latin cross headstone, with its artistic curves at the angles and slight flares to the 
arms, and the Star of David headstone.710 The calculated decision to use marble 
headstones was in keeping with traditional western sensibilities (white marble was a 
favorite medium of the Ancient Greeks and Romans), and promoted the notion that the 
cemeteries were meant to be permanent sites of remembrance (wood rots, marble does 
not). The rows of white marble headstones were to glow radiantly against the green and 
flowery natural backdrop, reminding visitors who, exactly, served as the centerpiece of 
                                                 
710 Ibid, 56-7. The decision to use white marble was made not only for aesthetic 
reasons, but for economic ones as well. General Pershing recommended the acceptance of 
a bid from a quarry in Carrara, Italy, which could provide an abundance of Italian marble 
at a fraction of what it would cost to transport stone from the United States. The plan to 
use Italian stone in American cemeteries caused a minor stir in Washington, D.C., and led 
a coalition of “American stone men” to protest the decision publicly (but unsuccessfully). 
See “Favors Italian Marble,” New York Times, June 24, 1926; “Plans for Markers May 
Not Be Changed,” Washington Post, July 7, 1926; and “Davis Acts on Headstones,” New 
York Times, July 17, 1926. 
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each cemetery. Furthermore, the headstones, manifestations of religious symbolism, 
would no doubt connote certain familiar meanings (sacrifice, salvation, and others) to 
most cemetery visitors.711 
The planners’ conception of the cemeteries entailed more than the organization 
and upkeep of the gravesites. Putting themselves in the place of future visitors, the 
ABMC expressed concern for the state of the cemeteries’ approaches. Specifically, the 
entranceway and flagpole of each cemetery lacked the decorative quality needed to create 
a liminal zone, that crucial threshold where “the visitor is initiated into the meanings 
inscribed” within a given space.712 The ABMC wrote: “One or more ornamental 
gateways of a type appropriate to a military cemetery have been placed at each cemetery 
                                                 
711 The Washington Post elaborated on the notion that such religious symbolism 
would bring some measure of comfort and solace to next of kin: “[The Senate passed] an 
amendment that would insure retention in permanent form of the white crosses that now 
mark the graves of American war dead overseas […] Senator Reed (Republican), 
Pennsylvania, who sponsored the action, said relatives of soldiers dead all favored 
retention of the crosses which were signalized in war poetry.” See “Senate Votes to 
Retain Flanders White Crosses,” Washington Post, March 23, 1924, 7. Given the 
demographics of the American Expeditionary Forces during the Great War, an 
overwhelming majority of the headstones would take the shape of the Latin cross. The 
image of the Latin cross itself, appearing over and over again in precisely aligned rows at 
each cemetery, is a well-known religious ideograph, a historical, visual symbol that 
signifies familiar meanings within most Western cultures. In Signs and Symbols in 
Christian Art, George Ferguson isolates the Latin cross’s twentieth century connotations: 
“The cross is one of the oldest and most universal of all symbols. It is, of course, the 
perfect symbol of Christ because of His sacrifice upon the Cross.  In a broader sense, 
however, the cross has become the mark or sign of the Christian religion, the emblem of 
atonement, and the symbol of salvation and redemption through Christianity.” For 
Christians, the Latin cross signifies “sacrifice,” “atonement,” “salvation,” and 
“redemption.” In summation, the Latin cross remembers Christ’s sacrifice for the 
collective good, the subsequent resurrection of Christ’s flesh, and the journey of Christ’s 
soul to heaven. See George Ferguson, Signs and Symbols in Christian Art (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1959), 100. 
712 For a detailed discussion of “liminal space,” see Alan Wallach, “Regionalism 
Redux” (exhibition review), American Quarterly 43 (June 1991), 269. 
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[…] An ornamental flagpole has been placed in each cemetery, and an American flag 
flies from it during the day. This serves as a means of identification and is the first object 
seen when the cemetery is approached from a distance. It is very appropriate that our 
soldiers rest under the flag for which they fought and gave their lives […] The gateways 
and flagpoles are passable, but have not gone beyond that point.”713 From the quality of 
the gates and flagpoles, approaching visitors were to realize they were entering a distinct, 
and American, site that demanded some type of proper behavior and reaction.  The 
condition of each gateway and flagpole called for further financial investment and artistic 
attention.714 
The report continued with a startling revelation: the planners believed that the 
cemeteries’ architectural and artistic beauty would be enhanced by means of a chapel and 
a memorial to the missing. Years before, the CFA had toyed with the idea of building an 
enclosed prayer space at the Meuse-Argonne Cemetery—something that no other country 
had done.715 Now, the ABMC was forcefully arguing that a “chapel of nonsectarian 
character should be erected in each of the cemeteries.” Amplifying the sacred, religious 
ethos of each burial ground, these designated sites of prayer would serve many useful 
                                                 
713 ABMC, Report, 13, 17. 
714 The decision to place U.S. flags in prominent locations throughout the 
cemeteries reflected the iconic role that Old Glory had come to play in American life. In 
1916, President Wilson had instigated the first observance of Flag Day—a national 
celebration of the American flag and a day for patriotic exercises and giving expression 
“to our thoughtful love of America.” By the 1920s, the flag (redesigned by the CFA 
itself) become a national totem—a sacred object of the nation’s civil religion that 
demanded reverence and could mark a space as American. See Carolyn Marvin and 
David W. Ingle, Blood Sacrifice and the Nation: Totem Rituals and the American Flag 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and “President Wilson Sets June 14 as 
Flag Day,” Idaho Daily Statesman, May 31, 1916, 2. 
715 Charles Moore had previously considered building a chapel at Meuse-
Argonne. See Grossman, “Architecture,” 121. 
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purposes. “If properly constructed,” the commission wrote, the chapels would “give a 
sheltered place” for “meditation and prayer,” offer visitors a “focus to the cemetery and 
thus attract attention away from the houses which are now the outstanding architectural 
features,” and serve as a “testimonial of the Nation’s debt to the men who are buried.”716 
A unique, but inevitably costly, proposition, this idea reflected a mortuary trend that 
emerged during the 1920s: in an effort to become a “one-stop, all-purpose establishment” 
funeral homes had begun constructing on-site chapels where guests could sit, think, pray, 
and grieve.717 The chapels also signified the ambitious nature of the CFA and the 
ABMC’s plans. Finally, they represented the CFA’s longstanding desire to control the 
movement and behaviors in crucial civic spaces; if funded and constructed, the chapels 
would serve as designated spaces where visitors would be encouraged and allowed to 
behave as they might in a church, temple, or mosque. 
Artistically designed memorials to the missing, the ABMC determined, would 
augment the purposes of the chapels and the headstones: “Each battle-field cemetery 
should contain some sort of memorial upon which should be inscribed the names of those 
now carried as missing in action in the vicinity. This memorial will be the earthly record 
of these men in the same manner as the headstone is the earthly record of a man whose 
body has been located. This memorial can take the form of a separate monument or else 
                                                 
716 ABMC, Report, 17. A modest house had already been constructed next to each 
cemetery in anticipation of future cemetery directors and their families (the houses are 
still used for this purpose today). The plan to construct a chapel at each cemetery was 
supported by Army and Navy chaplains of the Federal Council of Churches, who publicly 
argued that each site needed a proper building where burial services and religious 
exercises could be conducted. See “Erection of Chapels for War Dead Asked,” 
Washington Post, May 17, 1926, 7. 
717 Gary Laderman, Rest in Peace: A Cultural History of Death and the Funeral 
Home in Twentieth-Century America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 24-6. 
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of a memorial worked into the design of the chapels.”718 The memorials, like the 
headstones, were to serve as the “earthly record” of the dead (in this case, the missing 
dead). The commission use of the term “earthly record” implied that the interred soldiers 
had been, or would be, accounted for in some other transcendent way (a notion that must 
have appealed to religious Americans). 
Serving as architectural enhancements to the cemeteries, the memorials to the 
missing also represented the planners’ broader, fundamental desire to construct ‘lists’ that 
reorganized the dead for public viewing. In its thoroughness, towards the end of the 
report, the ABMC recommended that each cemetery should have a “complete 
alphabetical list showing the location of all American graves in Europe regardless of 
whether they are in American cemeteries or not […] a list of known dead whose bodies 
have not been recovered or identified […] a list showing the graves in Europe according 
to organizations [and] an alphabetical list of women in our cemeteries.”719 These and 
other textual lists,720 it seems, were meant to accomplish a series of tasks. First, they 
would reflect militaristic values of order and classification—American soldiers in death, 
as in life, were to be categorized and identified by function, position, gender, and other 
classifications. Second, the lists would verbally memorialize the sacrifice of the dead. 
                                                 
718 ABMC, Report, 21. 
719 Most of the ABMC cemeteries contain several graves of people who were not 
U.S. armed servicemen. For instance, Suresnes contains the graves of three chaplains, six 
doctors of medicine, two doctors of dentistry, two children of U.S. soldiers who died 
shortly after the war, eight female nurses, and two sisters (buried side-by-side) who died 
while volunteering in battlefield canteens. 
720 Other proposed lists included “an alphabetical list of graves for the cemetery 
itself […] a list for each cemetery by organization […] an alphabetical list of soldiers of 
allied countries buried in our cemeteries […] and an alphabetical list of naval personnel 
in our cemeteries.” ABMC, Report, 58. 
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Third, they would remind visitors of the ABMC itself and its role in Europe (by 
displaying the names of the seven other cemeteries the ABMC had constructed 
elsewhere). Fourth, in keeping with the very nature of the cemeteries themselves, the lists 
would further account for, and put on display, soldiers whose bodies had never been 
found or identified. And perhaps most importantly, the lists would aid visitors who 
wished to identify particular interred soldiers. It is clear that the planners were 
fundamentally concerned with making the presentations of the dead accessible and 
understandable to visitors. Their concern was reflected not only in their discussion of 
these lists, but also in their discussion of the headstones: “As a result of the commission’s 
investigation in Europe, it was informally suggested to the Secretary of War that before 
the permanent headstones were installed a study should be made concerning the 
abbreviations to be used on them. The reason for this is that many of the present 
abbreviations are so complicated that they can not be interpreted even by a person 
thoroughly familiar with Army organizations.”721 In these words, we can identify the 
planners’ ambition to make the sites communicate clearly and effectively to itinerant 
visitors. 
In order to communicate clearly and effectively, the ABMC argued, each 
cemetery would have to exude a sense of order and uniformity. As it unfolded, the report 
made it plain that the theme of ‘regularity’ was a key component of the planners’ designs. 
“All of the cemeteries […] should be enclosed by masonry walls,” the commission 
opined. “The present situation of having a wall on the road sides only is decidedly 
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unattractive.”722 The ABMC asserted that visitor reactions would be greatly determined 
by the consistent nature of each cemetery’s appearance. The arrangement of the wooden 
grave markers illustrated the commission’s point: 
The graves in all cemeteries, with the exception of certain sections in the Oise-
 Aisne and Somme, have been arranged so that the markers are equidistant apart 
 and in rows spaced at regular intervals. This regularity is very effective and adds 
 greatly to the appearance of the cemetery. Where not regularly arranged, the 
 effect is disturbing, as the graves are close together, and many spaces exist due to 
 the removal of bodies for return to the United States and other places. This 
 irregularity is very marked because in all cases these sections are immediately 
 alongside of regularly arranged sections.723 
 
For the planners, irregularity or inconsistency in the arrangement of the headstones 
produced an undesired and disturbing effect for the beholder. The ABMC believed that 
the grave markers of each cemetery were to be aligned equidistant apart from one 
another. Furthermore, the shapes of yet-to-be-made marble headstones were not to 
deviate from Dr. Cret’s models: “The Commission considers it very important that no 
variations be made from the standard types of headstones adopted. The cemeteries were 
planned with this point in view, and a large part of their impressiveness and beauty will 
depend upon its being strictly carried out.”724 Thus, the planners had produced a plan 
that, much like an Army manual, was to be followed down to the last detail. 
The ABMC expressed its acute awareness that the cemeteries were not only 
symbolic constructions, but also physical spaces upon which visitors would tread. 
Because each cemetery’s design emulated a natural landscape, visitors were expected to 
spend a considerable amount of time walking around outdoors. Therefore, the 
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commission was pleased with some of the steps that had been taken to accommodate the 
physical needs of itinerant visitors. For instance, the commission reported that rest rooms 
had been built at each cemetery. And the commission commended the extraordinary 
facilities at Meuse-Argonne Cemetery, stating that, “a rest house has been provided 
where meals may be obtained and a limited number of people can spend the night.” 
However, more widespread consideration for the wellbeing of visitors, who would be far 
from home and exploring the cemeteries by foot, was required. For instance, the cemetery 
roads and paths needed repair so as to be easier on visitors’ feet. “Most of the roads and 
paths [of the cemeteries] should be resurfaced, using very fine crushed stone,” the ABMC 
wrote. “In some places this is very badly needed.” Feet, as well as other body parts, 
would also benefit from sitting surfaces. Perhaps envisioning physically and emotionally 
exhausted elderly mothers who would require respites from all the walking, the ABMC 
contended that “[s]tone seats should be provided at each of the cemeteries. These can be 
of such a nature as to add to the beauty of a cemetery as well as to supply a real need. 
They should be carefully located so as to be useful and to take full advantage of the 
existing views.”725 While tending to feet and derrieres, “carefully located” stone seats 
would also allow visitors to maintain a connection with the cemetery via the beauty of the 
“existing views,” even as visitors took breaks and rested. 
Ultimately, the ABMC argued, the American military cemeteries abroad were to 
look as though the United States had invested proper amounts of money into them. The 
commission reported that the total cost of the memorials and chapels of the project would 
be $1,500,000. “This amount,” the commission wrote, “is about 75 cents for each 
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American soldier who served in Europe. It is believed that a more suitable, complete, and 
economical project can not be made.”  Furthermore, the ABMC declared, “[i]n the future 
the commission will require, besides the ordinary expenses of its office, a further 
appropriation of about $2,400,000 to complete the entire project as outlined in this report. 
When this project is completed, the entire operations of the American Expeditionary 
Forces in Europe during the World War will be properly commemorated.” A suitable 
memorialization of America’s dead, it seemed, depended on an increase of financial 
investment. After all, “the impression gained in almost every cemetery is that the work 
has been done with a minimum expenditure of funds. This is in direct contrast to the 
impression gained from a British cemetery, where everything is of the best.”726 The 
ABMC made it clear that the planners intended to produce sites of remembrance that not 
only honored the nation’s war dead, but also rivaled the standards of commemoration 
held by Britain and other European nations. 
The 1924 tour had taken the ABMC not only to the eight permanent American 
burial grounds, but also to British, French, Belgian, Italian, and German military 
cemeteries throughout Western Europe. The ABMC made it clear that the other nations’ 
cemeteries had served as valuable sources of inspiration and models of what and what not 
to do inside the walls of the American cemeteries. In the 1926 report, the commission 
recounted its findings at these foreign cemeteries so as to reveal the origins of some of its 
ideas and amplify the necessity of matching the monumentality of other nations’ burial 
grounds. For instance, the ABMC recounted how it had had met with members of 
Britain’s Imperial War Graves Commission in the French town of Ypres to inspect 
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various British cemeteries and memorials in the vicinity. Their tour leader Colonel Sir 
Herbert Ellisen of the IWGC, had imparted some sobering information that revealed the 
magnitude of the British burial operations. “The British Empire had approximately 
1,019,882 death casualties during the war,” the ABMC reported. “There are about 1,000 
British war cemeteries in France and Belgium, and British soldiers are buried in more 
than 1,500 communal cemeteries in these countries.” Comparatively speaking, the 
magnitude of the British need to bury a million casualties overshadowed the American 
task of burying 116,000 dead.727 The ABMC emphasized the impressive fact that, despite 
their post-war financial plight, the British had been able to maintain high standards of art 
and architecture for their expansive network of cemeteries. 
With little doubt, the ABMC had attained more inspiration in the cemeteries of 
Britain than in the cemeteries of any other nation—the ABMC had devoted ten pages of 
its report to British sites of remembrance. To begin, the ABMC was impressed with the 
consistency of design and theme they found in each British cemetery. “The British 
cemeteries have all been designed in accordance with certain general principles,” the 
commission wrote. “The first of these is to secure, in so far as possible, the permanence 
of the graves… all engineering work is planned and executed with this idea of 
permanence in mind.” The ABMC argued that the American cemeteries, like their British 
counterparts, should be built to last forever. “Another principle followed,” the 
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repatriation of found American bodies. Because of the magnitude of British losses and 
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commission wrote, “is to make the graves themselves the most striking feature in the 
cemetery and the one to which the attention is irresistibly attracted.” Above all else, the 
British cemeteries came across as cemeteries, where the markers of the dead, rather than 
edifices directly symbolic of the state, remained the main focus of each site. “To carry 
this out, the headstones are made of an attractive design, flowers are placed upon the 
graves, and the surroundings are planned so that the headstones will not be overshadowed 
by buildings or monuments.” To support this description, the commission included a 
photograph of a British headstone. A medium shot, the photograph revealed the aesthetic 
play between the “attractive” glowing, white, marble marker and the site’s ubiquitous 
natural foliage: the flowers on the graves, the green grass between the rows of 
headstones, and the hedges and trees in the background. The ABMC wished to reproduce 
such pleasing effects in its own sites. 
The commission also paid notice to the general uniformity of the British 
headstones, stating, “The headstones are all of the same shape and general design. On 
each headstone to a known soldier the following appears: The name, age, military rank 
and unit; a cross or other appropriate religious emblem; a reproduction of the badge worn 
on the cap; and if the relatives desire, a text or other personal tribute chosen by them.”728 
The vast numbers of British dead surely necessitated the mass production of a single 
model of headstone. But apart from meeting the demands of logistics, the standardized 
headstones worked to diminish the distinctions between individual British soldiers. 
Although militaristic hierarchy had kept the soldiers separated in life, the uniformity of 
the shape and design of the headstones made them virtually inseparable in death. 
                                                 
728 ABMC, Report, 23. 
 369 
It should be noted, however, that the IWGC had sacrificed some of the uniformity 
of its cemeteries by allowing families of the dead to place personal inscriptions on the 
headstones. This policy had resulted in the appearance of thousands of texts that adhered 
to varied styles of remembrance. “In addition to the still hopeful ones about dawn and 
fleeing shadows,” cultural historian Paul Fussell states in his famous book, The Great 
War and Modern Memory, “we find some which are more ‘modern,’ that is, more 
personal, particular, and hopeless.” Some examples include: “Our dear Ted. He died for 
us”: “Our Dick”: “If love could have saved him he would not have died”; and “A sorrow 
too deep for words.” According to Fussell, some of the personal inscriptions “read as if 
refusing to play the game of memorial language at all.”729 The fact that the 1926 report 
did not address this aspect of the British headstones indicates that the CFA and the 
ABMC were not interested in giving American families such an opportunity to disrupt 
the “memorial language” of the U.S. cemeteries.730 
The ABMC closed its discussion of the British cemeteries by focusing on the 
religious symbolism, art, and accommodations for itinerant visitors present at each 
British site: 
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own words on the back of soldiers’ headstones. At Suresnes, the ABMC permitted seven 
families to write messages much as British families had done in every IWGC cemetery. 
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Each cemetery contains a large ornamental cross of white stone called the Cross 
 of Sacrifice, which varies in dimensions with the size of the cemetery. This cross 
 is the distinguishing feature of a British cemetery […] The large cemeteries 
 contain a Stone of Remembrance. This is a white monolith weighing about 10 
 tons and with the words “Their name liveth forevermore,” carved on it […] The 
 larger cemeteries contain buildings and other works of art to relieve the bareness 
 which would otherwise result and to afford shelter and seclusion for visitors.731 
 
The overt Christian symbolism apparent in British headstones and each Cross of Sacrifice 
clearly struck the ABMC as something appropriate and necessary for its own sites. The 
commission was also duly impressed with the artistic qualities of the cemeteries. As Paul 
Fussell notes, the IWGC had contracted famed writer Rudyard Kipling “to devise almost 
all the verbal formulas employed by the Imperial War Graves Commission, from ‘Their 
Name Liveth For Evermore,’ carved on the large ‘Stone of Remembrance’ in each 
cemetery, to the words incised on headstones over the bodies of the unidentified: ‘A 
Soldier of the Great War/Known unto God.’”732 The fact that a public figure as 
influential as Kipling had been hired to enhance the rhetorical power of the IWGC 
cemeteries revealed the British commitment to maintaining a high-culture, artistic 
sensibility within their burial grounds. It is little wonder that the ABMC lamented that in 
the American cemeteries, “Nothing has been done […] in the way of works of 
architecture and art.” Finally, the ABMC lauded the buildings that provided shelter and 
seclusion to itinerant visitors of the British cemeteries—a feature it hoped to reproduce in 
the American burial grounds.733 
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In conclusion, the ABMC emphasized the staggering amount of money the British 
had invested in their military cemeteries and the speed in which the cemeteries were 
being constructed. “It is estimated that the work of the Imperial War Graves Commission 
will finally involve an expenditure of about $50,000,000,” the ABMC stated, “and that 
the work will be entirely completed by the end of 1927.”734 Surely, the ABMC implicitly 
argued, the eight American cemeteries, in comparison with the 1,000 British cemeteries, 
deserved corresponding amounts of financial and physical devotion. “The commission is 
making all plans to complete the memorials of its project so that they can be dedicated on 
November 11, 1928, just 10 years after the signing of the armistice.  This can be done, 
provided appropriations for the work are available.”735 In essence, the ABMC felt that if 
the British could afford to construct such places of memory and beauty, the Americans 
could do no less. Therefore, the necessary funds had to be appropriated for the 
commission to do its job. 
In its report, the ABMC devoted much less discussion to the cemeteries of France, 
Belgium, Italy, and Germany. But of this group, French cemeteries received the most 
consideration. The ABMC noted that roughly half of the 237 French cemeteries were still 
undergoing completion. As in the British cemeteries, each identified French soldier 
would have an individual grave. The French, however, treated their unknown soldiers 
differently: “The remains of unidentified soldiers are to be placed in ossuaries located at 
various places along the front.” Departing from the French, the Americans would bury 
the remains of unknown soldiers under individual headstones within the confines of the 
                                                 
734 Ibid, 29. 
735 Ibid, 75. 
 372 
U.S. cemeteries. While the French cemeteries utilized the attractive qualities of flowers, 
trees, and shrubs, the cemeteries were “surrounded by live hedges” and “reinforced by 
barb wire,” boundary markers that connoted feelings of exclusion rather than invitation. 
Of the French grave markers, the commission wrote: “The headstones will be of uniform 
design and will show the name, rank, unit, place and date of death, the words ‘Mort pour 
la France,’ and an emblem of religious faith (a cross for Christians, a Hebrew inscription 
for Jews, and a crescent for Mohammedans) […] These headstones are made of artificial 
stone, cast in three pieces.”736 Though made of artificial stone, a material inferior to the 
white marble of the American headstones, the French headstones articulated the usual 
religious symbolism and identity markers of name, rank, and unit. The phrase “Mort pour 
la France” (“Died for France”) clearly signified the alleged purpose of each French 
soldier’s sacrifice. 
 Although the ABMC had traveled to Belgium and Italy, it offered little discussion 
of those nations’ cemeteries. Of the Belgian sites, it wrote: “The Belgian procedure in 
regard to [military cemeteries and memorials] follows so closely that of the French that it 
will not be repeated here.” As for the Italian cemeteries, the commission reported that, 
“The Italian cemeteries follow no general rules in their design, each one being developed 
individually to conform to local conditions and the ideas of the architect.” While most of 
the Italian cemeteries were enclosed by masonry walls and most of the headstones were 
arranged in regular rows, the commission was not impressed with the fact that “a great 
deal of latitude is allowed in the decoration of individual graves.” The ABMC reported 
that although each Italian cemetery adopted its own standard grave marker, “the use of a 
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standard marker is optional, and the relatives may place any marker they desire over the 
grave. Most of the tombs of the higher ranking officers are very elaborate and ornate. 
Many of them have worked into their design fieldpieces and other relics of the war.”737 
The ABMC surely rejected the independent nature of each Italian cemetery, which 
clearly violated the CFA’s aesthetic and ideological sensibilities. Although they were 
dispersed throughout England France, and Belgium, the American cemeteries were to be 
regulated by identical principles. 
Unsurprisingly, the ABMC devoted only five short lines to the German 
cemeteries: 
 A number of German cemeteries and monuments were seen in France and 
 Belgium. Pictures of some of these accompany this report. The headstones and 
 monuments were all erected by the Germans during the war in the territory they 
 occupied. 
 German graves in France and Belgium are being cared for by these 
 countries in the same manner as their own graves. This is in accordance with a 
 provision in the Versailles treaty of peace. 
 
The ABMC accompanied this text with a stark photograph of four, irregular German 
headstones of dark color. Clearly the ABMC was not interested in glamorizing or 
emulating the sites that Germans had constructed “during the war in the territory they 
occupied.”738 While the American planners might borrow ideas from the cemeteries of 
the nation’s wartime allies, they would never turn to the German cemeteries for 
inspiration. 
The Annual Report of the American Battle Monuments Commission to the 
President of the United States for the Fiscal Year 1925 achieved its intended effect. By 
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June of 1927, President Coolidge and the governments of Britain, France, and Belgium 
had approved and publicly endorsed the plans outlined in the report, and the ABMC had 
secured all of the appropriations it had requested.739 In essence, the CFA and the ABMC 
were untethered and free to turn their grand ideas into material realities. In late 1927, 
large quantities of white marble crosses and Stars of David started arriving from Italy; by 
1929, their erection in the cemeteries was completed.740 In 1932, the cemetery chapels 
(designed by Paul Cret and his team of architects) were finished. When construction of 
the ABMC’s massive battlefield monuments (also designed by Cret and his cohort) ended 
in 1937, the commission held impressive dedication ceremonies at the eight American 
cemeteries (keynote speakers included General Pershing, Marshal Philippe Pétain, and 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt).741 Twenty years after the United States’ entry into the 
war, the nation’s overseas military cemeteries were finally established. 
5.6 THE CEMETERIES’ FINAL VISUAL PRESENTATION 
Still visited by tens of thousands of people each year, the eight U.S. World War I 
cemeteries in Europe appear today as they did when they were first opened to the public. 
Reflecting the planners’ determination to impose a sense of regularity, all eight 
cemeteries share marked aesthetic qualities. For instance, each site contains neatly 
                                                 
739 “Pershing Arranges for War Memorials,” New York Times, June 26, 1927, 16. 
740 “Brief History of Organization,” 2. 
741 For more on the establishment of these battlefield monuments, the architectural 
principles of the cemetery chapels, and the 1937 dedication ceremonies, see Grossman, 
“Architecture.” 
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ordered and evenly spaced white marble headstones that cast their silhouettes on smooth 
green lawns, linear walking paths that meet at important axial intersections and intensify 
the feeling of geometric order, and an architecturally and artistically impressive stone 
chapel that is situated at a crucial (and often climactic) focal point. At the same, each 
cemetery possesses unique visual characteristics that make it entirely distinct from the 
other sites; in other words, you have not seen all eight cemeteries if you have only seen 
one. This section offers brief descriptions of each American World War I cemetery so 
that we might begin to see the important similarities and differences between them.742 
Flanders Field American Cemetery and Memorial is the smallest of the eight 
cemeteries. Displaying only 368 headstones, this quaint burial ground exudes a sense of 
peace that matches the spirit of John McCrae’s famous poem, “In Flanders Field”: 
In Flanders fields the poppies blow 
Between the crosses, row on row, 
That mark our place; and in the sky 
The larks, still bravely singing, fly 
Scarce heard amid the guns below.743 
 
Situated in the quiet suburban town of Waregem, Belgium, Flanders Field Cemetery is 
spectacular, yet gentle and low key. A graveled, tree-lined lane leads visitors from a 
bustling Waregem thoroughfare to the interior of this bucolic and awe-inspiring site. 
                                                 
742 This section synthesizes my own on-site observations (conducted in the 
summer of 2006 as a University of Pittsburgh Nationality Rooms fellowship) with other 
scholars’ descriptions of the cemeteries. While the key aesthetic attributes of each 
cemetery will be addressed here, the descriptions will become progressively shorter for 
the sake of brevity. For more thorough descriptions of each site, see Marion, Famous, 
172-186; Richard E. Meyer, “Stylistic Variation in the Western Front Battlefield 
Cemeteries of World War I Combatant Nations,” Markers: Annual Journal of the 
Association for Gravestone Studies 18 (2001): 189-253; and Nishiura, American. 
743 John McCrae, In Flanders Field: And Other Poems, ed. Sir Andrew Macphail 
(New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1919), 3. 
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Closely cropped and manicured currant hedge, rhododendron, lilac, azalea, birch, ash, 
oak, elm, holly, maple, hydrangea, magnolia, spirea, and Japanese prune effectively 
transport visitors from the reality of modern life to an almost otherworldly and 
impossibly beautiful sanctuary. At the center of the cemetery stands a fifty-foot flagpole, 
atop which an American flag sways in the breeze. The flagpole’s bronze-cast base 
features carved images of acanthus leaves, butterflies, seashells, oak leaves, acorns, and a 
circle of poppies—symbols meant draw one’s mind to the natural splendors of everyday 
life and enhance one’s overpowering sense of communion with nature. 
The cemetery’s interdenominational chapel744 is relatively small, in keeping with 
the modest size of the burial ground. Designed by Paul Cret, it is set in a sunken garden, 
an attribute that provides greater depth to the small area and attracts attention to the 
Greco-Roman structure itself. Carved into the white Pouillenay stone above the chapel’s 
bronze doors are the words: “GREET THEM EVER WITH GRATEFUL HEARTS.” On 
the chapel’s three outer walls appear inscriptions in English, Flemish, and French (but not 
German, one of Belgium’s three official languages) that remind visitors:  
THIS CHAPEL HAS BEEN ERECTED BY THE UNITED STATES OF 
 AMERICA IN MEMORY OF HER SOLDIERS WHO FOUGHT AND DIED IN 
 BELGIUM DURING  THE WORLD WAR. THESE GRAVES ARE THE 
 PERMANENT AND VISIBLE SYMBOL OF THE HEROIC DEVOTION WITH 
 WHICH THEY GAVE THEIR LIVES TO THE COMMON CAUSE OF 
 HUMANITY 
 
                                                 
744 The chapels are decidedly Christian in nature (the term “chapel” itself denotes 
a small building for Christian worship). Although the ABMC eventually placed a silver 
or gold menorah on each chapel’s altar, there is little doubt that these designated spaces 
of contemplation harness traditional Christian symbolism, architectural design, and 
rituals of remembrance to achieve their rhetorical effect. 
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Beneath these inscriptions visitors see bas-relief figures, classical in nature, signifying 
Grief, Remembrance, and History. Within the chapel, visitors discover made of Grand 
Antique (black and white) marble, above which a rose-tinted marble panel displays a 
“crusader’s sword” outlined in gold. Carved into the altar itself are the words: “I WILL 
RANSOM THEM FROM THE POWER OF THE GRAVE, I WILL REDEEM THEM 
FROM DEATH”—a quote from the biblical book of Hosea. Impressive candelabra and 
the flags of the United States, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy flank the altar. 
The interior walls are made of rose-tinted marble and display the names of 43 American 
soldiers who died in Belgium, but whose bodies were never recovered. Above these 
names appear the Great Seal of the United States and the words: “IN MEMORY OF 
THOSE AMERICAN SOLDIERS WHO FOUGHT IN THIS REGION AND WHO 
SLEEP IN UNKNOWN GRAVES.” 
The chapel is the nexus of the cemetery, from which radial gravel pathways 
originate. Dividing and delineating the cemetery’s four grave plots, these paths terminate 
at four shaded and secluded recesses. Designated as sites of contemplation, each of these 
nooks contains an ornamental urn on a pedestal, upon which are carved the insignia of the 
four American divisions that fought in Belgium (the 27th, 30th, 37th, and 91st). The graves 
themselves are evenly clustered so that ninety-two appear in each plot. Twenty-one 
unknown soldiers are buried at Flanders; each of their white marble headstones bears the 
statement: 
HERE RESTS IN HONORED GLORY 
A COMRADE IN ARMS 
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KNOWN BUT TO GOD745 
  
The grave markers of the other interred soldiers (some of which are shaped in the Star of 
David) display the respective soldier’s name, rank, regiment, division, home state, and 
date of death. For instance, the headstone of Private Harry Volz—who died on the last 
day of the Great War—presents the following inscription: 
HARRY VOLZ 
PVT.   148 INF.   37 DIV. 
WISCONSIN   NOV. 10, 1918 
 
Springing from the earth, yet still modest in height and close to the ground, the uniform 
and evenly spaced headstones radiate against the tidy green lawn and the English yew 
hedge, trees, and shrubs that frame each plot. Collectively, the white marble headstones 
address visitors from every angle and vantage point (near or distant). Individually, 
however, each marker—displaying unique information about the respective soldier buried 
below—respectfully invites visitors to approach and offer their undivided attention and 
careful consideration. 
In contrast to the cemetery at Flanders Field, the Meuse-Argonne American 
Cemetery and Memorial in Romagne-Sous-Montfaucon, France, is impressive for its 
massive size. The largest of the eight cemeteries, Meuse-Argonne contains the graves of 
14,246 fallen soldiers and spans 130 acres. The cemetery’s land itself was captured by the 
32nd Infantry Division during the Great War—thus many of the men buried there died on 
that very soil. Visitors are subtly reminded of this fact by the presence of the infamous 
                                                 
745 This inscription is similar to the one that appears on the Tomb of the 
Unknowns at Arlington National Cemetery (“HERE LIES IN HONORED GLORY AN 
AMERICAN SOLDIER KNOWN BUT TO GOD”)—thus, the overseas cemeteries are 
linked once more to the homeland. 
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Argonne Forest, which serves as the cemetery’s backdrop. Visitors may enter the site 
through two portals, flanked by marble gatehouses; two eagle statues surmount each 
gatehouse. Generally rectangular in shape, the cemetery contains eight square plots of 
graves, each separated from the others by linear, tree-lined pathways; these linden trees 
provide a natural hallway of shade as visitors walk the paths. It should be noted that 
ABMC landscapers vigilantly prune the tops and sides of these trees so as to make the 
trees appear square-shaped; because each tree’s growth is kept in check, it is possible to 
see the white rows of headstones from a distance. Situated on a relatively steep incline, 
the eight symmetrical grave plots induce visitors to walk uphill toward a memorial chapel 
that crests the slope. By the time one walks through the sea of seemingly countless 
headstones and reaches the stone chapel, one is physically tired and emotionally 
overwhelmed. The chapel is flanked by two loggias, open hallways that evoke thoughts 
of a monastery. The loggias contain an ornamental map of the Meuse-Argonne offensive 
and the incised names of 954 men whose remains were never recovered or identified. The 
floors of the pavilions at the ends of the loggia display directional arrows that direct 
visitors’ attention toward the significant terrain where American soldiers fought and died. 
From one of the loggias, visitors can see the ABMC’s Montfaucon Monument, a stone 
spire rising two hundred feet above the once devastated land. The chapel itself is 
Romanesque in style. In keeping with the “spatial monument” design that had become so 
prominent on that National Mall in Washington, a broad set of set of steps guide the 
visitor up to the chapel. In contrast to the gleaming bright stone of the chapel’s exterior, 
the chapel entrance and the space inside look completely black and void of light—a 
visual effect that makes it seem as though one is about to pass from this world to some 
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other. Reminding visitors of who should be in their thoughts, an inscription above the 
entrance reads: “IN SACRED SLEEP THEY REST.” Inside, visitors walk past columns 
(on which are carved the heads of American soldiers), through a bronze filigree screen, 
and into an apse. In the center of the apse stands a flag-banked altar. Delicate sunlight 
passes through several stained glass windows to illuminate this silent space; the colorful 
stained glass windows commemorate the American regiments and divisions that fought in 
the region. Inscribed above the arches of the door, apse, and windows, are the phrases:  
GOD HATH TAKEN THEM UNTO HIMSELF 
 
THEIR NAMES WILL LIVE FOR EVERMORE 
 
PEACEFUL IS THERE SLEEP IN GOD 
 
 PERPETUAL LIGHT UPON THEM SHINES  
 
Upon exiting the tranquil confines of the chapel and returning to the outside world, one is 
greeted with a breathtaking, expansive vista of the entire cemetery below. 
Whereas the Meuse-Argonne Cemetery is impressive for its scale, the Suresnes 
American Cemetery and Memorial stands out for its delicate nature and meticulous, and 
perhaps unmatched, artistic and architectural beauty. Situated on top of the wooded hill 
of Mont Valerien, the cemetery is elevated high above the city of Paris. Because of its 
proximity to the City of Light, Suresnes has always been the most visited U.S. World 
War I burial ground. Designed to be the “gem” in the crown of America’s cemeteries 
abroad, Suresnes features gilded and gleaming wrought-iron gate at its entrance. Upon 
entering, visitors are met with a steep, linden-lined avenue that divides the two major 
grave plots. These plots contain 1,541 graves, including the graves of a pair of brothers, a 
pair of sisters (who had conducted volunteer work during the war), and seven nurses. 
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Carefully placed beech, weeping willow,746 mountain ash, horse chestnut, and paulownia 
trees provide appear intermittently throughout the plots. The central pathway, and the 
grave plots themselves, guide visitors upward toward a loggia-flanked chapel. Neatly 
manicured red polyantha rose bushes create a border of color at the chapel’s base, while 
tall pines, yews, acacia, and hornbeam rise up behind the chapel to provide a naturally 
majestic frame. One of the loggias features a sculpture in bas-relief of the ghostlike 
figures of eleven weary U.S. soldiers. A memorial to unknown soldiers, this frieze stands 
above the inscription: “SOME THERE BE WHICH HAVE NO SEPULCHRE. THEIR 
NAME LIVETH FOR EVERMORE.” The other loggia leads to a “memorial room”—
something no other American cemetery features. Upon entering this subdued space, one 
encounters a pure white statue of a grieving woman. At the base of this elegant, yet 
melancholy, figure, visitors read the word: “REMEMBRANCE.” Walking across the 
Italian marble floor to the back wall, one discovers a much longer statement: 
THE MEMORIAL HAS BEEN ERECTED BY THE UNITED STATES OF 
 AMERICA IN PROUD AND GRATEFUL MEMORY OF HER SOLDIERS, 
 SAILORS, AND MARINES WHO FAR FROM THEIR HOMES LAID DOWN 
 THEIR LIVES THAT THE WORLD MIGHT LIVE IN FREEDOM AND 
 INHERIT PEACE    FROM THESE HONORED DEAD MAY WE TAKE 
 INCREASED DEVOTION TO THAT CAUSE FOR WHICH THEY GAVE 
 THE LAST FULL MEASURE 
 
The chapel at Suresnes is made of a creamy French limestone. Four Romanesque 
columns support the chapel’s peristyle; each of these columns presents in large letters the 
inscription: PEACEFUL IS THEIR SLEEP IN GLORY. Inside, the chapel’s ceiling is 
paneled in French oak. A mosaic mural constitutes the main aesthetic feature of this 
                                                 
746 The very name of this easily recognizable tree—“weeping willow”—signifies 
sadness, mourning, and grief. 
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space. Situated behind the altar, it depicts the Angel of Victory laying a palm branch on 
the graves of fallen American soldiers. Four large bronze plaques are mounted on the 
walls, each bearing the names of men who were buried or lost at sea during the Great 
War. When leaving the chapel, visitors are greeted with panoramic view of Paris. The 
perspective makes it seem as though one is elevated high above the Eiffel Tower, which 
can be easily seen in the distance. 
If we conceptualize the Suresnes Cemetery as a “gem,” then we might think of the 
Aisne-Marne American Cemetery and Memorial in Belleau, France, as a solid hunk of 
granite. Although it features objects of natural beauty—red roses and multicolored shrubs 
like forsythia, laurel, boxwood, Japanese plum, deutzia, mock orange, and Oregon 
grape—Aisne-Marne exudes a stoic ethos unmatched by the other sites. It maintains this 
character by virtue of its pro-war symbolism and proximity to Belleau Wood, the forest 
where U.S. Marines engaged in battle for the first time in American history. A pseudo-
Mecca for the Marine Corps, this cemetery mostly contains the graves of Marines who 
died in the Battle of Belleau Wood or subsequent conflicts in the region. Aisne-Marne 
boasts the tallest memorial chapel; standing eighty feet high, this phallic-like structure 
(reminiscent of the Washington Monument on the National Mall) dominates the visual 
plane. Set against the green of Belleau Wood’s trees, the chapel promotes unmistakable 
connotations of virility and strength. Carved into the columns that flank the chapel’s 
entrance are images of trench warfare: soldiers readying for a bayonet charge; automatic 
riflemen; artillery observers; a machine gun crew; and soldiers tossing grenades. The 
chapel’s pediment displays a prominent bas-relief carving of a medieval crusader in 
armor. This barrage of pro-war, masculine symbolism continues inside. There, visitors 
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discover a frieze that depicts a crusader whose shield bears a lion device for fortitude; 
scales for justice; a Gallic cock symbolic of France; a pommée cross on an apple blossom 
with a snake representing the Garden of Eden; and, a passion flower, a symbol of Christ’s 
Crucifixion and Resurrection. Stained glass windows reinforce the message, depicting 
Saint Louis, one of the great crusaders; Saint Michael triumphing over the dragon; and 
the Christian martyr Saint Denis, a patron saint of France. Featuring only one textual 
statement—the chapel altar is inscribed with the words, PEACEFUL THEY REST IN 
GLORY EVERLASTING—Aisne-Marne Cemetery makes the Flanders Field and 
Suresnes cemeteries seem downright verbose. A celebration of masculine sacrifice and 
the violence of war, this site lets the dead and the surrounding forests speak for 
themselves.747 
Since we have begun to get a sense of the similarities and differences between 
America’s World War I cemeteries, I will limit my description of the four remaining 
cemeteries to brief discussions of their unique features. The Brookwood American 
Cemetery and Memorial in Surrey, England is particularly small; covering just four acres, 
it holds the graves of 468 soldiers. This burial ground is unique in that it is located in the 
heart of a large, sprawling, labyrinthine civilian cemetery. Surrounded by a seemingly 
endless network of secular, Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Islamic, Hindu, and Zoroastrian 
burial grounds, Brookwood is the most inconspicuous of all the American World War I 
                                                 
747 During the Second World War, German anti-tank guns fired at French tanks 
passing in the vicinity of the Aisne-Marne Cemetery. The German artillery inflicted 
much damage on the American burial grounds. After the war, the ABMC reconstructed 
what had been destroyed, but left an artillery shell hole in the stonework on the right side 
of the chapel entrance. This mark only serves to reinforce the masculine, violent ethos of 
the site.  
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cemeteries. Upon reaching this secluded, shady spot, visitors must feel as though they 
have stumbled upon some fabled, undiscovered secret garden. The Oise-Aisne American 
Cemetery and Memorial in Seringes-Sur-Nesles, France, is famous for containing the 
grave of beloved poet Sergeant Joyce Kilmer, who was killed just a short distance away. 
This site is also noteworthy for the fact that much of its symbolism emphasizes the 
themes of peace and rebirth. For instance, inside the chapel, an altar displays carvings of 
an olive tree for peace; a pelican feeding its young (a symbol of the atonement of Christ’s 
redemptive sacrifice); the oak tree for strength, faith, and virtue; the eagle flying (Christ’s 
Resurrection); and the palm wreath and cross (the cross for Christian faith, the palm 
signifying the Christian’s reward for his faith). The Saint-Mihiel American Cemetery and 
Memorial in Thiaucourt, France, is distinctive for its overtly sentimental rhetoric. In 
order to express its sympathy for grieving American women, the ABMC had allowed the 
mother of Lieutenant Walker Blaine Beale to commission and erect a statue of her son 
within the cemetery grounds. Dressed in his uniform, holding his helmet, and standing at 
ease, the effigy looks over the grave plot where the actual Walker Beale is interred. 
Below the statue appear the words: 
 
BLESSED ARE THEY THAT  
HAVE THE HOME LONGING  
FOR THEY SHALL GO HOME 
 
A variation of the iconic hero statue, the Beale statue is a psychologically complex 
representation of a brave, but tragic, hero of the nation (much like the effigy of Lincoln 
on the National Mall). An inscription on the exterior of the Saint-Miehel also addresses 
(if somewhat subtly) the imagined sacred bond between fallen soldiers and their mothers 
back home: 
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THIS CHAPEL HAS BEEN 
ERECTED BY THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA IN  
GRATEFUL REMEMBRANCE OF  
HER SONS WHO DIED IN  
THE WORLD WAR 
 
Finally, the Somme American Cemetery and Memorial in Bony, France, is remarkable 
for its spartan but effective design. Its squat, box-shaped chapel (the site’s only 
prominent architectural feature) is located at the bottom of the cemetery’s hill. Visitors 
enter the burial ground near the top of the slope, and work their way through the rows of 
headstones to reach the chapel. The chapel’s interior is dark and subdued, as the only 
source of light is a cross-shaped window made of crystal glass; it feels as though one has 
entered a stone womb of sorts. Outside, the endless fields of grain that surround Somme 
Cemetery make it hard to imagine that this very land was once the site of mass murder 
and bloodshed. Of course, the 1,844 white marble headstones on display at this quiet, 
isolated burial ground serve as sober reminders of the Great War’s tax on human life. 
5.7 A VISUAL RHETORICAL ANALYSIS 
Despite the recent “boom” in public memory and visual/material culture studies across 
the humanities,748 America’s overseas World War I cemeteries have received scant 
                                                 
748 Over the past three decades, public memory has become a key term and object 
of study across the humanities. Scholars like Paul Fussell and Pierre Nora have been 
credited with instigating the movement, which is to expansive to cite properly here. But 
some of the more relevant works include: Greg Dickinson, Carole Blair, and Brian L. Ott, 
Places of Public Memory: The Rhetoric of Museums and Memorials (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 2010); Paul Fussell, The Great War; Michael Kammen, 
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attention from scholars. Whereas the military cemeteries of Britain, France, Germany, 
and Russia have been the foci of many scholarly works,749 the American sites have been 
virtually ignored. The limited work that has been done rarely goes beyond mere 
descriptions of American cemeteries’ visual presentation750 or highly subjective accounts 
of scholars’ contemporary, on-site, phenomenological interactions with the sites.751 
Cultural historian Ron Robin has offered the most thorough history and analytical 
critique of the American cemeteries abroad, but his interpretations and judgments of the 
sites’ political meanings and overall effectiveness fall victim to a lack of contextual 
understanding (a point I address below). Recently, Lisa M. Budreau, a research historian 
at the Office of The Surgeon General of the United States, engaged the sites in her book, 
Bodies of War: World War I and the Politics of Commemoration in America, 1919-1933. 
Although she devotes an entire chapter to the American overseas burial grounds, Budreau 
does little more than repeat Ron Robin’s previous assertions. And like Robin, G. Kurt 
Piehler, et al, Budreau ignores the rhetorical foundations that emerged during the war (as 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in American Culture (New 
York: Vintage, 1993); George Lipsitz, Time Passages: Collective Memory and American 
Popular Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990); Pierre Nora, 
Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past, trans. Arthur Goldhammer 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Kendall R. Phillips, ed., Framing Public 
Memory (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004); Kirk Savage, Monument 
Wars; and Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European 
Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
749 See, for example, Suzanne Evans, Mothers of Heroes, Mothers of Martyrs: 
World War I and the Politics of Grief (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2007); Nina Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World 
War II in Russia (New York: Basic Books, 1994); and Jay Winter, Remembering War: 
The Great War Between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2006). 
750 See, for example, Richard E. Meyer, “Stylistic Variation.” 
751 See, for example, Blair et al., “Arlington-sur-Seine.” 
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her book’s title explicitly reveals) and fails to appreciate the CFA’s dominant role in the 
postwar project (again, a point I address below). In short, America’s overseas World War 
I cemeteries have not received the careful scholarly consideration they deserve. 
What explains this dearth of scholarship? Surely it is not a lack of interest in the 
intersections of American war rhetoric, public memory, and visual/material culture, for 
these intersections have become popular subjects of study in recent years. Perhaps the 
biggest factor is the Atlantic Ocean; while American scholars have relatively easy access 
to pertinent historical documents held at the U.S. National Archives and other 
repositories, conducting on-site research at the eight cemeteries abroad (in order to bring 
the documents to life) is a costly and time-consuming proposition; at the same time, 
while European scholars enjoy immediate physical access to the U.S. burial grounds, 
crucial information (written in English) concerning the sites’ genealogy and meanings 
can only be found thousands of miles away in American archives and libraries; in other 
words, a truly thorough analysis of the sites requires much hard work, dedication, and 
investment of resources.752 The lack of scholarship may also be explained by the fact that 
the historical, ideological, rhetorical, and physical complexities of these idiosyncratic 
burial grounds (which are, themselves, dispersed across Western Europe) are 
overwhelming to the individual scholar; thus, it is far easier to pay lip service to the 
cemeteries’ appearance and supposed political meanings. 
                                                 
752 While pursuing my Ph.D. at the University of Pittsburgh, I have been fortunate 
to win several fellowships and awards (the 2006 Stanley Postrednik Nationality Room 
Award, the 2008-2009 Andrew Mellon Predoctoral Research Fellowship, and the 2009-
2010 Cultural Studies Dissertation Fellowship) that have afforded me the resources and 
time to conduct on-site research in Europe and archival research throughout the United 
States. 
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Whatever the case, the standing research has been relatively simplistic and 
deficient. Working without the foundational knowledge I seek to provide in this 
dissertation, scholars have not had at their disposal the analytical tools necessary for an 
appropriate understanding of the sites. As a result, the cemeteries have received a rather 
misguided and negative appraisal. Their harshest critic has been Ron Robin, who 
generally considers the sites to be coercive, yet failed, articulations of American political 
and military might. Ignoring the CFA’s central role in the establishment of the 
cemeteries, lumping the WWI sites with the U.S. World War II overseas cemeteries built 
twenty years later, and claiming that the burial grounds’ visual presentation reflects 
General Pershing’s alleged personal agenda (a personal agenda for which he provides 
little evidence), Robin builds his critique on faulty premises.753  
Throughout Robin’s scholarship, two pointed criticisms emerge again and again. 
The first is that the cemeteries “fail” as “artifacts of political architecture” because they 
are not American enough. In his 1995 essay, “‘A Foothold in Europe’: The Aesthetics 
and Politics of American War Cemeteries in Western Europe,” Robin states: 
                                                 
753 Robin builds his essay, “‘A Foothold in Europe,’” on a quote taken from a 
1954 article that had been written by a proponent of the establishment of World War II 
cemeteries in Europe. Lumping the First World War cemeteries and the subsequent 
Second World War cemeteries together, he mistakenly analyzes the WWI sites through 
the lens of the WWII sites. Moreover, he claims that the original members of the ABMC 
“acted as a rubber stamp for policies defined by” Pershing, who saw himself “first and 
foremost as [a representative] of the government and the military establishment rather 
than guardians for the bereaved families.” Robin proceeds to argue that the WWI 
cemeteries were, more or less, of Pershing’s making. Unfortunately, Robin fails to cite a 
single piece of evidence to support these claims. Ultimately, I believe it is foolhardy to 
believe that Pershing and the ABMC could have pulled off anything as artistically, 
architecturally, and aesthetically beautiful as these cemeteries on their own. See Robin, 
“‘A Foothold in Europe,’” 56-8. 
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[T]he actual decision to erect large American cemeteries abroad demonstrated a 
 willingness to alert the world to the presence of a new and omnipresent world 
 power. However, the symbolism employed was self-defeating. By emulating the 
 iconography of European culture instead of developing uniquely American 
 symbols, the United States failed to capitalize on its contribution to the war 
 effort.754 
 
Of course, by overlooking the reality that the sites were almost entirely of the CFA’s 
making, and that the CFA had always sought to extend the classical aesthetics of its 
domestic Beaux-Arts projects to the cemeteries abroad, Robin mistakenly compares the 
American burial grounds to the architectural designs and artistic styles of European 
cemeteries, memorials, and buildings alone. Robin’s second major criticism is that the 
cemeteries’ symbolism is disingenuous and irreconcilably contradictory in nature. With 
regard to the cemeteries’ duplicity, Robin argues that, while the sites incorporate the 
graves of African-American soldiers, they deceitfully cover up the racial schisms of 
American life; that the cemeteries do not address the crucial role that modern military 
technologies played in the war; that the themes of egalitarianism and voluntarism erased 
“any sense of individuality” in the cemeteries; and that the use of traditional architectural 
designs assure a sense of continuity at the cost of acknowledging “the gash of the Great 
War.”755 As for their incompatible physical attributes, Robin criticizes the juxtaposition 
of classical Greek styles with visions of the Medieval Crusades (both of which he labels 
as “anachronistic”); the evocation of “historical symbols to rationalize a contemporary 
tragedy”; and the blatant contradiction between the sites’ muted celebration of the United 
                                                 
754 Robin, “‘A Foothold in Europe,’” 71. 
755 Enclaves, 45, 57; “‘A Foothold in Europe,’” 60-5. When reading these works, 
one wishes that Robin had proposed some alternative possibilities for the visual 
presentation of the cemeteries. Regrettably, the reader is presented with only negative 
criticisms of the sites. 
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States’ decisive role in the war and the imperious decision to establish the overseas 
cemeteries in the first place.756 In the end, Robin pans the sites, describing them as 
“weak, inconclusive, and indicative of a naïve concept of international affairs […] a 
confusing mixture of the various cultural trends affecting the American nation during the 
[early twentieth century].” For Robin, the cemeteries provide little more than “a small 
window through which we may peer at an American society coming to terms with a 
brave new world.”757 While certain aspects of these criticisms and judgments are not 
entirely incorrect, Robin has failed to take into account the domestic public discourse and 
the rhetorical constraints that shaped the CFA and the ABMC’s aesthetic decisions and, 
eventually, the final visual presentation of the sites. 
In the remaining pages of this chapter, I will offer a relatively brief visual 
rhetorical analysis of the cemeteries. My intentions are twofold. First, I hope to correct 
some of Robin’s misperceptions. Second, I hope to provide a richer analysis of the 
                                                 
756 Enclaves, 58, 60; “‘A Foothold in Europe,’” 60-5, 71. In his criticisms of the 
apparent contradictions of the American war cemeteries, Robin does not mention the fact 
that both war and cemeteries are, themselves, inherently contradictory in nature. While 
every war devolves into murder, chaos, hatred, and misery, the instigation of every war is 
couched in the terms of the ideology of “returning order and peace to the world.” As 
René Guénon writes (Symbolism of the Cross, page 42): “From whatever aspect and in 
whatever domain war is envisaged, one may say that the essential reason for its existence 
is to put a stop to disorder and to restore order. In other terms, it is concerned with the 
unification of multiplicity by means which belong to the world of multiplicity itself.” 
And I think it safe to say, that cemeteries are inherently contradictory in that visitors can 
become intensely aware of their own existence (of the fact that they are alive) when they 
encounter the reality of death before them. 
757 “‘A Foothold in Europe,’” 72. In his study of the sites, Robin makes several 
egregious factual errors. For instance, he states that “only name, rank, and serial number 
[appear] on each headstone” (he does not mention home state and date of death). He also 
claims that none of the sites depict weapons being used in a state of action (Aisne-Marne 
does). Such comments indicate that Robin may not have visited most (if any) of the 
cemeteries before publishing his works. See Enclaves, 45, 57. 
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cemeteries that may be useful to future scholarship. By no means do I claim that my 
interpretation will be definitive. I expect that these burial grounds will receive increased 
attention in the coming years, especially as the 100th anniversary of U.S. participation in 
the Great War approaches. Without doubt, future scholars will conduct research, unearth 
materials, and publish works that supplement and in all likelihood, challenge my own 
analysis of the sites. My only goal is to offer these future scholars a thoughtful critique 
that aids their own findings. 
Before I offer my judgments, though, I should say a few words about visual 
rhetoric. Although visual rhetoric has become a popular subfield of communication 
studies—and despite the fact that countless rhetoric scholars have used the term “visual 
rhetoric” in their scholarship—visual rhetoric remains a rather ambiguous, broadly 
defined concept that be casually invoked in discussions of anything having to do with 
both the visual and the rhetorical. Attempting to bring some measure of clarity to the 
term, rhetoric scholars Lester C. Olson, Cara A. Finnegan, and Diane S. Hope have 
recently offered what stands as the most authoritative definition of visual rhetoric: 
“[V]isual rhetoric name[s] those symbolic actions enacted primarily through visual 
means, made meaningful through culturally derived ways of looking and seeing and 
endeavoring to influence diverse publics.”758 Building on this definition, we might think 
of visual rhetoric as the art, practice, and study of persuasive communication through 
visual means. With regard to the inventional process, we might add one word to 
Aristotle’s famous definition of rhetoric and think of visual rhetoric as “the faculty of 
                                                 
758 Lester C. Olson, Cara A. Finnegan, and Diane S. Hope, eds., Visual Rhetoric: 
A Reader in Communication and American Culture (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 
2008), 3. 
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observing in any given case the available visual means of persuasion.” Ultimately, I 
believe the visual rhetorical perspective allows us to understand any given visual object 
as something more than a manifestation or expression of a particular culture or historical 
moment. Rather, the visual rhetorical perspective encourages us to examine the motives, 
decisions, and constraints that led to a given object’s final visual presentation; the 
original or intended audiences that the object’s maker had in mind; and the ways that the 
object’s meanings have lasted or changed over time. Now that we have a basic 
understanding of visual rhetoric, I will offer a brief analysis of the U.S. World War I 
cemeteries in Europe. 
The burial grounds “[emulate] the iconography of European culture” (as Robin 
puts it) only in as far as the aesthetic principles of the City Beautiful movement, the 
Beaux-Arts school of design, the McMillan Plan, and contemporary American symbolism 
(in general) emulated the iconography of European culture. In reality, the cemeteries are 
not simply the material manifestations of General Pershing and the other ABMC 
commissioners’ (untrained) imaginations. Nor are they mere conglomerations and 
reiterations of European cultural iconography. Rather, these sites represent and reflect the 
ambitions of the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts, a powerful governmental agency that 
sought to extend its ideologies of neoclassical design, ordered public space, permanent 
architecture, and the management of citizens’ bodies to the nation’s overseas military 
cemeteries. The Greco-Roman style of the marble and limestone chapels, for instance, are 
in keeping with the CFA’s veneration of neoclassical design (epitomized by the CFA’s 
design of the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C.). Much like the Acropolis in 
Athens, the Winged Victory of Samothrace at the Louvre, and the Washington 
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Monument on the National Mall, the cemeteries’ chapels, memorials, and white Italian 
marble headstones were constructed so as to last for all time. The uniformly spaced, 
standardized headstones—evenly divided between symmetrical grave plots—reflect the 
CFA’s ambition to correct the messiness and vicissitudes of crucial civic spaces with 
carefully planned landscape and architectural “systems” and “compositions.” The linear 
pathways that guide visitors through the plots and to the chapels, the directional arrows 
that steer one’s vision toward significant sites of American battlefield glory, and the 
chapels (designated venues for contemplation and prayer), are telltale signs of the CFA’s 
belief in establishing “flow spaces” that both shepherd visitors along planned routes and 
induce a particular and narrow set of experiences and rhetorical activities.759 The 
seemingly endless rows of grave markers, usually elevated upon a slope, collectively 
address the visitor at all times and from every angle; much like the citizens and tourists 
who traverse the National Mall in D.C., cemetery visitors are more or less props in the 
respective burial ground’s spacious panorama; in essence, every visitor who enters the 
site is transformed into what we might term ‘an American pilgrim.’760 And the 
                                                 
759 Without fully comprehending the aesthetic strategies of the CFA, Robin 
criticizes this aspect of the cemeteries, stating: “The general concept was to arrange 
cemeteries in a formal didactic fashion which represented the views of its planners […] 
However casual the walkways seemed, all paths led to the chapels with their official 
interpretation of the war effort. The unwavering steering of visitors towards these official 
structures assured that due homage would be paid to the role of government in 
coordinating, perhaps dictating, the will of the people.” See “‘A Foothold in Europe,’” 
64. 
760 When one approaches (whether by car or foot) many of the cemeteries—
particularly Oise-Aisne, Aisne-Marne, and Somme—the visitors already within the 
cemeteries, walking along the paths and through the rows of headstones, appear to be 
nothing more than little props in the grand panorama. The same can be said when one is 
in the cemetery proper and observes from a distance other visitors making their way 
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cemeteries’ heavy reliance on easily recognizable symbols—the Latin cross, the Star of 
David, the American flag, the heroic Christian crusader—help the sites amplify abstract 
notions of American democratic virtues and obfuscate the complex, contradictory, and 
disturbing details of history that would otherwise make celebration of the dead all but 
impossible. 
Recognizing that these national war memorials were first and foremost cemeteries 
where the remains of dead human beings would be buried, the CFA and the ABMC 
infused the sites with the aesthetics of familiar American gravescape designs so as to 
meet the expectations of grieving families back home. Carefully incorporating and 
synthesizing at each site the religious iconography of the memento mori gravescape 
(most notably the cross), the romance garden gravescape’s emphases on individualism 
and the union of art and nature, and the epic heroism gravescape’s egalitarian and 
spacious “lawn cemetery” scheme, the planners created a new kind of burial ground that 
nonetheless would be recognizable as a burial ground. (‘Religion,’ ‘nature,’ ‘art,’ and 
‘space’ are concepts that readily come to mind as one encounters each site.) Functioning 
as burial grounds, these sites necessarily had to attract attention to the soil where the 
dead were interred. Transgressing their own sensibilities regarding space and grounds, 
the planners placed unique and relatively detailed information on the headstone of the 
respective soldier buried below; thus, the planners found a way to invite visitors to 
become addressers (not just addressees) and direct their attention to individual markers 
situated close to the ground. Likewise, gorgeous, but vigilantly manicured, flower beds, 
                                                                                                                                                 
through the site. This can be a little unsettling, as one can begin to realize that one too 
probably looks like a prop to everyone else. 
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emitting fragrant scents into the air, were planted throughout the cemeteries so as to add 
natural beauty without distracting from the sites’ larger messages. The planners also 
ingeniously built living quarters for a cemetery director at each site (something that no 
other nation did). A professional position that had become ubiquitous with the rise of the 
epic heroism gravescape, the cemetery director was charged with managing the day-to-
day care of his respective burial ground.761 Families of the fallen must have been glad to 
know, not only that an American citizen would tend to the daily maintenance of their 
loved ones’ graves, but that an American citizen would serve as a constant guardian for 
their loved ones who were buried thousands of miles away. 
Of course, the sites were designed to be not only cemeteries, but also military 
cemeteries. As such, they had to meet the expectations of military personnel (and perhaps 
most of all, General Pershing), who would insist that the cemeteries connote pro-war 
sentiments and celebrate the accomplishments and prowess of the modern U.S. armed 
forces. The prominently displayed headstones of fallen soldiers—standardized in form 
and situated in an almost hypnotic, mechanized, and ultra-modern scheme—immediately 
                                                 
761 Each ABMC cemetery director is also charged with the task of enforcing rules 
of behavior at his respective site. When the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier was unveiled 
at Arlington National Cemetery, visitors often used it as a bench or a picnic table (a 
common practice in the garden romance gravescape). When the American Legion 
complained in 1926, the government decided that the Tomb would be guarded on a daily 
basis. The ABMC was sure not to let such things happen at its sites. In an oral history 
interview I conducted with Gerald Arsenault, Cemetery Director at the Brittany American 
World War II Cemetery and Memorial in St. James, France (May 10, 2006), Arsenault 
indicated how part of his job entailed managing visitors’ behavior: “Europeans, not only 
Americans, consider this sacred ground.  They all realize that the soldiers gave their lives 
for the liberation of France.  I have many French families, if I have children that will run 
in the cemetery before I can go out to tell them to stop running, sometimes a French 
family will grab them by the collar and tell them, ‘You’re on sacred ground here, and you 
will behave while you’re on these sacred grounds.’” For more on the Arlington 
controversy, see Piehler, Remembering War, 122. 
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accomplish these tasks. As if standing at attention, the headstones signify the ultimate 
sacrifice that U.S. troops made for both their nation and the world. But beyond that, the 
cemeteries contain plaques that list the names of American soldiers who died but whose 
remains were never found, tributes to specific divisions (within several cemetery chapels, 
stained glass windows display the insignia of the divisions that fought in the respective 
regions), representations of Christian crusaders (those heroic warriors who fought for 
Europe in God’s name), friezes and statues that depict stoic and noble U.S. soldiers in 
uniform, and depictions of early twentieth century technologies of war (such as the 
carvings of cannons, machine guns, and grenades that appear at Aisne-Marne). Moreover, 
to reach the cemeteries in France and Belgium, one must drive through the vast regions 
that, at one time, constituted the Western Front; while traversing this part of Europe, one 
inevitably encounters countless World War I battlefields, war memorials, and military 
cemeteries (mostly British, French, and German); thus, by the time one reaches any of 
these American cemeteries, the sites have been properly framed within the larger context 
of the Great War (and by deduction, war, militarism, and state-sponsored violence in 
general). 
At the same time, it was expected that these burial grounds would suture critical, 
contemporary American social divides and display the dead soldier as an ideal model of 
the U.S. citizen (much like the cemeteries of the Civil War had done). To the first end, 
the cemeteries incorporate the graves of Christian soldiers (marked by the Latin cross), 
Jewish soldiers (marked by the Star of David), and African-American soldiers (who, for 
the first time in U.S. history, received somewhat equal, formal recognition of their 
wartime contributions and sacrifices). However, while containing the graves of black 
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soldiers, the cemeteries fail to celebrate African Americans in any prominent fashion (a 
key aspect of Ron Robin’s criticism of the sites). The only way one would know if 
particular interred soldiers were African Americans was if the visitor knew to look for the 
graves of members of the 91st and 92nd Divisions (the American Expeditionary Forces’ 
“colored” divisions). Literally consumed into the whiteness of the marble headstones, the 
inscriptions of black soldiers’ names fail to mark the men’s racial status in the same way 
that their skin pigmentation had negatively marked them in life—the sites are, in essence, 
colorblind. Moreover, none of the plaques, friezes, or statues displayed at these sites 
honor black American soldiers in any discernable way. Ultimately, the cemeteries, much 
like the National Mall, amplify visions of American white male heroism. Thus, as Robin 
points out, the cemeteries cover up and whitewash the great racial schisms that plagued 
early twentieth century American society (from the CFA and the ABMC’s point of view, 
however, the cemeteries adequately sutured this critical social divide). Sadly, by hiding 
the presence and wartime accomplishments of African-American soldiers, the cemetery 
planners missed an excellent opportunity to right a wrong symbolically and pronounce to 
the world the United States’ commitment to freedom and equality for all.  
To the second end (displaying the dead soldier as an ideal model of the U.S. 
citizen), each site is nothing less than a grand shrine to the nation’s citizen-soldiers. At 
each cemetery, the following inscription appears (usually on a chapel wall): 
“DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF THOSE WHO DIED FOR THEIR 
COUNTRY.” And at each burial ground, at least one prominently placed flagpole 
displays Old Glory, which gently sways in the wind above the soldiers’ grave markers 
(the intimate relationship between the dead soldiers and the nation is patently clear). The 
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homogeneity of the headstones themselves is disrupted when one begins to read the 
ethnically diverse surnames of the individual soldiers. BAKER, FITZPATRICK, 
HOFFMANN, JENSEN, JOHNSON, KOWALSKI, LEVI, LIBERTUCCI, LOPEZ, 
OLSON, NOVAK, PAVLUK, PETIT, POPOTHEDORON, TOTH, ZDANCEWICZ—
the heterogeneity of the U.S. population (one of the nation’s most important and virtuous 
attributes) is poignantly on display to international visitors. Just as vitally, the inscribed 
names remind American visitors that every ethnic community sacrificed its men for the 
nation; thus, the World War is cast a great equalizer that brought previously divided and 
neglected ethnic communities into the country’s fold. 
Given the fact that these military cemeteries were to be established overseas, the 
planners had been faced with several daunting and unprecedented challenges. The first 
was to make the sites match (or perhaps even exceed) the monumentality and aesthetic 
beauty of other belligerent nations’ burial grounds. But the planners could not allow the 
sites to extol the American nation and its citizen-soldiers in ways that might overstep the 
bounds of good taste; after all, American casualties of the Great War had been 
comparatively light to those of Britain and France, and the U.S. cemeteries would be, in a 
sense, the permanent guests of their host countries. Borrowing ideas predominantly from 
the cemeteries of Great Britain (an English-speaking state power that had established 
hundreds of its own World War cemeteries throughout foreign territories), the CFA and 
the ABMC successfully incorporated certain aspects of Allied cemeteries (such as the 
overt religious symbolism found French and IWGC burial grounds) into the American 
sites. When compared to the colossal size of the Washington Monument and the Lincoln 
Memorial on the National Mall, the U.S. cemeteries seem to have been designed with 
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measured restraint; the headstones, trees, memorials, and chapels (except for the one at 
Aisne-Marne) stay relatively low to the ground. Yet at the same time, the cemeteries (and 
the objects they contain) tend to be situated on slopes that elevate them above the 
visitor’s plane of vision, a trait few European cemeteries feature; thus, the planners found 
a way to make the sites tastefully monumental and distinctly American without 
offending.  
The second challenge was to make the cemeteries’ meanings comprehensible to 
multinational audiences across time. Harnessing the talents and expertise of the finest 
skilled architects and artists, the planners settled on traditional (rather than forward-
looking) materials (marble, stained glass, gilded iron, and natural foliage), symbols 
(religious, nationalistic, militaristic, and pacifist), texts (biblical quotes and lofty rhetoric 
written in English and local dialects), and time-tested themes (neoclassicism, democracy, 
and the Christian crusades) that would connote easily recognizable, if somewhat abstract, 
messages about the character of the United States to American and European tourists 
alike. Finally, the planners had to find ways of re-linking the cemeteries, and the soldierly 
remains they would contain, to the American homeland. The mere fact that the fallen 
U.S. soldiers are buried in, more or less, the soil where they had spilled their blood—not 
to mention the fact that England France, and Belgium have given the various pieces of 
land to the United States in perpetuity—goes a long way in constituting the sites as 
American soil. Still, the planners found ways of reinforcing the notion that when visitors 
enter the cemeteries they are, in essence, walking on American territory. For instance, the 
planners created partitions and liminal spaces (pathways, walls, gates, and gatehouses) 
and erected physical objects (such as flagpoles bearing Old Glory) that effectively 
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separate the cemeteries from the European lands that surround them. The planners also 
inscribed on each soldier’s headstone his respective home state, thereby reminding the 
visitor of the relationship between the soldier’s grave (on which the visitor stands) and 
(as in the case of Joyce Kilmer) the State of New York thousands of miles away. And in 
several cemeteries, the planners displayed textual inscriptions that explicitly classified the 
cemeteries as timeless meeting spots where Americans could commune with their heroic, 
fallen countrymen. For instance, the chapel of Suresnes exhibits the following words: 
THIS MEMORIAL HAS BEEN ERECTED BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AS A SACRED RENDEZVOUS OF A GRATEFUL PEOPLE WITH ITS IMMORTAL 
DEAD. 
Perhaps the most pressing task the planners faced was incorporating into the 
cemeteries the kind of sentimental rhetoric that had become so prevalent and (for the 
government, at least) necessary during the postwar years. To fulfill this obligation, the 
CFA and the ABMC planted trees and foliage (key attributes of the romance garden 
gravescape), as well as delicate flowers, to connote perennial thoughts and feelings of 
love, affection, beauty, mourning, innocence, remembrance, purity, happiness, hope, 
wonder, grace, rebirth, eternity, and God’s presence.762 At each cemetery, textual 
                                                 
762 Remarkably, a sense of permanence is maintained at each cemetery by keeping 
the presentation of the foliage (every rose bush, every tree) the same as it was when the 
sites opened. As Gerald Arsenault, Director of the Brittany American World War II 
Cemetery and Memorial told me: “And of course, as you can see, the chestnut trees, the 
hedges that we have, I have a planting plan, and where you see a rose bed here, you see 
the alignment of the chestnut trees here, you see a Douglas fir, rhododendrons, I have to 
follow that original planting plan.  If I lose a tree I have to plant the same species and 
type.  As you see in the cemetery today, you can visit thirty, fifty years from now, it will 
always be kept in this manner.  And we will always have that original planting plan 
preserving the original vision that those architects had.  Of course a lot of their work was 
 401 
inscriptions couch death in the soft and gentle terms of “sleep” and “rest”; for example, a 
carving on the Oise-Aisne chapel reads: IN SACRED SLEEP THEY REST.763 Grief, 
rather than triumph, permeates many of the sites, as statues at Suresnes and Oise-Aisne 
depict mourning women, and inscriptions speak (if somewhat subtly) to the suffering of 
grieving mothers. The planners’ decision to erect headstones in the shape of the Latin 
cross and the Star of David indicated the government’s willingness to acknowledge and 
represent the personal faiths and beliefs of the fallen, their next of kin, and their religious 
communities in these national (and therefore, secular) spaces. The headstones themselves 
possess a particularly sentimental quality; though collectively they impart a sense of 
mechanical stoicism, each individual marker possess delicate curves and tapered ends 
that were (and could only be) carefully hand-carved by expert artisans; when one 
considers these attributes, as well as the fact that someone took the time to inscribe the 
respective soldiers’ unique information, one begins to sense just how much attention each 
fallen soldier received.764 Finally, at each site, the planners established living quarters for 
a cemetery director and his family. The constant presence of this ‘home’ imbibes each 
                                                                                                                                                 
collaborative with the Fine Arts Commission.  So you visit today.  Your children will 
visit fifty years from now, and they will basically see the same thing.” 
763 Mircea Eliade enumerates on the feminine undertones of the funerary rhetoric 
of “rest” and “sleep”: Throughout the mythology and iconography of Persephone, but 
above all during the Hellenistic period, the Mediterranean and Roman worlds produced 
certain images that show death as a deep sleep, a return to the maternal womb, a ritual 
passage toward a blessed world, or an upward journey through stellar space. See Eliade, 
Symbolism, 60-1. 
764 At the same time, however, this care and attention becomes less prominent and 
convincing as one retreats and sees the hand-carved headstones en masse. The delicate 
artistic flourishes found in each headstone’s form begin to devolve into what we might 
term “mechanized sentimentality.” Much like the telegrams and letters next of kin 
received during and after the war—those mass letters that, because of the unique 
information they contained, had an air of personal touch—the grave markers are, 
ultimately, reproductions masked as singular works of art. 
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respective burial ground with a sense of domesticity that is absent from European 
nation’s World War I cemeteries. Serving as a manager and guardian, each cemetery 
director is also a host of sorts; he greets visitors when they arrive, guides them through 
the plots, invites them to sit and chat in the visitors’ center, and generally helps them in 
any way that he can. In short, each cemetery director is like a friendly, ex-pat uncle who 
is glad to see you when you arrive and happy to tend to your physical, emotional, and 
intellectual needs.765 
Ultimately, the endless rows of crosses that appear at each American World War I 
cemetery cast the violent deaths of drafted citizen-soldiers as sacrifice. Christians 
typically consider the Latin cross to be a symbol of Jesus Christ’s righteous act of self-
sacrificial death. In the Old Testament, an individual who offered a sacrifice did not offer 
her/himself, but instead offered a precious possession in substitution, such as a child (as 
in the story of Abraham and Isaac) or an animal. With Christ’s death, the sacrificer’s gift 
of her/himself became literal. Although Christ’s alleged last words (“My God, my God, 
why have you forsaken me?”) implied a lack of agency, it was Christ’s willingness to die 
that consecrated humanity’s new covenant with God—for such willingness is not easy to 
exert, even for the Son of God: 
“Father, if you are willing, take this cup from me; yet not my will, but yours be 
 done.”  An angel from heaven appeared to him and strengthened him. And being 
 in anguish, he  prayed more earnestly, and his sweat was like drops of blood 
 falling to the ground.766 
 
                                                 
765 As far as I know, every ABMC cemetery director has been a male who served 
(in some capacity) in the U.S. military—a fact that imbues the position with a somewhat 
paternalistic and pro-war character. 
766 The New International Version of the Bible, Luke 22.42-44. 
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As the story goes, with heavenly support, in the final hours of life Christ found the will to 
offer himself to death to save the whole of humanity. References to these inherited 
Christian notions of sacrifice are made immediately apparent through the presentation of 
the headstones. For visitors (American or otherwise), it becomes hard to deny the 
swelling sense of sacrifice that permeates from the numerous, harmonized rows of white 
cross. Every soldier’s death becomes a sacrifice for the collective good of the citizens of 
Europe, the United States, and the rest of the world—not just the American state. 
Additionally, each buried soldier seems to attain salvation, as his or her actions of war—
presumably violent and against Christianity’s philosophy of peace—are justified, 
forgiven, and wiped away. Ironically, we should note, these religious connotations far 
outweigh the memory of the cross as an instrument of justified torture and death used by 
the Roman state against its subjects (just as these religious connotations far outweigh the 
memory of the Great War as an ungodly act of state-sponsored militarism that took the 
very lives of the men buried before you). In the end, the Great War is cast not as a 
“human-slaughter house” (as Americans had understood it during the period of U.S. 
neutrality), but rather as battle between good and evil. 
The visual presentations of the U.S. World War I cemeteries in Europe, then, are 
not “a confusing mixture of various cultural trends” (as Robin argues), but rather 
reflections of the ambitions of the CFA and the rhetorical constraints that had been 
placed on the cemeteries’ planners. Extending the CFA’s aesthetic ideologies overseas, 
while also meeting the expectations of citizens, politicians, military figures, international 
audiences, and imagined future visitors, the planners incorporated into each site a 
network of symbols, texts, and objects of artistic and natural beauty that might 
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communicate sustained messages to heterogeneous audiences over time. Of course, one 
must have understanding of the rhetorical foundations of the sites to come to these 
conclusions. 
The true genius of these permanent burial grounds, however, is found in their use 
of what I term “the third element.” Preceding questions of congruity and incongruity, 
logic and irrationality, harmony and dissonance, and truth and falsehood, “the third 
element” is the unspoken, often invisible, but always implied, relationship between any 
two (or more) readily perceived elements (e.g., material objects, written messages, ideas, 
the scent of a rosebush, the sound of tree branches gently swaying in the wind, the sight 
of a historically significant forest or grand battlefield monument in the distance) that exist 
(or appear) within close proximity of each other. By this I mean, when a visitor 
approaches an American cemetery and sees Old Glory flapping above a sea of white 
headstones, she automatically takes in a third element—the implied relationship between 
the flag and the grave markers. When a visitor directs her attention to an individual 
headstone, she simultaneously sees the countless other grave markers in her peripheral 
vision; thus, she also perceives a third element—the relationship between the individual 
soldier and the collective. When a visitor sees an inscription written in both English and 
French, she also sees a third element—the implied bond between English-speaking and 
French-speaking peoples. By composing physical and visual ensembles out of an 
expansive (and for Robin, chaotic) set of materials, symbols, texts, and themes, the CFA 
and the ABMC created at each site practically an infinite number of “third elements.” 
The planners left it up to the visitors to decide which combinations of “third elements” 
would speak most effectively to their own minds, hearts, and guts. 
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Throughout the late 1920s, as the ABMC neared completion of its work on the 
cemeteries’ final visual presentation, American newspapers and magazines issued 
detailed, and uniformly positive, accounts of the sites’ appearances. The cemetery 
planners must have been pleased with the coverage, as it indicated to the public that the 
overseas burial grounds met any and all expectations Americans might have had. In a 
1926 report on the work being done at the Aisne-Marne Cemetery, the New York Times 
stated: “Those who have sons or brothers lying in the ‘white-shadowed’ fields of France 
will read with grateful feelings the report of the National Commission on Fine Arts about 
the American cemeteries and battle monuments. Others will take patriotic satisfaction in 
knowing that these cemeteries will, when completed, present a ‘modest, dignified and 
beautiful appearance quite in keeping with the national sentiment of respect and 
reverence for the memory of the dead.’” The article continued with the eyewitness 
account of Mrs. Caspar Whitney, a representative of the National League for Women’s 
Service who had visited the site: 
 We got to our cemetery at Belleau Wood just before sundown, and the 
 beauty of the scene remains unforgettable. Our men rest on a hillside, in a 
 beautifully kept cemetery, all green and white—green lawns and white crosses; no 
 color otherwise, save the flag flying high above. It is majestic in its simplicity. 
 Encircling it on three sides were fields of newly cut hay stacked in small 
 haycocks, yellow and gold, across which the long shadows of the later afternoon 
 fell, adding to the deep tranquility. Above,  Belleau Wood, dark, solitary, 
 mysterious, seemed to stand guard over the sleep of our men. Not a soul was in 
 sight, not a roof to be seen, save that of the keeper of the cemetery. Here reigned 
 the peace of God, and here on felt that God is good, and out of the sorrow and 
 pain of the great war will come, in His own good time and way, good. Only we 
 mustn’t forget […] I am sure that mothers and fathers, could they see where 
 their sons lie, would feel less unhappy at having them sleep in foreign soil. Here 
 always will the graves be cared for; never will they be neglected or disheveled, 
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 whereas I fear  that many a grave at home will all too soon be neglected and 
 forgotten.767 
 
Speaking on behalf of all grieving American women (most of whom would never see the 
sites with their own eyes), Whitney offered an account that surely brought some measure 
of comfort to readers whose loved ones were interred at Aisne-Marne or one of the other 
cemeteries abroad. Whitney’s sentiments were echoed (perhaps not as eloquently) in 
subsequent newspaper accounts of the sites. Linking the burial grounds in Europe to the 
homeland, the New York Times described the eight cemeteries as “virtually American 
soil.”768 The New York Times also indicated that the sites functioned properly as military 
cemeteries—sites instilled a sense of egalitarianism and honored the heroic bravery of 
U.S. citizen-soldiers: 
 The 30,801 headstones are ranged in military alignment. Even in death the 
 men of the A. E. F. are soldiers. But death knows no rank; consequently there is 
 no distinction in the placing of the graves. Officers and men lie side by side. No 
 private monuments are permitted […] One of the most peaceful A. E. F. 
 cemeteries a dozen years ago was the scene of some of the most desperate 
 fighting by American troops during the war. This is  the Aisne-Marne Cemetery, 
 which lies at the foot of Belleau Wood, a mile square patch  of forest in which the 
 marines won undying glory. They are still finding bodies in this little wood. This 
 cemetery contains the graves of men who died in resisting the great 
 German drive on Paris in June, 1918.769 
 
In January of 1934, the National Geographic Magazine allowed General Pershing to 
publish a long article describing the visual presentation of the eight cemeteries. Replete 
with colored photographs, the essay provided an in-depth tour of each site. Making the 
                                                 
767 “Our Dead in France,” New York Times, December 4, 1926, 16. 
768 “Monuments to the Deeds of the A.E.F.,” New York Times, July 17, 1927, 
SM14. 
769 “‘Row on Row,’ They Await the Pilgrims,” New York Times, May 11, 1930, 
82. 
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most of this pulpit, Pershing overtly emphasized the themes of tranquility and maternal 
grief:  
 To-day 30,880 [soldiers] sleep in beautiful and peaceful cemeteries in the 
 areas where they were engaged […] To the [mothers], to relatives of soldier dead, 
 and to every American citizen, I can give assurance that the United States 
 Government has kept and will continue to maintain its trust in perpetuating the 
 memory of the bravery and sacrifices of our World War heroes.770 
 
Next of kin were to be assured that Pershing and the ABMC had fulfilled their 
responsibilities and created proper resting places for the nation’s war dead.  
By the time Pershing published this article, however, thousands of American 
women had already visited the cemeteries and seen their loved ones’ graves in person. 
Between 1930 and 1933, the U.S. government conducted what became known as the 
“Gold Star Mother Pilgrimages”—a federally subsidized program that brought 6,674 
willing and able-bodied widows and mothers to their men’s graves in Europe. Veteran 
A.E.F. officers, including Pershing himself, acted as tour guides for the women, many of 
whom were elderly and had made the long journey to see their sons’ graves despite 
suffering from severe health issues. Shamefully, the program reflected the Jim Crow era 
in that African-American pilgrims were segregated from their white counterparts—a fact 
that undermined the cemetery planners’ efforts to bring some measure of racial equality 
to the burial grounds. Still, grieving women of every racial and economic background 
were afforded the rare opportunity to visit the overseas cemeteries where their loved ones 
had been interred. For most of these pilgrims, the journey was bittersweet—a “wonderful, 
though sad” experience. On the one hand, the women were usually comforted to see that 
                                                 
770 John J. Pershing, “Our National War Memorials in Europe,” National 
Geographic Magazine 65.1 (1934): 1-35. 
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the cemeteries were, indeed, as gorgeous and majestic as the media reports had stated. 
“This cemetery,” remarked one mother, “so beautifully and carefully tended, is worthy of 
the government for which he died.” But despite the grandeur and tranquility of the sites, 
time had not healed the wounds of such profound loss. As historian Lotte Larsen Meyer 
tells us: “While having satisfied the desire to see a grave, the pilgrimage would never 
erase the pain of having lost a loving son or beloved husband.”771 One doubts that 
anything ever could. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
771 Lotte Larsen Meyer, “Mourning in a Distant Land: Gold Star Pilgrimages to 
American Military Cemeteries in Europe, 1930-33,” Markers: Annual Journal of the 
Association for Gravestone Studies 20 (2003): 31-75. For the most thorough study of the 
history of this program, see John W. Graham, The Gold Star Mother Pilgrimages of the 
1930s (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland and Company, 2005). 
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6.0  CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this dissertation was to reveal the rhetorical foundations of America’s 
permanent overseas World War I cemeteries in Europe. It uncovered the processes of 
negotiation between private citizens, President Woodrow Wilson’s administration, the 
War Department, and the Commission of Fine Arts that led to the sites’ establishment 
and final visual presentation. Through the analysis of archival documents (including 
postwar correspondence between next of kin and governments and military officials 
regarding the final disposition of soldierly remains), newspapers, photographs, and on-
site observations, it recovered the voices of the many stakeholders involved in the 
cemeteries’ foundation. Whereas previous studies have attempted to understand 
American World War I commemoration practices by focusing on postwar rituals of 
remembrance alone, this study contextualized and examined postwar commemoration by 
analyzing the political ideologies, public rhetoric, and material realities of the war years 
(1914-1918)—ideologies, rhetoric, and material realities that ultimately shaped official 
and vernacular projects of memory after the Armistice. Providing what I believe is the 
first complete history of American World War I cemeteries in Europe, my dissertation 
situated these rhetorically charged sites within contemporary political debates about what 
it meant for U.S. soldiers to die on foreign soil; what would constitute the “proper” 
treatment and commemoration of the nation’s war dead; how much control the U.S. 
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government should have over the lives and bodies of American citizens; and, how best to 
communicate the nation’s image to international populations. 
In the first chapter, I brought forth, analyzed, and interpreted American public 
discourse regarding the Great War and the relevant issues of death, killing, sacrifice, 
burial, and commemoration during the period of American neutrality (1914-1917) in 
order to contextualize the subsequent U.S. wartime policies (such as media censorship 
and compulsory military service) and postwar policies (such as repatriation of the dead 
and the establishment of permanent overseas military cemeteries) that were to follow. I 
argued that during the period of neutrality, Americans understood the Great War to be 
something akin to a “human slaughter-house”—an apocalyptic manifestation of 
mechanized death that threatened to destroy civilization. I showed how President 
Woodrow Wilson won his 1916 reelection campaign on the slogan, “He Kept Us Out of 
the War!”—Wilson’s victory had been considered by many to be a referendum against 
U.S. intervention in the World War. 
The second chapter examined the U.S. government and military’s wartime 
suppression of symbolic action. In April of 1917, Woodrow Wilson committed one the 
swiftest about-faces in U.S. presidential history. Abandoning the staunch antiwar 
platform of his 1916 presidential campaign, he went before Congress and asked for a 
declaration of war against Germany. Members of the House and Senate overwhelmingly 
supported the President’s idealistic call to make the world “safe for democracy” and 
plunged the U.S. into the Great War. Recognizing the antiwar streak that coursed through 
public discourse and consciousness, and comprehending the obvious incongruity between 
his pre- and post-election stances, President Wilson helped develop a series of wartime 
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laws, policies, and agencies that made citizen (and non-citizen) support for the war effort 
a matter of compulsion, not choice. Establishing an unprecedented national draft, a 
powerful propaganda and media censorship bureau, and a Justice Department bent on 
prosecuting dissenters, the Wilson Administration attempted to control the hearts, minds, 
and bodies of every American. Within months, the people of the United States were 
legally and rhetorically transformed (through language, law, and force) into subservient, 
expendable cogs of the national war machine. And by November of 1918, roughly 
117,000 American men would die “over there,” on the other side of the Atlantic. 
Utilizing rhetorical theorist Kenneth Burke’s heuristic dichotomy of motion and action to 
analyze Wilson’s address and the nation’s subsequent war effort, I offered a rhetorical 
analysis of (what I termed) the U.S. government and military’s wartime “project of 
motion”—a program that sought suppress dissent and symbolic action, and cast American 
intervention in the Great War as a matter of compulsion (motion), not choice (action). 
In the third chapter I recovered the voices of citizens (and non-citizens) who, after 
the war, responded to federal government inquiries regarding the final disposition of their 
loved ones’ bodies. Here, I analyzed correspondence from a wide range of Americans: 
from those who relinquished the care of corpses to the government, to those who 
demanded, sometimes bitterly, the return of loved ones’ remains, to members of the 
African-American community whose men had fought and died for a nation that treated 
African Americans as inferior citizens. I argued that through the process of 
communication it initiated with grieving families, the U.S. War Department learned to 
temper its highly bureaucratic and nationalistic speech with a personal and sentimental 
vernacular appropriated from the letters of citizens. In doing so, the War Department was 
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able to make a stronger public case for its controversial plan to bury soldiers in symbolic 
overseas cemeteries. 
The forth and final chapter explored the material realities and postwar processes 
of negotiation that led to the final visual presentation of America’s overseas military 
cemeteries in Europe. The task of designing the burial grounds had been initially assigned 
to the purview of the Commission of Fine Arts, the nation’s preeminent voice on cultural 
and artistic matters during the early twentieth century. While the CFA certainly had 
wanted to extend its preferred aesthetic style (a neoclassical, Beaux-Arts style that 
mimicked and venerated Greco-Roman traditions) and its ideologies regarding public 
space to the European sites without interference from outside parties, the commission had 
to approach its plans for the visual presentation of the overseas military cemeteries with 
great care and tact. To begin, the nascent sites were to be cemeteries—inherently sacred 
and emotionally charged spaces of profound social significance that would have to 
incorporate and display the remains of dead human beings appropriately. Thus, the CFA 
would had to take contemporary sensibilities regarding the function and appearance of 
the American gravescape into account. The sites were not just to be cemeteries, 
however—they were to be military cemeteries. Therefore, the CFA had to meet the 
expectations of leaders in the armed forces, who wanted the cemeteries to serve as 
decidedly pro-war celebrations of American military prowess, and governmental 
officials, who wanted the burial grounds to do the same rhetorical work that federally 
controlled Civil War cemeteries (like Gettysburg National Cemetery and Arlington 
National Cemetery) had done over the preceding decades (namely, suture critical social 
divides and display the dead soldier as an ideal model of the American citizen). Of 
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course, the planned sites were not only going to be military cemeteries—they were going 
to be overseas military cemeteries. The CFA had been compelled, therefore, to design 
sites that would simultaneously match the monumentality of other nations’ World War 
cemeteries, convey discernable and effective messages to heterogeneous international 
audiences, and symbolically re-link the interred soldiers to their homeland thousands of 
miles away—a very tall order. On top of this, the CFA had to weigh every aesthetic 
decision against economic considerations (the cost of obtaining suitable construction 
workers and masons in Europe, for example) and material realities (such as the relatively 
small number of dead bodies that had been left overseas). Finally, and most importantly, 
the CFA—an organization that held the emotional sensibilities of nineteenth century 
Victorian culture in contempt—had to account for both the sentimental vernacular that 
the government had appropriated into its own postwar public rhetoric and the feelings of 
grieving (and often dejected or disenchanted) Americans whose sons, brothers, and 
fathers—destroyed in the prime of their lives (supposedly) for the good of the nation—
had required a proper and meaningful burial. In short, the CFA had found itself in a 
highly constrained rhetorical position—but one that ultimately led it to design a new and 
effective form of American war commemoration. 
I plan to begin transforming my dissertation into a book manuscript for 
publication this summer. This process will entail adding at least three more major 
chapters to what I have offered here. The first of these supplemental chapters will 
examine how the figures who planned and designed American overseas military 
cemeteries after the Second World War borrowed and deviated from the aesthetics and 
visual rhetoric of the WWI sites. The second additional chapter will trace the impacts that 
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the American WWI cemeteries in Europe have had on American war rhetoric (in general) 
and American memorial design (specifically) since their foundation in the 1920s and 30s. 
Finally, I intend to write a chapter that uncovers the ways international audiences have 
responded to the sites over time; this will entail returning to Europe to conduct more 
extensive ethnographic and participant observation research. I look forward to staying in 
touch with my dissertation committee members as I write this manuscript, and I thank 
them in advance for their continued support. 
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